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Abstract

ABSTRACT

This thesis addresses a significant gap in the empirical research on concurrent
engineering (CE) implementation, namely the process of change in CE introduction over
time. This study captures the dynamic and temporal reality of this process and explores
the way CE is shaped and transformed in a setting that is different from its. original
context. The setting is an Indonesian aircraft manufacturing company. The researcher
employs Dawson’s (1994) processual approach to organisational change as the basis for
a research framework to address this important issue.
CE implementation is conceptualised and operationalised as a change process in the
organisation and management of new product development, influenced by both internal
and external contexts as well as organisational power and politics. CE is considered as a
loose set of initiatives in product development programs grouped into five categories:
(1) organisational integration; (2) communication and decision-making mechanisms; (3)
enabling technology; (4) external integration; and (5) human resources. The focus of this
study is restricted to the first two of these.
The case study reveals a complex and multidimensional process of CE introduction from
a pre-CE stage to the premature conclusion of the implementation. Four implementation
stages are identified, each with a different structure and different CE characteristics: (1)
l
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program initiation; (2) engineering matrix; (3) engineering integration; and (4) designproduction coupling. The absence of initiatives in ensuring the availability of competent
human resources, especially engineers, as well as the availability of systematic protocols
to guide the course of the change process significantly and adversely affected the
process and final form of CE in the company.
Organisational context and politics also provide important insights into the CE
implementation that occurred. A number of important factors are identified. The
centralised and compartmentalised organisational structure, the dominant engineering
culture, the company’s state of maturity as well as the power sources and ‘will and skill’
of key personnel all contributed to the shape of CE and how it was implemented. The
extent of the interrelationship among companies within the aircraft industry and the
pursuit of Indonesia’s national development and industrialisation contributed to the
decision to introduce CE while Indonesia’s economic crises forced the abrupt
termination of its implementation.
Implementing CE is a major strategic change that requires a thorough preparation and a
committed change champion. Internal and external contextual factors as well as power
and politics in an organisation are influential in determining which particular set of
operational initiatives is selected and how it is implemented.
The complexity of this change process requires more research in order to define
operational CE model and framework more clearly. Further research focusing on
enabling technology, external integration, and human resource aspects of CE
implementation as well as further comparison across industries and across countries are
recommended.
li
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Chapter 1: Introduction

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background
In recent years, the importance of new product development for competitive success
has increased, particularly in terms of the ability to bring excellent products to market
before the competitors. The necessary speed in product development is derived from
quick problem solving and integration of engineering understanding with critical
manufacturing knowledge. These capabilities are also seen as critical in achieving
cost reduction (Wheelwright and Clark, 1993).
Concurrent engineering (CE) has been introduced in a number of companies as an
approach to product development that proposes simultaneous rather than sequential
processes in order to achieve better, cheaper and faster product development. It has
been advocated as a solution, particularly for Western companies, for coping with the
shorter life cycle of the products and the continuous improvement and rapid response
to the market, which marked the Japanese success in the 1980s and early 1990s.
The term CE was first used in the United States to capture various best practice
initiatives in product development by several ‘high-tech’ companies involved in
tendering for U.S. Defense procurement (Winner, Pennel, Bertrand and Slusarczuk,
1988). Such initiatives were implemented in order to achieve three important
l
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objectives:
1) to achieve high quality products to meet customer expectations;
2) to achieve faster product development time to gain an early marketing advantage;
3) to obtain lower product development costs in order to stay competitive.
As high-tech and complex industries typically have a long product development time,
CE was initially proposed as a means of minimising this. Over the years, the
popularity of CE has grown (Patti, Gilbert and Hartman, 1997), and been adopted
across industries and countries. Along with this growing popularity, the rhetoric
around CE’s objectives and advantages has also increased. The objectives have been
expanded to encompass the total effectiveness of the product development process,
considering every aspect of the product life cycle from conceptualisation to disposal.
The term CE has become a fuzzy concept with this change in its scope, because it
means different things to different people and hence has many definitions (e.g.
Winner, et al, 1988, Cleetus, 1992).
In this study, CE is conceptualised as a strategic approach to product development
that relies on a multi-disciplinary approach to integrate all product life cycle
considerations up-front, minimise changes in the later stages of development and
maximise overlap and parallel activities in order to produce products that meet
customer expectations with reduced lead time and cost. This conceptualisation of CE
is used to guide in the empirical investigation.
In the research literature, a CE approach typically means that the product
development process has distinct features of organisational integration, holistic design
and concurrence processes (Zanko, Couchman, Badham, Schubert, and Zainuddin,
1998). A CE product development project is often associated with bringing together
2
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departmental representatives across functions in cross-functional teams, emphasising
early and intensive dialogue between ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ functions, using
collocation to foster further effective communication, and utilising advanced
computer technology for complex development tasks.
Taking these features into account, CE calls for an organisational arrangement which
is designed differently to the traditional ‘functional silos’ in the sequential product
development process. The sequential arrangement usually employs a ‘throw over the
wall’ approach (Stoll, 1990), where the task of developing a new product is handed
over sequentially from one function to the next, i.e. from design to manufacturing,
and then to sales and marketing. This arrangement is associated with problems of time
and cost as well as losing the focus on the customer’s desires. For a concurrent
process, Wheelwright and Clark (1993) suggest the formation of a ‘heavyweight’
project team in which the project manager has direct access to, and is responsible for,
the work of all those involved in the project. This arrangement is believed to be able
to overcome most problems associated with the traditional sequential approach in
delivering better products faster and cheaper.

1.2 Research Problems
During this period of the growth in popularity of CE, an Indonesian aircraft
manufacturing company (due to confidentiality issues, the pseudonym ‘Indaco’ has
been used) decided to adopt this approach in its new development program of a 100passenger jet airplane. This decision raised questions about CE’s suitability for the
IndacQ context, which in turn, led to the researcher’s interest to investigate the process
of CE introduction. As an engineer who has worked in Indaco for 13 years, the
3
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researcher has first hand experience and understanding of Indaco and its context.
The decision to use CE by Indaco also raised more fundamental questions about the
process of introducing CE in general. Despite the growing research literature on CE,
there is very little empirical research on its introduction in an organisation (Gerwin
and Susman, 1996). The CE approach is often presented as the application of new
tools or methods, emphasising the result, e.g. the percentage of time and cost saving
compared with the previous approach, rather than on the process.
CE is claimed as able to overcome the barriers for competing in an increasingly tough
environment. Its introduction, however, is far from easy. Moving away from the
sequential process, overcoming the functional silos and associated ‘throw over the
wall’ attitudes to create integrated processes involves not only technological change
but also substantial organisational and cultural changes. Despite the growing literature
on the importance of managing change for organisations that undergo technological
and organisational changes (e.g. McLoughlin and Clark, 1994; Carnall, 1991), there is
very little in CE literature that has paid attention to this change process.
The CE research literature can be broadly divided into two main groups: firstly,
engineering which focuses on manufacturing and design automation and secondly, the
management of technology and innovation (Moffat and Gerwin, 1994). The first is
heavily influenced by the engineering knowledge domain and primarily concerned
with the technical aspect of complex development process (e.g. Kusiak, 1993; Syan
and Menon, 1994). The aim is to develop various “enabling technologies” to support
CE implementation, such as software development for Design for X-ilities (DFX) and
Quality Function Deployment (QFD), integration simulation models, etc. (e.g. Syan
and Menon, 1994; Halevi and Weill, 1992). Although this domain acknowledges that
4
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process complexity has implications for organisation and management (e.g. Vasilash,
1990, Evans, 1990), it does not explore this aspect further.
The second grouping in the CE literature is grounded in the management of
technology and innovation domain. This literature recognises the complexity of the
process but is primarily concerned with the organisational complexity and the
implication of CE initiatives, such as the cross-functional team and the heavyweight
project team in work organisation and management (e.g. Clausing, 1994; Adler,
1995). This domain often ignores the complexity of the CE process and therefore does
not provide enough depth and richness in its analysis. Klein and Maurer’s study
(1995), for example, acknowledges the existence of more than one group supporting a
single product by mentioning the existence of product teams and process teams (who
support the product teams), but focuses only on the communication mechanism within
a single team and between the team and management. In this domain, CE might be in
danger of becoming a management fashion (Abrahamson, 1996) emphasising the
rhetoric of the objectives and advantages of the approach. Only in the mid 1990s did
detailed empirical studies of CE implementation begin to appear in the literature but
the complex and often messy change process that is associated with CE has not been
adequately addressed (e.g. Haddad, 1996; Klein and Maurer, 1995).
In order to address this knowledge gap, this study uses the introduction process of CE
at Indaco as a case study and seeks to provide a rich and in-depth empirical study of
this process using a processual approach (Pettigrew, 1973; Dawson, 1994) as its
research framework to analyse organisational change. The processual framework is
used because it provides the necessary in-depth and longitudinal analysis of the
introduction process by considering historical events, internal and external contextual
5
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factors and the organisational politics surrounding the process. It enables the study to
bring out the dynamic reality of the messy change process underlying the application
of the new approach often superficially seen as smooth. So far, this form of research
has never been used to investigate CE implementation and by doing so, this study
aims to make a significant contribution to CE literature.
Apart from the theoretical and conceptual contribution to the literature, this research
is also expected to offer practical benefits, particularly for companies that attempt to
introduce CE in their new product development program. By thoroughly investigating
the introduction process of CE, this study provides information that will assist the
implementation process and increase the readiness for technological, organisational
and cultural changes that are inherent in introducing CE.
In addition, the effect of cultural differences in business and workplace is strongly
advocated by several researchers (e.g. Hall, 1960; Trompenaars, 1994; Hofstede,
1984) and widely recognised (Katz and Seifer, 1996; Morden, 1995; Foster, 1995;
Weldon, 1996; Bridges, Floersheim and John, 1996) albeit some criticisms,
particularly upon its deterministic influence (Kanter and Corn, 1994; Wilkinson,
1996). Although CE has been applied across countries (Ashley, 1990), cultural aspect
of its implementation has never been explored. Therefore, by investigating the
introduction of CE in a country different from its cultural origin, this study may
provide insights in implementing and adjusting CE to culturally different context.

1.3 Research Objectives
This study investigates the process of introducing CE into Indaco, an Indonesian
6
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aircraft manufacturing company. The case study specifically involves the aircraft
industry where CE has been a very influential part on product development initiatives
(Winner et al, 1988). The first main objective of the study is to explore and bring out
the dynamics of introducing a ‘vague and fuzzy’ concept, such as CE in a particular
and changing context that is significantly different from its origins. The second main
objective is to longitudinally capture the dynamic reality of the change process during
the introduction of CE using the processual change analysis (Pettigrew, 1973; 1997;
Dawson, 1994). Processual analysis enables the exploration of the ‘constellation of
forces’(Hofstede, 1997) shaping the character of the process and its outcomes.
Using this processual change framework, research questions are developed around the
following two main issues:
• Defining the process of CE introduction in Indaco:
1) What does the introduction of CE in a product development project look like
in practice? What are the key characteristics of CE that are significantly
different from the traditional development process?
2) What stages occur in the introduction of CE and how does the organisation
introduce it?
• Explaining how the process took a particular form:
3) What are the key factors that influence the change process?
4) How do those factors influence such a transformation?
Thus, this study explores the way CE is shaped and transformed into a specific form
during its introduction in Indaco. The generic holistic, integration and concurrent
features of CE (Zanko et al., 1998) and the particular model of CE from a Western
aircraft manufacturing company (due to confidentiality issues, the pseudonym
7
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‘Westaco’ has been used), are viewed as the substance of change. This ‘substance of
change’ was transformed into a specific model of CE during the implementation
process as the result of adjustment processes and was influenced by contextual factors
as well as organisational power and politics.

1.4 Processual Approach to Change
Processual research is defined as “research concerning any process that exists
between two points in time, regardless of whether the actual processes are
observable” (Tuttle, 1997, p. 350). Pettigrew (1997) defines a process as “a sequence
of individual and collective events, actions and activities unfolding over time in
context” (p. 338). He further contends that while resulting from actions, processes
cannot be explained only by reference to individuals or groups. Actions are embedded
in context, which limit individuals or groups information, insight and influence.
Contexts are shaping and shaped by actions. Processual analysis draws on phenomena
at vertical and horizontal levels of analysis of the context of a process and the
interconnection between those levels through time (Pettigrew, 1990).
A source of change is the assymetries between levels of context, where processes at
different levels often have their own momentum, pace and trajectory (Pettigrew,
1997). The processual approach emphasises that change, particularly a large scale
transition, is a complex and dynamic process and should not be treated as a series of
linear events (Dawson, 1994). Dawson (1994) argues that organisations undergoing
change should be studied ‘as it happens’ so that the processes can be examined over
time and in context. He further argues that the dominant or official version of change
may often reflect the political position of certain key individuals or groups rather than
8
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being a true representation of what actually happens.
The usefulness of the processual framework in studying an organisation’s dynamic
process of change or decision-making can be seen in Pettigrew’s (1973) study of
politics in decision-making. This study sought to complement existing work by
exploring the nature of organisation politics in the context of an innovative decision
process. The decisions were empirically tracked back to find out what actually
happened rather than what ideally was expected or was represented by particular
actors reflecting the argument that an organisation or any other social system may
most usefully be explored as an ongoing system with a past, a present, and a future.
Pettigrew (1997) offers five guiding assumptions for carrying out processual analysis:
1) Embeddedness across a number of levels of analysis.
2) Temporal interconnection between past, present and future.
3) A role in explanation for context and action; action derives process.
4) A search for holistic rather than linear explanation.
5) A need to link process analysis to the location and explanation of outcomes.
Reflecting the above guiding assumptions, Dawson (1994) formulates the processual
approach to cover three stages that reflect the temporal elements of change and three
main groups of determinants used to explain the process of change. The three
temporal stages are (1) the conception of a need to change, (2) the process of
organisational transition, and (3) the operation of new work practices and procedures.
In between these stages lie complex non-linear processes of change. Transition rarely
occurs in a neat linear fashion; it is difficult to identify the start or completion of a
major change. According to Dawson (1994), three basic determinants of processual
change are (1) the substance, (2) the context and (3) the politics of change. The
9
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substance of change refers to the type and scale of organisational change. The context
of change refers to the past and present, external and internal operating environments
as well as the influence of future projections and expectations on current operating
practice. The politics of change refers to the ‘political activities’ of consultations,
negotiations, conflicts and resistance that occur at various levels within and outside an
organisation during the process of change.
Pettigrew (1973) considers that behaviour observed in a change process cannot be
adequately explained without reference to the past. A historical perspective on both
internal and external contexts is central to understanding the opportunities, constraints
and organisationally defined route to change (Kelly and Amburgey, 1991, p. 610).
The coexistence of a number of competing histories of change can significantly shape
the process and outcomes of an ongoing change program. The context is divided into
the internal organisational context and the context pertaining to the environment in
which the organisation operates (Dawson, 1994).
The third basic determinant of change in the processual approach is the politics of
managing change. Pettigrew (1973) considers the organisation as an open political
system in which its sub-units are both interdependent and have different interests that
may lead to conflicts. An understanding of organisational politics should be central to
any approach that seeks to explain the process of managing transition, e.g. middle
managers’ commitment toward the intended change cannot be taken for granted
(Porter, Crampon and Smith, 1976). Variations in commitment can significantly
influence the success of the change process (Guth and McMillan, 1989), particularly
in cases where differing vested interests between management levels and functions do
not align with strategic objectives (Wilkinson, 1983). Following Child (1972), it is
10
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possible to view these strategic choices as being modified and challenged collectively
by the workforce or by individual and groups of managers who are responsible for
implementing a strategy.
Using the processual framework, this study specifically explores the process of
introducing CE in Indaco. The important of the processual framework with its context
and politic determinants, particularly in analysing technological changes is
emphasised by Thomas (1994). In power process perspective, Thomas (1994) sees
technological change as a process and the relationship between technology and
organisation is dynamic which only visible by extending the temporal and
organisational context and assessing the role of power and politics.
However, in this study the organisation is not viewed as the substance of change as in
the Pettigrew’s (1973) and Dawson’s (1994) studies. Rather, based on research
objectives outlined in the previous section, this study takes the initiation to establish
CE as the substance of change that undergoes the shaping and forming processes
while being implemented in different organisational contexts. Such a framework is
expected to provide the process dynamics of such undertaking that are often ignored
as most case studies focus on a discrete process of change.
CE initiatives introduced in Indaco appeared in the form of a vague and general
concept with a set of broad generic features. Typically, the translation and adoption of
such a general concept depends on the contextual factors and the means used to
introduce it including the implementation process employed (Leonard-Barton, 1995;
Rogers, 1995; Badham (ed.), 1993). This translation and adoption process results in a
specific model. Thus, this study explores how a ‘Western’ model of CE was
introduced to the company and was gradually shaped and transformed into a specific
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‘Indaco’ model by its contextual factors and the organisational power and politics.
The context of change is represented by the internal and external environment of the
company. In this study, the context of change is of particular interest because it
involves transferring the substance of change (the CE approach) into a context that is
significantly different from its origins, namely Indaco organisational within the
Indonesia’s national context, apart from operate in the same industry. This has
implication for the implementation process. Adopting Schneider and Barsoux (1997)
this study frames the environment as sets of contextual factors consisting of society,
industry, organisation, and function/department that capture both soft and hard
aspects of the environment. These contextual factors not only influence and affect the
change process but also interact with one another.
The politics of change is represented by activities carried out by individuals involved
in the attempt to bring CE into the organisation. By using their power and by
engaging in organisational politics, these individuals continuously affect the change
process, influence the outcome of the process and determine the dominant spheres at
any points in the process. In this framework, organisational power and politics act
either as the catalyst mediating the effect of the contextual factors in the process.
Arranging all these three determinants of processual framework, the general approach
taken in this study is illustrated as Figure 1-1.

1.5 Research Strategy
Adopting the processual approach and the argument that theory and methodology are
interdependent (Pettigrew, 1973), this study is designed as a qualitative, longitudinal
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in-depth, single case study. Using three generic and interrelated features of CE
(Zanko, et al, 1998) as the basis of its CE literature review, this study identifies CE
initiatives as consisting of five generic elements: (1) organisational integration, (2)
communication and decision-making mechanism, (3) enabling technology, (4)
external integration, and (5) human resource.
External Context
Internal Context

X_____________________ y
Organisational Power and Politics

Figure 1-1: General Conceptual Framework: Processual Approach
Using this set of initiatives as a reference point, this study investigates the CE
introduction by focusing on two of the five categories: (1) organisational integration
and (2) communication and decision-making mechanism. CE initiatives in these two
categories include cross-functional teams, heavyweight management, formal
communication, collaboration, inter-team communication, and decision-making
mechanism. These initiatives are investigated thoroughly. CE initiatives in other
categories, e.g. enabling technology, external integration and human resources, are
also discussed and their interrelations with the focus initiatives are also investigated
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but not in such depth. Internal and external contextual factors as well as the
organisational power and politics of this transformation process are identified.
Focusing on the internal context and micro-politics in the organisation, influences of
these factors on the process are investigated. External contexts, e.g. societal and
industrial contexts, are broadly discussed.
To obtain a rich and in-depth case study that allows such processual analysis, within
almost four years research period a significant amount of time was allocated to two
field studies, each of duration of 5 to 6 months. Normally, the development process of
a new product platform in the aircraft industry is 7 to 9 years, which made it
impossible, in term of resource and time available, for this research to investigate the
overall process. The field study, therefore, used two main strategies to fulfil its
objectives:
1) Observing the process as it happened through participant observation, interviews
and documentary review during the field study periods.
2) Reconstructing the relevant significant events through a combination of
interviews, documentary review, and the experience of the researcher as an
‘insider’ in the organisation.
The insider position of the researcher provides immense advantage in carrying out the
research. The researcher’s past experience in the company, before the research began
in June 1996, enabled her to reveal the detail of the complex change process and
provided understanding to the context as well as access to the data and people
relevant to the process. However, it also had disadvantages. This involves cross
cultural and language problems as the researcher and most of respondents and
materials are Indonesian and use Bahasa Indonesia, the Indonesian’s national
14
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language. The researcher as an engineer had to deal with theory of management as
part of the research for such a domain. As an insider, the researcher acknowledges
potential biases due to 13 years of personal involvement in the company, such as the
opinions of the fairness of some company’s policies and the character of some
respondents. To minimise the effect of these biases, the researcher intentionally put
her personal knowledge of such issues as a background information that needs further
data collection and vigorous verification through cross-checking and triangulation.

1.6 Case Study
The case study focused on the introduction of CE in the development of a new 100passenger aircraft program (pseudonym as the PLI Program) of Indaco. The 100passenger jet PLI was the third aircraft designed by Indaco after the 35-passenger
commuter PLC (co-designed with a European company) and the 50-passenger
commuter PLP. The PLI Program started at the end of 1993. Its completion was
scheduled for 2004 but the program, due to the Indonesian financial crisis, was
prematurely terminated in 1999.
The introduction of CE, modelled on that of Westaco, started in 1995. A thorough
investigation and analysis of the case study revealed that the CE implementation in
this program was a complex transformation process. The study found four stages that
reflect this complex multidimensional process. Each stage was characterised by a
distinct program organisation. The focal CE initiatives (i.e. cross-functional team,
heavyweight management, formal communication, collaboration, inter-team
communication, and decision-making mechanism) in each stage also differed. At each
stage, there was a degree of increase in some initiatives, others became weaker or
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remained less strong. In general, it tended to deviate from the intended Westaco
model.
Analysis of the context and politics of change reveals the underlying factors affecting
this complex transformation. The analysis of the CE initiatives showed that the lack
of competence and systematic protocols significantly influenced the character of each
stage of the transformation. The strong technology sub-culture in the company was an
important factor that led to the formation of two parallel design and production teams
in the PLI Program rather than a single integrated one. This was also' the factor
underlying the rivalry between the PLI Program and the functional design units that
led to the lack of competency in the ‘program team’. In addition, Indonesian’s cultural
tendencies also influenced the communication and decision-making mechanisms.
Other external contexts played a more remote but nevertheless vital role. The industry
was the most significant factor in the push to introduce CE, while the contemporary
crises in Indonesia led to the termination of the Program and CE experiment. The
analysis of the politics of change revealed a complex and messy intertwining of the
contexts, the power sources as well as the skill and will of key personnel who were
responsible for various actions and non actions instrumental in the process.

1.7 Contribution of the Thesis
The thesis provides significant conceptual and theoretical contributions to CE
literature. It provides a rich and detailed empirical account on dynamic reality of
introducing CE by using the processual framework that takes into account the
contextual factors and organisational power and politics surrounding the change
16
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process. In doing so, this thesis offers an operationalisation of CE through classifying
CE initiatives into several groups, defining the dimensions of each initiative, and
defining the possible range of each dimension that could be developed further for
measurement of the level to which CE is applied. In addition, by taking a company
from a developing country as the object of the case study, this thesis also provides
insights of the probable underlying causes of introduction other than commercial
benefits.
This thesis also offers practical benefits for companies that attempt to introduce CE.
By thoroughly investigating the introduction process of CE, this thesis provides useful
insights in increasing the readiness for technological, organisational and cultural
changes that are inherent in introducing CE. It also increases the awareness of the
messiness of such process by outlining the roles and the dynamics of the
organisational context and politics in such a change. For practitioners from
developing countries that have a context different from which CE was originated, the
case study provides useful insights in implementing and adjusting CE.

1.8 Thesis Structure
The thesis is arranged in the following structure:
Chapter 1:

Introduction

Chapter 2:

Concurrent Engineering and Conceptual Framework

Chapter 3:

Context and Politics of Change and Conceptual Framework

Chapter 4:

Research Methodology

Chapter 5:

Indaco: the Company and Its External Context
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Chapter 6:

The Substance of Change: CE Implementation

Chapter 7:

Contextual Explanation of Change

Chapter 8:

Politics of Change

Chapter 9:

Dynamics of Change: Summary Discussion

Chapter 10:

Conclusions and Recommendations

Chapters 2 to 4 provide reviews of the relevant literature that leading to the
refinement of the general conceptual framework adopted from the processual
approach and the methodology employed in undertaking the research. Chapter 2
provides conceptualisation and operationalisation of introducing CE as a process.
Chapter 3 reviews the organisational context and politics and conceptualises and
operationalises them as the explanation of the change process. Chapter 4 describes the
appropriate methodology employed in this study.
Chapters 5 to 8 present the case study. Chapter 5 describes the company and its
industrial and national contexts and provides a bird eye view of CE introduction
process. Chapter 6 describes the complex process of introducing CE, focusing on
organisational integration and the communication and decision-making mechanism
aspects. Chapters 7 and 8 offer some explanation of the change process. Chapter 7
discusses the contribution of other CE initiatives, i.e. the inner context, as well as the
wider organisational context in shaping the transformation process of CE initiatives.
Chapter 8 discusses the influence of organisational power and politics.
Chapters 9 and 10 are the concluding chapters. Chapter 9 provides a summary of
research findings and discusses the correlation between these findings and the
relevant research literature. Chapter 10 outlines conclusions, conceptual and practical
implications, and recommendations for future research in CE.
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CHAPTER 2
CONCURRENT ENGINEERING AND CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction
This study explores the process of introducing concurrent engineering (CE) as a
distinctive approach to new product development approach. In this chapter, CE
approach and various literatures associated with it are discussed to provide a
comprehensive theoretical basis for investigating such process. CE is conceptualised
as an approach to product development, which seeks to achieve simultaneous rather
than sequential processes. It is defined as a systematic multi-disciplinary approach to
product development that focuses on integrating all product life cycle considerations
at the outset of the process to achieve customer expectations with maximum quality,
and reduced lead-time and cost.
Guided by the processual approach, the introduction of CE is viewed as a change
process in which the concept of CE was adapted and continuously shaped. Using the
identified generic features of CE (Zanko et al, 1998) as a framework in reviewing the
CE-related literature, namely: holistic design, organisational integration and
concurrence, CE is conceptualised as a set of initiatives under several categories, i.e.
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organisational integration, communication and decision-making mechanisms,
enabling technology, external integration, and human resources. This set of CE
initiatives is conceptualised as the substance of change in the processual analysis.
This study focuses on initiatives within the organisational integration and the
communication and decision-making mechanisms, which include the cross-functional
team, heavyweight management, formal communication, collaboration, inter-team
communication, and decision-making mechanism. Each initiative is reviewed and
operationalised into dimensions and sub-dimensions. Drawing from the
interdependent nature of the generic features (Zanko et al., 1998), initiatives in the
other three categories are also reviewed and conceptualised as influential to the
longitudinal process of implementation of the focus initiatives.
The chapter begins with an overview of CE within the product development
management literature. It is followed by a review of CE features and initiatives. This
review focuses on the organisational integration and the communication and decision
making mechanisms. Initiatives in these aspects are included as the substance of
change in the processual analysis adopted in this study and operationalised into
dimensions and sub-dimensions. This leads to a refinement of the general framework
incorporating CE initiatives in those categories as the substance of change that are
interrelated and interdependent of each other.

2.2 Concurrent Engineering and

New Product Development

Management
In an ever increasing competitive and globalised environment, high-tech companies in
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particular, are striving to improve their new product development performance. Some
researchers have argued that improving this area is the only way to survive in such
competition (Trygg, 1993; Wheelwright and Clark, 1993), which means a need for the
ability to bring higher quality new products to market faster and cheaper.
Wheelwright and Clark (1993) argue that this ability involves solving problems
quickly and integrating insight and understanding from the engineering perspectives
with critical knowledge from the manufacturing area which are critical in achieving
cost reduction in its final product.
Concurrent engineering (CE), which emerged from Western high-tech industries in
the late 1980s, has been represented as an approach to acquire these capabilities (e.g.
Braham, 1992; Nevins and Whittney 1989). This approach calls for a change from a
sequential to a simultaneous process in product development. In particular, CE has
been seen as an approach that can help Western companies to acquire the ability to
carry out faster and integrated product development that is responsive to market
expectancy (Evans, 1990; Gordon and Isenhour, 1990; Syan, 1994). Cleland (1991)
argues that the success of Japanese manufacturing industries, one of the stimuli to the
formulation of the CE approach, was derived from characteristics of their product
development, such as problem sharing and mutual respect between design and
manufacturing, close relationship with suppliers, attention to reliability and quality,
and cross-functional involvement at each stage. Japanese companies have followed
approaches similar to CE long before the CE became popular in the West (Clark and
Fujimoto, 1991; Bowonder and Miyake, 1992).
Developments in many large Western corporations in the post-war period, notably in
the aerospace, automotive and electronics industries, showed the following tendencies
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(e.g. Iansiti, 1995; Cleland, 1991):
1) increasing specialisation due to increasing complexity of the product,
2) compartmentalisation of functions that lead to ‘stove-piping’ and ‘silo-ing’, and
3) linear sequential process for efficiency purposes, such as to ease the co-ordination
and control of tasks.
These led to compartmentalisation with specialists looking inward within their own
speciality (Clausing, 1994).
This compartmentalisation is characterised by the traditional ‘relay race’ in which the
tasks of development are ‘thrown over the wall’ from an upstream function to the
downstream function in the development process (Cleland, 1991). In design and
production activities, for example, the sequential approach means that the product is
designed as completely as possible before being handed over to production (Riedel
and Pawar, 1991). The apparent benefits of the sequential approach as a means of
managing complexity include the formation of simple managerial tasks, escaping
early investment for down-stream activities, relatively safe and risk free, simple
communication channels, less frequent interaction, the insulation of the design team
from marketing and production pressures.
The sequential approach, however, causes many problems associated with the cost
and schedule, which, in part, reflect conflicts among functions due to differences in
attitudes and values. This lead to communication difficulties that hamper integration
(Cleland, 1991). The approach is inherently problematic in upstream-downstream
interaction (e.g. communication, co-operation, co-ordination, and goal displacement).
These disadvantages include (Riedel and Pawar, 1991):
1) it increases the possibility of longer lead-times for product introduction;
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2) it is less flexible and less innovative;
3) passing the tasks from one group to the other is often accompanied by crucial
problems at the interface that cause a hiccough-like process with stops and starts;
4) bottle-necks demotivate specialists and may lead to interpersonal and inter
departmental conflicts;
5) the isolation of specialists may cause technology mismatch to both the supplier’s
and customer’s expectations as well as the competitor development; and
6) the risk of design modification at the production stage that increases both the leadtimes and cost of development.
A number of authors have argued that the ‘time to market’ for new products has
become central to competitiveness in 1990s (i.e. Adachi, Shih and Enkawa, 1994;
Cleland, 1991; and Trygg, 1993). Faster lead-time means getting ahead of
competition and possibly lower development cost which can lead to winning in the
market (Cleland, 1991). Using their simple formula, Carter and Baker (1992) show
that a 2-month launching delay for a product with 12-month market window leads to
24% loss in total lifetime revenue. For manufacturing companies, a 6-month late will
result in a 34% reduction of potential profit over the life of the product, while a 20%
cost over run will result in just 8% reduced of potential profit (Harrel, Emanuel and
Kroll, 1995). Other advantages of being earlier include the ability to charge the
premium price, to incorporate more up to date technology, and to response faster to
changing market needs and taste (Trygg, 1993).
Companies strive to make a shift toward faster product development process. Yet, as
Trygg (1993) has noted, product development has also become increasingly complex
with longer development time, increasing cost, increasing product complexity,
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decreasing life cycle time, more frequent new technology, more rapid change
demand, and increasing competition and glamorisation. Within this context, CE,
characterised with simultaneous activities, has been prescribed by its advocates as a
major solution to deal with the problems of product development and the need to stay
competitive in 1990s (Clausing, 1994, Trygg, 1993). Braham (1992) even coined CE
as a condition of survival for manufacturing companies.

2.2.1 Concurrent Engineering History
CE is not an entirely new concept (Smith, 1997); it has antecedents, e.g. design for
manufacturing and assembly (DFM/A) and simultaneous engineering (SE). The
formal history of CE started when the U.S.’s Department of Defense (DoD) asked the
Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to investigate CE and its possible application to
weapon system acquisition in the 1987. This project aimed at improving concurrency
in product development programs (de Graaf, 1996). Prior to this project, the Defence
Advance Research Project Agency (DARPA) had undertaken a study of the emerging
new product development approach in 13 U.S. major weapon system suppliers
(Moffat and Gerwin, 1994). The IDA reviewed those various initiatives on the
DARPA Concurrent Engineering Workshop in December 1987. After the workshop,
the IDA study group continued the investigation, contacted many experts, sponsored
several workshops, and visited companies involved in the initiatives (Winner et al.,
1988).
It was understood that to achieve concurrency, U.S. companies had used various
similar approaches for decades as an inherent part of their development process
(Owen, 1992). This U.S. Government initiative, however, focused its attention on
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large high-tech companies engaged with the government’s defence contracts such as
General Electric (GE) and Boeing (de Graaf, 1996). The Concurrent Engineering
Research Center (CERC) was founded in West Virginia University to support the
initiative with the enabling tools (de Graaf, 1996). Although the formalisation of the
concept occurred in the U.S. as a result of the DoD initiative, within a few years CE
had become more widely adopted within various industries across geographic
boundaries (Ashley, 1990).

2.2.2 Concurrent Engineering Definition
CE was initially proposed as a means to minimise product development time.
However, its focus and scope has been progressively elaborated in successive
publications (Prasad. 1996). A tendency toward a wider scope of CE can be traced
from the evolution of its definitions. The first formal definition of CE, also the most
widely cited, is provided in the EDA report R338 by Winner et al. (1988) as the
following:
A systematic approach to the integrated, concurrent design of products and their related
processes, including manufacture and support. This approach is intended to cause developers,
from the outset, to consider all elements of product life cycle from conception through
disposal, including quality, cost, schedule and user requirements (Winner et al., 1988, p. v ).

Built on the earlier definition, another widely cited definition of CE is offered by
CERC (Cleetus, 1992; 1993):
CE is a systematic approach to integrate product development that emphasis response to
customer expectations and embodies team values of co-operation, trust and sharing in such a
manner that decision making proceeds with large interval of parallel working by all life
cycle perspectives early in the process, synchronised by comparatively brief exchanges to
produce consensus (Cleetus. 1993. p. 43. bold original).

The broadest definition is offered by the Computer Acquisition and Logistic Support
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(CALS) Office, which emphases the logistic support aspect after the product
delivered to the customer as part of the design consideration in the product
development process:
CE is a systematic approach to creating a product design that considers all elements of product
life cycle from conception through disposal ... CE defines simultaneously the product, its
manufacturing process, and all other required life cycle processes such as logistic support. CE
is not the arbitrary elimination of a phase of the existing, sequential, feed forward engineering
process, but rather the co-design of all downstream processes toward a more allencompassing, cost-effective optimum... CE is an integrated design approach that takes into
account all desired downstream characteristics during upstream phases to produce a more
robust design that is tolerant of manufacturing and use variation at less cost than sequential
design. (CALS Office, 1991, p. iv)

Other definitions of CE vary in their scope and emphasis. They range from a narrow
scope considering only simultaneous design of product and its tooling (Weill, 1992)
to very broad with an emphasis on multi-disciplinary (Clausing, 1993; Liu and
Fisscher, 1993), involving design, manufacturing and maintenance (Vos, 1993)
marketing, quality control, purchasing (Slade, 1993) and even disposal activities (Wu
and Choong, 1993). The emphasis in these definitions ranges from organisational
issues, such as establishing multifunctional teams (Clausing, 1993, Slade, 1993) and
achieving earliest possible integration of resources and experience (Wu and Choong,
1993), to technical issues, such as co-ordination methodology (Liu and Fisscher,
1993) and iteration procedures to solve a multi-criterion optimisation problem
(Olhoff, Lund and Rasmussen, 1993).
In short, CE can be viewed from the narrow focus of integrating product and process
engineering (product design and production process design) into a wider scope of
integrating the whole product life cycle. The narrow focus of integrating design and
production is of particular interest to many researchers (e.g. Anderson, 1993; Riedel
and Pawar, 1991; Krishnan, 1996), while the wider scope is less extensively
explored.This reflects the engineering focus of much of the CE literature on those
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themes that have been discussed since the early 20th century (Smith, 1997). In fact,
there are two distinct research traditions in CE: system engineering oriented
manufacturing automation approach and management of innovation and technology
approach (Moffat and Gerwin, 1994).
Focusing on the design and production interface, Riedel and Pawar (1991) describe
CE as a means to prepare for production while the design process is still in progress.
They argue that CE involves two risks: locking in investment in manufacturing
facilities early in the design stage and the possible modification of facilities as the
process unfolds. These risks are traded-off with the gains: being early to market,
minimal modification due to manufacturing difficulties, maximum compatibility with
manufacturing facility, and more efficient production. They further argue that the
choice between sequential and concurrent processes has a strategic impact. Its
adoption should consider three strategic issues: time benefit versus cost of the risk,
the firm ability to lay initial investment early, and the availability of competent
engineers and managers (Riedel and Pawar, 1991). In short, they see CE as a strategic
approach to improve new product development performance, and therefore to
organisational survival, by delivering products to the market, faster, with higher
quality and lower cost. However, Riedel and Pawar also illustrated that this strategic
approach is not suitable for every context and type of product development project.
Many concerns and issues in CE have been addressed in other knowledge domains
such as product innovation, organisational design, design management and project
management. In these areas CE appears to ‘re-disco ver’ and integrate concepts that
have previously been addressed elsewhere. Smith (1997) has argued that CE is a
summary of best practices in product development rather than the adoption of a
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radically new set of ideas. In 1986, for example, Takeuchi and Nonaka (1986), have
argued that design and manufacturing overlap enhances shared responsibility and co
operation, stimulates involvement and commitment, sharpens problem solving focus,
encourages initiative taking, develops diversified skills, and heightens sensitivity
toward market conditions. They also observed that this overlap creates more tension
and conflict and requires extensive interaction among team members and with
suppliers. Similarly, the issues surrounding integration and differentiation have been
addressed for quite some time in organisational design literature (e.g. Lawrence and
Lorsch, 1967; Burns and Stalker, 1961)
In general, CE remains a fuzzy term. CE means different things to different people.
People look at CE with different emphases that lead to different definitions and
different names. Other concepts have also been proposed to refer to similar
approaches, e.g. synchronised engineering, simultaneous engineering, collaborative
engineering, design for excellence, design for manufacturing, process driven design,
integrated product development, parallel product development, team approach, life
cycle engineering, black-box engineering, early manufacturing involvement, and
integrated design and engineering (Trygg, 1993). Most descriptions in the literature
present CE as an unstructured set of concepts and tools (Blackburn, Hoedemaker, and
Wassenhove, 1996).
CE is variably presented as a set of methods, a methodology, an environment, a
technique, a systematic approach, or a strategy. This variation of opinion makes what
is the essential of CE difficult to grasp (Vasilash, 1990; Trygg, 1993). Blackburn et al.
(1996) admit the lack of a clearly defined template for CE may become an obstacle to
its implementation. CE has all the hallmarks of what Abrahamson (1996) called a
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management fad’ (Abrahamson, 1996). Despite this fuzziness, however, there are
common elements in the various approaches. There is, for example, a widespread
agreement on the main objectives of CE in developing products that satisfy customer,
faster and with less cost (Prasad, 1996; Wu and Choong, 1993; Sharon, 1992).
To reduce terminology confusion, This study takes operational definition of CE as a
strategic approach to the organisation and management of design and development
programs that systematically relies on a cross-functional approach to integrate all
product life cycle considerations at the outset of a program, to maximise overlap and
parallel activities, and to minimise changes in later stages of development processes
so as to meet customer expectations, provide maximum product quality, and reduce
development lead-time and cost. This working definition is intentionally broad and
built upon various CE definitions to enable the viewing of CE comprehensively. It
implies the wider scope of consideration in the development process than the designproduction interface. However, it does not embrace the new product strategy or the
marketing aspect of new products.
This working definition is operationalised into three interrelated features: holistic
design (design integration), organisational integration, and concurrence (Zanko et al.,
1998). Holistic design refers to the extent that life cycle considerations are taken into
account up front in order to reduce down stream cost. Organisational integration
refers to the extent that the process taken breaks down ‘functional silos’. Concurrence
refers to the extent that it minimises the relay races in the development process. These
features are generic and reflect the underlying concept of CE. The use of these
features as the basis of operationalisation provides a clearer picture of CE and escapes
the trap to viewing it in terms of specific tools such as computer integration and
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analytical tools (Trygg, 1993) which are often associated with CE. Rather, these
features emphasise what such tools actually represent.

2.2.3 Achieving Concurrent Engineering
As an approach, CE is realised through the introduction of various types of
organisational arrangement, system and procedures, and supporting tools. There is a
tendency in CE literature towards universalism. Many researchers have attempted to
study and define its generic elements (e.g. Trygg, 1993; Haddad, 1996). After
reviewing successful CE practices, Trygg (1993) concluded that the generic elements
of CE success cases are the cross-functional teams, computer integration and
analytical methods and tools. In the cross-functional team, representatives from
involved functions, sometimes including suppliers, collaborate to ensure that the
design reflects both customer needs and downstream function restrictions. Computer
integration, particularly in the form of computer-aided design and computer-aided
manufacturing (CAD/CAM), aims to support the design and manufacturing parallel
work. Analytical tools, such as the design for manufacturing and assembly (DFM/A)
and the quality function deployment (QFD) seek to ensure that information needed is
available as early as possible to reduce slack time, unnecessary re-work and the
earliest start.
Apart from cross-functional teams, other elements remain inconsistently associated
with CE. Evans (1990), for example, argues that computer integration is not
absolutely necessary, and uses Japan as an illustration where, while integration is
common, the use of an advanced computer system is less so. The use of computer
integration relates to the team interaction and is more likely to be used when face to
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face interaction is not possible due to the size of the task or diverse locations.
Computerisation eases both the technical tasks and the management of large programs
(Evans, 1990). The tools and methods for producibility and manufacturability cannot
be standardised, but rather they are dependent on the type of tasks and therefore cause
variation on the way these aspects are taken into account during design decision
process. Although computer integration and analytical tools are apparently not the
most important elements of CE, research on CE has mainly focused on these enablers
(e.g. Blackburn et al, 1996; Hauptman and Hirji, 1996; de Graaf, 1996; Syan and
Menon, 1994). It seems that literature in the manufacturing automation approach is
ahead in detailing the operationalisation on the CE concept.
Although it is widely acknowledged that introducing CE involves organisational
change, the change processes associated with it have not been given adequate
attention. Much research in CE implementation has focused on the result, i.e.
comparing the previous old, traditional and typically functional-based development
process with the cross functional based CE process, rather than on the change process
per se. Haddad’s (1996) study is an example of this. Although it covers a reasonably
long period of time, from 1991 to 1994, this study did not capture the longitudinal and
contextual aspects in the implementation process. The CE literature tends to be
general and conceptual, with a strong tendency towards ungrounded prescriptions
(Gerwin and Susman, 1996), and does not address the problematic nature of its
implementation that involves organisational and cultural change. This may contribute
to the growing rhetoric of the excellence of CE that neglects the detail transitional
aspects of its introduction and put CE in the danger of becoming an Abrahamson’s
(1996) ‘management fashion’. Zbaracki (1998), in his evolutionary model of rhetoric
and reality, shows a similar pattern in which the rhetoric aspect of Total Quality
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Management (TQM) has driven out its technical aspect which in turn had led to
decreasing popularity of TQM.
Detailed empirical studies of CE only started to appear in mid-1990s (Gerwin and
Susman, 1996). In her study in the U.S. automotive industry, Haddad (1996) presents
the CE implementation model (CEIM) for operationalising CE. This model argues
that the central mechanism of CE is the establishment of product-focused, cross
functional teams to foster functional integration, information sharing and
collaborative problem solving. These teams are supported by organisational and
technological enablers. Organisational enablers involve changes in organisational
structure and practice such as cross-group communication, decentralisation and
participative decision-making and human resource practices that breaking down
traditional knowledge boundaries and control. Technological enablers are structural
artefacts, equipment, systems and physical design to support the teams such as
building design, computer aided design and computer networking. Other empirical
studies into CE, albeit at a simple team level of analysis, can also be seen in Harrel et
al. (1995), and Klein and Maurer (1995).

2.3 Generic Features of Concurrent Engineering
This study uses three inter-related generic features of CE: holistic, integration and
concurrence, as proposed by Zanko et al. (1998). These features address particular
problems experienced in the product development process and what CE seeks to
achieve as well as the means that can be used. In this review, the initiatives associated
with the means to achieve each feature (i.e. organisational arrangement, system and
procedure, and supporting tools) are laid out and become the basis of CE initiatives as
32

Chapter 2: Concurrent Engineering and Conceptual Framework

the operationalisation of a CE approach in the next section.

2.3.1 Design Integration
One of the main objectives of CE is reducing lead-time. Design changes disrupt
product development process, delay it, and increase its cost. Changes in later stages
disrupt more. However, changes are inherent in the development process (Stoll,
1990). A particular problem associated with the linear-sequential process in product
development is that it leads to an increased number of design changes throughout the
development process, especially at the interfaces due to the practice in which one
group of specialists do the work, make decisions, and ‘throw them over the wall’ to
the next group. Such practice can create problems of wasted time, weak
understanding, and inadequate commitment to earlier decisions (Clausing, 1994).
Clausing (1994) suggests a problem prevention approach in product development
through a more holistic development taking into account all the product life cycle
considerations up-front. The ideal process, therefore, is to have an activity that
addresses all parameters in the system and eliminates all kinds of partitioning. This
activity should be executed as early as possible and, therefore, causes a shift of
activities to the earlier stage of the process (Clausing, 1994). This is addressed
through re-integration of the design process using various concepts and
methodologies, such as quality function deployment (QFD), design for manufacturing
(DFM), design for assembly (DFA), design for services (DFS), design for testing
(DFT) and, design for product life cycle (DFPLC). To embrace all the above
concepts, the term ‘design for X-ilities’ (DFX) is often used (Trygg, 1993; Clausing,
1994). Some of those concepts have been developed as computer-based tools to help
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the designer in a concurrent engineering environment to work faster (Clausing, 1994).
In a CE that focuses on coupling between engineering and production, this concern is
reflected in the manufacturability and producibility of the product.

2.3.2 Organisational Integration
Another major problem in the development process is functional specialisation that
leads to ‘silo-ing’ in which specialists look inwardly toward the optimisation of their
own specialisation rather than toward the optimisation of the whole product. In the
1960s, this problem was addressed in the organisational design literature (e.g.
Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; 1968; Burns and Stalker, 1961) and more recently in the
product innovation literature (e.g. Wheelwright and Clark, 1992; 1993). The
organisational integration feature of CE specifically seeks to address this issue.
To achieve a holistic design, development is conducted through integrating all
involved functions and specialisation that contribute to the process. Reviewing design
and manufacturing relationship, Adler (1995) argues for the use of team integration
together with the use of standardisation, schedule and multiple adjustment. Adler
further argues for the contextual mode of integration reasoning that the most efficient
interdepartmental co-ordination mechanism is the one that is able to deal with the
uncertainty of product and process fit at the least cost. Wheelwright and Clark (1993)
argue that cross-functional integration, which may go beyond the organisational
boundary, is essential for a superior program in its cost, time, and quality. They
further argue that this integration may be achieved by fostering intensive
communication, information sharing, and collaboration between involved functions.
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Kahn (1996) proposes that integration is a multidimensional process that subsumes
formal interaction and collaboration. Formal interaction refers to the structured and
formal nature of co-ordination activities between involved functions including routine
meetings, memos, and other regulated communication. It is characterised by
transaction relationships and a competitive environment between relatively
independent functions. Collaboration refers to the unstructured, affective nature of
interdepartmental relationship emphasises on strategy alignment through a shared
vision, collective goals, joint rewards through an informal structure. It is characterised
by a continuous informal relationship, interdependent, and co-operative environment.
He concludes that formal interaction may be necessary but is not sufficient;
collaboration makes the difference between success and failure in product
development. Similarly, Schrage (1995) argues that the ultimate aim of any
interaction media such as meetings or teams is actually collaboration, which requires
a shared space where each collaborator can add value to the task in hand. The shared
space can be as simple as white board or as sophisticated as stereo-lithography rapid
prototyping.
There are different approaches to integration. Many researchers suggest the use of the
cross-functional team as the organisational means to achieve integration (e.g. Trygg,
1993; Clausing, 1994). Wheelwright and Clark (1993) add the necessity of
heavyweight feature in such teams in which the team leader had full authorities to
manage the process. They further suggest the use of integrated problem solving as an
interaction mode in which downstream functions participate in the preliminary stage
through an ongoing dialogue with the upstream functions to obtain early information
to enable a ‘flying start’ on their own work. To foster interaction, the team members
are collocated in one location. Another strong trend, particularly in the engineering
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literature, is the use of computers as an integrating mechanism (e.g. Norman, 1990;
Volk, 1992; Fan, 1995). The development of computer-based information system,
CAD/CAM, and rapid prototyping provides a significant contribution in providing
easy and faster communication and collaboration media (Schrage, 1995).

2.3.3 Concurrent Process
A key issue in reducing development lead-time is how to achieve as much
concurrency, simultaneity and overlapping activities as possible. The design
integration and organisational integration features facilitate opportunities to reduce
lead-time by shortening, simplifying, or overlapping the activities at all stages without
sacrificing cost and quality (Fujimoto, 1997).
Hauptman and Hirji (1996) argue that at the macro level, a high level of concurrency
is fostered by effective two-way communication, overlapping problem solving, and
willingness to release uncertain and ambiguous information. But, the use of such
information should be limited for collaboration before the decision is made rather
than for decision-making. Krishnan (1996) introduced a model based on upstream
information evolution and downstream sensitivity to obtain effective overlapping of
activities. He concludes that the best opportunity for overlapping is achieved by
preliminary product information exchange when the sensitivity of downstream
activities is low and by early finalisation of product information when the upstream
information evolution is fast.
Blackburn et al. (1996) argue that the process of design concurrency takes two
different forms: concurrency in activities and concurrency in information. Activity
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concurrency refers to the tasks and design activities that are performed simultaneously
by different people or groups (i.e. within-stage, across-stage, and across-platform
overlaps). Information concurrency refers to the integrated development (team
approach) in which all the concerns of the different functions are addressed through a
flow of shared information. They suggest two enablers linking both types of
concurrency: architectural modularity that divides design problems into modules with
well-defined functionality and interfaces, and synchronicity that co-ordinates parallel
activities, which is prime responsibility of the program leader.
Clausing (1994) argues that in a concurrent process frequent information exchanges
occur at the level of the small unit design tasks. At the micro level of the detail task,
the tasks may remain sequential, but the overall effect in the higher level perspective
is concurrence. It can be achieved through different means, such as partitioning,
overlapping, compressing, switching, deiterating, and front loading (Fujimoto, 1997).
The CE engineering automation domain shows that computer-based technology has
also been used in this area, particularly for “front loading” information through
computer-aided engineering (CAE) simulation software (e.g. 3-D CAD/CAM) and
virtual prototyping (e.g. stereo-lithography) (Fujimoto, 1997).

2.4 Concurrent Engineering Initiatives
This section categorises initiatives associated with the means of achieving CE in order
to operationalise the CE concept. This operationalisation is used as the basis for
analysing the case study. Based on the previous discussion of its generic features,
initiatives to realise a CE approach can be applied in three main areas:
1) in the organisation and management of a new product development (NPD)
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program with the establishment of heavyweight cross-functional team(s) and
encouraging interaction/communication;
2) in enabling technology with the establishment facility and technological support
for new product activities; and
3) in human resources with the establishment of supportive human resource
management (HRM) policies.
However, apart from the cross-functional team that seems to be accepted in most of
the literature, other generic elements are still largely indeterminate. Research on CE
has focused mainly on the organisational and technological enablers and overlooked
the reason for investing in those enablers: to achieve effective and efficient team
processes and attitudes (Hauptman and Hirji, 1996). This leads to another area of
initiatives in achieving CE: the HRM supports to ensure those involved have the
appropriate skills, knowledge, motivation and behaviour for engaging in CE. CE
introduction may require changes in those areas. This is the gap in the CE literature
that has only recently begun to receive attention with a growing literature in ‘softer’
CE within the management of innovation and technology domain.
This study focuses on initiatives in organisational integration because this integration
is considered as a most important feature of CE. Organisational integration is the
primary means for achieving the other two features of CE: design integration and
concurrence. Without organisational integration, a truly holistic design cannot be
achieved which, in turn, will inhibit the effort to increase concurrency of the process.
However, the study is not only interested in the structural issue of integration, i.e.
vertical and horizontal integration, as reflected by the cross-functional team and
heavyweight management initiatives but also in the processual issues of integration.
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This brings the initiatives in communication and decision-making mechanisms as the
other focus of the study. The reason behind this research decision is that the structural
issues, more often than not, do not reflect the real process in the organisation.
In order to provide adequate emphasis on the focus of this study, the initiatives in
organisation and management of product development program are classified into two
categories: the organisational integration and the communication and decision-making
mechanisms. Further, external integration categories are also added to reflect the
expansion of functional integration involving institutions outside organisational
boundary. As the result, efforts and initiatives in achieving CE in this study are
categorised as follows:
1) Organisational integration: cross-functional team and heavyweight management.
2) Communication and decision-making mechanisms: formal communication,
collaboration, inter-team communication, and decision-making mechanism.
3) Enabler technology: computer-based technology, collocation, CE methods and
systematic process protocols.
4) External integration: supplier involvement and customer involvement.
5) Human resources: competency, CE-related training and human resource policies.
These five categories are used as the CE framework of this study. By specifically
including the communication and decision-making mechanisms and human resources,
this study attempts to fill in the gap in the CE literature relating to these issues. The
first two categories are the focus of the longitudinal processual study and are
discussed and analysed further in their dimensions and sub-dimensions in the
following sections. The summary of this discussion is provided in Table 2-1.
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Table 2-1: Operationalisation of Initiatives within Organisational Integration and
Communication and Decision-making Mechanisms Categories
C a te g o r y

C E In itia tiv e
C ro s s

D im e n s io n
S iz e a n d a r c h it e c t u r e

F u n c t io n a l
Team
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M e m b e r s h ip p a t te r n

S u b d im e n s io n

Range
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f u n c t io n a l- b a s e d o r p r o d u c t - b a s e d

N u m b e r o f fu n c tio n in v o lv e d

d u a l fu n c tio n c o u p lin g to c o m p a n y - w id e

L e v e l o f f u n c tio n a l r e p r e s e n ta t io n

f o c a l p o in t, r e p r e s e n t a t iv e o r full m e m b e r s h ip

R o le o f fu n c tio n s

m a in o r s u p p o r t in g ro le s

P o s itio n a t f u n c tio n a l u n it

lo w ( e g . s t a f f ) to h ig h ( e g . s e n io r m a n a g e r )

N a t u r e o f m e m b e r a c tiv ity

o p e r a t io n a l, m a n a g e r ia l, o r lia is o n t a s k

d
O

L e v e l o f d e d ic a t io n

p a r t ia l d e d ic a t io n to fu ll d e d ic a t io n

O)
0)

T e m p o r a l c h a r a c t e r is t ic

te m p o ra ry to p e rm a n e n t

M u lt ip le m e m b e r s h ip

s in g le to m u lt ip le

H ig h e r t e a m c o m p o s itio n

in c lu s io n to e x c lu s io n o f lo w e r t e a m

CO
g
CO

'c

H e a v y w e ig h t

Ö

M anagem ent

CO
CD

Fom al

H ie r a r c h ic a l p o s itio n

F o r m a l s tr u c tu r e

lo w e r, e q u a l o r h ig h e r th a n o f t h e fu n c tio n s

A u th o r ity o f t h e p r o g r a m le a d e r s

lim ite d ( e .g . d e s ig n o n ly ) to e x t e n s iv e

N a t u r e o f d e le g a t io n

D e le g a tio n f ro m p r o g r a m m a n a g e r

n o n e to e x t e n s iv e

D e le g a tio n fro m f u n c tio n s

n o n e to e x t e n s iv e

S e n io r ity o f le a d e r

T e n u re

s h o rt to lo n g t e n u r e

Age

y o u n g , e g . u n d e r 3 5 , to m a t u r e

C o m m u n ic a t io n m o d e

C o m m u n ic a t io n

CO
‘c
-£Z
o
CD

T y p e o f d a ta c o n v e y e d

cp

25

CO

C o lla b o r a t io n

CZ
o
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o
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Q

"O
c
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c
o
To
g
Z5

E
E
o
O

E d u c a tio n

lo w to h ig h

R ic h n e s s o f m e d ia

s p a r s e ( e g . n o t e s ) to ric h (e g . f a c e to fa c e )

F re q u e n c y

b a t c h t y p e to in te n s iv e , o n -lin e ty p e

D ir e c tio n

o n e - w a y m o n o lo g u e to t w o - w a y d is c u s s io n

T im in g

e a r ly ( a t in it ia tio n ) to la t e ( a t c o m p le tio n )

T y p e o f d a t a r e le a s e d

a m b ig u o u s to c e r ta in

T y p e o f d a ta u s e d

a m b ig u o u s to c e r ta in

In t e r a c tio n a l r e la tio n s h ip p a t te r n

c lo s e & fr ie n d ly to d is ta n t & c o m p e t it iv e

C o n flic t & n e g o tia tio n p ro c e s s

c o n f r o n t a tio n w in - lo s e to d ia lo g u e w in -w in

P r e s e n c e o f c o lle c t iv e g o a l

in d e p e n d e n c e to in t e r d e p e n d e n c e

P r e s e n c e o f s h a r e d v is io n

p ro g r a m o r f u n c tio n a l s e lf a s s o c ia t io n

F o r m a l c o m m u n ic a t io n

( s e e f o rm a l c o m m u n ic a t io n )

C o m m u n ic a t io n

C o lla b o ra tio n

( s e e c o lla b o r a tio n )

D e c is io n - M a k in g

A u th o rity o f t e a m s

n o n e to fu ll a u t h o r it y

R e s p e c t to lo w e r t e a m d e c is io n

r e s p e c t e d to ig n o r e d

P o w e r d if fe r e n tia l p e r c e p tio n in lo w e r a n d h ig h e r t e a m s

lo w to h ig h

In t e r - t e a m

M e c h a n is m

Initiatives from the other three categories are also discussed. The summary is
provided in Table 2-2. The conceptualisation and the operationalisation of all
initiatives are used in investigating the CE introduction in the case study. The
interrelation and interdependence between them are used to explain the
transformation of the primary focus initiatives.
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Table 2-2: Operationalisation of Initiatives in Enabling Technology, External
Integration and Human Resource Categories
Category
CE Initiative
Enabling Computer-based Technology
Technology
Collocation
Formal CE Methods
Systematic Protocols
External Supplier Involvement
Integration
Customer Involvement
Human Competency
Resources
CE-Related Training
Human Resource Policies

Dimension
Supporting individual design task
Integrating across function
Assisting information management
Supporting collaboration work
Collocation area
Space layout
Direct utilisation
Utilisation of informal methods
Formal description of CE-in-practice
Implementation strategy and planning
Number of supplier
Position in the team
Temporal characteristic
Number of customer
Position in the team
Temporal characteristic
Educational background
Experience
Multiskilling
Knowledge and skill parity
Team -related training
Training on CE concept and initiatives
Recruiting
Career development and training
Performance measurement
Reward system

2.4.1 Organisational Integration Initiatives
This section reviews two important initiatives in achieving organisational integration:
the formation of the cross-functional team and the heavyweight management.

2.4.1.1 Cross-Functional Team: Horizontal Integration
A cross-functional team is often formed when a form of co-ordination mechanism is
needed to integrate several functions (Adler, 1995). In cross-functional teams of
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product development programs, representatives from involved functions collaborate
to ensure that the design incorporates the customer’s needs as well as restrictions and
possibilities in downstream functions (Trygg, 1993). This collaboration may go
beyond the organisation’s boundary to involve suppliers and customers in the team
(Adachi et al., 1994; Wheelwright and Clark, 1993; Cleland, 1991).
In the CE approach to product development, the cross-functional team is the only
indisputable generic element (Trygg, 1993). A cross-functional team is a means for
achieving integration (Clausing, 1994). A similar argument also appears in the
product innovation literature. Wheelwright and Clark (1993), for example, argue that
cross-functional effort is essential for the superior development program in industries
with dynamic markets and technologies, and where time is a critical element. Some
studies and some companies (e.g. Boeing, Xerox) interchange the term ‘CE’ with
‘integrated product development team’ which reflect the importance of the cross
functional team in such an approach (e.g. Clausing, 1994; Klein and Maurer, 1995;
Stantham and Kleiner, 1996). Other elements of organisational change in CE are
basically derived from the existence of such teams in CE implementation.
Henke, Krachenberg and Lyons (1993) found that firms realised four primary benefits
of cross-functional teams in a product development: overcoming the shortcoming of
hierarchical structure by its ability to cut across vertical authority, decentralising
decision-making, reducing information overload at a higher level, and providing
higher quality decisions. However, establishing a cross-functional team is a
challenging task. From the engineering management domain, Thamhain and Wilemon
(1987) have argued that team building involves taking a collection of individuals with
different needs, background and expertise and transforming them into an integrated,
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effective work unit. They argue that team ‘output’ is not only task-related outcomes
(e.g. technical success, on-time and on-budget performances) but also involves
people-related outcomes, such as communication effectiveness, interface
effectiveness, team spirit and mutual trust.
For larger development programs, the team may comprise of a ‘team of teams’
(Clausing, 1994). Depending on its complexity, a product can have numerous teams
and each team may have several sub-teams. They are integrated or co-ordinated by a
product management team. The product management team itself is a cross-functional
team at a higher level (Henke et al., 1993). According to Clausing (1994), the team
leader (e.g. program manager) and the managers who directly report to him/her
constitute one team, often referred as the ‘core team’. Typically, the core team is
responsible for everything related to the program. The membership of a core team
may include sub-team leaders. Clausing (1994) considers such formation of an
interlocking structure of teams as a key factor for success.
Many studies focus on the structural characteristics of the team (Page, 1993; Henke et
al., 1993; Adachi et al., 1993). In his study of multi-disciplinary teams in new product
development, Page (1993) uses three dimensions of team structure: the type of
organisation, the level of functional involvement, and the role of product champion.
Henke et al. (1993) describe the team structure in terms of functional representation,
hierarchical and lateral relationship within and among teams, and supplier
involvement. Adachi et al. (1994) identify the structural dimensions of a cross
functional team to include its size, location, and composition. Team’s composition is
defined by the authority of its leader, membership pattern, level of specialisation, and
internal and external integration. Similar dimensions are also identified in the
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literature on team and teamwork (e.g. Ellis and Fisher, 1994). For example,
Katzenbach and Smith (1993) include small size and having adequate complementary
skills, meaningful purpose, clear working approach, mutual accountability, and
members who enjoy being part of the team, as the characteristic of an effective team.
Thus, the structural dimensions of a cross-functional team include: the team size and
architecture; membership pattern; internal and external scope of integration;
leadership pattern; communication pattern; and location. This section only focused on
3 structural dimensions: (1) team size and architecture, (2) scope of internal
integration, and (3) membership pattern. Other structural dimensions are discussed
later to provide a thorough discussion of each dimension.

• Team Size and Architecture:
The size of a cross-functional team relates to the scale of development program and
the level of specialisation. Some researchers argue that the team size is crucial for
team effectiveness as the larger size hampers communication (Katzenbach and Smith,
1993). To remain effective, a large team is normally divided into a core team and
several layers of sub-teams (Adachi et al., 1994; Ellis and Fisher, 1994), and is often
supported by a computerised information support system. As can be seen later in the
intended model of CE in Chapter 6, the division of development team can either
primarily be functional-based (e.g. production groups and design groups) or productbased (e.g. wing group and cockpit group). The dimension of the team size and
architecture varies in the following four sub-dimensions:
1) The number of member involved in the program team: small to large number.
2) The number of sub-team within the program team: single to multiple teams.
3) The number of layer of teams within the program team: single to multiple layers.
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4) The division of team: functional based or product based
In a case study, it is possible that the Teams’ are defined and constructed on the basis
of the role of a group of people as observed by the researcher, rather than on the basis
of a formal organisation of people by the organisation under study. The existence of
the core team, for example, may be a researcher’s construct to simplify the
organisation mechanism observed in the study.

• Scope of Integration:
This dimension refers to the range of functions involved, represented, and co
ordinated within a cross-functional team to achieve integration (Adachi et al. 1994).
This dimension varies from dual function involvement (coupling) such as a designproduction team to a full organisational-wide involvement, in which all organisational
functions are represented in the team. Slade (1993) and Adler (1995), for example,
focus on product design and manufacturing process; Clausing (1994) includes design,
production, logistic and field support; while Pawar (1994) goes further and includes
product design, process, engineering, marketing, service, purchasing, and selected
suppliers. This dimension seems contextual dependent; functions represented in the
team vary according to industry and market. In part, this variation in the scope of the
cross-functional team contributes to many definitions of CE as discussed previously.
The matrix arrangement identified in the heavyweight management (Wheelwright and
Clark, 1993; 1992) implies functional representation in the product development
teams. Along the continuum of this representation, the functional involvement can be
distinguished into three following levels:
1) full-membership, in which functional experts are part of the program and report
only to the program leaders;
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2) representative, in which functional experts are partly part of the program and
report to both program and functional leaders; and
3) focal point, in which functional experts are not part of the program and report only
to the functional leaders. Typically, the focal points are specifically assigned by
functional units to internally co-ordinate support for the program.
Cross-functional teams, however, are vulnerable to problems associated with its
temporary nature and diverse backgrounds and perspectives that lead to conflicting
goals, weak desire to co-operate, and weak allegiance (Pinto and Pinto, 1991). This
different perspective between functions can be derived from differences in orientation
toward particular goals, time orientation, interpersonal orientation, and formality of
structure (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). These differences exist between engineering
specialisation, which coined as the ‘object world’ by Bucciarelli (1994). He notes that
the object world of a mechanical engineer and an electronic engineer, for example,
can be quite different in seeing a technological problem. In a product development
program, this diversity often leads to the relative role of each function in the
development activities. In Haddad’s (1996) case study of automobile industry, for
example, the main development activities (i.e. design) were carried out by productbased teams that consisted entirely of engineers from the design function while
representatives from other functions (e.g. marketing, manufacturing, finance,
purchasing) provided support for those teams.
Based on this discussion, the scope of team cross-functionality can be divided into
three sub-dimensions:
1) The number of function involved: ranges from dual function coupling to
company-wide functional involvement.
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2) The level of functional representation in the program: ranges from focal point,
representative and full membership.
3) The role of each of those functions in the program: ranges from playing main role
to playing supporting role.

• Membership Pattern:
This dimension is concerned with the members’ positions in the team vis-a-vis their
position in their functional area, whether the members are partially or completely
withdrawn from their functional area, and whether the members are fully dedicated or
not to the program. Page (1993) observed that the membership pattern of a cross
functional team involves who, when and how far they are involved. In Haddad’s
(1996) case study, for example, representatives from non-design functions were
involved in the core team and provided liaison with their respective functions while
engineers were full-dedicatedly involved at the operational level in product-based
design teams.
Further, Henke et al. (1993) argue that multiple membership, horizontally within
product-based development team, may facilitate information flow. Closely related to
the team size and architecture is the formation of the interlocking structure (Clausing,
1994) represented by the nature of the relationship and interface arrangement between
layers of core team and sub-teams (Ellis and Fisher, 1994). This can be reflected
through the composition of the core team and higher-level sub-teams, for example,
whether the leaders of sub-teams become members of the next higher level teams.
Based on the above discussion, the membership pattern varies in the following six
sub-dimensions:
1) The hierarchical position of members in their respected functional unit: ranges
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from operational level engineer to top level manager.
2) The nature of members activities: ranges from working on operational,
managerial or liaison tasks.
3) The level of member’s dedication: ranges from all partly dedicated to fully
dedicated and completely withdrawn from their functional area.
4) The temporal aspect of their involvement: ranges from the whole lifetime of the
product development phase to only a temporary one in a single phase.
5) The extent of multiple membership within a single program (i.e. a member being
part of two or more sub-teams): ranges from single to multiple membership.
6) The composition of the higher level teams: ranges from the absence to the
existence of lower level team representatives.

2.4.1.2 Heavyweight Management: Vertical Integration
The heavyweight management initiative refers to the organisational arrangement that
provides team leaders at every level with more power than their functional
counterparts in program-related matters. In particular, the heavyweight management
refers to the presence and authority of team leaders in relation to the seniority, rank
and position of the leaders in the company and authority assigned to them (Adachi et
al., 1994). Heavyweight management initiative is concerned with the co-ordination
mechanism of the inherent interdepartmental interdependence of product development
process (Adler, 1995). Wheelwright and Clark (1992; 1993) used the term
heavyweight program team to describe the ideal type of organisational structure and
leadership for the managing a new product development program, yet it is rarely
presented in the product development practice.
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Along the continuum of the matrix of function-division structure, Wheelwright and
Clark (1993) distinguish four types of development team: functional, heavyweight,
lightweight and autonomous, as diagrammatically shown in Figure 2-1.
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Figure 2-1: Types of Development Team (Source: Wheelwright and Clark, 1993, p. 524)
Functional teams reflect the traditional sequential process of product development.
Heavyweight program managers are senior managers who have the primary influence
over those involved in the program and supervise their work directly through key
functional people on the collocated core team. In contrast to the heavyweight team,
the lightweight program managers, typically junior managers with little status or
influence, lack of the power to directly execute and control the process which in to
large part remains under the control of various functional managers. In the
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autonomous team, on the other hand, individuals from functional units are assigned
and totally removed, at least temporarily, physically and administratively from their
functions and totally dedicated to the team.
In a heavyweight program team, the program leader is responsible to ensure the
achievement of product development’s objectives in its phases (Gordon and Isenhour,
1990). To do so, the leader should have direct access to and responsibility for the
entire work of all functional representatives involved in the development program.
Heavyweight management provides a powerful team leader without losing the
opportunity to benefit from the accumulated expertise in functional units. This leads
to the first dimension of the heavyweight management initiative: the program position
within the organisational hierarchy. This position is reflected in the formal structural
position of the program manager relative to functional managers and the extent of the
authority assigned to the program manager and other program leaders.
The engineering culture, in which the main part of development process takes place,
has been characterised as a culture fostering competition, high individualism, and
aversion to co-operation (Thamhain and Wilemon, 1987). In addition, the matrix
arrangement that is embedded in a cross-functional team adds other challenges in
terms of horizontal and vertical communication, resource sharing among programs,
multiple reporting relationship, and dual accountabilities (Pinto and Pinto, 1991;
Thamhain and Wilemon, 1987). Facing the above challenges, the leadership becomes
a crucial factor (Thamhain and Wilemon, 1987).
A cross-functional team works at the operational level (Wheelwright and Clark,
1993). Therefore, the extent of the program manager authority is delegated to the
lower-level program leaders and the extent of the functional authority is delegated to
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functional representatives working in the team become crucial for effective
functioning of the team. This leads to the second dimension, namely the nature of
delegation, which involves the authority delegation from the program manager and
from the functional leaders.
Wheelwright and Clark (1993) further suggest that the senior heavyweight managers
not only have expertise but also have significant ‘organisational clout’. They have full
control over resources contributed by the different functional groups and become the
evaluators of the contribution made by individual team members. McDonough (1993)
argues that the characteristics of the team leader include tenure for understanding
internal functioning of the company, position tenure for understanding the necessary
knowledge and procedures, age for accumulating experience, and education for
understanding technical issues. This leads to the third dimension of heavyweight
management: the seniority of the program leaders.
Based on the above discussion, heavyweight management is operationalised into the
following dimensions:

• Program hierarchical position:
1) Formal structural position ranges from lower, equal or higher than of the
functional positions.
2) The authority of the program leaders ranges from limited (i.e. design aspect
only) to extensive (i.e. overall aspects).

• The nature of delegation:
1) Delegation of program manager’s authority ranges from none to extensive.
2) Delegation of functional authority ranges from none to extensive
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• Seniority of program team leaders:
1) Tenure ranges from short to long.
2) Age ranges from young (i.e. under 35 years of age) to mature.
3) Education ranges from low to high level.

2.4.2 Communication and Decision-making Mechanisms
Initiatives within this category deal with the processual aspect of organisational
integration (Kahn, 1996). These initiatives are critical for integrating design and
development activities. Closely related to the task dimension, these initiatives can be
seen as both part of CE initiatives and as the result of them. Cross-functional
integration can only be achieved by fostering intensive communication, information
sharing and collaboration between involved functions (Wheelwright and Clark, 1993).
Trygg (1993) argues that team and other aspects such as job rotation, regular meeting,
social interaction and physical proximity aim for fostering interdepartmental
communication. Schrage (1995) even sees that the ultimate aim of all organisational
initiatives is achieving better interaction and collaboration to ensure effectiveness.
The importance of the communication and decision-making mechanisms in CE has
been noted by many researchers (e.g. Kahn, 1996; Blackburn et al., 1996). Blackburn
et al. (1996) suggest its importance by arguing that concurrent activities performed by
various individuals and groups require a flow of shared information in which all the
concerns of different functions are addressed. As mentioned, Kahn (1996) argues that
integration process include formal interaction and collaboration. Formal
communication and collaboration patterns exist simultaneously in a cross-functional
team(s) albeit in different degree across teams. Formal communication is dominant
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when the network is characterised by ‘wheel-and-hub’ pattern (Ellis and Fischer,
1994) with the leader in hub position. In contrast, collaboration is dominant when the
communication network is characterised by an ‘all channel’ network (Ellis and Fisher,
1994) with the leader as catalyst to foster dense and frequent collaboration.
Wheelwright and Clark (1993, p. 147) identify four dimensions that jointly determine
the quality and effectiveness of communication: the richness of its media, its
frequency, its direction, and its timing. Based on these dimensions, they identify four
modes of upstream-downstream interaction: serial/batch, early start in the dark, early
involvement and integrated problem solving, as illustrated in Figure 2-2.

Figure 2-2 Four Modes of Upstream-Downstream Interaction
(Source: Wheelwright and Clark 1993, p.475)
Integrated problem solving is a particular mode of interaction for effective cross
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functional team characterised by intensive, rich, face-to-face dialogue between
upstream and downstream participants early in the beginning of the process with more
comprehensive problem solving style. In this mode of interaction, downstream
participants are involved in early activities and in an ongoing dialogue with the
upstream counterparts in the preliminary stage and use that information and insight to
get a flying start on their own work (Wheelwright and Clark, 1993).
In studying the effect of communication and the level of concurrence between
upstream and downstream activities, Hauptman and Hirji (1996) conclude that high
degree of two-way communication, overlapping problem solving, and the release of
uncertain and ambiguous information lead to more favourable outcomes in terms of
product cost, schedule and quality as well as in team satisfaction; while the use of
uncertain and ambiguous information leads to negative outcomes. These contradictory
findings on the release and the use of uncertain/ambiguous information suggest that
such information should be used for further collaboration between upstream and
downstream participants rather than for the downstream’s decision-making. This
finding refines the Wheelwright and Clark (1993) suggestion in the way of
downstream participants use the information from the upstream participant.
This study follows Kahn (1996) and divides initiatives in this category into formal
communication and collaboration. In addition, inter-team communication is also
discussed considering the existence of several layers of sub-teams in large-scale
development programs. This initiative focuses on the interaction between members
from different teams within a product development program. With this addition, the
previous two initiatives are dedicated to the intra-team communication and
collaboration. The decision-making mechanism is further added in respect to how the
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information, gathered through communication initiatives, is used to make decision.

2.4.2.1 Formal Communication
This initiative refers to the establishment of structured, formal and intentional
communication media that facilitate interaction between functions, including routine
meetings, memoranda, forms, reports, faxes and any kind of regulated interaction
among functions (Kahn, 1996). Such media are characterised by a formal transaction
relationship among independent functions within an environment in which they may
have different and conflicting interests.
Following Hauptman and Hirji (1996) and Wheelwright and Clark (1993), formal
communication is operationalised into two dimensions: the mode of communication
and the nature of data conveyed. Using communication dimensions identified by
Wheelwright and Clark (1993) and the conclusion of the Hauptman and Hirji study
(1996), these dimensions are further operationalised as follows:

• The communication mode: refers to how information is released by the upstream
counterpart and how this information is used in the process.
1) Richness of media ranges from sparse, e.g. the use of document and computer
network, to rich, e.g. face to face communication.
2) Frequency: ranges from low, e.g. one-shot, batch type, to high, e.g. piece by
piece, on line, intensive.
3) Direction: ranges from one-way, e.g. monologue, to two-way, e.g. dialogue.
4) Timing: ranges from late, e.g. completed work, at the end of the process, to
early, e.g. preliminary, at the beginning of the process.
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• The nature of data conveyed:
1) The nature data released: ranges from ambiguous to certain.
2) The nature of data used in the decision: ranges from ambiguous to certain.

2.4.2.2 Collaboration
As mentioned previously, according to Kahn (1996) collaboration refers to the
informal, unstructured and affective nature of inter-functional relationships that
emphases strategy alignment among collaborators through a shared vision, collective
goals and joint rewards. The suggestion that cross-functional integration “rests on a
foundation of tight linkages in time and in communication between individuals and
groups working on closely related problems” (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992, p. 175) is
closely related to the notion of collaboration. This involves a shared act of purposive
relationship, mediated by shared space (Schrage, 1995), in a problem solving process
through which different aspects of a problem are constructively explored and goes
beyond the limitation of individuals (Gray, 1989).
Many authors argue that collaboration is the ultimate form of relationship sought in
teams (e.g. Trygg, 1993; Schrage, 1995; Kahn, 1996). Kahn (1996) views
collaboration as being characterised by a continuous relationship, informal media,
relatively interdependent and co-operative environment, shared vision and collective
goals. Collaboration can occur simultaneously with co-ordination (e.g. means used to
ensure that separate activities from different people can fit together), while not every
co-ordination results in collaboration. Levine (1994), using Senge’s (1990) and
Bohm’s (1990) notion of dialogue versus discussion, takes the importance of this
continuous relationship even further by arguing that the vehicle of dialogue is selfless
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listening that creates a common vessel of collective spirits. In contrast with discussion
in which choices are made and held, dialogue is a conversation between individuals
that are examining possibilities together and are willing to suspend and alter their
positions (Levine, 1994). This, in effect, is similar to collaboration.
Collaboration distinguishes teamwork from team work (Donellon, 1993; 1996). In her
study on interaction between individuals in the cross-functional teams in four large
US companies, Donellon

(1993; 1996) assessed team interaction using six

dimensions: dependencies, identification, conflict management tactics, negotiation
processes, power differentiation, and social distance. Combining these dimensions
with Kahn’s (1996) collaboration characteristics, the dependency dimension relates to
the presence of a collective goal; the identification relates to the presence of a shared
vision; the conflict management and negotiation process relates to the presence of
shared media; while power differentiation and social distance relate to the interaction
pattern.
Based on the above discussion, collaboration can be seen as a form of informal
interaction characterised by a communication pattern that is intensive face-to-face
dialogue since the beginning of the process and supported with the shared-space
media among those who share collective visions and goals. This study, therefore, uses
the following four dimensions to operationalise collaboration:
1) The relationship pattern between people involved ranges from a close and friendly
to a distant and competitive relationship.
2) Conflict and negotiation process ranges from a confrontation process toward winlose situation or a dialogue process in order to reach win-win situation.
3) The presence of collective goals ranges from independence goals (e.g. achieving
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individual goals) to interdependence goals (e.g. achieving collective goals).
4) The presence of shared vision ranges from personal identification (i.e. no shared
vision) to group association, either toward the program or toward the function (i.e.
shared vision presence).

2.4.2.3 Inter-team Communication
This initiative specifically relates to the relationship patterns both vertically between
the core team and sub-teams and horizontally between sub-teams in term of
channelling and sharing information. The interlocking structure between layers of
development teams, co-ordination mechanism between them, and multiple
membership across teams are important in the effective development process
(Clausing, 1994). Although many development teams, particularly in high-tech
manufacturing industries, are made up of core team and sub-teams due to the team
size constraint and the complexity of the product (e.g. Clausing, 1994; Fan, 1994;
Haddad, 1996), there has been very little research in this aspect of teamwork.
Most inter-team relationship involves higher level issues rather than operational tasks.
This leads to the extent of the formal communication and collaboration presence
although in this process both formal communication and collaboration patterns exist
together. The communication may rely less on informal and personal face to face
media and more on formal and impersonal media, such as budget and schedule
documents, regular meetings, and technical reports. This initiative, therefore, is
operationalised as follows:
1) The presence of formal communication (see formal communication in 2.4.2.1).
2) The presence of collaboration (see collaboration in 2.4.2.2).
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2.4.2.4 Decision-making Mechanism
This initiative is concerned with how the team uses the information ogathered through
o
the communication media in various teams and sub-teams in decision-making
mechanism. Decision-making mechanism relates closely to the authority and
responsibility relationship among teams and among individuals. In an interlocking
structure, co-ordination mechanism is represented by an authority relationship
between core teams and sub-teams, which reflects on the extent to which the sub-team
decision is respected and not being ignored by the higher level team (Clausing, 1994).
Henke et al. (1993) argue that authority and responsibility relationship among teams
depends on the extent of authority possessed by sub-teams vis-a-vis to the authority of
the core team or higher level teams.
The composition of the higher level teams, i.e. whether sub-team leaders become
members of higher-level teams (Clausing, 1994), is closely related to the perception
of relative power between team leader and sub-team leaders and between sub-team
leaders and sub-team members which, in turn, influences the effectiveness of the
overall process. Sub-team leaders who are part of the core team may be perceived as
having greater proximity and less status differential with the program leader than the
leaders who are not parts of the core team. They may also perceive themselves as
having a higher level of status differential with members of the team than leaders that
are not part of the core team.
Therefore, the decision-making mechanism is operationalised through the following
three dimensions:
1) Authority of the program teams: ranges from none to full authority.
2) Respect over the lower level teams’ decisions: ranges from respected to ignored •
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3) Power differential perception: ranges from low to high.

2.4.3 Enabling Technology
Enabling technology refers to initiatives that utilise various physical tools and
structured methodologies that have been promoted as means of realising a CE
approach. They include computer-based enabling technology, collocation, formal CE
methodologies, and systematic protocols. While collocation initiative is often
regarded as part of organisational integration category, in this study it is classified as
one of the enabling technology initiatives based on the fact that it refers to physical
means (e.g. building and space layout), as oppose to organisational means. Some have
argued that part of its functions can be substituted by computer-based technology (e g.
virtual collocation) (Adachi et al., 1994; Fan, 1995). Although effectiveness and
applicability in supporting CE objectives are still in doubt, their contribution in
supporting CE in large-scale development program is largely acknowledged. CE
application in aircraft and auto industries, for example, are supported by these
enablers (Fan, 1995; Haddad, 1996).

2.4.3.1 Computer-Based Technology
Computer-based technology initiative refers to the utilisation of both hardware and
software of computer technology in the application of CE. This initiative is widely
advocated, particularly in the engineering literature, as a means of achieving and
supporting integration (e.g. Volk, 1992; Syan and Menon, 1994; de Graaf, 1996). The
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utilisation of computer-based technology includes the following areas:
1) Supporting the individual engineering tasks e.g. CAM, CAE (Fujimoto, 1997).
2) Supporting cross-functional integration, e.g. CAD/CAM, CATIA (Trygg, 1993).
3) Assisting information management, e.g. enterprise resource planning (ERP),
intranet and internet (Hameri and Nihtila, 1995).
4) Supporting collaborative work, e.g. rapid prototyping, computer-supported co
operative works (CSCW) (Fan, 1995; Fujimoto, 1997).
Although its position in CE can be argued about (Evans, 1990), the computer does
make communication easier especially for large development tasks due to the large
amount of information involved and their complex interdependency (Clausing, 1994;
Schrage, 1995; Fujimoto, 1997). There is a relationship between the mode of
interaction and the use of the computer technology. When the more intensive face to
face interaction is not possible either due to the task’s size or location, it is substituted
by computer integration (Adachi et al, 1994; Hameri and Nihtila, 1995).
Recent developments in computer technology, such as computer networking,
integrated CAD/CAM system, and rapid prototyping system, provide significant
contribution in providing and easier and faster communication (Schrage, 1995). It
support collaboration. It can also support concurrence work, particularly for a front
loading strategy, in terms of simulations such as 3-D CAD-CAE, CAE simulation,
and stereo-lithography (Fujimoto, 1997). However, King and Majchrzak (1996) argue
that the assumptions made by developers of such CE tools are likely to inhibit the
tools for successfully enabling CE because they are often inconsistent with
documented behaviours of people using similar technologies.
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2.4.3.2 Collocation
The term collocation is used to describe the intentional physical proximity of people
involved in the development process, e.g. a group is collocated into a single area. It
relates to the physical location in which team members reside. The team’s location
may be scattered in the case when members are located all over the organisation’s
buildings and only meet from time to time in designated spaces or they are collocated
at the same place. Allen (1977) argues that increased physical distance exponentially
reduces the probability of communication between counterparts (i.e. ‘communication
distance curve). However, this negative impact of physical distance on
communication appears to be less evident with computer and electronic
communication (Hameri and Nihtila, 1995). In this sense, location becomes one of
the determining factors for the selection and design of an information support system
(Adachi et al., 1994).
Collocation is widely cited as conducive to achieve cross functional interaction and
integration (Trygg, 1993; Pelled and Adler, 1994; Pawar, 1994; Jurgen, 1997). Pelled
and Adler (1994) argue that physical proximity plays a role in influencing the
outcomes of a task conflict, whether it enhances effectiveness and leads to functional
outcomes or it becomes an emotional conflict that reduces effectiveness and leads to
dysfunctional outcomes. This argument underscores the importance of collocation in
understanding others’ perspectives through free interaction and socialisation.
Similarly, Pawar (1994) argues that collocation helps informal consultation and
improves relationships leading to faster problem resolution.
Pawar (1994), however, admits that loyalty to the functional unit for some members
may prevent them from talking to members from other functions. It seems that the
62

Chapter 2: Concurrent Engineering and Conceptual Framework

way they arrange the layout of the allocated space is influential in reducing the effect
of functional loyalty. Another issue is concerned with which functions are collocated.
In many large programs, often only engineering related functions are collocated (e.g.
Haddad, 1996, for automotive development programs) which is understandable
considering the size of the team.

2.4.3.3 Formal CE Methods
Formal CE methods refer to the use of various formal analytical methods frequently
associated with the CE approach in the product development process. Most of these
systematic methodologies are developed within the discipline of engineering design
‘pre-CE’ as part of the rationalisation of the design process (Smith, 1997). However,
they are regarded as important elements of CE (Trygg, 1993; Hales, 1994). Clausing
(1994) argues that the movement toward a more holistic way of development has led
to several concepts and methodologies, while Hales (1994) argues that without tools
the CE approach is only a ‘catch phrase’. The focus of these methodologies is to
ensure that the information needed is available as early as possible to reduce slack
time and unnecessary rework (Trygg, 1993).
These methods include DFM, DFA, QFD, Taguchi methods, DFS, DFT and
ultimately DFPLC or DFX (Trygg, 1993; Clausing, 1994). The use of some of these
tools and methods as other names of CE (Trygg, 1993) marks the importance of their
contribution in the conceptualisation of CE. The most frequently cited and used tools
are DFM, DFA, and QFD (Syan and Menon, 1994; Waterbury, 1986; Stoll, 1990).
DFM and DFA take the issues that the cost of production is mainly determined in the
design phase. They are systematic methodologies of designing the product in such a
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way as to minimise the total cost of manufacturing and assembly. In more general
terms, they are conceived as manufacturability and producibility evaluation.
The objective of DFM is to obtain a product concept that is inherently easy to
manufacture by focussing on design for the ease of manufacture and integrating the
manufacturing process and product design for the best matching of need and
requirement (Stoll, 1990). DFM guidelines consist of all encompassing rules for best
practice for economic manufacture, such as minimising the number of parts,
developing modular designs, minimising part variations, and minimising handling
(Syan and Swift, 1994a). The objective of DFA is to obtain product concepts that are
inherently easy to assemble. DFA consists of rules and techniques specific to
assembly which can be applied methodically for assembly rationalisation, and design
of components for ease of handling and assembly (Syan and Swift, 1994b). Some of
DFA techniques include Corbett’s checklist for DFA, Hitachi’s assemblability
evaluation method, the Boothroyd Dewhurst Inc.’s DFA procedure, and the Lucas
DFA Technique (Syan and Swift, 1994b, Waterbury, 1986).
Quality function deployment (QFD) originated in 1972 at Mitsubishi’s Kobe shipyard
(Hauser and Clausing 1993; Prasad 1996). The objective of QFD is to incorporate the
voice of customers into all phases of the product development cycle in order to
effectively match product concept and performance specification to market needs
(Slade, 1993; Hales, 1994; Prasad, 1996). QFD involves tiered matrices o f ‘what’ and
‘how’ from customer requirements down to the production control (Hauser and
Clausing, 1993; Prasad, 1996). QFD basic matrix is the house of quality (HoQ),
which translates the voice of the customer into the engineering, design process, and
production stages (Prasad, 1996). The translation process involves sequentially
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constructing several matrices of customer requirement versus design requirement,
design requirement versus engineering design, engineering design versus product
characteristics, and so on (Menon, O’Grady, Gu and Young, 1994).
As with computer technology, there is criticism over the effective use of CE
methodologies (e.g. Evans, 1990; King and Majchrzak, 1996). The main point in the
criticism is that such methods cannot be standardised but rather depend on the type of
task as long as these aspects are taken into account during design decision process
(Evans, 1990). Considering this issue, this study considers both formal and informal
utilisation of these methods. The more informal methodologies include all efforts that
are effectively utilised to ensure producibility and manufacturability of the design.

2.4.3.4 Systematic Protocols
This initiative refers to the effort to establish a set of systematic guidelines that assists
the organisation in maintaining commitment to the CE approach. Protocols
encapsulate the key element of how the approach is realised in a particular context.
Procedure manuals are common in engineering functions to help them deal with the
complexity of their task. CE methodologies such as DFA and DFM, for example, are
derived from such a custom (Syan and Menon, 1994a; 1994b).
Introducing CE implies a large-scale transition from the sequential approach. CE also
involves more intense and demanding activities and interaction than the sequential
approach, and creates more tension and conflict within the program team (Riedel and
Pawar, 1991). Pinto and Pinto (1991) note that the team’s rules and procedures are
significant predictors of the success of a cross-functional co-operation. Unfortunately,
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only a few studies have examined the importance of such protocols in implementing
CE. This issue is another gap in the CE literature. Cleland (1991) is among the few
researchers who underline the importance of protocols in the implementation process.
He argues that several important strategies have to be laid out at the start including the
descriptions of the cross-functional team, how it influence the overall process, team
charter, system support committed and resource allocation planning.
The necessity of systematic protocols in CE implementation involves two issues:
1) What CE initiatives are carried out, which is represented by operating manuals
consisting of an applied set of CE initiatives (i.e. CE-related manuals);
2) How CE is implemented in the organisation, which is represented by a structured
and systematic approach to its implementation (e.g. CE charter and plan).

2.4.4 External Integration
Cross-functional integration may go beyond the organisational boundary and involve
both suppliers and actual or potential customers in the process. Many researchers and
practitioners have suggested such an involvement, particularly in high-tech industries,
such as aerospace and aircraft (i.e. Fan, 1995; Slade, 1993; Henke et al., 1993;
McDonough and Griffin, 1997). This category covers such initiatives and can be seen
as an extension of the scope of a cross-functional team. Therefore, the membership
pattern of the cross-functional team is also applied in the dimension of this category,
which include the following:
1) the number of supplier/customer involved,
2) the relative position of external counterparts in the team (e.g. whether they work
in the operational level, or mainly as the representatives in the higher-level team),
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3) the stage of the process they are involved (e.g. whether only sporadic in a
particular stage or throughout the whole process).

2.4.4.1 Supplier Involvement
The involvement of supplier representatives as part of a cross-functional team is often
cited as an important element of CE and of successful new product development (e.g.
Fujimoto, 1997; Slade, 1993; Jurgen, 1997). Slade (1993) argues that the relationship
with suppliers is often complex and problematic, and therefore requires supplier
integration, in which suppliers’ engineers work together with design and
manufacturing engineers in the design teams, early in the design cycle and continues
throughout the product cycle. The involvement of key suppliers provides the
opportunity to rationalise and harmonise operating system interfaces, i.e. quality
standards, production and paperwork process, and delivery schedule (Henke et al.,
1993). Supplier involvement is more apparent in large development programs with
long development cycle (e.g. 5-9 years), such as aircraft development. Fan’s (1995)
study of extended enterprise in CE, draws the experience of many aircraft
manufacturers that involved key suppliers in their cross-functional teams and were
engaged with some them in a risk and cost sharing partnership.

2.4.4.2 Customer Involvement
The involvement of key or potential customers in the cross-functional team is a
significant initiative in CE, particularly in the industrial and contract-based customers
(McDonough and Griffin, 1997). In the aircraft industry, for example, the
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development of a new platform involves a long period of time (i.e. 7 to 9 years). Any
customer s doubt about the design (e.g. product safety) will greatly affect the sales
and bring about changes to the design in later stages to incorporate such concerns. In
a long development cycle program, it will greatly affect delivery to market, which in
turn will affect sales more adversely.

2.4.5 Human Resource Management (HRM) Policy and Capability
Katzenbach and Smith (1993) argue that to be effective and successful the team
should have adequate complementary skills: technical, problem solving and
interpersonal. This argument implies that HRM issues should be included to facilitate
required changes and to develop necessary competencies in establishing a cross
functional team. This aspect relates to the competencies necessary for establishing a
CE approach and organisational policies that develop and foster such competencies
within the organisation. However, HRM issues are largely ignored in CE literature.

2.4.5.1 Competency
This element refers to the building of key competencies required in new product
development, which are acquired through HRM policies and practices. Nakayama
(1997) argues that innovative product development is knowledge creation, which
requires interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge held by involved people.
Explicit knowledge is derived from the organisation’s knowledge represented by
specification, calculation, or blue prints, which later materialised into the product.
Explicit knowledge is tangible and transferable from one person to another
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(Nakayama, 1997). Tacit knowledge is derived from the organisation’s knowledge
that is kept and internalised by each member of the organisation. It is intangible and,
therefore, the transfer is difficult (Nakayama, 1997).
At the group level, knowledge creation activity evolves through interaction, which
leads to the sharing of tacit and explicit knowledge and results in the
conceptualisation process (Nakayama, 1997). Development technology refers to the
tacit knowledge internalised in each engineer of the development teams and brought
to the next development effort (Nakayama, 1997). It comprises the field work
knowledge (e.g. intuition, experience and analogy), which provides the insight
necessary for understanding overall circumstances and actively re-framing or
integrating various technologies to fit the needs of a product development program.
Klein and Maurer (1995) argue that an integrated product development team needs
technical experts who possess integrative knowledge across multiple functions. These
integrators are needed because an effective group process relies on the ability to
communicate and synergistically integrate its combined skills and knowledge
throughout the development process. An integrator bridges functional knowledge
bases. To be an integrator requires deep knowledge of and experience in one field
plus basic understanding of several adjacent fields (Iansiti, 1993; Klein 1994).
Crucial to this integration is a set up of overlapping knowledge or multi-skilling.
Klein and Maurer (1995) further argue that overlap between individual members in
many areas is not necessarily duplication of knowledge but often varying degrees of
expertise or different types of knowledge. The areas of overlap are essential for the
team to function. If only one member possesses the overlapping knowledge (even
peripheral in some instances) he or she would become the de facto team leader.
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Similarly, Volk (1992) argues that multidisciplinary education is required to balance
the requirements of more specialisation. Furthermore, professional equality and trust
among members seems to be a determinant in interaction. The higher the professional
trust and equality among members, the stronger their tendency is toward
collaboration. Indeed, Reidel and Pawar (1991) argue that competency of engineers
and managers of the company should become one of the basic considerations in the
decision to implement a CE approach.
Based on the above discussion, the dimensions of required competency for this study
include: educational background to capture the explicit knowledge; experience in
previous programs to capture the tacit knowledge of development; multi-skilling or
overlapping expertise to become effective integrators; and the knowledge disparity
level to ensure professional trust and equality.

2.4.5.2 CE-Related Training
This initiative refers to the availability of specific training courses in supporting the
application CE. Gordon and Isenhour (1990) suggest that members in integrating
teams be trained in team building and problem solving skills. The adoption of a cross
functional team implies a break from a traditional hierarchical and isolated functional
work environment (Donellon, 1993) toward specialists working closely together with
other specialists from different functional areas. This experience can cause a cultural
shock (Anderson, 1993). Specific team-related training courses, such as team building
and interpersonal skills, are important in breaking down people’s barriers to effective
functioning of the team (Donellon, 1993; Anderson, 1993). In addition, the applied
CE concepts and guidelines need to be introduced to the entire functional units, and in
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particular to direct participants.
Thamhain and Wilemon (1987) view team building as a process of taking a collection
of individuals with different needs, background and expertise and transforming them
into an integrated, effective working unit. Another team related skill needed is
collective listening that is necessary in reaping the benefit of ‘teamness’ (Levine,
1994). However, Henke et al. (1993) found that more effort has been invested in the
structure than in the preparation of team members to ensure them to function
effectively through such training courses.

2.4.5.3 Human Resource Policies
Human resource management (HRM) issues play important role in product innovation
for manufacturing success. HRM policies had to be congruent with new product
development practices; otherwise the expected result can not be achieved (Zanko et
al., 1998). Breaking the silos that hinder the integrated process raises a concern for
the long-term maintenance of strategic competencies. To retain critical functional
knowledge and skills, an organisation needs an HRM system with an appropriate
balance between short-term product related needs and long term strategic business
and employee development goals (Klein and Maurer 1995).
HRM policies that are considered important for CE are recruitment, training and
career development, performance measurement and reward system (Jurgen, 1997).
Klein and Maurer (1995) report a case in which these issues were handled through a
set of policies starting with skill registration or skill inventory to list the core and
other expertise available in the organisation and the knowledge map that reflect the
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knowledge required for the product development. The selection system reflects the
matching of the individual with the knowledge map. Training needs are identified
through the gap between the skill register and the knowledge map. Career
development is handled considering the continuity of knowledge. This includes job
rotation to facilitate overlap knowledge. Performance is measured through team based
peer appraisal rather than individual appraisal. Reward systems include team based
pay plans and skill based pay systems. However, Zanko et al. (1998) suspect that in
much CE implementation HRM has been addressed more as ad-hoc issues rather than
as a systematic whole and, these issues are undertaken mostly by the involved line
managers which put the HRM function in a reactive and clerical mode.

2.5 Conclusion
CE conceptualisation and operationalisation reveal that introducing CE is not as
simple as its concept would indicate. It involves the selection of a combination of
these initiatives as well as the types most appropriate to be applied in a particular
context. Therefore, it covers a wide range of CE models.
Throughout the introduction process these initiatives may change and be shaped by
the context and politics surrounding the process and may take different forms to that
they initially intended. Each initiative may go through different paths and be
influenced by the context and politics in different ways. The interrelation and
interdependence of the identified generic features (Zanko et al., 1998) imply that all
these initiatives are also interrelated and interdependent. The substance of change,
therefore, consists of several interrelated sub-processes as illustrated in Figure 2-3.
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This study focuses on initiatives in organisational integration and communication and
decision-making mechanisms, which include: cross-functional team, heavyweight
management, formal communication, collaboration, inter-team communication, and
decision-making mechanism. Focusing on these initiatives, this study analyses the
longitudinal development of each sub-process of these initiatives through their
dimensions and sub-dimensions.

Initiatives from other categories are also discussed. Drawing on the interrelationship
between initiative sub-processes, these initiatives are used as part the explanation of
what happened in the focus initiatives, which are central to the study and used to
characterise the shape and the transformation development of the CE in the case
study. This discussion on CE leads to a refinement of the general processual
framework developed in Chapter 1. This refinement is illustrated in Figure 2.4. The
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operationalisation of focus initiatives into dimensions and sub-dimensions is provided
in Table 2-1 (p. 40). The operationalisation of other initiatives into their dimensions is
provided in Table 2-2 (p. 41). The internal and external contexts as well as
organisational power and politics surrounding the implementation process are
discussed in the following chapter.

Figure 2-4: Conceptual Framework Refined based on CE Initiatives
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CHAPTER 3
CONTEXT AND POLITICS OF CHANGE AND
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Introduction
Introducing CE into an Indonesian aircraft manufacturing company means bringing
CE to a context that is different from its origins, and involves a significant change
from the previous approach adopted by the company. The choice and process of
change are influenced by the organisational structure and context, as well as the
political manoeuvring of those who have access to the development process,
particularly when such change is viewed as an opportunity to alter the structure and to
express their worldviews (Thomas, 1994).
Guided by the processual approach to organisational change (Dawson 1994;
Pettigrew, 1990), this study aims to explore through longitudinal research how a
model o f CE was over time shaped and formed by the contextual factors and the
organisational power and politics surrounding its introduction to an organisation.
Furthermore, following Thomas (1994) argument in his power process perspective,
this study expands the organisational and temporal context in analysing the process of
change in order to see the dynamics and interactive nature of such a process.
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In order to define a conceptual framework for such exploration on the context, this
chapter reviews research literature on contextual factors and organisational power and
politics, particularly ones that surrounding the implementation of a new approach or
strategy in an organisation. This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part is
devoted to the review of contextual factors that comprise the context of change and
the incorporation of these factors into the research framework. Pettigrew (1997, 1990)
and Dawson (1994) suggest that context of change includes both external and
organisational environment within which the process takes place such as the particular
circumstances within the organisation and its functional units, industry and society. In
this study, the analysis of the context is focused on the organisational context and
considering not only its structural but also its processual and cultural dimensions. The
external context will only be reviewed in a broad sense.
The second part reviews the literature associated with organisational power and
politics. Although often ignored, organisational politics play a central role in process
innovation, either in the decision to adopt an approach or in the implementation of the
adopted approach (Thomas, 1994). Politics can be viewed as the practical domain of
power in action (Buchanan and Badham, 1999), which may go beyond the traditional
authority in directing activity of others (Madison, Allen, Porter, Renwick, and Mayes,
1980). The discussion is arranged based on tripartite analysis of power (Pettigrew and
McNulty, 1995): power sources; context and structure; and will and skill. This review
is used to conceptualise the role of organisational politics in this change process of
introducing CE to complete the elements of a processual analysis. The final
conceptual framework incorporating the above analysis of context, power, and
politics is presented at the end of this chapter.
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3.2 The Context of Change
In processual analysis, the context of change refers to the past, present and future
projection of internal and external operating environment (Pettigrew, 1973; Dawson
1994). The internal or organisational context is represented by contextual factors
inside the organisation. The external context covers competitor strategy, international
competition, government legislation, changing social expectation, technological
innovation, and changes in business activities (Dawson, 1994). The external factors
can be grouped into the industry and the society in which the organisation operates.
Typically, the management of an organisation has more control and influence over
internal context, but less or no such control or influence over the external context.
Thomas (1994) argues that in order to attain deeper understanding on the dynamics of
the change process, it is necessary to expand the organisational and temporal context
in which the process occurs. However, to make the research tasks ‘manageable’, this
study focuses on the organisational context. To satisfy the necessity of expanding the
organisational context, the literature on the external contexts, namely the industry and
the society is reviewed broadly, with a particular purpose to provide guidance in
describing the organisation and its environment rather than to intentionally seek
explanation from it. Using this review, the overview of the industry and society in
which the subject of case study operated, namely the aircraft industry and Indonesia,
are provided in Chapter 5 which introduces the company and its environment.
The reason to choose the organisational context as the focus of the study is two-fold.
Firstly, organisational context, at least partly, represents the intersection of the
industry context and the society contexts (Schneider and Barsoux, 1997).
Organisational context is both moderating and affected by the conflicting aspects of
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the industry and society. Hawkins (1999), for example, notes the complex criss
crossing of national, professional, and departmental cultures as well as the cultures of
different clients while working in an international company. In this line, Hosffcede
(1991) outlines the relationship between the organisational culture and mechanism
and the societal culture of its members. From the contingency theory proponents,
Thompson (1967) suggests the technology employed by an industry determines the
degree of complexity, uncertainty and interdependence within an organisation
operates in that industry. Secondly, since the external context is in the outer layer of
the process, the direct influence of its factors is expected to be more remote than the
influence of the inner context.

3.2.1 Organisational Context
As discussed in Chapter 2, many researchers acknowledge that moving from
sequential to integrated process involves not only technological change but also
substantial organisational and cultural changes and hence emphasise the
organisational aspects of CE initiatives (e.g. Clausing, 1994; Adler 1995; Klein dan
Maurer, 1995). Central mechanism of CE is supported by both technical and
organisational enablers (Haddad, 1995). These organisational enablers involve
changes in organisational structure and practices. More specifically, Zanko et al.
(1998) argue that organisation integration is one of the distinct features of CE, which
calls for an organisational arrangement designed differently to the traditional
functional silos (Zanko et al., 1998). The fit between organisational context and CE
approach being introduced greatly affects the implementation of CE in a company.
Therefore, organisational context is an important issue in the discussion of successful
78

Chapter 3: Context and Politics of Change and Conceptual Framework

CE implementation.
Basically, an organisation is the grouping of individuals into one or more groups in
order to accomplish a given task (Ensign, 1998). Organisational context covers hard,
formal structure and mechanism of the organisation as well as its soft, behavioural,
attitudinal, and cultural aspects of people within the organisation. According to
Dawson (1994), five main factors in the internal organisational context are human
resources, administrative structures, technology, product, and history and culture.
Contingency theory argues that there is no best way of organising (Galbraith, 1973;
Child, 1984). Galbraith (1973: p. 2) states “there is no single best way to design the
structure of an organisation” and “any way of organising is not equally effective”.
One of these contingency factors is the size of organisation (Child, 1984; Handy,
1985; and Wong and Birmbaum-More , 1994). Other contingency factors that are
considered as determinants of organisational structure are market environment (Burns
and Stalker, 1961), production technology (Woodward, 1965), industry characteristics
and its technology (Handy, 1985; Chapman and Jehn, 1994), strategy (Chandler,
1962; Child 1972), type of work and environmental demands (Lawrence and Lorsch,
1967; Lorsch and Allen, 1973); objectives, history and ownership of the organisation
(Handy, 1985), product characteristics, administrative heritage, and the organisational
stage of development (Schneider and Barsoux, 1997).
Child (1984) further argues that contingencies are themselves interrelated. He
emphasises the important of choice in defining organisation of the firm by arguing
that it is not simply a technical matter but also reflects the preference embodied the
dominant culture of the organisation. This confirms Buchanan and Boddy’s (1983)
argument of interrelationship between the organisational structure and organisational
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culture in their analysis of technical change. In fact, many researchers argue that
organisational culture is reflected by organisational structure (Harrison, 1972; Handy,
1985; Hofstede, 1991; Pheysey, 1993).
Furthermore, many of these contingencies, such as market, type of work and
technology, relate to the external context, namely the industry in which the
organisation operate, indicating contribution of the industry context in defining the
organisation structure (Woodward, 1965; Thompson, 1967). Thompson (1967), for
example, argues that greater technical complexity of the industry results in increased
structural differentiation. In a sense, this technology deterministic argument
contradicts the above argument of strategic choice put forward by Child (1972, 1984).
In this respect, Thomas’s (1994) argues that in addition of the ‘invisible hand’ of
exogenous technological deterministic and the ‘visible hand’ of strategic choice,
change may occur as a result of the ‘political hand’: initiated in response to existing
structure by means of technology. This Thomas’s power process perspective sees
relationship between technology and organisation as dynamic and interactive rather
than static and unilateral.
Meanwhile, Hofstede (1991) argues two dimensions of societal culture (i.e. power
distance and uncertainty avoidance) influence the structural aspect of the organisation.
He argues that power distance and uncertainty avoidance dimensions of societal
culture are represented by the centralisation and formalisation dimensions of
organisational structure (1991). He also made comparison between his quadrants and
Mintzberg (1979) organisation typology indicating interrelation between the
organisation context and the national/societal context.
In summary, the organisational context in this study is represented by the
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organisational structure and stage of development of the organisation, organisational
culture, and functional culture. This is taken considering the contingency theory’s
(Galbraith, 1973) argument for the interrelation between structure and the contigency
factors, Schein’s relationship of organisational history and culture (1985), and
Lawrence and Lorsch’s functional orientation (1967).

3.2.1.1 Organisational Structure and Stage of Development
This section discusses the organisational structure and its co-ordination mechanism
and the organisation’s stage of development. The stage of development of a company
is included here because it affects some structural contingencies, such as the size,
administrative heritage, goals and objectives and particular strategy employed by the
organisation (Schneider and Barsoux, 1997).
Organisational structure is a major factor within the organisational context. In
simplest term, it is the way in which organisation divides its people into distinct tasks
and achieves co-ordination among them (Mintzberg, 1979). Child (1984) and Handy
(1985) refers to organisation structure as a means for allocating formal responsibility
that provide a framework for operation and co-ordination mechanism within the
organisation. Similarly, Scott (1992) argues that a formal structure defines the formal
roles and relationship among people, and thus creating a certain authority pattern.
According to Child (1984), organisational structure has three main aspects:
1) The basic structure: a formal allocation and co-ordination mechanism of people
and resources. This includes organisation charts, job descriptions, and the
constitution of boards, committees, and teams.
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2) Operating mechanism: a set of devices that govern what is expected from the
people. This includes operating procedure; standard performance, rewards and
appraisal systems; and planning, scheduling and communication systems.
3) Decision-making mechanism: mechanisms to attain decision and its associated
information, such as environmental scanning and information systems.
Matteson and Ivancevich (1990) use three dimensions of formalisation, centralisation
and complexity (differentiation/specialisation) in analysing organisational structure.
Formalisation refers to “the extent to which rules, procedures, and other guides to
action are written and enforced” (p. 653). Centralisation refers to “the extent to which
authority to make decisions in retained in top management” (p. 651). Complexity
(differentiation/specialisation) refers to “the number of different jobs and/or different
units within an organisation” (p.652).
In line with his three aspects of organisational structure, Child (1984) argues that
organisation structure has six major dimensions: design of jobs (specialisation),
design of formal relationship, hierarchy and span of control (the shape), the grouping
(fimctional/divisional), integration, delegation of authority, and performance appraisal
and rewards system. This list seems to accord with the above Matteson and
Ivancevich’s (1990) three dimensions of organisational structure.
Similarly, Scott (1992) describes the structural features that integrating an
organisation include formalisation, hierarchy, centralisation, and various way of
facilitating the lateral flow of information. Hierarchy is associated with the way
people are linked into a single pyramidal structure of control relation, while
centralisation is a structural mechanism that defines who participates in decision
making (Ensign, 1998). These descriptions of ‘centralisation’ and ‘hierarchy’ are
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similar in their essence to the definition of ‘centralisation’ in Matteson and
Ivancevich’s (1990) dimensions of organisation structure.
On the basis of key dominant parts of the organisation, Mintzberg (1979) developed a
typology of the organisation structure, each with different co-ordination mechanism:
1) simple structure of the strategic apex with direct supervision,
2) machine bureaucracy of the techno-structure with standardisation of work process,
3) professional bureaucracy of the operating core with standardisation of skill,
4) divisionalised form of the middle management with standardisation of output, and
5) adocracy of the support staff with the use of mutual adjustment.
This typology can also be described in term of formalisation, centralisation and
differentiation with adocracy represents the low end of formalisation, centralisation
and differentiation dimensions while full bureaucracy represents the high end of
formalisation, centralisation and differentiation dimensions.
Based on the above discussion, it seems that the Matteson and Ivancevich’s (1990)
dimensions of organisation structure covers all aspects of the organisation structure
more comprehensively. Therefore, following Matteson and Ivancevich’s (1990), this
study operasionalises organisational structure and co-ordination mechanism through
three dimensions of centralisation, formalisation, and specialisation.
The operationalisation of the organisation’s stage of development is sought in various
organisation models within the strategy imperative framework, i.e. whenever strategy
change the organisation must change (Galbraith, 1991; Mintzberg, 1991; Chandler,
1962). This framework indicates that organisation is more than just structure. The
elements of both strategy and organisation should be combined to suit a particular
context (Mintzberg and Quinn, 1991). Mintzberg and Quinn (1991) relate their
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context with the stage of development of the organisation: entrepreneurial context of
the start up companies, mature context of the large business organisations, and
diversified context of the conglomeration. Start up organisation is typically used a
simple structure to deal with the entrepreneurial context, while the large business
organisations and conglomeration use machine bureaucracy and divisional structures
respectively.
The above discussion shows that the stage of development of an organisation is
closely related to the age of the company and its business maturity relative to other
players in the industry. Considering that this study is concerned with new product
development process, knowledge and technology accumulation also become highly
relevant. In this aspect, Riedel and Pawar (1991) warn that the adoption of CE should
also consider the issue of availability of competent engineers and managers other than
the time-cost trade off and the ability to lay substantial capital investment at the
outset. Their case study emphasises the importance of the technological and
managerial competency. Therefore, the stage of development is operationalised
through the following three aspects:
1) the age of the company relative to other players in the industry,
2) the business maturity, and
3) the technological competence maturity.

3.2.1.2 Organisational Culture
The term organisational culture is used to reflect a wide range of the organisational
dynamics from behavioural attitudes and values. There is a wide body of literature on
this subject, but there is disagreement on its definition; to some extent it is still a
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polemical concept. For example, Bloor and Dawson (1994) emphasise its features on
facilitating sense making and guiding working behaviour, and therefore, see
organisational culture as patterned systems of perception among people that share
common experiences. Schein (1985), on the other hand, has deliberately excluded
overt behavioural patterns from his widely cited definition. He further argues that
organisational culture provides consensus on organisational mission, goals, means,
measurement criteria, and repair strategies in dealing with survival and external
adaptation issue. It provides common language and consensus over group boundaries.
Organisational culture consists of the core values that maintain an organisation as a
bounded unit and provide it with a distinct identity (Chatman and Jehn, 1994). In its
essence, these core values also play a role as a normative control that continuously
forces members of the organisation to behave in accord with the organisation’s
objectives (Kunda, 1992). Schein (1985) suggests the dominant influence of the
founders and strong leaders, the dominant groups, and the unique history of
organisation in shaping the core values of organisational culture. Kunda’s empirical
study on ‘engineered engineering culture’ (1992) in a high-tech company is also
underscore the strong influence of the founder and senior management members in
defining and shaping the intended organisational culture.
Organisational culture is not static but develops over time in a complex interplay with
the external environment (Schein, 1985). Using Hofstede’s (1991) model, Pheysey
(1993) suggests that the organisational culture is the golden means of achieving the
organisational mission. This means an organisation evolves from one culture to the
other whichever best fits the organisational context. Similarly, Charles HampdenTurner (1994) sees organisational culture as the way the organisation deals with the
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dilemma of contradictory choices that may create either a vicious cycle that goes from
one extreme to the other, or a virtuous cycle that creates solution to achieve harmony.
In conceptualising organisational culture, Roger Harrison (1972) and Charles Handy
(1985; 1987) develop similar quadrants with four types of culture and coined with
different names. Their quadrants are derived from a similar formalisation and
centralisation dimensions and represent co-ordination mechanism and organisational
structure. Interestingly, these typologies closely resemble Hofstede’s (1991)
organisational culture quadrant and Mintzberg’s (1979) organisational typology
mentioned in the previous section. These interrelationship between organisational
culture and organisational structure is illustrated in Figure 3-1.
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Figure 3-1: Organisational Structure and Organisational Culture Interrelationship
(Adapted and Extended from Hofstede, 1991)
These typologies highlight the interrelation between structural and cultural aspects of
the organisation context as well as the interrelation between the organisation context
and the external contexts. Furthermore, the use of key part of the organisation as the
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basis of Mintzberg’s (1979) typology leads to the notion of the existence of different
parts and functions in organisation. This implies the relationship of the structure and
the nature of various functions in organisation, which leads to the functional culture.
Meanwhile, Martin (1992) views organisational culture from three different
perspectives: integration, differentiation and fragmentation. The integration
perspective views organisational culture as a set of shared-values, often espoused by
the organisational management as bringing organisational members together. The
differentiation perspective takes the view that the espoused organisational culture
sometimes conflicts with organisational sub-cultures that exist in the organisation.
The fragmentation perspective views that several, and sometimes conflicting, sub
cultures exist in an organisation and their interplay shapes the organisational
dynamics. This three-perspective of organisational culture is strongly supported by
the empirical result of Kunda’s ethnographic study in a high-tech company. Kunda
(1992) found that the engineered ‘tech-culture’ was intensively brought forward by
the management while other members reacted to it quite differently, either embracing
or distancing, according to the his/her particular circumstance at a particular time.
Within this framework, the above discussion on organisational culture represents the
integration perspective of culture characterised with the notion of espoused, united
and shared culture. Two other perspectives imply the importance of sub-cultures (i.e.
various functional cultures) that coexist in the organisational context and the way of
individuals within the organisation deal with the espoused and intended culture. This
is supported by one dimension of organisational culture suggested by Schein (1985)
and by the result of Kunda’s (1992) study, namely the dominant group within the
organisation, which implicitly recognised the distinct identities of various groups
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within the organisation. This organisational sub-culture (i.e. functional cultures) is
discussed further in the next section.
Based on the above discussion, this study follows Schein (1985) and Kunda (1992)
and assesses the organisational culture through the dimensions of founder and strong
leaders and the unique organisation history. These two dimensions are the major
contributors that define a set of distinctive common cultural attributes that are shared
by the entire organisation and often intentionally espoused.

3.2.1.3 Functional and Professional Culture
Professionals acquire judgement through intensive training, supervision and
socialisation. Different professions differ in their values and beliefs, and what is
considered as appropriate behaviour. These differences may reflect differences in
mission, method, and concerns (Schneider and Barsoux, 1997). However, some
professions are often blurred with the occupation. Engineers, for example, while
coming from the same profession, are more likely addressed according their
functional occupations (e.g. production engineers, designers). Hansen (1995) notes
that while being part of the same profession, hardware and software development
departments have different cultures. In this study, this sphere is not taken into
consideration. The influence of particular professions, if relevant, will be included as
part of this discussion on functional culture.
Following Martin’s three perspectives (1992), this study acknowledges the potential
coexistence of a united organisational culture that is shared across functional
departments and various differentiated and fragmented sub-cultures (i.e. functional
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cultures) with conflicting interests within an organisational context. Schein (1993)
argues that sub-units of an organisation are likely to develop their own subcultures
because they share core technologies and learning experiences. These subcultures
imply differences in languages, assumptions about reality, and mental models.
Similarly, Kunda (1992) found significant differences in the ownership of an intended
culture among three different categories of employees in his case study of high-tech
culture. This case study shows that design engineers became the centre of the culture
and the effort to inseminate that intended culture. Design engineers was clearly the
first class employees and the main target of the intended culture put forward by the
senior management members. Other groups, including production engineers, are less
important. This empirical result is in line with Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) argument
for the degree of domination of a particular function as one dimension in describing
industry environment.
Schein (1993) suggests that subcultures tend to form around any stable social unit.
This stability is a function of relative stability of membership, the duration of the
founders leading the group, the potency of leadership, the number and intensity of
common coping experiences, the life time of the group, and the “smallness” of the
group to foster mutual acquaintance and trust. Program teams, functional groups,
geographical units, or hierarchical strata, each inevitably creates a common frame of
reference, a common language, and a common assumptions-forming sub-culture due
to their differences within the organisation (Schein, 1995). Bloor and Dawson’s
(1994) definition of culture emphasises patterned systems of perception that facilitate
sense making and guide behaviour at work, suits the concept of functional culture as a
group level phenomena linked by the ‘sharedness’. Each function (e.g. marketing,
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R&D, production) has its own particular culture.
The reasons for these differences are related to the nature of the task and what is
considered to be the best way to achieve success (Schneider and Barsoux, 1997).
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) identify specific differences in the way of thinking and
working of three functional units: sales and marketing, production, and research,
which are rooted in cognitive and emotional orientations as follows:
1) orientation towards the goals of their particular units,
2) time orientation: short term versus long term of sales and research,
3) interpersonal orientation: task versus people orientations of production and sales,
4) formality of structure: formal-hierarchical versus flat-less precise control of
production and research.
The effect of functional cultures on the CE implementation process is apparent.
Schein (1993) argues that, although it is often overlooked, understanding differences
in functional cultures is important when cross-functional teams are created to develop
new products, design new policies or explore new market. The domination of one
function over others may affect the structural hierarchy and mechanism within the
cross-functional team. In such teams, particular attention should be paid to the design
and production functions that normally become the main players in CE product
development process. In this respect, Thomas’s (1994) and Kunda (1992) accounts
from their case studies provide useful information about these two main functions of
high-tech companies.
Design function is typically a dominant function (Thomas, 1994, Kunda, 1992). As
the heart of product development process, this function is considered worthy to
become the focus of attention in insemination engineered culture (Kunda, 1992). The
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hegemony and substantial power of this function come from its unique skill to
confront complexities in designing parts and integrating them into a coherent system
(Thomas, 1994). Thomas (1994) further argues that this hegemony itself is the
product of core assumptions about the nature of product and the organisation
necessary to produce it.
On the other hand, production functions and engineers in production area are
accorded to a lower status and less critical than the design function (Thomas, 1994).
In contrast with the organic organisation of design function, production function tends
to be mechanical in nature with traditional functional units, standardisations,
documentation, and bureaucratic organisation (Burns and Stalker, 1961). Its activities
continue to be perceived as secondary, e.g. responding order, executing design, and
devoting energies to diminish variation rather than creating it). Consequently, it is
granted less control over resources, and considered substitutable (Thomas, 1994).
This inequality may trigger political actions to assert a worldview and interpretation
either to reinforce or to alter the existing structure and power relation which discusses
further in the next section.
In summary, functional cultures are represented by differences in language and
assumptions about reality and mental model (Schein, 1993). These differences are
rooted in four orientation differentials (e.g. goals orientation, time orientation,
interpersonal orientation, and structural formality) between various functions within
the organisation (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Therefore, these four orientation
differentials and the degree of domination of a particular function are used in this
study to assess the existence of various functional cultures in the organisation and
their effect to the introduction of CE.
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3.2.2 External Context
3.2.2.1 Industry Context
Industry context refers to both structural and processual aspects that are specific to the
industry and distinguishes one industry from others. A solid description of industry
context is important as part of extending the organisational context to provide better
understanding of the change process (Thomas, 1994).
In their analysis on organisational environment, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) use
three dimensions to describe industry environment: the degree of risk, the speed of
feedback, and the degree of domination of a particular function. The degree of risk
indicates the degree of certainty in various aspects (e.g. market and technology) in a
particular industry. The speed of feedback indicates the time needed to obtain
feedback about a decision taken. Based on these dimensions, they suggest that
industries differ along the continuum from the most stable to the highly dynamic. The
aircraft industry, for example, was classified as a dynamic industry because it deals
with high uncertainty (i.e. high degree of risk) in its technological aspect and needs a
long time before the technology is confirmed (i.e. low speed of feedback).
Porter’s (1985) competitive advantage model of industry structure provides further
useful insight on underlying factors that define the structural characteristics of a
particular industry. He suggests five structural forces that determine the level of
competition within an industry: rivalry, threat of substitute products and new entrants,
and bargaining power of suppliers and buyers. He further argues that the strength of
each factor is a function of the underlying economic and technical characteristics of
an industry.
Chatman and Jehn (1994) also suggest that technology is one of the most salient
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similarities among firms in the same industry. They suggest that technology
differences create most organisational variance since technology constrains the
variation in how things are done by defining what is being done. Within contingency
theory framework, Thompson (1967) argues that the technical core of an organisation
determine the degree of complexity (diversity), uncertainty (unpredictability), and
interdependence. Greater technical complexity results in increased structural
differentiation; greater technical uncertainty results in less formalisation and
centralisation of structure; and greater technical interdependence requires greater co
ordination.
In assessing industry culture which reflects processual aspects specific to an industry,
Schneider and Barsoux (1997) identify five reasons for differences across industry:
(1) the nature of decision-making, (2) the nature of products or services, (3) the rate of
technology change, (4) the degree of state intervention, and (5) market characteristics.
There is a relationship between the structural and processual aspects of an industry.
Schneider and Barsoux (1997) argue that nature of decision-making is determined by
the degree of risk involved and the amount of time required to know the consequence
of a decision, and suggesting the use of cultural quadrant developed by Deal and
Kennedy (1982). This quadrant uses the Lawrence and Lorsch’s (1967) speed of
feedback and degree of risk dimensions. The nature of product/services, the rate of
technological change, and the degree of state intervention are closely related to the
technological core of the industry, while the market characteristic relates to the
market and economic core of the industry.
In summary, factors associated with industry characteristics developed by Lawrence
and Lorsch (1967) and Schneider and Barsoux (1997) are interrelated and closely
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related to the underlying factors of an industry, namely the technology and economic
characteristics. These overlapping dimensions provide a guide in describing the
industry context relevant to this study, namely the global aircraft industry.
The effect of this industry context on CE is obvious. CE approach was originated,
developed and then diffused within and across industries to balance the inherent
technical complexity and uncertainty with the need for integration in order to achieve
better products with faster and cheaper development process (e.g. Winner et al.,
1988). However, CE is of greater relevance to some industries than to the others.
Aircraft and other high-tech and complex manufacturing industries seem to be the
ones that benefit most from CE in their product development, as reflected by their
domination in the IDA report (Winner et al., 1988). As noted in the previous
discussions, the underlying aspects of an industry (i.e. technology and market) also
influence the process indirectly through their effect in organisational structure and
culture. For example, the more complex industry leads to high differentiation and
specialisation, and therefore needs more sophisticated integration mechanism.

3.2.2.2 National Context
As with the industry context, the description of national context is important as part of
extending the organisational context to provide better understanding of the change
process (Thomas, 1994). National context consists of two interrelated aspects:
societal institutions and societal culture. Societal institutions are represented by a set
of systems of governance (i.e. law, economics and political system) applied in a
politically bounded society (i.e. nation state), which lead to the contemporary political
and economical circumstances of a particular nation. This, in turn, affects the
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organisation that operates within an nation state, its mission, and its governance
system and practices.
Schneider and Barsoux (1997), for example, argue that government regulations
influence the degree to which technologies are developed and protected and signal
which industries are more valued and perceived as crucial to national security or
economic sovereignty. The effect of national context in the introduction of CE, either
directly or indirectly, is mainly rooted in this issue. In a developing country, stateowned companies typically have not only economical objectives (i.e. profit making)
but also political objectives of the government. A state-owned company is often seen
as a vehicle for technology transformation of the country to become part of
industrialised world. These objectives often cause the company to become vulnerable
of government’s intervention. The economic and political systems of governance
influence the degree of this intervention.
Culture is originally an anthropological term used to describe different behavioural
patterns between geographically divided societies (Kluckhohn, 1962). Societal culture
is represented by layers of cultural artefact; values, norms, and believes; and
underlying assumptions held by the members of a society (Hofstede, 1984, Schein
1985, Trompenaar, 1994). Some researchers argue that social institution is part of the
artefact, the observable part of culture (Wilkinson, 1996; Ralston et al., 1995). There
is reciprocal relationship which reflects the interrelated layers of culture: culture
shapes social institution, and in turn, social institution and their reproductions shape
culture (Schneider and Barsoux, 1997).
Societal culture has been related to many organisational issues including:
organisational structure, leadership style, interaction and group dynamics,
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organisational system and processes, human resource management, organisational
culture, and international business (e.g. Hall, 1960; Hofstede, 1984; 1991; Lane and
DiStefano, 1988; Trompenaars, 1994; Adler, 1991; Jackson, 1993; Mead, 1994;
Schneider and Barsoux, 1997). This wide range of issues can be summarised into two
main aspects of organisation and management practices: the institutional (e.g.
structures, policies, systems and procedures), and processual and behavioural (e.g.
leadership and interaction).
A widely cited and tested framework in analysing societal culture is Hofstede’s
(1984) study (e.g. Lane and DiStefano, 1988; Adler, 1991; Jackson, 1993; Pheysey,
1993). Defining culture as “the collective programming of the mind which
distinguishes the members of one group category of people from another” (Hofstede,
1991, p.5), Hofstede constructs four dimensions of culture (Hofstede, 1984):
1) Power distance: the level of the less powerful members of a society expect and
accept that power is distributed unequally.
2) Individualism/Collectivism: the level of individual ties in a social relationship.
3) Masculinity/Femininity: the level of distinction of gender role in social
relationship.
4) Uncertainty Avoidance, the level of the society feels threatened by uncertain
situations.
While widely cited, Hofstede’s study is also the subject of criticism. The main
objection is the use of quantitative approach in assessing culture. Critics consider that
culture must be assessed using a more qualitative approach (see for example Schein,
1984; Pettigrew, 1973). Mead (1994) lists five criticism over Hofstede’s framework:
assuming homogeneity within national territory, conceptual and methodological
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problems, the research is in itself culture-bound, some findings are out of date, and
concentrate on single industry and single multinational.
There are only a few studies that link the product innovation with societal culture.
Among these, Jurgen (1997) contributes an empirical study on variation in product
development restructuring from four countries: Japan, US, Italy and Germany. In
assessing the effect of culture in organisation, Hofstede (1991) further suggests that
power distance and uncertainty avoidance dimensions are related to the institutional
aspect, while individualism and masculinity dimensions are related to the processual
and behavioural aspect. Likewise, societal culture is likely to affect CE introductory
process, either directly or indirectly in both structural and behavioural aspects. Power
distance and uncertainty avoidance dimensions are likely to influence organisational
integration, e.g. how the cross-functional team is structured and managed, while the
individualism and masculinity dimensions are likely to influence team’s interaction.
In summary, national context can be described into two aspects, the national system
of governance and the societal culture within the nation. The system of governance
leads to the contemporary situation that influences the organisational context,
particularly for the state-owned company in a developing country. The societal
culture affects the process, either directly or indirectly, in both structural and
behavioural aspects. The use of Hofstede’s framework (J984) is common in such
analysis. However, aware of criticisms of this framework as pointed out by Mead
(1994), this study not only relies on Hofstede’s framework but also on anthropology
and other social science literature which provide richer descriptions of the culture and
with more appropriate qualitative methodology (e.g. Geertz, 1960; Hill, 1994).
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3.2.3 Conceptual Framework Refinement Based on Contextual Variables
Based on the above discussion, the conceptual framework is refined to incorporate the
operationalisation of contextual variables. This framework is illustrated in Figure 3-2.

3.3 Organisational Power and Politics
As mentioned previously, introducing CE involves a process of change. In such a
process, organisational politics is influential and may become a dominant contributor
of the result attained (Thomas, 1994). Commitments from various functions and
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individuals cannot be taken for granted, particularly due to competing interests across
functions and levels within an organisation (Guth and Me Millan, 1989; Wilkinson,
1983; Porter, Crampon and Smith, 1976). However, Thomas (1994) notes that
researchers tend to treat the role of politics and political action lightly in the process
innovation. The reasons include: innovation is considered as in accord with a broader
organisational objectives; consensus is assumed as essential while conflict is
considered dysfunctional and indication of ineffectiveness; and politics and conflict
are sensitive issue involve questioning rationality of management action.
Using his power-process perspective in studying technological change process,
Thomas (1994) argues that politics is far more central to the process than has been
recognised. Innovation and change in technology and organisation may be as much
products of internal political action as they are products of exogenous forces,
conscious design of top leaders, or efforts of units formally sanctioned to it. In this
respect, Thomas (1994) views politics not only influential in the process of
implementing change but also in the decisions over the choice of what need to be
changed prior to the implementation process. Such a choice involves three screens:
technical, economic, and political or interest. Apart from its technological and
economical advantages, this choice also represents a vehicle to express and enact
worldviews for individuals or groups of individuals (e.g. functional units) that may
embody both self-interest and genuine collective interests. Desire for status,
recognition, and balanced inequities, can trigger functional groups to enact their views
(Thomas, 1994).
From this perspective, it can be argued that the process of introducing CE is
immensely influenced by political maneuvering of key individuals and groups
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involved in the process, particularly considering the unbalanced domination of one
functional group (i.e design engineering) over others (i.e. production and production
engineering). In fact, Thomas (1994) notes that approaches, such as CE or
simultaneous engineering, are beneficial in balancing the power between functional
groups, but their prescriptions miss the opportunity for changing the perceived
relationship between those functions.
In broader management literature, many authors acknowledge the importance of
politics in organisation (e.g Buchanan and Badham, 1999; Pettigrew and McNulty,
1995; Buhler, 1994; Mintzberg, 1991). Buhler (1994), for example, views
organisational politics as one mechanism that enables managers to get things done
through people. He argues that politics is unavoidable, but the degree to which
politics is used, discussed and even encouraged varies across organisations. In his
study of decision-making, Pettigrew (1973) views an organisation as an open political
system in which its sub-units are interdependent and have different interests, which is
likely lead to conflict. He views political behaviour as behaviour of individuals and
sub-units in making a claim against the resource sharing system of the organisation.
Many other studies relate political behaviour to organisational decision-making
(Drory, 1993; Kozlowski and Doherty, 1989; Allen and Porter, 1983; Garguilo,
1993). However, Egan (1993) argues that the politics of the workplace often takes
place out of sight. This shadowy side consists of all those things that substantially and
consistently affect the productivity and quality of the working life but which are not
found on organisational charts, in company manuals, or in formal meetings. In this
respect, Thomas notices that “political actions might be a vital though not necessarily
a comfortable part...” (1994, p. 230)
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Much research takes a negative view of organisational politics (Ferris and Kacmar,
1992). Matteson and Ivancevich (1990) identify politics as a potential source of stress.
Drory (1993) suggests that organisational politics have a potentially damaging effect
(i.e. negative attitudes) on lower status employees. Gilmore, Ferris, Dulebohn and
Harrell-Cook (1996) view political behaviour as self-serving behaviour that is not
sanctioned by the organisation and potentially has negative consequences including
conflict and disharmony at both individual and organisational levels. Individuals
and/or groups are pitted against each other, or against the organisation itself. This, in
turn, results in negative outcomes such as poor job performance, negative attitudes,
and employee withdrawal from the hostile and political environment.
Scholars have recently focused on neutral and even positive perspectives of
organisational politics (Gilmore et al, 1996). According to Mintzberg (1991),
organisations function on the basis of system of influence: authority, ideology,
expertise and politics. The first three are considered as legitimate in some sense, while
politics is necessary to correct deficiencies in legitimate systems of influence and to
provide some sense of flexibility discouraged by other systems. Buchanan and
Badham (1999) view power and political behaviour as significant to the effectiveness
of the organisation and the individual, but can also be individually self-serving and
organisationally damaging. According to Buchanan and Badham (1999, p. 11),
“political behaviour is the practical domain of power in action, worked out through
the use of techniques of influence and other (more or less extreme) tactics”. Power
can be seen in three perspectives: a property of individuals, a property of
relationships, or a property of social and organisational structures and procedures.
In line with Buchanan and Badham’s three perspectives, Pettigrew and McNulty
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(1995) have used a “tripartite analysis” of power and influence as the framework for
studying the power of the board of directors in several UK companies. This
framework views ‘power sources’ and the individual's ‘skill and will’ in using such
sources are located within broad features of ‘context and structure’ that have both
constraining and enabling characteristics. This framework can be seen in Figure 3-3.

Context and
Structure
A

Power
Sources

V

—1----------

Skill and
Will

Figure 3-3: Tripartite Analysis of Power and Influence
(Based on Pettigrew and McNulty (1995))
This framework is used to conceptualise the organisational politics in this study
particularly because it reflects a dynamic quality of power and politics. As Pettigrew
and McNulty (1995) argue, skilful mobilisation of power sources may change the
rules of the political game and provides a new context for subsequent influence
attempts. The crisis, the history of effective or ineffective users of power, and the
violation of trust or codes of conduct may destabilise and change the power
relationship. This framework, for example, is useful in explaining why managers
often perceive political activity as an influence attempt outside the traditional use of
authority (i.e. traditionally defined limits of legitimate power) and attribute political
activities to those in positions of high legitimate power (Madison, Allen, Porter,
Renwick, and Mayes, 1980). It also useful to explain why managers tend to be more
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tolerant toward organisational politics and consider it as less immoral compared with
non-supervisory employees (Drory and Romm, 1988).

3.3.1 Power Sources
In line with the view of power and power source as a property of individuals or
groups of individuals, Lukes (1974) suggests three ways of viewing power. Firstly,
the one-dimensional, traditional, pluralistic view that suggests power is distributed
pluralistically (e.g. Dahl, 1957). This view involves a focus on behaviour in the
making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of interests,
as expressed in policy preferences, revealed by political participation. Secondly, the
two-dimensional view that suggests the pluralistic view was inadequate (e.g.
Bachrach and Baratz, 1962) because some issues are intentionally brought into the
organisational agenda politics while others are deliberately discarded from the
agenda. This view involves an examination both decision-making and non-decision
making. Non-decision-making is a means by which demands for change are killed
before gaining access to the decision-making arena.
Third, the three-dimensional view that criticises the first two views as too
individualistic (e.g. Lukes, 1974). Lukes (1974) argues that there are ways to keep
potential issues out of politics, whether through social forces, institutional practices or
individual’s decisions. They occur in the absence of actual, observable conflict, which
may have been successfully averted although the issue remains an implicit reference
to potential conflict. The three-dimensional view incorporates this latent conflict,
which consists in a contradiction between the interests of those exercising power and
the real interests of those they exclude.
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In line with this three-dimensional view, Thomas (1994) argues that such power
relation relates to the domination of one worldview over the others. Therefore, such
decisions as introducing a technological change or process innovation may be
influenced by both effort to alter structure and effort to reinforce or reproduce existing
relation (Thomas, 1994). In this sense, Thomas (1994) criticises the strategic choice
perspective (Child, 1972: Buchanan and Boddy, 1983) that only limited their analysis
of technological change process to the behaviour of the leaders. Both those exercising
power and those they exclude may use one or more of Mintzberg’s (1991) systems of
influence (i.e. authority, ideology, expertise, and politics) to enact their interpretation.

3.3.2 Skill and Will
Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) argue that power is a relational phenomenon. It is
generated, maintained and lost in the context of relationship with others. The will and
skill relates to this relational aspect of power. The relational aspect of power, defined
as influence, explore personal and group’s ‘will and skill’ in creating and using the
power sources potentially available. Power involves the ability to produce intended
effect in line with one’s perceived interests (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995). Power
and influence inherently have highly situational character (Knoke, 1990; Pettigrew
and McNulty, 1995). Most influences are limited to certain domains and occasions
and may not transferable to other setting (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995). Therefore,
power and influence are dynamic and potentially unstable (Knoke, 1990).
Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) also argue that individuals differ in ability, skill and
willingness to mobilise and use the features of context and the variety of power
source available or created. The perception that political activities occur outside
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traditional use of authority (Madison et al., 1980) reflects the importance of the skill
and will in the organisational politics. Further, skilful political activities may be
required to overcome a lack of power sources or a less valued set of power sources
available (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995). Thomas’s (1994) case studies show that
resource constraint, lack of influence, and status inequality may increase the will of a
group of individuals to take political actions in order to initiate or support changes
that conform with its view of the way things should work and, hence, to shape the
context by their perceptions and interests.
Within this perspective, many researchers argue that organisational politics closely
relates to uncertainty. Tushman (1977) found organisational politics becomes more
intensive within uncertain circumstances. Hickson, Hinnings, Lee, Schneck and
Pennings (1971) stress that the real basis of power is the ability to cope with the
uncertainty and not the presence of the uncertainty alone. Political activity intensifies
prior to decisions concerning resource distribution (Frost and Hayes 1979), and when
the interdependence among units and individuals on important resources is relatively
high (Pfeifer, 1981). Madison et al. (1980) suggests three conditions that relate to
high level of perceived political activity : uncertainty, the importance of the situation,
and the salience of issue. This makes organisational politics crucially important in the
product development process. Pettigrew (1993), for example, argues that political
behaviour is likely to be especially pronoun in an uncertain task environment
surrounding an innovative decision.
Implementation of new approaches such as CE implies a significant change in the
way product development is undertaken and managed, and consequently increases
uncertainty in the already uncertain nature of development process. The effect of
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organisational power and politics in such circumstances is likely to be highly
significant as indicated by Pettigrew (1973). In addition, the inequality between two
functional groups closely involves in the process (i.e. design and production groups)
that commonly exists in high-tech companies (Kunda, 1992; Thomas, 1994) is likely
to enhance political manoeuvring and its effect to the process. In his case studies,
Thomas (1994) notices that political manoeuvring involves various tactics, such as
being quiet and discreet, being vague On discussion with other groups, going outside
for technical help, and forming internal coalition. However, these issues have been
largely ignored and have not been adequately dealt with in CE literature and even
within the broader product innovation literature.

3.3.3 Structure and Context
Power is not just about interpersonal dynamics; it has a macro or structural aspect and
a micro or relational aspect. The structural analysis of power deals with the
possession and control of power sources, such as position, rewards, and sanction and
information. Giddens (1979) argues that structure and context are not just barriers to
action but are essentially involved in its production. Following Giddens’ structuration
theory, Brass and Burkhardt (1993) argue that structural and behavioural treatments
of power should be regarded as simultaneous and complementary: “The structure
provides the contexts within which actors operate to acquire and exercise power.
Structure arises from the action of people, and these actions are shaped by structure”
(p.443). Features of structure and context enable rather than simply determine the
actions (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995). Madison et al. (1980), for example, note the
attribution of political activities to those in managerial position and that such
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activities may result in even higher positions of authority. Thomas (1994) notes that
features in structure and context often influenced the range of technological change or
process innovation considered. The hegemony of design engineering function in the
complex aircraft manufacturing company illustrates how structure and context play
important role in determining and enabling organisational politics.
Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) further suggest that power should also be understood
in its historical context. The outcomes of earlier events may change individual’s
power sources and alter key features of context such as rules, roles, and individual
interpretations of the world around them. The outcome of historical exchanges feeds
the current dynamic and shapes the emerging context for power and influence. In this
respect, Thomas (1994) criticises previous research on technological change that
narrowed the temporal context to the final moments of change and often ignored the
process dynamics altogether. He argues that the analysis must include a full range of
activities including the identification of problems, the selection among alternative
technology and its configuration, and the implementation of chosen technology.
Thomas further argues that the process occurs within social and historical contexts
embedded with interests and ideologies influenced by the structure,
professional/occupational values, and social status. All of these become apparent
when focusing on the dynamics of the process in its extended historical and
organisational context.

3.3.4 The Final Conceptual Framework
Based on the above discussion, this study takes Thomas’s (1994) power-process
perspective that organisational politics play a central role in the technological change
107

Chapter 3: Context and Politics of Change and Conceptual Framework

or process innovation. To review organisational politics on such process, this study
takes Buchanan and Badham’s (1999) neutral perspective that political behaviour
represents both an ugly and deplorable face as well as a positive and beneficial one.
Political behaviour is the practical domain of power in action, worked out through the
use of techniques of influence and other tactics of power play. Following Pettigrew
and McNulty (1995), this study conceptualises power using the tripartite analysis
framework involves power sources, skill and will, and structure and context to
acknowledge the relational and structural aspects of power.
Following Lukes (1974), this study conceptualises power to encompass all overt and
covert, decision and non-decision, and micro and macro aspects. Therefore,
organisational politics is operationalised through the actions taken by several key
persons and their associated groups in the process. These actions (and in some cases,
non-actions) are an illustration of political behaviour of organisational members that
reflect micro and macro aspects as well as decision and non-decision aspects of
organisational power and politics. By focusing on the key individuals and their groups
and investigating their power sources and relational background, the assessment of
their actions also infers the skill and will as well as the structural aspect of power
relations.
Incorporating organisational power and politics into the previous framework, the final
conceptual framework of this research is developed through the addition of two
dimensions of organisational politics: power source and skill and will, as can be seen
in Figure 3-4. The third dimension is already embedded in the dimensions of internal
context that have been developed in the previous discussion on organisational context.
These dimensions are used in assessing the element of change process represented by
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the actions (or in-actions) of key groups and individuals, which have affecting the
process across the contextual barriers.

3.4 Conclusion
Guided by the processual approach, this research views the implementation of CE in
the case study as a change process. During the process, the concept of CE is
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continuously being shaped to fit with the contextual environment. The context of
change is captured as a set of cultural spheres that capture both the soft and hard
aspects of the environment. The internal context is represented by the organisational
context including the organisational stage of development, organisational structure,
organisational culture, and functional culture. The external environment is represented
by industry and national contexts. The politics of change is operationalised through
the actions taken by several key persons or groups in the process. These actions (and
in some cases, non-actions) reflect micro and macro aspects as well as decision and
non-decision aspects of organisational power and politics.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction
This chapter describes research methodology employed in this study as well as the
reasons and appropriateness in employing such a methodology. This description
includes the research design and strategy, data collection methods, data analysis, and
report writing. The description also outlines the advantages and disadvantages of the
methodology and efforts taken to deal with their limitation to ensure the reliability
and validity o f the research and its findings.
This chapter is arranged as follows. Section 4.2 discusses research design and strategy
adopted for this study. Section 4.3 describes research methods employed, including
field research, data collection, data analysis, and report writing. Section 4.4 discusses
validity, reliability, and generalisability issues. Section 4.5 provides a summary.

4.2 Research Strategy
Following the argument that theory and method are necessarily interdependent and
that it is most appropriate to explore an organisation as an ongoing system with a past,
present and future (Pettigrew, 1973), the research strategy here is to be a single
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longitudinal case study. This longitudinal design is adopted because the study
attempts to understand a real process of CE introduction with all its attendant
messiness. Such a processual analysis cannot rely on time-series snapshots (Pettigrew,
1990). The processual research studies a certain phenomenon over time within its
context (Johnson, 1987). It observes how the process unfolds and how it is shaped by
various factors, actions and politics within the context (Van de Ven and Huber, 1990).
The objective of this study is to explore how the CE approach is shaped within a
particular context. The study involves a case study (Yin, 1989; 1993) of introducing
the CE approach to the organisation and management of a product development
program. The case study is an exploratory one and focuses on what the company
intended to do and what actually happened. The present case study is an intrinsic and
instrumental single case study according to Stake’s (1994) case study classification.
The case study aims to provide a better understanding of a particular phenomenon
(i.e. the introduction of CE approach) as well as insights on more general issues. The
decision to use a case study approach also provides the opportunity for longitudinal
research design that suits the processual analysis intended in the study while the
processual aspect of the study enables the researcher to further investigate why
particular actions or decisions were taken.
The research framework conceptualised in the previous chapter is similar to
Pettigrew’s approach in his study of politics in decision-making (1973) in
emphasising the effect of the past events on the present and focusing on the influence
of the organisational context and politics and how they continuously influenced and
shaped organisational practices over time. This framework also enables to observe
aspects of the broader context of the change process that might provide a more
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complex picture of the process and a better understanding of the relationship of the
technical and social systems. This present study resembles the processual approach of
Pettigrew and Whipp (1993) and Dawson (1994). However, it attempts to achieve a
more detailed account, i.e. the ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973), than those studies by
using more in-depth ethnographic research methods. This effort brings the study to
more closely resemble Thomas’s (1994) case studies.
The research strategy adopted in this study has both advantages and disadvantages.
The main advantage is its ability to provide the opportunity to investigate the process
of an organisational change in its real context and in ‘real-time’, and to discover
issues which had previously remained hidden and hence, broaden the understanding
of the object being studied (Dawson, 1997). Such a research framework enables the
researcher to present something unique about the case (Stake, 1994). This uniqueness
includes the nature of the case, its historical background, its physical and societal
settings, and its other contexts, such as the economic and political situations.
The disadvantages and limitations include:
1) It is messy. It may prohibit the researcher from seeing the ‘big picture’ of the
change process as the researcher struggles to obtain and later is drown under the
huge amount of detail and rich data. For this reason, the processual approach
remains contentious among social science researchers.
2) Since the political issues are not immediately evident in public, the researcher
must seek out and then carefully weight the competing worldviews and
rationalities that exist in the process (Thomas, 1994).
3) A single case study as a study of the particular, raises issues of generalisability
(Stake, 1994).
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However, this research does not focus on ‘working the data’ to strengthen the
generalisability of the findings (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), but rather to provide a
narrative accounts of complex organisational dynamics that develop continuously
(Dawson, 1994).
The researcher believes that given the above advantages and limitations this research
design provides a valuable contribution to the CE literature on the detailed and
problematic nature of introducing CE. Like Stake (1994), the researcher also believes
that readers with an intrinsic interest in the case learn more about it from its
description, and particularly from what Geertz (1973) calls ‘thick description’.

4.3 Research Methods
The single longitudinal case study design and the intention to provide a ‘thick
description’ of the change process has led to the use of a qualitative research
methodology. This type of study is designed to observe how a process unfolds over
time and how various contextual factors, actions and politics influence such a process
(Van de Ven and Huber, 1990, Thomas, 1994). Such a research design typically
requires (although it is not restricted to) qualitative research.
Qualitative research refers to multi-method research involving an interpretive,
naturalistic approach to its subject matter (Silverman, 1993, Denzin and Lincoln,
1994).This means researchers study things in their natural setting, attempting to make
sense of, and interpreting the meaning of their phenomena (Denzin and Lincoln,
1994). Similarly, Silverman (1993) argues that qualitative research traditions share a
commitment to the assumption that systematic social inquiry should be conducted in a
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natural setting rather than an artificially constrained one such as experiment.
Considering the above arguments, the researcher adopted qualitative research as the
most appropriate methodology for the study. This approach has been widely
employed in other studies with a similar conceptual framework (e.g. Pettigrew, 1973,
Pettigrew and Whipp, 1993, and Dawson, 1994). Another significant reason to use
qualitative research methodology in this study is that the research involves assessment
of the soft aspect of cultural spheres, e g. national, organisational, and functional
cultures. The researcher agrees with the argument that culture must be assessed using
a more qualitative approach (Schein, 1984; Pettigrew, 1973).
The process of qualitative research usually begins with a framework that specifies a
set of questions that are then examined in a specific way and result in empirical
material to be analysed and written about (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). In doing so,
Janesick (1994) argues that at various stages in the process, the researchers are
situating and recontextualising the research within the shared experience of the
researchers and the research participants. Typically, qualitative researchers start with
tentative questions of what they want to know, then select appropriate methods
considering the social setting of the subject to be studied and with an intention of
living in that setting over time.
This technique bears a ‘double-faced ghost5 (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). Firstly, it is
assumed that competent researchers can report their observations of the social world
with considerable objectivity, clarity and precision. Secondly, it relies on the subject
(e.g. interview respondents) to report their experiences as true accounts. The main
cause of these problems is that there is no objective observation. Observation is
always socially situated in the world of researchers and respondents and has filters
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such as language, social class, and ethnicity (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994).
Qualitative research is not restricted to a single method. Many methods including
interviews, participant observation, and visual methods can be categorised as part of
this methodology (Silverman, 1993; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). The aim is to make
the case study more understandable and to secure as rich and in-depth data as
possible, although objective reality might never be captured (Denzin and Lincoln,
1994). The most common methods include interview, participant observation,
documentary analysis, or a combination of them (Pettigrew, 1990).
Following the argument that the best way to understand a process is to become part of
it (Pettigrew, 1973), participant observation was chosen as the principle method of
investigation. Fieldwork data collection and data analysis tasks were, following Yin
(1993), undertaken interactively toward the final definition of the study questions.
This means the analysis of the earlier data was used to refine the research questions
that would be used in the later stages of the fieldwork.

4.3.1 S election o f the Case Stu dy

This case study was selected because of the accessibility of the site and its
involvement with the introduction of CE. Its familiarity, the result of the researcher’s
working experience in the company since 1983, was the trigger for the decision to
undertake the research. Silverman (1993) considers most case studies are selected
based on the accessibility. Detailed studies of CE implementation especially outside
Western countries and Japan are extremely rare, while such diffusion has raised many
issues about the concept and difficulties in achieving substantial organisational
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change. Direct access to such a research site, therefore, provided a unique opportunity
to explore those issues.
The selected case study was defined as a recent attempt (i.e. 1995 - 1999) to
introduce CE into a new product development program in a state-owned aircraft
manufacturing company in Indonesia. It involved a series of inter-related change
initiatives aimed at making the development program run likes those at a Western
aircraft manufacturing company. Initially, the case covered two parallel development
programs that were carried out by the company. One was the new platform 100passenger jet aircraft (pseudonym PLI) and the other was a derivative of the 35passenger commuter airplane (Pseudonym DRI). During the study, the derivative DRI
Program was terminated. Hence, the final report of this case study only covers the PLI
Program although data were drawn from both programs.

4.3.2 D a ta C ollection

Considering the research strategy, research questions, the context and researcher’s
capacity to obtain the data in such a setting (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994), this study
employed a combination of various data collection methods including participant
observation, in-depth interviews, and the review of documents. Participant
observation was the main method and, in turn, required the researcher to spend a
significant amount of time at the field study site. Through participant observation the
researcher observed the development of current situation by being present and in
close contact with the program teams and by attending various program-related
meetings. Through a combination of interviews and a review of secondary data
sources, significant events in the past were identified to gain a historical perspective
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of the case study. Given the scale of the development program and the intention of the
research, it was necessary to focus on a particular area of the development process in
order to gain a sufficient depth of data. The field study, therefore, focused on one
element of the overall development process (i.e. the design of the body component).

4.3.2.1 Field Research

The main body of fieldwork was carried out in two stages. The first was from October
1997 to April 1998, and the second, from October 1998 to March 1999. In addition,
there were also four informal field-site visits during July 1998. Correspondence with
participants and other employees o f the company via E-mail enabled the researcher to
monitor the development of the program and the company while not at the field-site.
During the first field study, the researcher observed both the PLI and the DRI
programs that were currently undertaken by the company. The PLI and DRI programs
were in two different stages of their development process. The DRI was in the detail
design phase and the PLI was in the preliminary design phase. Observing both
programs enabled the researcher to gain a more comprehensive picture of the overall
development process. At the time of the second field study, however, only one, the
PLI, survived Indonesia’s economic crises and could be studied. The summary of
field research conducted for this study can be seen in Table 4-1.
During the field study, the researcher spent an average of 4 days a week, 4 to 8 hours
a day, at the field site. Because the researcher was also an employee of the company,
the researcher was based at the company’s management centre building. However, in
order to obtain rich and in-depth data, the researcher always attempted to spend as
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much time as possible near the engineers involved in the programs. In the first field
study, the researcher spent most of the time at the PLI Program’s various locations as
well as in the headquarter of the DRI to observe, talk and discuss with engineers and
managers involved in the programs. During the second field study, the researcher was
located in the collocation area, at the Operation Centre quarter of the PLI Program.
Table 4-1: Field Study Summary
First Field Study

Informal Visitation

Second Field Study

October 1997-April 1998

July 1998

October 1998- March 1999

Program Studied

DRI
PLI

DRI
PLI

PLI

Data Collection

Participant Observation
Interview & Conversation
Documentary Review

Interview
Conversation

Participant observation
Interview & Conversation
Documentary Review

Time

As a long serving employee, the researcher was also able to draw on her first hand
experience of the company’s history and culture. This provided advantages as follow:
1) It minimised the accessibility issues to the selected field study site.
2) It facilitated access to information particularly at the operational level, the level
addressed in this study. Since the beginning of the field study the researcher had a
general idea about where the information lay and who was to be approached to
acquire that information.
3) It eliminated the usual familiarisation phase to the research site that normally
takes a significant amount of field study time (e.g. Pettigrew, 1973).
4) It ensured full co-operation of the respondents. The researcher never experienced
rejection for interviews or discussions because the respondents or respondent’s
superiors were her acquaintances. The respondents often relaxed considering they
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were talking with an insider’ and in most cases, someone they knew.
5) It helped in the interpretation of the collected data. Pettigrew (1973) argues that a
researcher is in a stronger position to interpret historical material if his/her data
collection and analysis are undertaken after he has acquired a thorough knowledge
of the present day culture of the society he/she is studying.
6) It enabled the researcher to speak, read, and write in the same language with most
respondents (i.e. Bahasa Indonesia) and understand its nuisance subtleties.
On the other hand, such a position also raised problems, such as possible bias and
ethical issues. It is important, however, to recognise that the researcher does not
claim that she is unbiased. Having worked for the company for almost 15 years, the
researcher s opinions would always contain biases based on her personal experience
throughout those years. These biases could not be eliminated. The researcher, for
example, shared the opinion of most members of non-design functions that the value
of the additional reward system was unfairly favourable to the members of designrelated functions. Given the understanding of these biases, the researcher took an
extra care with the data collection not to pass judgement on information gathered
based on her personal knowledge. Steps taken to minimise the personal bias involved
vigorous verification through cross checking and triangulation. For example, when
the researcher suspected an information was untrue, such information was not
immediately regarded as untrue, but the researcher rather waited until it revealed itself
through findings gathered from other respondents or through other methods.
The ethical dilemma faced by the researcher was derived from two facets: the
company’s commercial confidentiality and the interviewers’ personal confidentiality.
The issue of commercial confidentiality was associated with the problems of
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accessing and reporting on commercially sensitive data. The researcher prior and
during the study had known of confidential materials considered relevant to the study.
The Program Manager only imposed a loose confidentiality guidance, which the study
should not jeopardise the intellectual property of the PLI Program, and relied on the
researcher s own judgement in deciding which issues should be considered as
confidential. While this guidance provided immense opportunity and generated
flexibility in data gathering, it also created a burden in the sense that the researcher
continuously applied self-censorship and had to deal with the ever present doubt
whether or not the writing went too far and, hence, violated the Program Manager’s
trust. The solutions to address these concerns included disguising the company name
and designating the thesis as a non-public domain.
Another source of ethical dilemma concerned personal confidentiality. Some
respondents had long been in close working relationship with the researcher. In some
cases, the relationship could be traced back as far as university undergraduate days.
While such relationships provided advantages in terms of accessibility and frankness,
it could also affect the researcher’s judgement in establishing the character of key
persons involved in the case study and therefore contributing to the researcher’s
personal bias described above. The concern involved the issue as to how far the
person could be characterised without revealing private knowledge based on personal
relationship. On this issue, the researcher took precautions not to include the
researcher’s personal view. After each characterisation (see especially in Chapter 8), a
careful review was taken to ensure that it was based on the research findings and
respondents’ opinions.
The frankness, particularly in data gathered from casual conversation, also created a
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moral dilemma in that the researcher continuously self-questioned how far the
personal relationship contributed to this frankness and hence how far it could be used
as part of the research writing. This anxiety reduced immensely for the data gathered
in the interview because of the respondents’ knowledge on the nature of the
conversation. The researcher handled this issue by using such data as background
information and only used them in direct quote after personal permission from the
respondents involved.
On the other hand, a respondent’s frankness, particularly over sensitive issues, might
jeopardise his/her career and position in the company as well as relationships with
other people involved. To deal with this issue, the researcher decided to disguise the
name of all respondents. Company-wise, however, it would be obvious who some of
respondents were because their particular positions were revealed in the case study.
This issue was solved by restricting the thesis to the non-public domain.

4.3.2.2 Participant Observation
The aim of observation in qualitative research is to gather information about a process
in a naturally occurring context (Silverman, 1993). This method enables a direct
observation of processes, facilitates interview opportunity with key players, and
allows first hand experience on the organisational context. Pettigrew (1973) argues
that the method is not atheoretical and participant observation was considered as most
appropriate in qualitative longitudinal research. Following this argument, this study
used the participant observation as the main data collection method, which involved
sharing the respondents’ lives in an attempt to understand their world (Denzin, 1970).
The rationale in this research decision was the Olesen and Whittaker (1968) argument
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that the best way to understand a process is to become part of it and observe how the
practices, processes, and interactions among involved people are really carried out
rather than formally espoused.
Beside its relation to the theoretical conception, the participant observation method
gives several other advantages as the result of a close relationship with the
respondents. It enables to correctly evaluate impute motives, avoid pointless and
abrasive questioning, and get best-informed respondents (Dalton, 1964). It also allows
the researcher to build rapport before asking disturbing questions and to gain access to
sensitive material. Its flexibility enables the researcher to ‘wait and see’ what the
critical research questions are (Pettigrew, 1973). However, this method also has some
disadvantages. Silverman's (1993) list of its disadvantages include:
1)

it may blind the researcher of important events occurred before his entrance;

2)

respondents may be entirely unrepresentative of the less open participants;

3)

researchers may change the situation just by their presence;

4)

researchers may ‘go native’ forgetting the principles underlying the study.

The researcher acted as a participant observer in two development programs in the
first field study. In the derivative DRI Program, the researcher established a full
participant role as part of the program management team and was involved in the
daily operation of the team. The main tasks of the researcher in the team were to
ensure the integration and compatibility between the ‘engineering release date’ from
the design engineering and the ‘number-one flow’ schedule from the production and
to improve the effectiveness of the interaction between the design and production
functions. In fulfilling these tasks, the researcher was involved in various schedule
reviews. The data collected from the DRI Program included minutes of various
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meetings, excerpts of conversation in selected meetings, and the researcher’s personal
observations that were recorded in the field journal. This participant observation
provided an understanding of the nature of the relationship among various functions
within design and production areas and between design and production functions. Due
to the national economic crisis, the DRI Program was later terminated.
Throughout both field studies, the researcher also participated in the PLI Program as a
non-official member of the computer support group of the Program. The researcher’s
task was to improve the effectiveness of the approach taken by this group in dealing
with both the program’s design team (i.e. Design Centre) and its production
engineering team (i.e. Operation Centre). However, the interaction between the
researcher and the members of the Program was not limited to this participation,
rather the researcher moved quite freely across various groups within and outside the
Program. The researcher was involved in various discussions and meetings at the
middle and operational levels within the Operation Centre and the Design Centre. The
researcher also attended several program reviews that involved the Program Manager.
The relevant information from those meetings was later documented in the field study
journal. When available, the minutes of those meetings were kept. A list of formal
meetings and discussion attended can be seen in Appendix-A.
The time spent with the engineers in both the Design Centre and the Operation Centre
also allowed the researcher to observe how they interacted with each other and to see
how their superiors and others, such as technical advisers, interacted with them. It
also revealed how they dealt with technical and non-technical problems.

All

observational information was kept in the field study journal.
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4.3.2.3 Interviews

From the perspective of a symbolic interactionist, interviews are social events and,
consequently, the social context of the interview is intrinsic to understanding any data
obtained (Silverman, 1993). It is argued that open-ended questions are the most
effective way to gain authentic understanding of people, but its flexibility frequently
results in a lack of comparability of one interview with another and raises problems of
reliability in data collection (Silverman, 1993). Furthermore, Denzin (1970) notes that
interviewees’ responses are influenced by several issues, such as the different
interactional roles and relative status between interviewers and interviewees; the
context of the interview; the self presentation of interviewees, especially in early
stage; the short-term relationships that cause little commitment and tale fabrication;
and the difficulty of penetrating private experience.
In this study, open-ended questions were used for the interview. The possible
distortions were minimised by researcher’s familiarity to the site and some of
interviewees. The main objectives of the interview were:
1) to understand how different actors contributed to and interpreted the change
process,
2) to gain their interpretations of CE, and
3) to gain an understanding of past events within the company and their context..
During the field study, the researcher carried out formal interviews with 36 managers
and employees. 25 out of 36 interviewees worked in the PLI Program and comprised
25% of the total full-time members of the program. Other interviewees were not part
of the program although some were closely involved with the development process of
the program. The characteristic of interviewees can be seen in Table 4-2.
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Table 4-2: Characteristics o f Respondents
Number of Interviewees
Program Member
Program Manager
Middle Manager
Other
Total
Non Program Member
Top Management Member
Middle Manager
Other
Total
Total Respondent

1
10
14
25
4
4
3
^rr~
36

Most interview sessions were conducted privately in the interviewees’ office.
Typically, each interview took around 1 hour, but some expanded up to 2 hours. Some
interviewees, particularly the key persons within the Program or the company
management were interviewed several times in order to follow up the progress of the
program or the development of the company overall situation. Some interviews were
carried out as group interview. The researcher also carried out a series of discussion
sessions with a focus group of 5 to 7 engineers. The sessions involved 7 one-hourmeetings in 3 weeks of the first field study and were held in a meeting room at
lunchtime. In addition, the researcher was also engaged in many informal discussions
and casual conversations related to the study with a wide range of people in the
company. The interview methods used in this research are summarised in Table 4-3.
Most interviewees were selected due to their involvement in the PLI Program. Only 4
interviewees were chosen for their involvement of the DRI Program, which was later
eliminated by the company. However, the interview data from the DRI Program was
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kept due to its high relevance with the case and used as part of the case study data.
The approach to the interviewees varied with the extent of their familiarity with the
researcher as well as their position in the organisation. The interview with the PLI
Program Manager that was carried out very early in the beginning of the study, i.e.
June 1996, enabled the researcher to identify the key persons in the Program as well
as gaining permission to interview them. Discussions with these key persons, who
were middle managers of the Program, opened up the opportunity to be introduced to
and subsequently, discuss with and interview the supervisory and operational-level
staff involved in the Program.
Table 4-3: Interview Methods
Interview Method
Single Private Interview
Multiple Private Interview
Single Group Interview
Multiple Group Discussion
Casual Conversation
Total

Number of Interviewee
17
7
5
7
39
75

Number of Interview
17
18
2
7
39
83

Interviewees from outside the PLI Program were selected based on their close relation
with the Program as observed through meetings or revealed from the interviews and
casual conversation. They were personally approached and asked to be part of the
study as interviewees. Beside the Program Manager, three other senior managers were
also interviewed. They were chosen because of their accessibility and their roles in
the early period of the program or previous programs.
Typically, the researcher prepared a set of open-ended questions based on the
operationalisation of the research framework prior to the interview sessions. These
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questions varied according to the position of the respondents in the Program or in the
company. However, these open-ended questions were used in a flexible way. The
researcher added or eliminated questions during the interview sessions according to
the situation and interviewee’s response. The open-ended questions were used only as
guidance. Except for the discussion sessions and the interviews involving expatriates,
Bahasa Indonesia (the first language of both the interviewee and the researcher) was
used. In the interviews with expatriates, English (the second language of all) was
used. In the discussion sessions, English was used based on the preference of the
interviewees although it was the second language for them and the researcher.
At the beginning of all interview sessions, the researcher explained the nature of the
research and that the research had no relation with the company management. She
also ensured them that the confidentiality would be protected. She requested their
frankness, and their permission to use a tape recorder to record the conversation.
Except for 9 interview sessions, the researcher was granted permission to use the tape
recorder. The conversations were taped and transcribed. For non-taped sessions, the
researcher took notes and then rewrote them after each interview session.
Informal discussions and casual conversations were held with a wide-range of people
from various functional organisations. The discussion sessions held in the first field
study significantly helped in bringing those respondents and some of their colleagues
closer to the researcher and obtaining their trust. At a later stage of the field study,
they often engaged in casual conversations with the researcher and gave their frank
opinions on various issues related to the Program and the company. The participant
observation method employed in the field study provided the opportunity to engage in
many such conversations. Some casual conversations involved people who were not
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part of the Program. Some of them indirectly related to the Program and some others
had no involvement in the Program at all. These people provided the other side of the
story and balanced the information gathered by the researcher. The casual
conversations were not taped but the relevant issues were recorded in the field study
journal immediately after each occasion.
To reduce biases and errors in data collected from the interviews and casual
conversations, the following precautions were taken:
1) data were collected from primary sources only (i.e. direct witnesses); second-hand
accounts (hearsay) were not drawn in;
2) data were checked against documentary material;
3) interviewees’ statements were internally checked for contradictions, and
externally checked against the information obtained from other sources.

4.3.2.4 Secondary Data Sources: Documentary Review
Documents are used both to check verbal statements and to find out whether
positional bias occurred in the other methods of data collection (Pettigrew, 1973).
The documentary review in this study can be divided into two categories based on the
nature of the document being reviewed. The first category was the ad-hoc
documentary review. This category involved a documentary review conducted in-line
with other data collection methods to provide hard evidence from accounts gathered
from other methods. It included various documents shown during or after discussions,
interviews or conversations that were used to emphasise or clarify issues raised on
such occasions. It also included a documentary review on documents searched by the
researcher for similar purposes, such as organisational structures, company policy, the
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company’s short and long term planning, and the company’s systems and procedures.
The researcher’s long term service in the company provided knowledge on where to
search for such documents. Some of these documents were classified as confidential
or could be considered as confidential. Due to the loose restrictions applied to the
researcher on the issue of confidentiality, the researcher used her own judgement
which documents should be considered as confidential and should not be used for the
research purpose as discussed in the previous section.
The second category was the pre-selected documentary review. This category
involved the files and documents that were deliberately chosen by the researcher to be
reviewed in order to gain comprehensive understanding of the process. After
accustomed with several key persons in the Program, their work, and their interaction
patterns, the researcher decided to review the inward and outward files of both the
Chief Engineer (Head of the Program’s Design Centre) and the Chief of Operation
(Head of the Program’s Operation Centre). These files contained various types of
documents such as memos, reports and draft reports, proposals and draft proposals,
and minutes of various meetings.
Administratively, these files covered most of the development-related correspondence
because of the Chiefs’ central positions as the administrative gatekeepers of the
Centres. Formally, all outward correspondence on behalf of the centres came from
and were signed by those Chiefs. When a supervisor needed materials, for example,
he/she would draft a memo to be signed by the Chief and sent to the Procurement
Department. When a supervisor composed and signed a letter, he would ensure that
his/her Chief received the copy. Likewise for inward correspondence, most letters
that requested attention from anybody within the centres were usually directed to the
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Chiefs who then allocated the tasks to supervisors or other members. When the
correspondence was directed directly to persons within the Centres, the Chiefs also
usually received a copy. Further, these files contained some relevant correspondence
from the higher management level, as the Program Manager usually distributed copies
of relevant materials from his own correspondence to the Chiefs. This tactic to pre
select the ‘gatekeeper files’ was proven to be very beneficial in understanding the
whole complex process as could be seen in Pettigrew study (1973).
However, since both Design Centre and Operation Centre were only established in
1997, these files did not capture much of the early stages of the program. There was
not enough data to establish the overall evidence before the establishment of the
Centres. To fill in this gap, the inward and outward files of one supervisor in the
Operation Centre, who had been involved in the Program since 1995 was reviewed.
Likewise, some old files frorma manager who had been involved in the engineering
aspects since 1995 were also reviewed.
To capture a high level information on the program, the relevant folder, from one of
senior managers involved in pursuing support for the Program from outside the
company was also reviewed. This folder contained memos, reports, and proposals that
ranged from the early initiation of the program in 1993. Putting them together, all
these files provided information that covered the beginning of the program in 1993 to
the end o f the field research in early 1999. They also contained information across the
organisational hierarchy, from the top management level to the operational level. All
information gathered from this method were summarised and kept in separate files.
List of documents reviewed during the field study is provided in Appendix-B.
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4.3 .3 D a ta A n alysis

Data collection is followed by data analysis and evaluation in an iterative process.
With a massive amount of field data, this stage is a difficult task. The strength of a
qualitative research in refocusing as new data become available in the subsequent
iteration can easily be spoiled due to disorganised field data (Silverman, 1993). The
interpretation of data and its relevancy to the case study can be obtained through data
categorisation after considerable familiarisation with the process and linking these
data categories to one another (Silverman, 1993). These classifying and recombining
data, coined as decoupling process, enable researchers to develop, redefine, create,
and present new authentic accounts (Dawson, 1997). Hammersley and Atkinson
(1983) suggest using broad descriptive categories, e.g. types of people, activities,
topics, periods, etc, in which one item may be assigned to more than one category.
As the result of rigorous data collection methods and the intention to collect ‘rich
data’ from the field, this study dealt with a large and diverse body of data from both
primary (i.e. participant observation and interview) and secondary (documentary
review) sources. Interpreting this huge amount of field data involved categorising data
in two different ways to fulfil both longitudinal and contextual elements of the
processual study. Firstly, data were categorised and arranged in a time-line that spans
from the initiation of the Program to its termination in order to review the order of
past and present events and their relation to internal and external contexts. Data
collected from the documentary review formed the backbone of this process, with
refinements from data collected through interview and participant observation. By
establishing three levels of time-line, i.e. top management, middle management, and
operational levels, those events could be presented in a way that enabled the
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researcher to relate them to their respective context for further analysis. These Event
Time-Lines can be seen in Appendix-C.
Secondly, field data were codified into accounts and categorised into several
theoretically driven categories. These categories were developed based on the
conceptual framework and its operationalisation developed in Chapter 2 and Chapter
j.

After being codified, each account was designated into a tree-diagram filing

system. Data from interviews provided the backbone of this coding. By combining
both analyses in time-line and theoretically driven categories, the researcher was able
to interpret data in both longitudinal and contextual accounts that, in turn, became the
body of research report.
The analysis stage commenced in the middle of the first field study. Therefore, the
researcher had the opportunity to construct an early version of the study report and
then brought it back to the multiple interview sessions and continually refined the
construct based on the later interviews. This iterative process of field research and
data analysis stages was maintained for the whole period of the field study. By doing
so, the researcher was not only able to refine the construct as new data become
available (Silverman, 1993) but also to ensure its validity through respondent
validation as suggested by Denzin (1970). This respondent validation involves the
researcher asking respondents' feedback from a tentative result and refining it in line
with their response (Reason and Rowan, 1981).
Another important activity during the data analysis stage was triangulation to ensure
validity of accounts. Triangulation is a process of using several accounts from
different sources to clarify meaning and verify an observation or interpretation (Stake,
1994). The process involved comparing data from different data collection methods to
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see whether they corroborated with one another and presented a complete picture
(Denzin, 1970). Denzin (1970) has suggested this technique as a solution to minimise
three possible flaws in field research: negligence toward important past events,
unrepresentative informants, and the change of situation due to researcher present.
In this study, each interview transcript was internally checked for consistency. Then,
the interview transcripts were cross-checked against one another. The transcripts were
also triangulated with data from the documentary review method and with data from
participant observation. Likewise, data collected from the documentary review and
participant observation were treated in the same manner. Several unclear issues found
in the interview transcripts, documents or observations were brought back to some of
key interviewees as part of open-ended questions in subsequent interview sessions or
as part of casual conversation with some respondents. Another validation technique
offered by Denzin (1970) is respondent validation discussed above.

4.3 .4 R ep o rt W riting

This stage involved bringing a large amount of information across a language barrier.
Most data collected were in Bahasa Indonesia, the national language of the country of
the field study, while the report was written in English. The researcher, an Indonesian,
relied on her own bilingual ability to translate all material for the final report.
Specific for direct quotations, an Indonesian colleague from the company with a
degree in English was asked to translate them. For each quote, the researcher’s
translation was compared with his translation. The differences were worked out to
achieve a final translation. The option of using an in-house translator was taken after
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considering that the in-house colleagues would have a better understanding of the
company s overall process as well as over the terms, jargons, and other specific
language used in the company. This decision, however, had a communication
disadvantage as the researcher and the translator could not have face to face
discussions. Most of the discussions over the translation were carried out through e
mail correspondence. To ensure confidentiality, the quotations were sent to the
translator without any real name attached to them and the translator was asked not to
reveal any quotation material.

4.4 Validity, Reliability and Generalisability
The most important issue in a social science research is how it can be both
intellectually challenging and rigorous (Silverman, 1993). Validity, reliability and
generalisability are central concepts here although there is considerable controversy
about how they might be applied to the social sciences. Arguments on validity,
reliability and generalisability are often used as a criticism against qualitative research
methodology. For this study, the steps taken during field research preparation, data
collection, data analysis and report writing stages had ensured the validity and
reliability of the research result as well as its generalisability to the theoretical
propositions as suggested by Yin (1993).
Validity refers to the extent to which an account accurately represents the social
phenomena to which it refers (Hammersley, 1992). In qualitative research, the
opinions about validity claims vary. Some argue it is unnecessary, while others argue
it should be addressed. Agar (1980) argues that systematic hypotheses is inappropriate
and rejects this traditional scientific control in favour of an intensive personal
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involvement seeking to fit the current situation and ability to learn from mistakes as
the way to ensure validity. Hammersley (1990, 1992) argues that validity can be
claimed with confidence in the knowledge. He, therefore, suggests three steps on
judging the validity of claims: first, plausibility of claim given our existing
knowledge, second, credibility of claim given research phenomena and the
characteristic of researcher; and third, when in doubt convince the plausibility and
credibility of evidence (1990, p.61). Silverman (1993) relies only the plausibility and
credibility of evidence arguing Hammersley’s first two steps are problematic.
Standard criteria of validity involves assessing the impact of the researcher in the
setting (i.e. halo effect, the values of the researcher and the genuineness of the
respondent's account) and two forms of validation most widely used: triangulation
and respondent validation (Denzin, 1970, Silverman, 1993). Both triangulation and
respondent validation were employed in this study. However, there are some
criticisms over triangulation and respondent validation techniques. Triangulation is
criticised as ignoring the context from which each account was gathered (Silverman,
1993). Respondent validation has weaknesses as the respondent may not be interested
(Bloor, 1978) and overt validation may only be given if the result is compatible with
their self-image (Abrams, 1984). Therefore, this study also follows Silverman (1993)
suggestion to rely on plausibility and credibility of evidence, and presents some tables
with simple data collection statistics to provide a sense of flavour of the data.
The impact of the researcher’s presence was considered as minimal. The researcher
was officially an employee of the company and, therefore, was often considered by
respondents as an inclusive part of them (i.e. regarded as one of them). The
researcher’s constant presence around them helped relaxing some interviewees who
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were new to the researcher. Although the researcher does not claim that the study is
bias free, the effect of possible bias due to values and perspectives held by the
researcher was minimised. Careful steps were taken to ensure that the study only
considered issues raised by interviewees and not researcher’s own account. The
genuineness of interviewees’ accounts was validated by both triangulation and
respondent validation.
The reliability refers to the degree of consistency with which data were collected by
different observers or by the same observer on different occasions (Hammersley,
1992). This issue derived from reliability of scientific measuring instrument and
replicability of scientific experiment. Kirk and Miller (1986) suggest three kinds of
reliability: consistency within a single method, consistency over time, consistency
over various methods at the same period. Reliability is addressed by using
standardised methods to write field note and prepare transcript (Silverman, 1993) and
providing information on how field data were acquired as well as the detail of its
relevant context (Bryman, 1988, Kirk and Miller, 1986).
To ensure the reliability of this study, field notes and transcriptions were taken using
the accepted techniques, such as tape recording, transcribing, summarising, and field
journals. The field research and data collection processes previously describe have
adequately ensured the reliability of this study. However, it is important to note that
not every researcher who comes to this same field and researches the same issues
would come to the same conclusions. The difference would be the researcher’s
knowledge that has been accumulated during 15 years experience with the company.
Dawson (1994) has argued that processual research such as this study deliberately
confines itself to one or a small number of organisations. It does not focus on working
137

Chapter 4: Research Methodology

the data to strengthen the generalisability of the findings, but rather to provide
understanding of the complex dynamic of the organisation. This argument can be seen
as a severe weakness as some researchers doubt the generalisability of the data. The
issue becomes more severe in a single case study approach.
The researcher, following Bryman (1988, 1990) and Yin (1989), argues that
generalisability of cases should be to the theoretical propositions rather than to the
population or universe. The aim is not to ensure statistical generalisation but to
expand and generalise a theory (analytic generalisation) or inductive reasoning (Yin,
1989). The case study derives its validity not from the representativeness of its
samples but from the thoroughness of its analysis (Bryman, 1990). This study,
therefore, aims for detailed understanding of a single case (selected with no sampling
logic and without the intention of generalising to a population) to provide detailed
empirical accounts and generate several propositions based on those accounts.

4.5 Summary
Considering the research objectives and conceptual framework developed in the
previous chapters, this study designed as a single longitudinal case study. This
research design and the intention to obtain a ‘thick description’ led to the adoption of
a qualitative research using a combination of participant observation, interviews, and
documentary review as data collection methods during the extended time spent in the
research site. During data analysis and report writing, several actions have been taken
to ensure the validity and reliability of research findings and interpretations, which
include triangulation and respondent validation.
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CHAPTER 5
INDACO: THE COMPANY AND ITS CONTEXTS

5.1 Introduction
The case study of introducing CE took place in Indaco, an Indonesian company
operated in the aircraft industry. This chapter provides an overview of the
organisation and its industrial and national contexts. The aim is to provide a general
understanding on the contexts of the change process, the opportunities, challenges and
impediments surrounded the process that contributed to the shape of CE introduction
process as it took form in the case study. This description of the organisational
context provides the background of the attempt to introduce CE as well as the basis
for contextual explanation discussed in detail in Chapter 7. This chapter is intended to
provide a general understanding on the overall process and its background prior to the
detailed description and complex explanation of the process in the next chapters.
In general, the organisation of Indaco reflected the influence of both industrial and
national contexts. Indaco organisation could be characterised as ‘centralisticbureaucratic’ with a strong technology orientation. The need for differentiation of the
aircraft industry led to high compartmentalisation of various specialisations into
functional units. The industry was also responsible for the high formalisation and
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standardisation of various organisational processes. These, in turn, fabricated a high
level bureaucratisation. On the other hand, the establishment of Indaco as an
inseparable part o f national pursuit on technological and industrial development
created a strong technology orientation with little concerns for the market, while the
Indonesian’s cultural tendency of high power distance (Hofstede, 1984) contributed to
the severely centralised organisational structure and mechanism.
As the overview involves extended industrial context from which CE was adopted as
well as the national context in which the economic crisis led to the termination of CE
introductory process, this chapter also provides the ‘bird eye’ view of CE
introduction, from its beginning to its end. In particular, this overview discusses the
contribution of the industrial context in the decision to introduce a selected CE
configuration as well as in shaping the Indaco organisation in general. This overview
also discusses the role of national context in the existence of Indaco in general and in
the effect of the economic crisis in the termination of Indaco’s CE. Overall, the
effects of these extended contexts were more remote but nevertheless crucial and vital
to the existence of CE in Indaco. As the outer layer of contextual factors, the
contribution of these contexts might be more remote and indirect than the contribution
of the other contextual factors.
In order to fulfil the above objectives, this chapter is arranged as follows. Section 5.2
describes Indaco, the Indonesian state-owned aircraft manufacturing company in
which the case study took place. This description is the basis of contextual
explanation (discussed in Chapter 7) of the detailed change process (discussed in the
next Chapter 6). Section 5.3 describes the global aircraft industry and its relation to
the CE introduction in Indaco. In focuses on the typical aircraft development process
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and the common relationship among aircraft companies that led to CE adoption by
Indaco. Section 5.4 describes the Indonesia national context and its relation to Indaco
organisation as a vehicle for national development as well as the contemporary
Indonesian economic and political crises that led to CE termination. Section 5.5
provides a summary and brief discussion on interrelationship between organisational,
industrial and national context.

5.2 Overview of Indaco: The Organisational Context
5.2.1 O rg an isa tion a l M ission
Indaco was established in 1976. As a state-owned company, it has a mission to act as
a vehicle for Indonesian industrial transformation by becoming a centre of excellence
in the aircraft and aerospace industries. This mission was carried out through four
consecutive and overlapping phases of technology acquisition1:
1) Fam iliarisation of the aircraft technology phase. This phase started in 1976 and
was undertaken via various licenses and subcontract programs to expose the
company to process and manufacturing technology in the industry.
2) Integration o f the existing technology phase. This phase started in 1978 and
took the form of a joint development program with another company to gain
access to technologies available in the industry and integrate them in the product.
The joint development of a 35-passenger commuter airplane, the PLC, was part of
this phase. In this program, Indaco was responsible for the design and
manufacturing the fuselage of the aircraft.
1 Item (36) Appendix-B
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3) Integration of new technology phase. This phase was carried out through the
application of acquired technology for local design. The development of the PLP,
a new platform 50-passenger aircraft, started in 1989, was a major part of this
phase.
4) Implementation of R&D for future technology phase. The applied R&D
activities were undertaken in 1990 and their results were implemented in the PLI,
a new product platform for a 100-passenger jet airplane.
In 1976, Indaco employed 500 staff with 17 engineers and 2 small hangars of 11,000
square metres. These facilities were inherited from a small research department of the
Indonesian Air Force. Subsequently, the Government provided US$ 170 million for
production facilities and allocated on average of USS 100 million per annum working
capital for several years (Todd and Simpson, 1986). The Government also secured the
company’s domestic market with a decree in 1980 that forbade all domestic airlines to
import products that could be provided by Indaco. By 1997, Indaco employed 15,000
people including more than 3000 engineers. Its production facilities included various
conventional and computerised machine tools, autoclaves and other heat and surface
treatment facilities, and assembly lines for various airplanes and helicopters. All
facilities were centralised in its 75-hectare site. The total assets of Indaco were valued
at US S 1 billion at the end of 1996.

5.2.2 P ro du cts a n d P ro du ct D evelop m en t P ro gram s

During the time of case study, Indaco involved in various business activities
commercialising their product lines as well as developing new aircraft platform or
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derivative products. During the case study, there were five main category aircraft
programs:
1) Under licence programs from various aircraft and helicopter manufacturers that
produced and sold 15-passenger turboprop airplane, as well as light, medium and
heavy helicopters.
2) PLC, the joint development of 35-passenger airplane and its derivatives. This
aircraft had been in the product line since 1985 with various derivatives to suit its
customers.
3) PLP, the development program of the first indigenous 50-passenger airplane,
which was undergoing certification program during the time of the case study.
4) PLI, the development program of the 100-passenger jet airplane, which was the
subject of the case study, and
5) Subcontract programs from various global primes, including Westaco from which
CE was adopted.
Other than the above aircraft development and production programs, the company
was also engaged in aircraft services particularly for Indaco’s products, defence
system, and satellite businesses to fulfil the need of Indonesian Government.

5.2.3

O rgan isation al S tructu re

The complexity of the aircraft industry (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) was reflected in
Indaco’s complex organisational structure. Before June 1997, Indaco used a
functional structure where activities were centralised in functional units. Matrix
mechanisms (Davis and Lawrence, 1977) had been adopted since 1984 to bridge and
co-ordinate functional supports to each program. A program was defined as any
product line in the form of either a serial line, a new platform, or a product derivative
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undertaken by the company. A program manager was responsible for managing a
particular program and co-ordinating resources from various functions to support the
program.
Prior to the PLI development program, program managers were perceived as having a
lower status than a head of functional units, mainly because they did not have
resources directly allocated to them. The role of those program managers was
‘lightweight’ (Wheelwright and Clark, 1993): monitoring the progress and negotiating
support from various functions. They were often sandwiched between conflicting
interests of various functional units. Over time, however, the program management
moved toward the ‘project team’ (Pawar, 1986) in which a program manager had
more discretion in allocating resources and greater influence over team members.
Nevertheless, except for their significant roles on functional budget allocation that
required their approval for outflows budgeted to support the Programs, the influence
of program managers over design and manufacturing processes remained limited.
In 1989, functional units were organised into eight main divisions: Technology,
Production, Fabrication, Purchasing, Commerce, Finance, Program Co-ordination,
and General Affairs as can be seen in Figure 5-1. Production Division was divided
further into Fixed Wing, Rotary Wing, Defence Systems, Industrial Engineering,
Production Engineering, and Manufacturing Development divisions. Technology was
divided into Aircraft Technology, Aircraft Design, Aircraft Engineering, Aircraft
Interior, Satellite, Electronic Measurement, and Flight Test divisions. The Chief
Executive Officer, Chief Operating Officer, and heads of main divisions formed the
Executive Management Council.
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Figure 5-1: Indaco’s Organisational Structure Prior to 1997
In order to improve the company’s performance, in June 1997 Indaco was
restructured into a more product-based organisation, shown in Figure 5-2 (Bold box
indicated member of Executive Management Council).
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Figure 5-2: Indaco’s Organisational Structure After 1997
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5.3 Aircraft Industry and Its Relation to Indaco and CE Adoption
5.3.1

O verview o f th e G lobal A ircraft In du stry

According to Todd and Simpson (1986), the global aircraft industry can be divided
into three tiers. Firstly, the tier-1 companies or the primes which are the airframe
producers, i.e. companies that design and assemble the whole aircraft or aero-engine
and install the power plants and other components and systems manufactured
elsewhere to the airframe and wing. Secondly, the tier-2 companies, which are
airframe component manufacturers that make the required components for the primes.
Thirdly, the tier-3 companies, which are companies deal with aircraft maintenance,
repair and overhaul services.
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) regard the aircraft industry as industry that operates in a
complex, diverse and dynamic environment. Working in such an environment, the
global aircraft industry has developed the following characteristics:
1) Technology intensive. The aircraft industry is characterised by invention,
innovation and development of new and complex materials and products.
Research and development play a fundamental role (BIE, 1993) and make the
industry very sensitive to technical changes. Todd and Simpson (1986) argue that
the relationship between customer demand and technical progress in aircraft
industry is interactive; innovation probably owes as much to customer stimulus as
customer enthusiasm responds to technical performance. Its evolution is
contributed by ‘a combination of technology-push and demand-puli’ innovations.
2) Long developm ent time. Developing an aircraft involves a very complicated
process from concept definition, preliminary design and analysis, detail design to
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testing, and certifying the product before it is ready for the customer. Typically,
the development time for a new aircraft platform takes seven to nine years.
3) Capital intensive. The aircraft industry normally requires state-of-the-art
manufacturing facilities and modern design tools and with high development cost.
The gap between initiating a new design and full-scale production due to long
development time must also be covered by sufficient working capital.
4) Labour intensive. The industry requires a large quantity of highly skilled labour.
The industry is regarded as a high value-added sector, in which high level of
productivity is expected (BEE, 1993). Since educating such skilled labour takes a
long time, there is a preference toward employment stability and a desire to retain
skilled labour despite fluctuations of business (Todd & Simpson 1986; BIE,
1993). Only recently this preference is lessening due to more business pressure.
5) A relatively sm all num ber but dem anding customers. The aircraft market can
be divided into civil and military market. The market of military aircraft is
determined by the size of national defence budgets (Todd and Simpson, 1986),
while the civil market is basically determined by the growth of air traffic. The
military demand for new features often results in significant innovation, which
typically supported by the government. In the U.S., this takes form in research and
initiatives within National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the
Institute of Defense Analyses (IDA). International marketing strategy in both
civil and military markets usually involves customer financing, offset programs
(i.e. some portions of the contract packages are carried out in the customers’
countries), and counter trade. This marketing package puts an additional burden
on the financial aspect of the industry.
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6) Demanding regulatory environment. Each military customer normally has its
own safety standards. In global civil market, there are two most respected
authorities to which most countries referring to: the US Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and the European Joint Aviation Authority (JAA).
Manufacturer has to comply with any standard required by its customer. These
standards have tended to increase not only in regard of the safety of the product
but also the safety of the product to the environment.
7) Close relationship with suppliers. This industry requires materials and

components made to specific standards. The suppliers are normally short-listed to
a list of approved suppliers in which the manufactures periodically audit their
compliance to specific standards of production process. Aluminium and forging
material, for example, are supplied by two or three specialists for the whole
industry. Bought-out components like engines, landing gears, avionics, electronics
and hydraulics systems require close contact with the suppliers from the early
stages of development.
8) Extensive government involvement. The basis of government involvement in
nurturing a domestic aircraft industry comes from a perception that this industry is
a national asset. It is important in major industrial economies and has a strategic
importance for national sovereignty due to of its military function. It also has the
ability to generate multiplier effects and sizeable balance of payment gain (Todd
and Simpson, 1986). Government involvement takes various forms such as
providing direct investment; facilitating R&D; being a customer; creating
government financing scheme; and providing protection through tariff, regulation
and other barriers (Todd & Simpson, 1986). This involvement has put the industry
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in the position of ‘permanent receivership’ (Lowi, 1975), as companies in the
aircraft industry are the recipients of state attention in order to guarantee their
continued stability and success.
With these characteristics, the aircraft industry is often regarded as a ‘high-tech’
industry dominated by engineering and technological orientations. The industry
evolves around the uncertainty in all aspects of its environment (i.e. market, science
and socio-techmcal) and continuous venture to new frontiers of technology. In its core
is technological imperatives with a belief that the product will sell itself at its own
price (Schneider and Barsoux, 1997). However, the combination of immense
uncertainty, long feedback time, and heavy investment makes the aircraft industry
become more conservative than other high-tech industries, particularly ones with
speedier feedback (e.g. computer and electronics industries) that are typically risktaker (Deal and Kennedy, 1982). The decision-making process is typically
conservative and involves careful assessment of all risks. This leads to heavy reliance
on standard manuals, standard operating procedures, detail implementation plan,
protocols, and prudent technical documentation.
These characteristics of the aircraft industry result in various common practices.
Internally, their managers have to deal with the inherent paradoxical issues of
differentiation and integration (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). According to Thomas
(1994), aircraft companies are companies in contrasts, risk-taking and risk-aversing at
once: flexible and organic in design and development functions while rigid and
mechanical in production functions. Eventually, this industry becomes one of the
incubators of management concepts that try to find solution in dealing with
specialisation and integration, such as matrix organisation and concurrent engineering
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(e.g. Davis and Lawrence, 1977, Winner, et al., 1988, Fan, 1995). This is reflected in
Indaco through highly compartmentalised structure in combination with matrix
mechanism between program and functional organisation, highly formalised
procedures, and strong technology orientation and the domination of design and
technology functions as described in the previous section and elaborated in detail in
Chapter 7.
Externally, the companies' managers have to deal with various demanding
stakeholders such as customers, suppliers, government, and regulation bodies. With
heavy investments at stake, companies in this industry typically maintain a close
inter-organisational relationship within the industry and with their constituents.
Launch customers (i.e. customers who are the first in a product’s booking order) are
important part in the ‘go-ahead’ decision of a development program and, typically,
enjoy many financial and technical benefits. Some key suppliers become risk and
cost-sharing partners (Fan, 1995). Subcontracting and manufacturing under-license
are common production practices. Many companies are involved in joint design
development, technological research and human resource development. These inter
organisational practices and its contribution to Indaco’s decision to adopt CE is
discussed further in Section 5.3.3.

5.3.2 N ew P ro du ct D evelop m en t in A ircra ft In du stry a n d the N eed f o r CE

Aircraft development is a risky initiative that involves various disciplines to find a
small optimum ‘envelope of solutions’. The stakes are high due to high investment
cost, long development time, high standard regulation, and increased competition,
particularly in the low-end and smaller products. Due to its high technological
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complexity, the aircraft development process typically involves considerations over a
wide-range of aspects in its design decisions, such as technological, operational,
financial, commercial and environmental, as illustrated in Figure 5-3.

Figure 5-3: Aspects of Aircraft Development Process (Source: Internal Course, 1998)
The overall aircraft development process can be illustrated in a sequential diagram as
in Figure 5-4.
Given the nature of highly differentiated specialisation, an aircraft development
program normally struggles to integrate and harmonise various and often conflicting
specialisation perspectives in order to achieve a commercially and technologically
viable design. Often, a specialist seeks optimisation only in terms of his own ‘objectworld’ (Bucciarelli, 1994). This situation of competing interests of specialisation in
the aircraft development process can be illustrated as Figure 5-5.
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Figure 5-4: Aircraft Development Process (Adapted from Internal Course, 1998)
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aircraft industry had directly played a significant role in bringing the CE approach to
Indaco which triggered the Indaco’s management decision to apply it in the PLI
Program, and influenced the introduction process of CE in Indaco:
1) Licensing, subcontracting and co-development relationship. These business
relationships were common within the industry. Beside their business prospect,
new entrants often saw these relationships as a means of technology transfer.
2) Technical and managerial consultation relationship. The large primes (i.e.
companies that design and assembly the aircraft) often had a management service
division that offered technical and managerial consulting services for smaller
manufacturers world-wide, particularly in the area of design and production
process. Many new and smaller manufacturers acquired this service as part of
their effort to comply with the standards set by the large primes, which in turn
would create opportunity to become subcontractors. Compliance with these
standards was also seen as a means of achieving compliance with the standards of
the internationally respected regulatory bodies.
3) Internship program. The less developed and smaller manufacturers engaged in
internship program with larger primes in which they temporarily released their
engineers to work with the primes for 1-2 years. During this period, those
engineers were typically treated as primes’ employees. Sometimes, the internship
program was tied to an international purchase contract, as part of an offset
agreement. But, often it was a voluntary co-operation between the two companies
in which the larger primes fulfilled their short-term shortage of engineers while
the smaller manufacturers gained the opportunity to upgrade the skills and
knowledge of their own engineers.
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Since its establishment, Indaco has had business relationships with other companies in
the global aircraft industry through licensing, subcontracting and joint development
programs. Westaco was one of the companies with whom Indaco engaged with in the
above three types of relationship. Indaco had been a Westaco subcontractor since the
late 1980’s and this subcontract program had forced Indaco to standardise its
production system prior to signing a contract agreement. As part of the strategy to win
this contract, Indaco had engaged in various agreements with Westaco since 1984, in
which Westaco agreed to provide some managerial and technological supports and
consulting services.
As part of these services, Westaco sent its people as technical assistants, up to 20
people at a time, in Indaco to help establishing adequate working systems and
practices in various areas. Some of these technical assistants even spent more than
five years in the company. Several worked as functional specialists in the design
process.

Some assisted functional units (e.g. Production, Quality Assurance,

Engineering, etc.) to improve Indaco’s design and production systems in order to
comply with internationally recognised regulatory standards, (e.g. FAA and JAA), so
that the company could market its products world-wide. These systems included
configuration management and control, quality systems, product specification
systems, and computational and information systems. Some others worked in the
program divisions (i.e. PLC, PLP, and PLI programs) to establish program
management systems and assisted in running the programs.
Indaco had started the internship program in 1990 by sending Indaco’s 4-5 engineers
annually to work for 1-2 years in Westaco. This internship covered various areas,
such as aircraft design, production, customer support, and system administration.
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These engineers brought back the experience of implementing the ‘Westaco Way’ as
it was documented in various Westaco procedure manuals. The most prominent ex
intern was the PLI Program Manager. Several other ex-interns also directly or
indirectly supported the PLI Program.
These contracts for support and consulting services between Indaco and Westaco
were terminated later due to the Indaco’s financial crisis. However, as the result of
these various engagements with Westaco, some understanding towards those systems
and various Westaco’s protocols, standard manuals, and operating procedures started
to accumulate in Indaco. Many Westaco’s manuals and protocols were adopted as part
of Indaco’s standard manuals and system procedures. Various CE protocols from
Westaco’s development programs were available in Indaco through a similar pattern.
These protocols were, partially, used as references in establishing the mechanism
applied to Indaco’s development programs.
The previous PLP development program, for example, adopted the Design Production
Team which actually w?as a part of CE initiatives in one of Westaco’s development
programs (see Chapter 6), albeit with some fundamental deviations. In Westaco, this
initiative is involving production-related engineers in the early stage of the
development process in order to incorporate production considerations early in the
design process. In the PLP Program, however, the Design Production Team was
established late in the detail design phase. Therefore, its purpose reduced only to filter
the design drawings prior to the engineering release in order to reduce the number of
engineering changes and to discuss producibility and manufacturability of those
design drawings. It was too late to talk about the optimum process or ease of
production. One of the engineers from production recalled:
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Figure 5-5: A Dream for a Specialisation, a Nightmare for Others
(Adapted from McMasters, 1993)
The pursuit to obtain optimal solution for such competing interests and objectives
with immense risk at stake and long feedback time that triggered various initiatives in
the aircraft companies to find a better concept and approach in their product
development program. It is unsurprising that some aircraft companies is among the
first that came up with and implement the concurrent engineering approach (albeit
often with different names) as indicated in Winner et al. (1988).

5.3.3 Inter-Firm Relationship within the Aircraft Industry and CE Adoption
As mentioned in Section 5.3.1, the characteristics of aircraft industry lead to close
interrelationship among companies that constitute the industry. In turn, this inter
organisational relationship permits the spread of various management and
technological concepts and approaches such as matrix management and concurrent
engineering through out the industry. In particular, three common practices within
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[In the PLP Program,] we were involved at the detail design [phase]. The design had been
completed. So. we only assessed whether this part [design] could be fabricated. If we
suggested a new idea, it would take a long time and many steps [back to the design process].
... It was only 'could we do it’ question. If we could, [the design] was released. If not, we sent
it back to the designer. ... Since the design loop had been completed even a small change
would go back to the design cycle, analysis and verification, which took months (Kevin,
Tooling Engineering, January 1999).

Not surprisingly the Design Production team was eventually abandoned. Another
issue that surfaced from this experiment was concerning the competency of personnel
in both Design and Production Divisions, which led to many disappointments in the
PLP development process. One of senior manager from production function recalled:
People assigned to [the Design Production Team] often did not have the necessary
qualification as there were to many teams to be fulfilled........ We worked with for
information only' drawings with an assurance [from Designers] that they would not be
changed. But, when the drawings were formally released, they had been changed. Designers
[apparently] went through the weight and balance analysis and several other calculations,
found several mistakes and modified the drawings. It happened many times ... There were
[also] a lot of parts that were compliance with design drawings but when assembled together,
they did not fit. The design must be changed... (Steve, Fabrication Division, July 1998).

Unfortunately, these issues were not taken into full consideration when the CE
implementation in the PLI Program began, despite the concerns expressed by many,
including the engineer who was the Project engineer of both PLP and PLI programs.
Nevertheless, this experience enhanced some team members’ understanding of CE
and became part of the lessons learned as they went through the PLI Program:
Based on our experience [in the PLP program] we try to provide input to design people while
they are carrying out early aircraft planning. (Peter, Operation Centre, November 1997)

The introduction of the CE approach in the PLI Program started when the PLI
Program Manager, who had two years internship experience in Westaco, early after
his assignment announced that he would apply the CE modelled on Westaco’s. This
move was intended to take benefit of his own and other ex-interns hands-on
experience, the availability of various Westaco’s CE protocols, and the previous
experience in the PLP Program.
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However, it was clear that computer-based technologies as CE enablers were the
focus of attention. Later in the interview in 1996, the Program Manager stated:
[Westaco] termed it as enabling technology. With this enabling technology, [engineers] can
work optimal. [Westaco] uses 100% digital [design]. So is our [PLI], no compromise. We will
define the product with 100% digital CAT1A and we will utilise the digital mock up in which
engineers can compare and find the areas that require changes due to design faulty or part
interference.... For [PLI], we will use that. [Westaco] has used that... (Clive, Program
Manager, June 1996)

There was a less serious effort in adopting other aspects of Westaco’s CE practices,
which in turn, led to difficulty in realising other aspects of CE, such as cross
functional teams and sufficient communication mechanism as can be seen later in
Chapter 6.

5.4 National Context and Its Relation to Indaco and CE Termination
National context played a vital role in the existence of Indaco and its organisational
mechanisms. The very existence of the company, for example, could not be separated
from Indonesia’s pursuit for industrial development, while its cultural tendencies
played a role in shaping the organisation’s structure and practices. In particular, this
section discusses the following three aspects of national context that significantly
contributed to Indaco and its CE:
1) Indonesia’s national development plan that led to the existence of Indaco and its
PLI Program.
2) Cultural Tendencies of the society, particularly the high power distance and
collectivism, that led to centralised structure and its social-professional leakage
was contributed to the acceptance of CE adoption.
3) The contemporary Indonesia’s economic crisis that led to the termination of the
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PLI Program and its CE.

5.4.1 Indonesia’s Development Plan and Its Relation to Indaco and PLI Program
The establishment of aircraft industry was an integral part of Indonesia’s national
development program (Todd and Simpson, 1986). Economically, it was part of
industrialisation plan to promote economic growth and development in order to
become one of the new industrialised countries. Rich in natural resources, Indonesia’s
domestic revenue in the 1970s was heavily relied on such resources, oil tax in
particular which accounted for more than 50% (Tanter, 1990). In comparison,
manufacturing sector was accounted only for 2% of national export (Todd and
Simpson, 1986).
Indaco, established as a state-owned company operating in aircraft manufacturing
industry in 1976, was seen as the vehicle toward industrialisation. It was intended to
diversify the composition of national export, facilitate import substitution and at the
same time fulfil the country’s high-tech industry ambition. This labour intensive
industry was also beneficial in creating and tending new highly skilled jobs for
Indonesia which its growing workforce became a major challenge for the government
(Edwards, MacIntyre, and Asra, 1994). Politically, the national aircraft industry was
also seen as a strategic factor for promoting further integration throughout Indonesia
by enabling to develop air transportation suitable in connecting and bridging the
archipelago. These broader objectives were clearly reflected in Indaco’s
organisational mission that emphasising technology transfer as well as its strong
orientation toward technology advancement and less attention toward marketing and
financial aspects of the business. Eventually, the company had accumulated a
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significant loss and later faced financial difficulties in the time of national economic
crisis during which the government’s aid stopped flowing.
During the 1990s, the government viewed that the global economic competitiveness
could only be captured through high-level of scientific and technological capability
(Hill, Marsh, Merson, and Siregar, 1994). This view was reflected in the objectives of
the Government’s Sixth Five Year Plan (REPELITA VI) that covered the period of
1994-1999. This plan included establishing industry as the economic motor and
primary absorbent of the labour forces and increasing industrial productivity and
efficiency through the enhancement of the quality of human resources and
improvement in skills, creativity, discipline, technological mastery and managerial
skills (Nomura Research Institute, 1993).
The combination of these government’s objectives and Indaco’s success in the first
flight of the first indigenous design of PLP in 1995 provided the opportunity for
Indaco to propose another aircraft development program, the jet engine PLI. Due to
its limited available fund for such undertaking, the Government fostered the
establishment of a private company as a financial scheme to accumulate public
funding for the PLI Program.

5.4.2 C u ltu ral T endency a n d Its E ffects in In d a co 's O rganisation

Indonesia has great ethnic diversity with hundreds of ethnic groups each with their
own cultural and social heritage (Prijadi and Rachmawati, 1998). Among these,
Javanese is the biggest ethnic group, accounted for one-third of the population and
widely dispersed throughout the country. The unifying forces of this diversity were
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accounted in national language, artistic expression, tradition, history of their struggle
against Dutch colonialism, as well as in the national ideology, ‘Pancasila’ (the Five
Pillars: belief in one God, just and civilised humanitarianism, a united Indonesia,
democracy guided by wisdom through consultation and representation, and social
justice for all Indonesian people) (Vatikiotis, 1993). Lubis (1990) argues close
relationships and inter connections within those ethnic groups went far back into the
pre-colonialisation era.
In assessing Indonesian cultural tendencies, this study uses Hofstede’s (1984, 1991)
framework as a starting point. Aware of the limitation of Hofstede’s study, further
confirmation is sought in more qualitative studies from anthropology literature and
contemporary reports on politic and sociology, such as Geertz (1960), Vatikiotis
(1993), and Guinnes (1994). According to Hofstede (1991), Indonesia is a country
with a tendency towards high power distance, high collectivism, low masculinity, and
low in uncertainty avoidance. This classification implies that people are likely to
prefer to work in a group, be less competitive, and prefer co-operation and group
harmony. Relationships are personal and activities are oriented toward the group
interests. The organisation is likely a centralised structure that relies more on the
individual who has the power rather than on the system (Hofstede, 1984).
This implication is broadly confirmed by anthropological work of Geertz (1960) on
the Javanese culture, which is argued as the primary source of the contemporary
Indonesian culture and social practices (Vatikiotis, 1993; Guinnes, 1994). Focusing
on the Javanese culture, Geertz (1960) has classified the Javanese into three vertical
sub-cultures: the ‘abangan’ culture of village peasants and urbanised working class,
the ‘santri’ culture of the market traders, and the ‘priyayi’ culture of aristocrats and
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government bureaucrats. These sub-cultures share many common values, such as
value for harmony and against overt aggressive behaviour, value for proper behaviour
according to status, disregard for open expressions of opposition, and the value of
politeness and polite suppression of feelings.
These cultural tendencies were clearly reflected in Indaco’s organisation. The
tendency o f high power distance was reflected by high level of centralisation of the
organisational structure, in which the ‘man at the top’ had an enormously wide span
of control, much wider than most top management in Western countries. His direct
control by-passed the control of his direct subordinates as all heads of the divisions
had also a reporting line directly to him, beside the reporting line to their respective
directors. Managers, even the senior ones, often hesitated to make decisions, and
sought direction from the top. Influenced by the tendency of high collectivism, the
decision-making process was slow and dominated by several consultation meetings
among the executives prior to bringing the issue to the top, even for insignificant
issues. The consultation process among those executives was slow as they avoided
direct confrontation and sought for the necessary ‘face saving’. This slow process was
regarded by the impatient middle managers as the ‘bolt-and-nut executive meeting’.

5.4.3 C on tem porary In d o n esia ’s E con om ic Crisis a n d C E T erm ination

The financial crisis that devastated South East Asia since in the middle of 1997 has
had a great impact on Indonesia’s economy and politics. The Indonesian currency,
Rupiah , had fallen by more than 60% against US dollar, the stock market index had
dropped by more than 30% and inflation raised rapidly to more than 80% by early
1998 (Prijadi and Rakhmawati, 1998). The financial crisis led to economic and social
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problems. Unemployment rapidly increased; manufacturing and construction workers
were affected most. This situation eventually led to civil unrest that led to political
crisis. The pressure for reform brought about by student and general demand,
ultimately toppled the more than 30 years old regime on May 21 1998. Reformation
in political, economics and social institutions as well as law reinforcement was
highlighted as urgent in the new administration. However, social, political and
economic situations remained uncertain.
Unlike other parts of Indaco that were affected since the end of 1997, the financial
impact of the economic crisis only started to seriously affect the PLI Program in late
1998. This one-year lag was instrumental in allowing the PLI Program to complete its
preliminary design phase. However, when the crisis was eventually felt, it totally
eliminated the program’s source of finance. There had been indications of financial
difficulties since the mid 1998 when the Program Manager issued a directive stated
that the main objective of the Program was reduced to the completion of the
preliminary design phase by the middle of 1999. At the end of 1998, the private
company set up to finance the Program, decided to liquidate itself for various political
and economic reasons. This development erased a hope of the PLI Program
continuing the development process in the near future. With the termination of the
PLI Program, the implementation process of CE initiatives was also ended.

5.5 Summary
Indaco was a fully state-owned Indonesian aircraft manufacturing company. Its
establishment in 1976 was linked to the Indonesia’s national pursuit of economic
growth and development toward industrialisation. The industry was intentionally set
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up in the perception that it could fulfil the economical mission for export
diversification and import substitution while fulfil the nation ambition of high-tech
industry.

Although it also had commercial missions, the engineering and

technological orientation was enormous. This company operated in the industry
through various way, including under license production, new aircraft developments,
subcontract services for other primes, and aircraft maintenance services. Influenced
by both national and industrial contexts, Indaco, had an elaborated organisational
structure with highly differentiation, highly centralisation, and highly formalisation.
The characteristics of aircraft industry contributed to high level of differentiation and
formalisation, the cultural tendency associated with high power distance led to high
centralisation, while the collectivism tendency led to slow decision making process.
Extending the organisational contexts towards the external environment of the
company, also provided the bird-eye view of CE adoption: the background of its
initiation and the reason of its termination. The effect of external context on CE
implementation was more remote but nevertheless crucial to its existence. Industry
common practices (e.g. subcontracting, technical and managerial consulting services
and internship program) had exposed CE to Indaco and triggered the decision for
adoption. However, as Indaco was one symbol of national technology development,
this adoption was not solely triggered by the market and competition in the industry
but also, and more intensely, by high-tech ambition which led to strong attention
toward the enabling technology of this approach, namely the computerised support
system. The Indonesian economic and political crisis that started in 1997 had forced
Indaco to terminate the PLI Program due to the ending of the program’s source of
finance. This termination also ended the CE introduction process in Indaco.
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CHAPTER 6
THE SUBSTANCE OF CHANGE: CE IMPLEMENTATION

6.1 Introduction
As outlined in Chapter 2, CE is conceptualised as an approach to new product
development process that focuses on integrating all product life cycle considerations at
the outset of the process to achieve customer expectations with maximum quality, and
reduced lead-time and cost. This approach is operationalised through several sets of
initiatives. This study focuses on two of these sets, namely initiatives on organisational
integration and communication and decision making mechanisms. The organisational
integration has horizontal and vertical dimensions. The degree of cross functionality in a
team represents the degree of horizontal integration, while the degree of heavyweight
management represents the degree of vertical integration. Communication and decision
making mechanisms represent the processual dimension of such integration.
In analysing the introduction process of CE approach, this chapter looks at the changing
shape of CE initiatives throughout the introduction of CE into the Indaco’s PL1 Program from its initial adoption and adjustment to the current approach used at that time to its
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final result. During this process, the model was adjusted, shaped, adapted to the specific
organisational and temporal context. The changing nature of CE in this introduction
process is assessed through operationalised dimensions of the above two initiatives.
In the organisational integration initiatives, the changing nature of the cross-functionality
is assessed through the size and architecture, the scope, and the membership pattern of
the program teams. The changing nature of heavyweightness is assessed through the
structural position, the degree of assigned delegation, and the seniority of the leaders of
the program teams. The initiatives on communication and decision making mechanisms
are assessed through the degree of which formal communication, collaboration, inter
team communication, and involvement of lower level teams in the decision making
process. The assessment in this chapter involved all levels of program teams (i.e. core,
middle-level, and operational teams) that existed throughout the introduction process.
The dimensions assessed are summarised in Table 6-1.
In this assessment, the intended CE model is represented by the Westaco model. This
model was drawn from initiatives related to the CE approaches undertaken by Westaco,
in particular CE approaches from its two recent product development programs. The
assessment reveals that this intended model had a high degree of organisational
integration. Its cross-functional teams had a wide-ranging and in-depth involvement of
various relevant functions. It also had a heavyweight management at all levels of the
development team, which composed of senior and high position leaders with extensive
authority in controlling the development process. Communication and decision making
mechanisms in this intended model was characterised by a systematic communication
system with a high degree of both formal and informal communication within and across
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all levels of the development teams as well as a significant involvement of lower level
teams in the decision making process. This communication system was supported by an
advanced computer system.
Table 6-1 Dimensions of CE Assessed in the Case Study
C a te g o ry
Organisational Integration

C E In itia tiv e
Cross-functional
Team
Heavyw eight
M anagem ent

Com m unication and
Decision Making Mechanisms

Fom al
Com munication
Collaboration

Inter-team
Com m unication
Decision-Making
Mechanism

D im ension
S ize and architecture
Scope
Membership pattern
Hierarchical Position
Nature of delegation
Seniority
Communication mode
Type of data conveyed
Interactional relationship pattern
Conflict & negotiation process
Presence of collective goal
Presence of shared vision
Formal communication
Collaboration
Authority of team s
Respect to lower team s' decision
Power differential

The assessment of CE introduction in the Indaco’s PLI Program is intentionally detailed
to see the dynamics of its changing shape and nature throughout the process. As
discussed in Chapter 2, many studies of CE only provide a superficial understanding of
the complex organisational arrangements involved in multi-teams product development
projects. Their models, analyses, and prescriptions appear too simplistic. The assessment
of Indaco’s PLI Program in this thesis reveals four stages of the Program in relation to
CE. The first stage represented the traditional approach, while other stages represented
the CE introduction process to a new product development program. Each stage had a
different characteristics of organisational integration and communication and decision
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making mechanisms. Further more, this longitudinal analysis reveals no consistent path
of this variation toward the intended model. Rather, this variation seems to be ad-hoc and
strongly influenced by the temporal and organisational contexts. This variation is the
subject of the explanatory assessment in the next chapter.
The sections of this chapter are arranged as follows. It begins with an overview of the
Indaco’s PLI Program. Then, CE initiatives at Westaco as the model of CE being
introduced to Indaco are described. This is followed by a detailed discussion on CE
implementation in Indaco throughout the phases of the PLI’s development process. Four
stages of change process were identified, characterised by differences in organisational
integration and communication and decision-making mechanisms. This is followed by a
discussion on the extent of variation between the intended Westaco model and what was
emerging as the Indaco model and its changing nature throughout the process.

6.2 Overview of Indaco’s PLI Program
The PLI was conceived as a new generation of regional jets for the 21st century. Indaco
forecasted that there would be an increasing demand for regional aircraft in order to fill
an increasing gap between the supply of jumbo jets and regional airplanes that usually
serve as the jumbo jet’s feeders. The PLI was intended meet that demand (Indaco, 1997).
Company-wise, the PLI was regarded as a major vehicle to bring Indaco to the fourth
phase of its planned strategic development, i.e. the implementation of R&D in future
technology. The PLI was the third new aircraft platform development undertaken by
Induce after the co-development of the 35-passenger commuter PLC and the development
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of the first indigenous 50-passenger commuter PLP. The objective of the PLI program
was to develop, build and, certify prototypes of a new platform 100-passenger jet airplane
that could fulfil the world market by 2004. At the outset, the estimated development cost
was USS 2 billion. The general features of this new aircraft are provided in Table 6-2.
Table 6-2: General Features of the PLI (Source: Indaco ])
PLI-100
Basic
Increased
Gross Weight
Gross Weight

Dimension
Wing:
Gross Area
Span
Aspect Ratio
Sweepback (0.25c)
Overall Length
Fuselage Diameter
Weight
Max. Take Oft'Weight
Max. Landing Weight
Max. Payload
Engine Thrust
Passenger Capacity
All tourist Class
Mixed Class

(m2)
(m)

PLI-200
Basic
Incerased
Gross Weight
Gross Weieht

(degree)
(m)
(m)

107.4
29.9
8.4
25
31.25
3.95

107.4
29.9
8.4
25
31.25
3.95

107.4
29.9
8.4
25
33.86
3.95

107.4
29.9
8.4
25
33.86
3.95

(kg)
(kg)
(kg)
(KN)

49550
44600
11400
2x83

51500
46350
11400
2x86

56600
50950
13200
2x94

58700
52850
13200
2x98

(pax)
(pax)

114
104

114
104

132
122

132
122

The lifetime of the PLI Program ran from November 1993 to June 1999 when it was
terminated due to the ongoing economy crisis within the country. The initial engineering
study of PLI development was begun in November 1993 by the New Product
Development (NPD) Department, a department within the Technology Division. The PLI
Program was officially launched in March 1994 and initially led by the Head of NPD
Department as the Chief Engineer. In August 1995, a program manager was assigned to
1 Item (83) Appendix-B
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manage the PLI Program. The Program Manager, who recently completed his internship
in Westaco, decided to introduce CE using the Westaco initiatives as the model. At the
time of the field study from October 1997 to March 1999, there were more than 130
people from various specialisations fully dedicated to this Program, while a significant
number of others were supporting the Program through their work in functional areas.

6.2.1 P ro g ra m P h a ses

The PLI Program established a typical five-phase aircraft development process:
1) conceptual design phase,
2) preliminary design phase,
3) detail design phase,
4) prototype production (fabrication and assembly) phase, and
5) flight test and certification phase.
This, however, was not so much a linear sequential process, rather a process of
continuous iterative and overlapping development. Despite the decision to use CE, the
program schedule showed no significant expectation of a faster development time.
Rather, the schedule can be seen as ‘moderate’ for such a development program. It was
slightly longer than the schedule of the previous PLP Program reflecting that the PLI was
larger and more complex than PLP. The Program’s Master Phasing Plan can be seen in
Appendix D. The activities planned in each of the development phases are given in Table
6-3, while the simplified version of its major milestones can be seen in Figure 6-1.
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Table 6-3: Development Activities in Each Development Phase (Source: Indaco2)
Phase

A c tiv itie s

C o n cep tu al

D efinition of D es ig n R e q u irem e n t and O bjectives (D R & O )
D e v e lo p m e n t o f b asic configuration (cabin s p a c e , m axim um ta k e off w e ig h t (M T O W ), wing size , en g in e s ize )
D efinition o f b a s e lin e configuration options( 8 0 ,1 0 0 and 1 3 0 passenger)
P relim in ary a s s e s s m e n t of aircraft system s (hydraulics, electrics, avionics)
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Figure 6-1: Simplified Milestones of the PLI Program (Source: Indaco )23

2 Extracted from items (9), (10), (13), and (16) of Appendix-B
3 Item (83) Appendix-B
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The program had completed its conceptual phase and delivered the design requirement
and objectives (DR&O) at the beginning of 1997. The airplane-level DR&O of the PLI
Program can be seen in Table 6-4. The DR&O was continually refined and detailed
during the next preliminary design phase.
Table 6-4: PLTs Airplane Level DR&O (Source: Indaco4)
Payload

Feature

Design Range
Long Range Cruise Speed
Take-off Field Length
Landing Field Length
Sendee Ceiling

Description
114 passengers all tourist class 32" seat pitch (baseline)
132 passengers all tourist class 32" seat pitch (stretched version)
2963 km (1600 nm)
0.8mach
1750 m (5742 ft) (MTOW, ISA+18, sea level)
1750 m (5742 ft) (MLW. ISA+18, sea level, wet runway)
11890 km (39000 ft)

At the time of the field study from October 1997 to March 1999, the Program was
undertaking the preliminary design phase with some parallel activities covering the detail
design and certification process. By the end of 1998, due to Indonesian economic
difficulty, Indaco decided to temporarily terminate the Program on the completion of this
preliminary design phase scheduled on June 1999. The aim was to make the design
concept ready for potential investors.

6.2.2 P ro gram U niqueness

Compared to Indaco’s other programs, the PLI Program had two distinctive features: a
4 Item (83) Appendix-B
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unique financial arrangement and the deliberate attempt to use CE as its approach to the
organisation and management of the development process. These features affected the
whole process of development within the Program and the relationship between the
Program and the rest of the company.
1) Financial arrangem ent:

Officially, the PLI Program was undertaken by Indaco through a contract with the
owner , a private company (pseudonym: Prico), specifically formed to acquire funding
for the PLI development. The contract between Indaco and Prico, signed in August
1996^, made in effect that Indaco acted as a sole contractor to Prico. However, as the idea
of the program was proposed by Indaco, it effectively acted as the virtual owner of the
Program, particularly in defining the airline features and program schedule. Prico was
typically seen as part of a scheme to ensure financial support for the Program.
Prico reserved the right to audit cost disbursement of the PLI Program. To simplify the
audit procedure and to limit exposure of the company’s financial affairs to outsiders, the
Program’s financial management was set up separately from Indaco’s. By this
arrangement, the PLI Program was authorised to manage its own financial affairs using
the statement of work authorisation. The statement of work was used both to authorise
the execution of tasks and to control the process. Periodically, the Program submitted a
work plan to Prico in the form of a statement of work draft, which included targets on
deliverables, schedules and man-hours required. Prico then authorised this statement of
work and provided money to the Program based on the agreed man-hours required. A
5 Item (35) in Appendix-B
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similar procedure was also in place (or at least attempted) for the functional units within
the company that provided services to the Program.
This specific financial arrangement allowed the Program to have flexibility in allocating
its financial resources and relative freedom from the myriad of Indaco’s slow corporate
procedures. It increased the ‘heavyweightness’ of the Program organisation and
influenced the decision to become an autonomous program. This arrangement created
more flexibility for the Program than any other divisions, including the ability to bring
functional expertise from outside Indaco rather than rely on the internal support.
However, this arrangement also created inconsistency in the overall company policies. It
was perceived by others as an indication of the Program’s exclusiveness and created
displeasure among other senior managers and jealousy among other employees. This, in
turn, affected the interaction between the Program and other divisions.
2) Concurrent engineering approach:

When he was appointed in 1995, the Program Manager, an engineer in a functional
design unit (i.e. Technology Division), had just returned from an internship in Westaco.
His announcement to implement CE in the PLI Program was seen as an opportunity to
improve the product development process, particularly by people from production-related
functions who were concerned with the problems they had encountered in the previous
PLP Program. Basically, the PLI Program attempted to implement an approach that was
modelled closely on Westaco’s DRX Program. The Program manager stressed in the
interview:
In my opinion, [the DRX] Program was more concurrent because it was truly product oriented. ...
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For [the PLI], we will use that. (Clive, Program Manager, June 1996)

A wide range of Westaco’s manuals were available to Indaco and often used as
references to support CE implementation. The Program Manager established a group to
develop the ‘Sidina’ system as CE enabling technology for this Program. This group, co
ordinated outside the Program team by the Head of CADCAM Division, aimed to
prepare, develop and set up the necessary enabling technology to support CE
implementation. The Sidina group ran two pilot projects: one dealt with the idea of using
a cross-functional team in the application of digital product development process, and the
other attempted to develop a system based on knowledge-based engineering. Further
analysis of enabling technology provided by Sidina group is discussed in Chapter 7.
Apart from the Sidina projects and the availability of Westaco’s manuals, there was no
deliberate attempt to introduce and socialise CE, neither within the PLI Program team nor
in the rest of the company. Within the PLI Program, CE was interpreted variously and
given different meanings by different people and groups. Since this issue was never
brought into a formal cross-functional discussion at any level, there was no single
agreement on what a CE approach meant to the Program. As a result, despite the Program
Manager’s intention to follow Westaco’s approach, the implementation process revealed
that the realisation of CE in Indaco’s PLI Program varied over time and did not follow
the intended model. Detailed assessment of this variation is provided in the next sections.
In addition, most senior managers within Indaco were not well informed about the
consequences of implementing CE. There was no deliberate link between the Program’s
CE initiatives and the company-wide organisation and human resource policies. The
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objectives and consequences of introducing such an approach were only casually
addressed in the Executive Management Council meetings. This lack of communication
raised conflicts during the development process between the Program and the involved
functional units. These conflicts mostly appeared in functional units’ hesitation to
provide the human resources demanded by the Program which, in turn, was perceived by
the Program as a resistance toward the CE approach.

6.3 CE Initiatives at Westaco: The Model of CE for the PLI Program
In this case study, CE initiatives in product development applied by Westaco, a major
player in the aircraft industry, are taken to represent the intended model that was
introduced into Indaco for the following reasons:
1) The Westaco model of CE was an explicit basis for the introduction of CE in Indaco.
At the beginning of the program, the Program Manager of the PLI continuously
expressed his intention to implement CE and to bring a particular set of initiatives and
concepts from Westaco to be implemented in the PLI Program. These concepts were
learned either indirectly through the availability of manuals and protocols concerning
those concepts at Indaco, or through hands-on experience by Indaco’s engineers in an
internship program at Westaco.
2) Westaco is one of the most respected companies in the global aircraft industry and its
• model was a representative of CE application in the industry. CE initiatives from
Westaco have been widely researched and reported on in various books, journals and
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magazines, and regarded as ‘one of the best practices’ in the aircraft industry.
For the purpose of this thesis, the key characteristics of the Westaco model were those
elements communicated to and within Indaco rather than the complex and most probably
involved reality of Westaco’s longer-term implementation of CE. CE initiatives at
Westaco were identified indirectly through the following sources:
1) Published materials, including CE books, journal and magazines.
2) Unpublished materials, particularly in the form of Westaco’s procedures and
protocols that were widely available in Indaco.
3) Accounts from primary sources, i.e. ex-interns, who experienced and witnessed
Westaco’s development processes.
According to these sources, Westaco’s CE approach was applied through various sets of
initiatives. These varied from one program to another. Typically, initiatives applied in the
later development programs were more advanced than in the earlier programs. In part,
this variation reflected the cumulative experience that Westaco has gained through its
previous programs. It also reflected the development of both the CE concept and
computer technology as its enabling technology since Westaco’s major CE initiatives
involved advanced computer support systems.
Two sets Westaco’s CE initiatives were particularly influential in the Indaco’s CE: CE
initiatives for a new platform program (pseudonym: PLX) established in 1991 and CE
initiatives for a major derivative program (pseudonym: DRX) established in 1994.
Although the Program Manager of the PLI Program often expressed his preference to use
the DRX model of CE, the PLX model was also significantly influential in the PLI
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Program. There were two major reasons of this. Firstly, the protocols of the PLX model
are more widely available in Indaco than the protocols of the DRX model. Technical
assistants hired from Westaco even long before the PLI Program had started brought
these protocols. Secondly, most ex-interns who brought hands-on experience of CE from
Westaco were involved in the PLX program rather than in the DRX Program. Therefore,
these two sets o f Westaco CE initiatives are included in this review and regarded as the
Westaco Model’ as intended to be introduced in Indaco. Table 6-5 provides a summary
of this review, which is discussed in more detail in the remainder of this section.
In general, CE initiatives in the PLX and DRX Programs were similar. Despite the
obvious difference of the size and the nature of these programs (i.e. new platform versus
derivative development), they both had a sizeable team divided into several layers of a
core team and sub-teams. They had a wide ranging cross-functionality and a heavyweight
program management with similar communication and decision-making mechanisms. A
detailed analysis on organisational integration and communication and decision making
process revealed their differences in the nature of how their sub-teams were divided, the
role of the functions involved, and the pattern of team membership as follows.

1) Organisational Integration
C ross-F u n ction a lity:

Both programs involved company-wide full members and functional representatives
representing both engineering and non engineering functions, such as airframe structure,
aerodynamic, system, stress analysis, weight analysis, manufacturing planning, NCprogramming, tooling engineering, design to cost analyst, customer service,
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manufacturing, quality control, purchasing, business, training, computer services, and
scheduling. They also involved external organisations, such as main manufacturing
contractors, suppliers and potential customers.
Table 6-5: Summary o f the Westaco Model of CE
CE Initiative and Dimension
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In the PLX Program, the team was primarily based on the design specialisation (e.g.
structure, system) and then divided further into several layers based on product division
(e.g. wing structure, aileron structure). Design engineers comprised and played the main
role in the sub-teams. Members from other functions played supporting roles as
functional representatives outside the operational design teams. In contrast, the DRX
Program team was primarily divided based on fully integrated end product incorporating
various design specialisations (e.g. wing, aileron). Design engineers and members from
other functions comprised the operational sub-teams and played equal roles.
Overall, the team architecture, scope of integration, and membership pattern of the PLX’s
cross-functional team resembled the findings of CE teams on the U.S. automobile
industry (Haddad, 1996). The overall cross-functional team covered a wide range of
functions and specialisation through permanent and fully dedicated representation, but
the operational design teams were dominated by engineers. In a sense, the horizontal
integration of the DRX Program was a refinement from the PLX Program. It refined the
interlocking structure of the core team and sub-teams of the PLX program through
specific membership pattern of the high-level teams. It pushed the involvement of various
engineering and non-engineering functions into the operational levels and freed those
levels from the confusion of a matrix mechanism. By integrating all specialisations to
work together in an operational team, its architecture also provided a truly productfocused team structure.

Heavyweightness:
At Westaco, the program managers had the highest authority in the development process,
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while the functional units served as ‘support pools’ to provide the required skill
competencies and to ensure the compliance with any relevant regulations. The Program
Manager was responsible and accountable for the product’s features and performance, as
well as for the program’s management including planning, budgeting, allocating
resources and controlling the progress. To provide the program with sufficient power,
Westaco had established program teams with heavyweight management.
Structurally, the management of both programs had formal hierarchical positions equal
with the functional heads at their levels. The difference in the nature of the program (i.e.
platform versus derivative) caused the difference in the hierarchical position of the
program managers of these two programs. The program manager of the new platform
PLX program was a vice president reported to the president director of the group. The
program manager of the derivative DRX program was a subdivision head and reported to
a vice president. However, both program managers had extensive authority and access to
control the overall development processes. They and other team leaders at all levels were
typically senior members of the company in terms of age, tenure and experience with a
sufficient degree of education. These program leaders had extensive delegation from both
the programs and functional units to make and execute decisions throughout the
development process.2

2) Communication and Decision Making Mechanism
Both Westaco’s programs had the same pattern of communication and decision making
mechanisms. At the operational development process, technical information was shared
and channelled across the teams through the on-line computer system, but updated
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authorisation remained with the originators. The whole program teams were also linked
by four levels of systematically arranged regular meetings. This also reflected the
decision-makmg mechanism of the programs that had a low degree of power differential
and respect the authority of low-level teams.

• Operational meeting: Each development team had its twice-a-week meeting chaired
by its leader and attended by all engineers and representatives worked for that team.
The agenda of this meeting typically included discussion of new design issues, and
closing issues that involved team decisions signed by every member including
finalising drawings so that they could be passed on to manufacturing. Minutes of
meetings were distributed to all attendants after each meeting
• Progress Review Meeting: This was a weekly co-ordination meeting at the middle
management level for clearing up issues and problems from the above operational
meetings. The meeting was conducted with a formal time-controlled agenda and a
circulation of minutes of meeting afterward. Typically, the agenda involved reports
from Chief Engineers, representatives, lead engineers, and key engineers, each of
which was followed by a discussion. The decisions were made in the meeting.
• Design Review Meetings: The development process was divided into several design
reviews. Typically, the design review meetings were conducted every two months.
The aims o f these meetings were to review the overall development process and to
straighten out any engineering problems. Prior to each of these meetings, the design
process was frozen, and the administration services distributed the list of design
interferences (i.e. the mismatch between one part or aspect of the design and other
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parts or aspects) to be resolved at the meeting. As most interferences involved more
than one operational team, these meetings represented the formal communication
across teams to resolve issues in the first and second meetings. Therefore, these three
program meetings systematically interlocked across all layers of teams.

• Program Management Meetings: These meetings represented the communication
and decision-making mechanisms in the program top management. The meeting
covered a wide range of issues encountered by the program, such as training, major
purchasing, interactions with the authority, and changes of important material.
Formal communication at various levels was accompanied with more informal
collaborative modes that ranging from on the spot discussion, e-mail, and telephone
conversation. Within the operational development teams, this intensive collaboration was
fostered by collocation and the ‘indoctrination process’ of a program familiarisation
course through which any new member was introduced to the programs’ overall plans
and protocols at the very beginning of his/her involvement in the programs.
Informal collaboration across operational teams also occurred, typically triggered by the
preparation for design review meetings. As engineers from various teams had to establish
their joint course of actions to resolve the interference problems prior to these meetings,
informal interactions even with unfamiliar colleagues were intensified. Any problem
resolution as a result of these interactions within and across teams was respected. Only
issues that could not be resolved through interaction at the lower level were brought to
higher level meeting for decision.
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6.4 CE Approach in Indaco’s PLI Program
This section captures the process of introducing CE in the Indaco’s PLI Program. During
the PLI Program’s lifetime (1993-1999), four different structures in organising its
development teams were identified in regard to organisational integration aspect of CE.
This led to four different stages of CE implementation as follow:
1) The Program Initiation Stage (November 1993 - August 1995).
This stage corresponded with the beginning of the conceptual phase of the PLI
Program. In general, this was a pre-CE stage. At this stage, there was no intention to
implement CE. Instead the task was carried out by the New Product Development
(NPD) Department with the team exclusively made up of design engineers.
2) The Engineering Matrix Stage (August 1995 - October 1996).
The commencement of this stage marked by public launching of the PLI development
program in August 1995. The Program Manager, officially appointed by the Indaco’s
President Director in this event, established a program structure that primarily
consisted of matrix between the Program’s component-based design teams and
engineering specialists groups supported by functional design units.
3) The Engineering Integration Stage (October 1996 - June 1997).
This stage was marked by the launching of a new program structure that internalised
engineering specialists and functional representatives within the Program
organisation. The internalisation involved merging the component-based design
teams and engineering specialists into the Program’s Design Integration teams, and
addition of five functional representatives as part of the Program team, including the
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Operation Co-ordinator representing production-related functions.
4) The Design-Production Coupling Stage (June 1997 - June 1999).
In this stage the PLI Program restructured its organisation to become an autonomous
division internalising all functions necessary to develop and build the aircraft as parts
of the Program. The main feature of the Program was the Design Centre and the
(production) Operation Centre; each consisted of parallel product-based teams.
In general, these various structures and stages can be seen as part of the effort to find an
appropriate means of implementing CE. The field study started in the beginning of the
design-production coupling stage. The overlapping between these stages, program
development phases, and field study time can be seen in the Figure 6-2.
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The review of this section is constructed around the CE initiatives that are the focus of
this study (i.e. organisational integration and communication and decision making
mechamsms). It starts with outlining the changing nature of CE initiatives in
organisational integration and communication and decision making mechanisms within
the program teams throughout four identified stages. A longitudinal analysis of each
stage is provided afterward to clearly capture the dynamics of the change process and the
temporal and organisational contexts that might influence the process and the variations,
either against one another or against the intended model, that were present throughout the
process. Therefore, this analysis is intentionally detail, exploring the nature of each team
involved throughout four identified stages, from the core team to the operational teams.

6.4.1 Overview of Indaco ’s CE
Throughout four identified stages, the changing nature and shape of CE initiatives in the
PLI Program can be summarised in Table 6-6. In general, both organisational integration
and communication and decision making mechanism were undergone significant
changes. The introduction of CE started at the second stage, the engineering matrix
stage, and was marked by the effort to establish a cross-functional team with a
heavyweight management for the PLI Program and separate the Program team from the
functional design units (i.e. Technology Divisions) that traditionally housed such
development activity. This was accompanied by another effort to establish an integrated
computer system to support product development activities.
Throughout all stages, however, this effort took a different path from the intended
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Westaco model. By the end of this introduction process, the Program abandoned the
heavyweight matrix organisational arrangement to become an autonomous division that
independent from the influence of functional units. The process was dominated by the
design-related functions. Consistent support came only from production-related
functions. The computer-support system remained a stand-alone rather than an integrated
system. Decision making process was dominated by high-level teams and individuals.
Involved teams were not linked either by systematic formal meetings or by informal
collaboration. The changing nature of CE initiatives in each of organisational integration
aspect and in communication and decision making mechanism aspect is as follows:
Table 6-6: Summary of the Changing Nature of CE in Indaco
CE Stage

CE Initiative and Dimension
Program Initiation

Cross
Functional

See and

Smal

Architecture

Smote team

Engmeenng Matrix

Engneering Integration

Design- Production Couping

Large wth core team and several levels of subteams

Team
Scope

Design team was divided pnmariiy based on

Design Centre: product-based teams

integrated eno product

Operation Ctr product-based + functional

Wide range company-wide functions
Design engineering

Design function in the man role

Design function m the man role

Weak support from ether functions.

Support from other functions.

incbdng production (focal pcxnts*)

including production (representatives)

Design and production in the man role
Internalisation of aft relevant functions

Membership

Permanent and fully

Mxed fulty/partly defeated members Mostly fully dedicated members of

Pattern

dedicated members

of design teams wth overlapping and design teams with overlapping and

members separated into Design Centre

Q
©__

Overlapping

riteriocktfig membership

and (Production) Operation Centre

m

membership

1

s
m

s

C

Permanent and fully dedicated

inîeriocktng membership
Representatives and Focal points' of

Focal poets’ cf other functions

Intemaïsation of relevant functions
other functions

Heavyweight OrganisationsV

Functiona! department

Management Hierarchical Position Mddfe tevel

Heav/ws art matrix

Autonomous division

High tevel auihoniy

High level authority

Nature of Delegation Extensive

Extensive to Program Manager, senior leaders, aid senior engineers

Extensive

Seniority of leaders

Sensor leader

Mxed of junior and senior leaders in design teams

Junior leaders/engneers in design teams

Junior engineers

Junior engineers

More senior in operation teams

Routine meeting

Communication modes were ad hoc based on preference and situational context

*o

Early ntormation

Computer-based meda were stand alone

*G

Extensive

High level coSafcoration within the subteams but rarely extended across teams

c
o

m

s

Formal Gommmication
Cotaborabon

• È Merteam Comnuucabon
iS lO
c E

Reason Malang Mechanism
8 1
T

Rich two-way

Fated to maintain a rich two-way dialogue
Formal and Less cofeboratives

comtruncation
Smal

autonomous
team

that ftounshed earlier this stage
"Semi autonomous' hierarchy of teams *Semi autonomous' hierarchy of

design strongly influenced by fractional
design units

Large autonomous design / production

teams less influenced by design units teams increasingly centralised in the core
as sngneers were integrated

team

Focal Ports: fonctional expens assigned by functional mils to support a program
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1) Organisational Integration
CE initiatives in this aspect caused a significant change in Program organisation. Prior to
CE introduction, PLI development activities were carried out as functional activities in
the NPD Department of Technology Division. At the engineering matrix stage, when CE
was first introduced, the development activities were managed by a heavyweight program
team involving all design-related functions through a matrix between the Program’s
operational design teams and the engineering specialist groups backed by functional
design units. In the next stage, (i.e. engineering integration stage) engineering specialists
were integrated to the design teams but the PLI Program managed a matrix between the
Program and other supporting functional units. In the last stage, rather than keeping the
matrix arrangement as the intended Westaco model, the PLI Program became an
autonomous division, mainly consisted of design-related and production related
functions. The heavyweightness of the Program team was reflected by the structural
position of the Program Manager who reported directly to the President Director
throughout all stages. However, these efforts did not ensure that the Program achieved its
intention in implementing CE to its development process.

Horizontal Integration: Cross Functional Team in the PLI Program
Cross-functionality in the PLI Program evolved in line with the increasing complexity of
the development process and the growth of the program team. Initially, the Program was
carried out by a small team. Over time, the size had grown to become more than 130
people by the last stage. Starting at the engineering matrix stage, the Program team was
divided into a core managerial team and several levels of sub-teams. At the program
initiation stage, the development team only covered the design-engineering
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specialisation. With the decision to introduce CE, the Program started to involve other
functions in the engineering matrix stage. Unlike the cross-functionality in the DRX
Program, however, functions other than design-related functions were only involved in
supporting roles and were separated from the design teams. Only at the last stage did
other functions (i.e. production-related functions) become involved in the main
development activities through the formation of the Operation Centre along side the
Design Centre.
In the program initiation stage, team members were permanent and fully dedicated
engineers. In the engineering matrix stage, additional partly dedicated engineers from
various design specialisations were brought to the design teams as part of the matrix
arrangement. In the engineering integration stage, most of representatives became fully
dedicated to the Program. In the last stage (i.e. design-production coupling stage), with a
few exceptions all involved parties belonged to the Program and became permanent and
dedicated members of the Program.

Vertical Integration: Heavyweight Management in the PLI Program
From the beginning, the top management of the PLI Program had enjoyed an equivalent
position and authority to that of the heads of functional units on issues such as budget and
resource allocation. However, the Program struggled to gain control over some
development processes carried out by the functional design units (i.e. technical analyses
that were central to making design decisions) particularly because the leaders of the PLI
Program were less senior in their age and less experienced than their counterparts in the
functional design units. The complexity of the relationship between the functional units
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and the PLI Program under a matrix arrangement in the second and third stages led to the
creation of a stand-alone independent program in the fourth stage. In this stage,
functional representatives became full members of the Program team, and thereby gave
up their positions in the functional units.

2) Communication and Decision Making Mechanisms
In a development process of the PLI’s scale, the release and use of uncertain information
by engineers were necessary in the initial stages to establish an ‘engineering solutions
envelope’. This information was shared through the computer system and continuously
updated when more refined data (e.g. analyses and test results) were available. The
process in the core team and middle level teams was dominated by formal
communication, such as meetings, reports and memoranda. Over time, these higher level
teams increasingly ignored and disregarded decisions made by the lower level operational
teams. There was evidence of difficulties in maintaining interaction across teams both
horizontally and vertically. However, the communication and decision-making
mechanisms within the operational design and (later) production sub-teams were often
dominated by collaboration based more on friendly and informal communication and
dialogue to achieve mutual goals. Formal communication was typically used to formalise
the result of the collaboration process, rather than in the decision making itself.
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6.4.2 Longitudinal Analysis of CE Introduction Process in Indaco
6.4.2.1 Program Initiation Stage (November 1993 - August 1995)
The PLI Program was first initiated in November 1993 when the President Director of
Indaco asked the Head of NPD Department to assess the possibility of developing a
regional jet airplane. The preliminary design requirements and objectives (DR&O), a
rough concept of the PLT was completed in January 1994. A series of management kick
off meetings was conducted during March - July 1994. These meetings decided that the
PLI would be a 100-passenger wing-mounted engine regional aircraft and outlined the
program milestones with the first delivery targeted in 2006. By the end of 1994, the PLI’s
two-year plan of the conceptual design phase was completed. Following this, the
President Director assigned the Head of the NPD Department as the Project Engineer of
the PLI Program. He was responsible for the overall product performance aspects as well
as the progress of the development program. Consequently, most engineers worked at the
NPD Departments worked for this Program. Detailed analyses of organisational
integration and communication and decision making mechanism in this stage are as
follows:

1) Organisational Integration:
Cross Functionality:
In this stage, the size of the team working for PLI was around 20 members. The team was
divided into nine overlapped informal groups in which one member might belong to more
than one group: Configuration, Flight Mechanic, Aerodynamics, Structure, Wing Design,
System, Fly-by-Wire, Load Alleviation, and Propulsion. Each group had 3-6 members.
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Despite this sub-grouping, the whole team, due to its relatively small size, was able to
perform as a single team without hierarchical division of core team and sub-teams. As
part of the NPD Department, all members were representing design engineering. There
was no representation of other functions. All members worked at the operational level
and were fully dedicated to the development of PLI. Their involvement was permanent as
part of their task in the department.

Heavyweightness:
The Project Engineer was the Head of NPD Department, a middle manager who reported
to the Director of Technology. As all team members were part of his department, he had
full authority and was able to directly control and supervise the process. Due to his
involvement as the Project Engineer in the previous PLP Program, he often had direct
access to the President Director and, therefore, influential in engineering-related issues.
However, his discretion over budget and resource allocation was limited. His request for
additional facilities, for example, had to proceed through the Director of Technology.
The team members were mainly junior, 20 - 35 years old, engineers. Typically, this
Program was their first involvement in product development process. Most co-ordinators
of the sub-groups were equally juniors, typically appointed on the basis of either their
qualifications or their experience. These co-ordinators had little delegated authority in
design process or in controlling other members. Supervision and direction of the process
came directly from the Project Engineer.

2) Communication and Decision Making Mechanisms
The PLI development team had a weekly meeting led by the Project Engineer that
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discussed and decided various interface issues between sub-groups. The release and use
of uncertain and ambiguous data were common. The design concept was continuously
refined, as more valid data became available.
The interaction among members was highly collaborative. Inspired by the often quoted
President Director’s vision “Mastering advanced technology is an effort to accelerate
national development”6, team members were typically determined to prove that they were
capable of making such a contribution to the company’s and the nation’s future. These
shared vision and goals led to a relatively cohesive team. The cohesiveness among these
particular members remained throughout all stages. The overlapping small-size groups
made informal discussion within and between groups possible. Engineers who belonged
to more than one sub-group acted as catalysts in inter-group communication. Although
friendly, there was a significant power differential between the Project Engineer and
team members. Most major decisions were made by the Project Engineer.

6.4.2.2 Engineering Matrix Stage (August 1995 - October 1996)
In August 1995, the PLI Program was publicly launched and the President Director
officially appointed its Program Manager. The Program Manager, who reported to the
President Director, decided to introduce CE. This marked the commencement of this
stage. As part of CE introduction, the Program Manager established a matrix arrangement
involving the Program’s product-based teams and specialist groups from various
6 e.g. Item (36) Appendix-B
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engineering specialisations. Other functional units supported the Program through their
focal points specifically assigned to provide functional supports for the Program. The
Program organisation was structured as in Figure 6-3.

The main part of this structure was the matrix between the product-based design teams
called TOP (stands for Team optimisasi produk’: product optimisation team) and the
engineering specialist groups. The TOP teams were responsible for the physical features
and configuration of the aircraft and aircraft components. There were four TOP teams:
Fuselage, Wing, System and Propulsion, co-ordinated by the TOP-Airplane Manager.
This manager reported to the Program Manager and was responsible for the whole
aircraft configuration development. The typical work plan of the TOP teams during this
conceptual design phase included preliminary design concept definition; trade-off study
on sizing and configuration; design concept validation and tool evaluation; and
application for preliminary design.
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Engineering specialist groups were functional-based groups that responsible for the
necessary non-physical products, such as analysis and calculation, to support the TOP
team in the development process. There were four engineering specialist groups:
1) Aeromechanics, Aerodynamics and Aerolastics;
2) Aerophysics and Flight Mechanics;
3) Airframe Structure, Material and Processing; and
4) Aircraft System.
These groups were supported by functional design units. They consisted of engineers and
specialists who were assigned as representatives to the PLI Program by functional design
units. These specialists worked in the TOP teams. Table 6-7 illustrates the typical task
division between various engineering specialist groups in a component-based TOP team.
TOP-Wing

Engineering Specialist
Groups
Aeromechanics

Airfoil Family

High-lift Devices

Non-Physical
Clean Wing

Specify pressure distnbution

Obtain optimum

Obtain platform, bad

Obtain geometry

configuration

distribution, isobars

Wing and Movable Surface

Product

Determine movable

Software

surfaces

CFD/FEM

Aerophysics and Flight

Define/check control

Expenmental

Mechanics

power

d-base

Airframe Structure, Material

Define wingbox thickness

and Processing
Aircraft System

Define volume and space

Define space for

Compute stress at

New material

fuel and system

critical bads

assessment

Devebp concept for gust/

Advancement of

maneuvre bad contraHer

FBW concept

Define mechanism

of system boxes
Physical Product

Aerofoil

Flap and Slat

Clean Wing

Wing and Surfaces

Table 6-7: Matrix between TOP Teams-Engineering Specialist Groups (Source: Indaco7)
The Program organisation also had a Deputy Program Manager, a Program Management
Office (PMO) Manager, an Engineering Operation Manager, and Executive
Representatives from Business and Finance Divisions. The Deputy Program Manager
was assigned to the previous Project Engineer. He was responsible in managing the
' Item (11) Appendix-B
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technical aspects of development process. In addition, the Program Manager also
requested company-wide functional units to assign their focal points. Focal points were
representative assigned by functional units to provide and co-ordinate functional support
for a particular program. These focal points were involved in various activities to support
the Program.
The attempt to extend the scope of CE was reflected in activities under the Engineering
Operation Manager who was responsible for co-ordinating early involvement of
production-related functions in the Program and assessing enabling technologies
necessary for CE implementation. This Manager established the design build process
(DBP) team to co-ordinate production activities and the advanced system development
(ASD) team to co-ordinate enabling technology assessment. The design build process
team consisted of focal points from production-related divisions, such as Fabrication,
Fixed Wing, Production Engineering, Industrial Engineering, and Quality Assurance.
This team aimed to make necessary preparation for the production phase and to provide
insights to TOP teams on producibility and manufacturability issues of their designs.
The advanced system development team consisted of focal points from Information
Technology, CADCAM, and Manufacturing Resource Planning Divisions. Its objective
was to support CE implementation in the PLI Program. In April 1996, this team obtained
management’s approval to develop a computer-based integrated digital system called
‘Sidina’. Later, known as ‘Sidina’ group, this team was co-ordinated outside the program
organisation by the Head of CADCAM Division. Further analysis o f ‘Sidina’ initiative is
provided in Chapter 7.
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The PMO Manager was responsible for the program management, which involved
planning, monitoring, and controlling the process. The PMO manager co-ordinated
company-wide focal points to establish the program’s Master Phasing Plan (MPP). This
activity involved a series of weekly meetings. By the end of this stage, the Master
Phasing Plan was submitted to the Program Manager for approval. The Business and
Finance Representatives were primarily involved in the establishment of the Preliminary
Feasibility Study of the PLI Program. With this feasibility study, Indaco’s top
management lobbied the Government officials for financial support. This resulted in the
formation of Prico to finance the development cost of the Program in March 1996.
Subsequently, the contract between Indaco and Prico was signed in August 1996.
Detailed analyses on CE initiatives in organisational integration and communication and
decision making mechanisms in this stage are as follows:

1) Organisational Integration
The characteristics organisational integration of the PLI Program in the engineering
matrix stage can be summarised in Table 6-8.

Cross-Functionality:
The size of the Program team expanded to over 60 members, excluding the functional
based focal points. The hierarchical division into three levels was evident on the basis of
their regular meetings: the core team of the Program Manager and its direct subordinates;
a middle level team consisted of the TOP-Airplane Manager and the leaders of designrelated TOP teams; and operational level teams represented by the TOP teams. The scope
of the Program team expanded through the assignment of focal points from all relevant
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functional units. However, functional focal points were typically involved in supporting
roles. The main role laid in the functions that were involved in the core team and designrelated TOP teams.
Table 6-8 : Organisational Integration Characteristics in Engineering Matrix Stage
S ize and A rchitecture:

Large, over 60 people (excluding focal points)
T h ree layers: core team , middle m anagem ent team and sub-team s

Scope:

Core team

Cross-Functional Team

- Role

T O P team s

M P P team

D B P team

M ain D eve lo p m en t Role

A S D /S idina team

Support Roles

- Level o f Involvem ent

Full/representatives

Full/representatives

Focal points

Focal points

Focal points

- Functions Involved

D esign, Business, Finance

D esign functions

com pany-wide

Production functions

IT-related functions

- Position

High level

S taff & m iddle level

M iddle level

M iddle level

M iddle level

- Activity

Liaison/m anagerial

O perational/m anagerial

Liaison

Liaison

Liaison/operational

- Dedication

Full/partly dedicated

Full/partly dedicated

Partly dedicated

Full/partly dedicated

Partly dedicated

- Tem poral

P erm anent

P erm anent/tem porary

Tem porary

Perm anent

Perm anent

M em b ership Pattern:

- M ultiple m em bership

M ultiple within and across team s

- H igher team 's com position

Include leaders of lower team s

Heavyweight Management Team

Hierarchical Position:
- Structural

Equal to functional division

Equal to functional departm ent

- Authority

Extensive authority

M ixe d of little/extensive authority

- A ccess to Control

Less access to control

Little access to control

E xtensive

Extensive for experienced ones

Program delegation:
Functional delegation:

No hierarchical position
Little authority and access

Extensive for experienced leaders and less for inexperienced leaders
M oderate to extensive

Little for inexperienced ones
S en io rity
-A g e

Young

M ixed, increasingly young

M ainly M ature

- Tenure & Experience

inexperienced

increasingly inexperienced

M ainly experienced

- Education

Highly educated

Highly educated

M ixed of highly and less educated

The core team included representatives from design, business, and finance functions. Its
members were considered as high and middle level managers. The Program Manager, the
PMO Manager, and the Engineering Operation Manager were full members and fully
dedicated to the managerial tasks of the Program. Business and Finance representatives
were partly dedicated to the Program and involved in liaison tasks linking the PLI
Program with their functional units. The Project Engineer and the TOP-Airline Manager
were representatives from Technology Divisions. They were partly dedicated to the
Program and mainly handled engineering supervisory tasks.
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The component-based TOP teams (i.e. Fuselage, Wing, System and Propulsion) involved
design-related functions only. To reduce task complexity, each TOP team was divided
into sub-teams. The TOP-Wing, for example, was divided into Airfoil, High-Lift
Devices, Clean Wing, and Movable Surfaces. The TOP teams consisted of fully
dedicated designers from the PLI Program (i.e. engineers from the previous New Product
Development Department) and partly dedicated engineering specialists from various
functional design units (i.e. Technology Divisions). Some members were involved in
more than one TOP team due to the limited number of available engineers and created
multiple membership among these teams. These teams carried out the operational tasks of
the design process. TOP team leaders handled both operational and supervisory tasks.
Most of them were not fully dedicated and had other responsibilities from their functional
design units. The inclusion of the TOP-Airplane Manager in the core team and the
leaders of TOP teams in the middle level team provided interlocking structure in the
program teams.
Other functions played supporting roles in the process as their focal points became parts
of three support teams: the master phasing plan team, the design build process team, and
the advanced system development (later known as Sidina) team. Most of focal points
held middle managerial positions. Typically, they were partly dedicated and performed
liaison tasks between the program and functional units. The master phasing plan team
involved company-wide focal points. The design build process team involved productionrelated focal points and led by the focal point from Production Division. The growing
activities in this team led some members to become representatives and fully dedicated to
the PLI Program. The advanced system development/Sidina team involved focal points
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from divisions related to information technology. Some members of this team performed
operational tasks, evaluating advanced technology possible to support CE
implementation. These support teams had multiple membership as most focal points took
part in the master phasing plan team and some of Sidina members were members of the
TOP teams and the design build process team.

Heavyweightness:
Structurally, the Program Manager’s position was at the same high level as the heads of
functional divisions as he reported directly to the President Director. At 30 years of age,
the Program Manager was a ‘junior’ in the company compared with his counterparts in
functional units. But, his doctoral degree in Aeronautics and his intensive internships in
various Western aircraft companies were considered as substitutes for this lack of tenure
and experience.
The Program Manager had some authority over budget allocation but had problems in
allocating and controlling the resources requested by functional units for PLI purposes.
Although functional units were required to get approval from the PLI Program for any
supporting facility funded by the Program, they afterwards retained full control over such
resources. They were not required to report on the utilisation of those facilities. The PLI
Program often had problems in requesting functional units to share their facilities with
other divisions or to use facilities acquired from other programs.
The Program Manager also had problems in gaining access to control the product
development process. He had less authority than the heads of functional design units over
people who worked for the Program. Most members of his core team were
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representatives with extensive delegation from functional units and were not fully
dedicated to the Program. Officially, they were members of functional units. Their salary
and career path remained attached to those divisions. The Program Manager provided
extensive delegation to members of this core team in performing their tasks.
Leaders of the design-related TOP teams and sub-teams were a mixture of inexperienced
and experienced engineers but they were increasingly dominated by the young and
inexperienced ones albeit with Master or Doctorate degrees. The experienced leaders had
extensive delegation from both the Program and the functional design units they
represented to perform and co-ordinate design tasks. The young and less experienced
leaders had less delegation from the TOP-Airplane Manager. Inexperienced leaders and
engineering specialists also had little delegation from their functions to perform the tasks
and also had to report to their experienced functional leaders. Consequently, the
inexperienced TOP team leaders had problems in controlling engineering specialists
within their teams as these specialists were closely supervised by more experienced
functional leaders. Furthermore, the engineering specialists reallocated some analytical
tasks (e.g. the finite element analysis) to other specialists controlled entirely by functional
design units. Such analysis became a ‘black box’ for the TOP team leaders. They did not
know how it actually proceeded. This raised some design variation concerns that
contributed to the internalisation of engineering specialists in the next stage.
In supporting teams, the master phasing plan team was led by the PMO manager, a
member of the core team. The design build process team was led by the Production Focal
Point, a young engineer who held a Master degree. He had been given an extensive
delegation to co-ordinate focal points from production-related divisions, but neither had
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the authority nor direct access to control them as they were experienced focal points who
also had extensive delegation from various functional units. As most of the members of
this team were experienced engineers, he played a co-ordination role and maintained a
collegial relationship. The advanced system development team was led by the
experienced Head o f CADCAM Division, who had extensive delegation from the
Program Manager and significant influence over other members due to his seniority.

2) Communication and Decision Making Mechanisms:
The characteristics of communication and decision-making mechanism in this stage is
summarised in Table 6-9. Formal communication, such as formal meetings and written
reports were often used to deal with both increasing complexity of development process
and increasing number of team members. Typically, each team had a weekly meeting
complemented with minutes of meeting. The minutes were circulated to other teams.
Table 6-9: Communication and Decision-Making Mechanisms in Engineering Matrix
Stage
Core Team
- Weekly meeting
c
_o
03

and some discussion

TOP Teams
- Mainly weekly meeting
and some discussion

_o
3

- Minutes of meeting
- Reports and memos

- Minutes of meeting
- Communication Memos

E
O

- Mainly late, after all

- Early and on- line
sharing of technical data

information gathered

o
(0
o
J5
o
O

- Late, in batch after each
function had a plan

- Early and batch type,
section by section

- Early and batch type,
section by section

- Friendly and close
- On the spot dialogue
- Relatively independent
- Mainly identified with
functional divisions

- Friendly and some close
- On the spot dialogue
- Relatively independent
- Mainly identified with
functional divisions

- Some release and use of
ambiguous data

E
o
LL
C

Master Phasing Plan Team Design Build Process Team
Sidina Team
- Weekly meeting
- Weekly meeting
- Weekly meeting
and some discussion
and some discussion
and some discussion
- Minutes of meeting
- Minutes of meeting
- Minutes of meeting

- Friendly and distant
- A few dialogue

- Friendly and some close
- On the spot dialogue

- Friendly and distant
- A few dialogue

- Relatively independent
- Some identified with

- Interdependent
- Mainly identified with

- Relatively independent
- Mainly identified with

functional divisions
the Program
the Program
- Formal Meetings with minutes of meeting
o - Formal written reports, memorandas, carbon copies of minutes of meeting and communication memos
- Online shared technical data, particularly within TOP teams and between ASD/Sidina and TOP teams
=
- Less collaborative except for within some TOP teams

1inI i

S

O

c

E

^

-C

- More distant, less dialogue, independent, and more functional or other identification rather than to Program
- Some design decisions were influenced by functional design units (i.e. Technology Divisions)
- Lower level teams (i.e. TO P teams) increasingly had less authority in making decision
- Decision made by lower level teams were mainly respected

O O - Increasingly high power differential perrception between low-level teams and high-level teams

0) 4>
Q ^
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In the core team, formal communication was dominated by weekly meetings and written
reports. The information was communicated after the completion of tasks or decisions
were made. Informal collaborative activities were less evident. Relationship among
members was distant although friendly. Conflicts were not solved through dialogue.
Resolution process typically depended on who had the most legitimate authority on the
issue. Some members identified themselves with the Program but others, functional
representatives in particular, remained loyal to functional units.
The middle level team and most of design-related TOP teams held regular weekly
meetings. Within these teams, technical data was intensively shared through the computer
system. To increase design compatibility, they also used communication memos to
circulate design decisions to all members. A communication memo was a written
medium in which a team listed both their design decisions and design commitments with
other teams or engineering specialists. The release and use of uncertain technical data
increasingly reduced. Engineers tended to consult their superiors before sharing the
information with other members.
Within the TOP teams, the processes were dominated by informal collaboration. Lead
Engineers typically worked together with other engineers. Engineers involved in the
previous stage fostered friendly and close relationship among most members of the TOP
teams. Conflicts were solved through dialogue and informal discussion. Collaboration
across TOP teams was catalysed by engineers involved in more than one TOP team.
Some members identified themselves to the Program but others remained identified to
their functional design units.
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Formal communication in three supporting teams was dominated by regular weekly
meetings. In the master phasing plan team, communication occurred late, after each
functional unit had worked out its plan. Although friendly to one another, members did
not have close relationship, and therefore informal dialogue rarely occurred. In the design
build process team and the advanced system development team, communication occurred
early and in batches, one section at a time. These two teams were also collaborative.
Some members had friendly and close relationship fostering by similarity in their
occupations. Conflicts were often solved through informal discussion. As focal points,
members of all supporting teams were relatively independent of each other and remained
identified themselves to their functional units.
Inter-team communication was mainly characterised as formal. Co-ordination meetings
and written reports were particularly used when involving the core team. The middle,
operational and support teams mainly used meetings and the circulation of
communication memos and minutes of meeting. The leaders of supporting teams usually
attended the meetings of design-related TOP teams.
The matrix between TOP teams and engineering specialist groups allowed some analyses
and design decisions to be outside the control of the Program teams and heavily
influenced by the functional design units (i.e. Technology Divisions). Low level teams
(i.e. the TOP teams and their sub-teams) initially had extensive authority in decision
making. This authority was later reduced as inexperienced engineers involved in those
teams increased. Their decisions also became less respected. Power differential between
high-level and low-level teams increased which led to more dependent low-level teams.
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6.4.2.3 Engineering Integration Stage (October 1996 - June 1997)

The engineering integration stage was marked by the new program structure (Figure 6-4)
that internalised engineering specialists and functional representatives within the Program
organisation. The internalisation involved merging the TOP teams and enmneerin0^
specialists into the Program's design integration teams. This was expected to eliminate
the anxiety over the development process experienced by the members of design teams
due to a dual reporting relationship of the matrix. The Program also internalised the
marketing and customer support functions by appointing a Manager for Marketing and
Customer Support. The organisation involved Sales, Operation, R&D, Procurement and
Finance Co-ordinators who were representatives from functional units. To maintain the
relationship with Prico, the Program also appointed a Prico Co-ordinator.
P ro g ra m M a n a g e r

Figure 6-4: PLI Program Structure in Engineering Integration Stage
This structure was adopted by the Program Manager for several reasons including: (1)
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dissatisfaction over the level of control gained by the PLI Program team for the tasks
allocated to functional units, (2) the growing importance of the above functions as the
Program progressed, and (3) the increasing urgency of facility investment and
procurement issues. With this new organisation, design engineers were ‘hired5 from
functional design units and reported only to the leaders of the PLFs design integration
teams. To add design and technical expertise in the design teams, several technical
advisers were contracted.
Similar to the TOP teams in the previous stage, the Airplane Integration Manager co
ordinated four component-based design integration teams: Body Integration, Wing
Integration, System Integration, and Propulsion Integration teams, and the Configuration
Management and Certification Department. Each team had several sub-teams with the
same grouping as the previous TOP teams. The Configuration Management and
Certification Department was responsible for engineering documentation to ensure the
compliance with the regulatory standards.
Although administratively remained as the members of functional units, the Co
ordinators were appointed by the Program Manager. They did not participate directly in
the development process. Their roles were to provide advice and to ensure the Program
gained the necessary supports from their functional units. Their tasks typically involved
co-ordinating functional activities for the Program. The R&D Co-ordinator linked the
PLI Program and the functional design units (i.e. Technology divisions). Previously, this
link was maintained through the matrix between the TOP teams and engineering
specialist groups. With this new arrangement, the necessary matrix mechanism was
moved from the operational teams into the core team. The R&D Co-ordinator became the
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junction of the matrix between the Program and functional design units with espoused
dual reporting relationship to the both of them, but remained primarily report to his
functional unit.
The addition of the Operation Co-ordinator reflected the increasing activities in the
production-related design build process team. Within this team, the Operation Co
ordinator formed four component-based production-related teams called TIP (stands for
‘tim integrasi produk’: product integration team): TIP Fuselage; TIP Wing; TIP
Assembly and test; and TIP System. This Co-ordinator arranged a matrix between these
TIP teams and production specialist groups, mirroring the matrix of the TOP teams and
engineering specialist groups in the previous stage. Production specialist groups were
supported by their respective functions from functional production units (i.e. Production
Divisions), such as tooling engineering, quality engineering, manufacturing engineering,
industrial engineering, and material processes. Activities in these production-related
teams were actively pursued by the Operation Co-ordinator. These increasing activities in
the production related aspects contributed to the change of the PLI program structure to
balance the hierarchy and authority of design-related and production related teams which
led to the next stage of the CE process in the PLI program.
Detailed analyses on CE initiatives from organisational integration aspect and
communication and decision making mechanism aspect for this stage are as follows:

1) Organisational Integration:
The organisational integration initiatives in this stage is summarised in Table 6-10.
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Table 6-10. Organisational Integration Characteristics in Engineering Integration Stage
S ize and Architecture.
Scope:

Heavyweight Management

Cross-Functional Team

- Role
- Level of Involvement
- Functions Involved

Large, 100 people
______________________ Three layers: core team, middle manaoement team, and sub-teams
Core team
Design Integration Tearns
DBP and TIP teams
Main Development Role
Support Role
Full membership/representatives Full membership/representatives
Representatives
Design. Production, Finance

Design functions

Production functions

Procurement Sales
Membership Pattern
- Position

Middle level representation

Staff representation

Middle level representation

- Activity

Liaison and managerial task

Operational tasks

Liaison/operational tasks

- Dedication

Fully dedicated

Mainly fully dedicated

Full and partly dedicated

- T emporal

Permanent

PermanentAemporary

Permanent/temporary

- Multiple membership

Multiple membership in/across TO P s

Multiple membership across TIPs

- Higher team's composition

Include leaders of lower teams

Include leaders of lower teams
No hierarchical position

Hierarchical Position:
- Structural

Equal to functional division

Equal to functional department

- Authority

Extensive authonty and mainly

Mainly little authority

Little authority

- Access to Control

extensive access to control

Some access to control

Some access to control

Program delegation
Functional delegation

Extensive

Extensive for experienced and less for inexperienced leaders
Full delegation
Extensive

Seniority:
-A g e

Young

Mainly young

Mainly mature

- Tenure & Experience

inexperienced

Mainly inexperienced

Mainly experienced

- Education

Highly educated

Highly educated

Mixed of highly and less educated

Cross-Functionality:
The size of the whole team expanded to over 100 people due to the inclusion of
functional co-ordinators, internalisation engineering specialists, and expansion of the
production-related design build team. Team’s architecture was similar to the previous
stage: a core team of the Program Manager and its direct subordinates; a design related
middle level team of the Airplane Integration Manager and the leaders of design
integration teams; and the operational level teams represented by design integration
teams and their sub-teams. The core team and the design integration teams played the
main role in the development process.
The core team consisted of 11 members covering design, production, finance, sales,
marketing, customer support, R&D, and procurement functions. Co-ordinators
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representing these functions typically held middle managerial positions in their functional
units and performed both liaison and managerial tasks in co-ordinating support for the
Program. Unlike the previous stage, all core team’s members were assigned permanently,
fully dedicated to the Program and no longer had other responsibilities in their functional
units.
In contrast with the previous stage, all leaders of design integration teams were full-time
members of and fully dedicated to the Program. The internalisation of engineering
specialists into the design integration teams changed the nature of membership of these
design teams. Most engineering specialists, who previously were functional
representatives, became full members and were fully dedicated to the Program. However,
it did not significantly change the size, the architecture, or the scope of the design
integration teams in comparison with the previous TOP teams.
The design build process team and its production-related TIP teams (i.e. Body, Wing,
System, and Assembly and Test) were the only support teams that remained in the
Program organisation. These teams involved 30 members, a significant increase from 14
members in the previous stage. Each TIP team had around 10 members. Typically, they
performed both liaison and operational tasks (e.g. carried out preliminary assessment on
design concepts).

All members were functional representatives.

Although

administratively they were members of functional units, most were fully dedicated to the
PLI Program. Their assignment was permanent and intended as a preparation for the
production phase of the PLI. Production specialists often supported more than one TIP
team, and therefore, created overlapping membership among these TIP teams.
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H eavyw eigh tn ess:

The Program Manager had increasingly gained power and influence over the product
development process and resource allocation issues. He gained more direct access to
control the PLI s development process as all leaders of design integration teams were
administratively members of the Program. The relative power of the Program Manager
over functional units was demonstrated by the fact that he, and not the respective
functional heads, chose and appointed the functional co-ordinators although those co
ordinators were administratively members of functional units. The PLI Program’s unique
financial arrangement provided access to control and allocate program-funded facilities
across functional units as only the Program reserved the right to assess and approve
requests from functional units.
In the design integration teams, the hierarchical position and the seniority of their leaders
remained the same as that of the leaders of TOP teams in the previous stage. The
internalisation o f engineering specialists made the engineers of the Program had full
delegation to perform tasks that previously under the control of functional design units.
This provided more authority to the leaders of design integration teams. However, some
problems o f controlling the development process remained for three reasons. Firstly,
some members were not collocated due to the lack of adequate office space. Secondly,
functional design units released only ‘second-class’ engineers to the Program. Thirdly,
some engineers remained functional representatives ‘hired’ by the Program, and
therefore, performance evaluation of these engineers were administered by functional
design units. Due to their limited competence, members of design integration teams often
turned back to their functional supervisors nearby for assistance in solving design
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problems. As the Chief Engineer and one of the Design Centre members recalled:
[Technology Divisions] did not want to provide the best engineers and they did not like the idea of
engineers being fully dedicated to and collocated in [the PLI Program], (Robert, Chief Engineer
October 1997)
’
Everything is much easier now. The real challenge was during [the Engineering Matrix and
Engineering Integration Stages]. We only had little authority and barely had facility ... We
borrowed engineers [from Technology Divisions] but those engineers were not committed to the
program. (Frank. Design Centre. November 1997)

In addition, most leaders of design integration teams were less experienced than their
counterparts in functional design units. As a result, most leaders of design integration
teams remained with less influential than their functional counterparts in the process
carried out by engineering specialists.
In the design build team and production-related TIP teams, most leaders were middle
managers in their functional units. Operation Co-ordinator had extensive delegation from
the Program and his functional unit. The leaders o f TIP teams had no hierarchical
positions in the Program, and so has little authority to direct the process. Most were
experienced engineers, some with a university degree. This seniority created some access
to control the process through their influence. Similar to the previous stage, these leaders
basically maintained collegial relationship and played co-ordinator roles.
2) Communication and Decision Making mechanisms
In general, communication and decision-making mechanisms, particularly involving the
core team and design integration teams, remained the same as at the end of the previous
stage. There was a significant change in the decision making process. Due to the
internalisation of engineering specialists into the Program teams, the Program teams had
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more control over development process and design decisions were less influenced by the
functional design units. A few other changes included the increasing use of written
communication, more identification self with the Program in the TIP teams, and the
increasing in the use and release of more certain information in both design integration
teams and production-related TIP teams as the product development proceeded and the
results of analysis and engineering tests started to be made available.

6.4.2.4 Design-Production Coupling Stage (June 1997 - June 1999)
This stage corresponded with the beginning of the Program’s preliminary design phase
and its termination in mid 1999. In line with the Indaco’s restructuring program, the PLI
Program restructured its organisation to become an autonomous division internalising all
functions necessary to develop and build the aircraft as parts of the Program. This
program structure ’S provided in Figure 6-5.
P LI Division
P rogram M a n ag er
Prico Coordination

C h ie f E n g in e e r

p

C h ie f of O p e ra tio n

p

1------------------------------------------------------------■
O p eratio n C e n tre
B usiness M a n a g e m e n t

___________________1
___________________

___________________1-------------------------------

F in a n c e

D esign C entre

Facility P lan n in g

W o rk M a n a g e m e n t

A c c . & M g m t. R eport

Body Integration Design

Q u a lity P la n n in g

T im e M a n a g e m e n t

Treasury

W in g Integration Design

P rodu ction P lan n in g

B udget M a n a g e m e n t

B u d g e t a n d A nalysis

Propulsion Integration Design

P ro c u re m e n t M a n a g e m e n t

Verification & Control

S ystem Integration Design

G e n e ra l Affairs

C onfiguration M an ag em en t

Figure 6-5: PLI Program Structure in Design-Production Coupling Stage
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The Program Manager adopted this structure for two reasons: (1) the continuing
dissatisfaction over the Program’s ability to directly control some engineering activities
as discussed previously, and (2) the increasing contribution of the production-related
teams. The intention of this restructuring was to make the Program relatively independent
from and did not rely on the support of functional units. With this internalisation, the
selection and deployment of members, the evaluation of their performance and rewards,
and their career path planning were administered and managed by the Program.
The main parts of the structure were the Design Centre and the Operation Centre. The
Design Centre was led by a manager who also functioned as the Chief Engineer. The
Chief Engineer was responsible for the design aspect of the Program. The Design Centre
was the incarnation of the Design Integration teams of the previous stage and had the
same four component-based Design Integration teams (Body, Wing, System, and
Propulsion) and a Configuration Management Department.
The production-related Operation Centre was led by a manager who also functioned as
the Chief of Operation. He was responsible for co-ordinating the production aspects of
the Program. The Operation Centre can be considered as the incarnation of the previous
design build process team and production-related TIP teams since most members of this
Centre had been involved in those previous activities. The Operation Centre housed three
functional departments: Production Planning, Facility Planning, and Quality Planning,
and, as in the previous stage, four TIP teams: Body, Wing, Assembly and Test, and
System and Propulsion. The Operation Centre focused its activities on the assembly of
aircraft and components, for two reasons. Firstly, assembly was seen, particularly by the
Chief of Operation, as the Centre’s core activity, while detail part manufacturing and
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tooling activities might be ‘out-sourced’ either internally to Indaco’s Fabrication
Division, or externally. This view was inspired by the global trend of outsourcing within
the aircraft industry. Secondly, manufacturing and tooling concepts were technically
defined by the assembly concept. Defining assembly concepts, in effect, means also
broadly defining manufacturing and tooling concepts without wasting their resources for
that purpose.
The design integration team and the production-related TIP team responsible for the same
component were expected to work concurrently and interact directly. The Body
Integration team and its sub-teams from the Design Centre, for example, would work
concurrently with the TIP Body team and its sub-teams from the Operation Centre. The
operational level structure of the Design Centre and Operation Centre in which this
working relationship was expected to occur is illustrated in Figure 6-6.
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However, the Program intention to be a truly autonomous division was not achieved. The
engineers brought into the Design Centre were young and inexperienced, who typically
either became dependent upon the expatriate technical advisers or would informally seek
advice from experts in functional design units. On the operation side, the focus on
assembly as the core activity had left the crucial tooling engineering and manufacturing
functions outside the Operation Centre. These functions were vital in the development
tasks currently undertaken by the Design Centre. In effect, the Design Centre often saw
the Operation Centre as an unnecessary ‘bridge’ in interaction with those functions. This
contributed to the increasing tension between the Design Centre and Operation Centre.
Furthermore, the rest of Indaco’s top management was not well informed about CE, the
comprehensive plan to implement it in the PLI Program and its implications for the
overall organisational working system. This lack of information had caused conflicts
between the Program and the functional design units involved in the development
process, which at this stage felt ‘locked out’ by the intention of the Program Manager for
the PLI Program to become an autonomous division. This issue is discussed further in the
next chapters.
The Indonesian economic crisis that started in July 1997 and peaked in early 1998 badly
affected most Indonesian companies including both Indaco and Prico. In February 1998,
the Program Manager released a directive that the Program would progress only until the
completion of the preliminary design phase due to financial problems faced by Prico. In
mid-December 1998, Prico’s shareholders decided to liquidate Prico. With this
development, any prospect of continuing the PLI development program disappeared, at
least until Indaco could find another source of finance. Consequently, the experience with
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CE was also cut short.
Detailed analysis on each CE initiatives of organisational integration aspect and
communication and decision making mechanism in this stage is as follows:

1) Organisational Integration:
The change in the Program structure had caused several changes in the characteristics of
organisational integration as summarised in Table 6-11.
Table 6-11: Organisational Integration in Design-Production Coupling Stage
Size and Architecture:

Large, over 130 people
Three layers: core team , middle m anagem ent team s, and sub-teams

Scope:

Core team

Design Centre and Design Integration team s

- Role

Operation Centre and T IP Team s

Main Development Role

- Level of Involvem ent

Full mem bership

M ainly full membership

Full membership

- Functions Involved

Design, Production, Finance, Business

Design functions

Production functions

- Position

High and middle level

A few functional staff representatives

- Activity

M anagenal tasks

Operational and managerial tasks

Operational and managerial tasks

- Dedication

Fully dedicated

Fully dedicated

Fully dedicated

- T emporal

Perm anent

Mem bership Pattern:

Perm anent

Permanent

- Multiple mem bership

Multiple m em bership within Integration team s

Multiple membership in/across TIP s

- Higher team s’s composition

Include leaders of lower team s

Include leaders of lower team s

H e a v y w e ig h t M a n a g e m e n t

Hierarchical Position:
- Structural

Equal to functional division

Equal to functional department

Equal to functional department

- Authority

Extensive authority

Mainly little authority

Extensive authority in the Centre but

- A ccess to Control

Extensive access to control

Extensive access to control

Little access to production activities

Program delegation

Extensive delegation

Little delegation

Extensive delegation

Functional delegation

Full delegation

Full delegation

Full delegation

Young

M ainly young

Mainly mature

- Tenure & Experience

Inexperienced

M ainly inexperienced

Mainly experienced

- Education

Highly educated

Highly educated

Mixed of highly and less educated

Seniority:
-A g e

Cross-Functionality:
The whole team expanded to more than 130 full-time members. It consisted of the core
team, two middle level teams of the Design Centre and the Operation Centre, and
operational level teams in both Centres (i.e. Design Integration teams and TIP teams).
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The production-related Operation Centre had equal positions to the Design Centre as the
main player in the development process. In the core team, the size was reduced to six
members covering design, production, finance, and business functions. All members
were full-members permanently assigned by the Program Manager and were fully
dedicated to the PLI Program. Administratively, they belonged to the PLI Program.
The Design Centre had over 60 members covering design-related functions, such as
configuration management, aerodynamics, load analysis, stress and fatigue analysis,
structural design, system analysis, and system design. It had four design integration teams
(i.e. Body, Wing, System, and Propulsion), each led by a supervisor. The Chief Engineer,
Technical Adviser, and all supervisors of design integration teams comprised the middle
level team of the Design Centre. This level mainly performed managerial tasks.
Each design integration team had around 15 members, and as in the previous stages, was
divided into several sub-teams of 4-6 engineers, each led by a lead engineer. The Body
Integration Team, for example, had four sub-teams: Nose Section, Mid-Section,
Empennage, and Payload System. Initially, each design integration team covered all
design-related functions. Later in 1998, the Chief Engineer moved all aerodynamic
specialists from these teams to a separate group under his supervision in order to reduce
aerodynamic inconsistency at the airplane level. Chief Engineer argued these specialists’
involvement in design teams had exposed them to too many design constraints that led to
aerodynamic inconsistency. This removal reduced the scope of design integration teams.
Most members of the Design Centre belonged and were fully dedicated to the Program
except some system engineers who remained as functional representatives. Lead
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engineers had operational responsibilities and worked at the operational level together
with other members. The multiple membership occurred within a design integration team
(i.e. across sub-teams in a design integration team) but not across teams. The
involvement of supervisors of the design integration teams in the middle-level team
created the interlocking structure between the high and low level teams.
The Operation Centre had over 35 members, covering most of production-related
functions, such as production planning, industrial management, material and process
development, facility planning and maintenance, quality engineering, and quality control.
All members belonged and were fully dedicated to the Program. This centre consisted of
three functional-based departments that housed the above specialist groups, and four
product-based TIP teams (i.e. Body, Wing, System, Assembly and Test) each lead by a
TIP co-ordinator. The Chief of Operation, supervisors of functional departments, and TIP
co-ordinators comprised the middle level team of the Operation Centre.
The TIP teams performed and co-ordinated operational tasks related to their components.
Initially, TIP co-ordinators reported to the Production Planning Supervisor, but later this
reporting line was upgraded to the Chief of Operation. Each TIP team had around 10
members and was divided to sub-teams, each led by a lead engineer. Multiple
membership was present within and across TIP teams as production specialists typically
supported more than one team. Interlocking mechanism between the low and high level
teams was provided by the involvement of TIP co-ordinators in the middle level team.

Heavyweigh tn ess:
Overall the seniority of the program leaders remained the same as in the previous stage,
218

Chapter 6: The Substance of Change: CE Implementation

but some significant changes occurred in the hierarchical position and delegation
dimensions. As the PLI Program became an autonomous division, the program
management had full authority to perform and control tasks that previously, at least
partly, under the control of functional units. The appointment of the Program Manager to
also be the Director of the Airplane Group made him a member of the Executive
Management Council. This significantly increased his ‘influence5. Fabrication and
assembly divisions that involved in the Program were part of this Airplane Group and,
therefore, under his control. Furthermore, as an autonomous division, the Program had
full discretion on functional issues.
In the Design Centre, the leaders of the design integration teams had equal supervisory
positions as the department heads in functional design units. However, experienced
leaders continued to leave the Program for two reasons: Firstly, they had already held
managerial positions in functional design units and opted to remain there when the
Program became an autonomous division. Secondly, they had conflict with the
domineering Technical Adviser. This left an increasing number of inexperienced team
leaders with little authority over technical decisions. Their authority was often overridden
by the Technical Adviser in particular who made most decisions for them.
In the Operation Centre, the leaders of component-based TIP teams initially reported to
the Supervisor of Production Planning Department. This provided them with less
legitimate power than their TOP team counterparts from the Design Centre. Their source
of influence was the ‘residual5 reputations from the previous occupation in functional
units. Later, the position of TIP leaders was upgraded to become the staff of the Chief of
Operation. However, they did not have the authority to control the work packages
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authorised to and carried out by a functional unit.

2) Communication and Decision Making Mechanisms
Characteristics of formal communication, collaboration, inter-team communication and
decision-making mechanisms in this stage are summarised in Table 6-12.
Table 6-12: Communication and Decision-Making Mechanisms in Design-Production
Coupling Stage
Core T earn
Weekly
formal
meeting
o
"rao Minutes of meeting
c
Report documents, memoranda
3
II Mainly late, after all data gathered
h. a
C
Friendly and distant
o
CO
A few dialogue
O
m
Relatively independent
Self indentification with the program
O
co
TO Formal Meetings
E E Written reports, memos.
S E routing of COM and minutes
£i OEo Few collaboration, mainly one-way communication
-S
Eu)
Authority of making individual decision
2(/) o)
E _cÜro Individual decisions were respected
Üa ^co
a>
O 2 5 High power differential
c

Design Centre
A few formal meetings
Minutes of meeting
Communication Memos
Early and Online shared technical data
Some released and used of ambiguous data
Friendly and some close
On the spot dialogue
Interdependent
Mainly indentification with program teams

Operation Centre
Weekly formal meeting
Minutes of meeting
Communication Memos
Early and batch type, by sections
Some released and used of ambiguous data
Friendly and close
On the spot dialogue
Relatively independent
Indentification with program
Formal meeting with minutes of meeting
Written reports, routing of minutes and communication memos (COMs)
Online shared technical information
Some collaboration in the beginning but reduced toward the end

Lower teams rarely made decision
Decisions they made often ignored
High power differential

Lower teams made decisions
Their Decisions were respected
Low power differential

In the core team, formal communication was the same as in the previous stage: weekly
meetings, and written reports. The two-way informal dialogue that characterised
collaboration was rarely evident. Open conflicts were avoided rather than solved through
dialogue. Conflicting perceptions about CE, the dissatisfaction over Sidina support, and
the uncomfortable situation due to the domineering role of the Technical Adviser, for
examples, although privately complained were never be discussed until the process had
greatly deteriorated. Decisions individually made by members of the core team were
respected as Program decisions. Due to the high power differential between the Program
Manager and the rest of the core team, however, many of these decisions were referred to
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the Program Manager for his approval.
Inter-team communication involving the core team was mainly formal: meetings, reports,
minutes of meeting, and communication memos. Collaboration was non-existent. In
particular, the Core team had a monthly review with the Design Centre, a monthly review
with the Operation Centre, and a configuration review involving company-wide design
functions. The objectives of these reviews were to evaluate the progress of design
development and production preparation. Each meeting had on average 50 people in
attendance. Meetings were characterised by one-way communication, either reports from
supervisors to the Program Manager or directives from the Program Manager, without
adequate open discussion on the issues presented. These meetings tended to be ‘courtesy’
meetings as a way of the Program Manager to show appreciation and to motivate his
team members. Similarly, feedback from functional design units (i.e. Technology
Divisions) in the configuration review was not documented and followed up.
Within the Design Centre, formal meetings were increasingly discouraged and regarded
as ‘a waste of time’ by both Chief Engineer and Technical Adviser. Instead, on-the spot
discussion was encouraged and fostered by the collocation, online information system,
and the ‘management by walking around’ approach of the Chief Engineer. This
discussion sometimes involved engineers from more than one design integration team.
The results were formalised in communication memos and routed to other design
integration teams and to the respective production-related TIP teams.
The members of a design integration team worked interdependently and most had
identified themselves with their team. However, this collaboration was not extended
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across other design integration teams despite the proximity of their workplace. Instead,
written communications were often used. Sensitive conflicting issues, such as over
human resource allocation and task division, were resolved through the Chief Engineer.
Most design integration teams had little authority and were often intervened by the
Technical Adviser. Technical decisions or commitments made with their counterparts
(e.g. production-related TIP teams) were often ignored or disregarded. Power differential
between the Technical Adviser and the leaders of these design integration teams was
strikingly high due to the Technical Adviser’s experience level (i.e. more than 40 years in
aircraft industry) and the Program Manager’s reliance on him. On most occasions the
decision making was characterised by ‘do as you are told’ situation.
Within the Operation Centre and its TIP teams, the characteristics of formal
communication and collaboration mainly remained the same as in the previous stage. As
all members belonged to the Program, they identified themselves with the Program. Inter
team communication across TIP teams mainly flowed through regular meetings chaired
by Chief of Operation. Written reports were complemented with informal collaboration
fostered by multiple membership and collocation. However, informal collaboration
between Supervisors and the leaders of TIP teams was limited. They relied more on
formal communication. The overlapping of tasks between the TIP teams and functional
groups tended to create conflicts over accountability of those tasks. However, considered
as sensitive, this issue was never brought into an open discussion.
Communication between the Design Centre and the Operation Centre was mainly formal:
on-line information, reports, minutes of meeting, and communication memos. Initially,
both Chief Engineer and Chief of Operation encouraged their members to collaborate.
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Informal discussions between these two centres flourished. They had a weekly meeting
chaired by the Chief of Operation, which involved tooling engineering, manufacturing
planning and process development functions from the Fabrication Division. This,
however, was reversed later in mid 1998 when the influential Technical Adviser urged
the design engineers to concentrate on design tasks and regarded such interaction as
ineffective and wasting designer’s precious time. The Design Centre, therefore, reduced
the level o f its direct communication with the Operation Centre. It also started to directly
communicate with the Fabrication Division arguing that the Operation Centre was
ineffective. The Operation Centre was forced to communicate their manufacturability and
producibility assessments to the Design Centre through written reports. The setback to
this was that there was no channel for direct feedback from the Design Centre.

6.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In respect to the implementation of CE approach, four stages of the PLI Program were
identified: the program initiation, engineering matrix, engineering integration, and
design-production coupling stages. The first program initiation stage represented the
traditional sequential approach in which the development task was first assigned to a
functional design unit (i.e. the New Product Development Department, Technology
Division). The next stages reflected the progressive efforts to introduce CE into the
Program modelling the CE initiatives from Westaco. Overall, despite the Program
Manager’s overt decision and encouragement to use the Westaco model, the CE
initiatives that took form during each stage were often not consistent with the intended
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Manager’s overt decision and encouragement to use the Westaco model, the CE
initiatives that took form during each stage were often not consistent with the intended
model. In some cases, they moved further away as discussed later in this section.
Reviewing how the process unfolded over time, an additional finding could also be
inferred, the CE structures were partially implemented and continuously modified to
address the problems that arose throughout these stages. Variation between the intended
Westaco model and what was emergent as the Indaco model is outlined in Table 6-13.
Table 6-13: Variation between the Intended Model and the Emergent Indaco Model
C E In itia tiv e and D im e n s io n

W e s ta c o
PLX

Cross

Size and Architecture

Functional
Team

Scope

Role

In d ac o
DRX

Large with core team and several levels of sub-team s

PLI
Increasingly large with core team and several levels of sub-teams

Primarily based on

F’rm a rily based on integrated

Design team s based on integrated produd . Production fundions

specialisation

end product

becam e increasingly part of the program team

Design functions in the

Design and other fundions had Design functions in the main role, others in supportina role

main role, others in

equal roles n design team s

Produdion had equal role as design in last stage

Level

F u l m em berstup/representative

Changing from representatives to full m em ber

Involved functions

W ide range company-wide functions, customers and

Increasingly wide range but not include customers and suppliers

Mem bership

Position

Staff and middle m anagenal level

Staff and Middle m anagenal level

Pattern

M em ber's activity

Operational and liaison

Changing from liaison to operational

Dedication

F u ly dedicated

Changing from mainly partly dedicated to fully dedicated

Tem poral

Perm anent

Increasingly perm anent

Multiple m em bershp

Som e m em bers w ere part of m ore than one team

Operational

Som e m em bers were parts of m ore than one team

H igher team 's composition Lower team leaders w ere part of higher team s

Lower team leaders were part of higher team s

Heavyweight

Hierarchical

Form al

Equal to functional division [Equal to functional subdivision

Equal to functional divisions

M anagem ent

Position

Authonty

Extensive authonty and control

Extensive authority but limited control until the last stage

Delegation

Program

Extensive

Extensive only to senior/expenenced m em bers

Functional

Extensive to all m em bers

Extensive to experienced m em bers To all m em bers in last stage

T enure

Senior leaders

Increasingly junior leaders

Age

Senior engneers

Increasingly junior leaders and engineers

Education

Highly educated

Highly educated in design team s, m ixed in operation team s

Sem onty

Formal

Com m unicatio Richness

Several levels of system atically arranged regular m eeting

Mainly weekly m eeting, reports, and m em os

Comm unication

Modes

Frequency

with ritensive discussion and m inutes of m eeting

based on preference of team sleaders

Direction

Integrated com puter-based m edia for sharing technical data Adhoc and unintegrated computer based media

Type of data

Collaboration

T m in g

Early at the beginning of the process

Variable

R eleased

Ambiguous data released and used

Ambiguous data released and used

Used

but b e c ^ n e m ore certain during the process

but becam e more certain during the process

Interaction

Collaborative at all levels characterised by

Increasingly less collaborative although the degree

Conflict M anagem ent

dose and friendly interaction to achieve program's goal.

of dose and friendly interaction varied between team

Collective goals

dialogue to solve problems in interdependent work

S hared vision

fostered by indoctrination process and social activities

Inter-team

Foim al Comm unication

Formal and informal

Com m unication

Collaboration

Intensive, triggered by formal and informal communication

Ion-in tensive but variable degree of collaboration
Autonomous design team through stages of semi autonomous to

Decision M aking
-‘rogram - Function

Sem i autonomous m atnx strudure

-ligh level - Low Level

_ower team s had extensive authonty

autonomous design-production team s

Authority

M echanism s

Mainly used formal communication

.ow er team s increasingly had less authonty

Respect to lower team s

.ow er team s' dedsions were resp ed ed by higher team s

.ower team decisions were ncreasingly being ignored

^ower differential

_ow power differential between higher and lower team s

High power differential between higher and lower level teams
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6.5.1 Org anisational Integration
In general, total organisational integration was never achieved in the PLI Program. CE
initiatives in organisational integration evolved to become two parallel design and
production ‘teams’ under the single integrated umbrella of the ‘program team’:
1) The formation of the design-related TOP teams in the engineering matrix stage, led to
the establishment of design integration teams in the engineering integration stage, and
later the Design Centre in the design production coupling stage.
2) The formation of the production-related design build process team in the engineering
matrix stage led to the appointment of the Production Co-ordinators to co-ordinate
design build process team and its production-related, component-based TIP teams
activities in engineering integration stage, and later the creation of an Operation
Centre in the design-production coupling stage.
While the design-related teams had played the main role in the product development
process since the beginning, the production-related teams started as supporting
participants and gradually established themselves as more central participants alongside
the design teams.
This arrangement of two sets of parallel design and production teams was different from
Westaco’s DRX model that integrated both production and design engineering into
integrated development teams from the outset. However, considering that both design and
production functions consisted of various sub-functions which previously worked within
a rigid sequential process, even this movement toward two functional-related teams was a
significant change in Indaco and raised major organisational and managerial issues,
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particularly in terms of co-ordination and interaction with supporting functional units.
The abandonment of the matrix structures of the engineering matrix and engineering
integration stages in favour of more autonomous program teams in the design-production
coupling stage can be seen as an effort to reduce those problems.
This decision to eliminate matrix arrangement was inconsistent and, even, moved away
from the Westaco model. While having a large degree of independence and authority
over the product performance and program management, Westaco’s development teams
always maintained their relationship with functional units through various forms of
matrix mechanism. This relationship was very important, particularly in providing a
technological competitive edge for the product. Giving the nature of technological
uncertainty within the industry, the technological core competency was too complex to be
maintained entirely by the management of a development program. At Indaco, the pitfalls
of abandoning the matrix mechanism were apparent. The Program teams struggled with
design, manufacturing and communication problems throughout the later stages. Most of
this was due to the lack of competency of the team members.
1) Cross-Functional Team
Following the Westaco model, from the engineering matrix stage the PLI Program was
divided into several horizontal sub-groupings accompanied by the hierarchical
arrangement of a core team and two levels of product-based teams: middle management
and operational teams. In this stage, the main part of the PLI Program only involved
design-engineering functions. This arrangement resembled more closely the PLX rather
than the DRX model, but had much weaker support from other functional units in forms
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functional focal points rather than functional representatives. In the engineering
integration stage, support from some non-design functions (i.e. Production, Procurement,
Sales, and Finance) became more adequate as their representatives became part of the
program s core team as functional Co-ordinators (e.g. Production Co-ordinator). At the
design-production coupling stage, the whole production-related functions, not only the
Co-ordinator, became the main part of the PLI Program. However, instead of forming an
integrated development team as in the DRX Program, the PLI Program established two
separate groupings primarily based on functional specialisation (i.e. design and
production functions).
Unlike the Westaco model, most additional members brought into the PLI Program at the
engineering matrix and engineering integration stages were temporary and not fully
dedicated to the Program. In contrast, members became permanent and fully dedicated to
the Program in the design-production coupling stage. However, with the total
abandonment of matrix arrangement they were also totally independent from the
functional units. Following the Westaco models, the interlocking mechanism of the PLI
teams was created by incorporating leaders and key members of the design and
production teams to the higher level teams. At Indaco, however, this arrangement was not
fully supported by complementary initiatives in the communication and decision-making
mechanisms.

2) Heavyweight Management
Similar to the Westaco model, the PLI Program Manager enjoyed a high level position, at
least equivalent with his counterparts in functional units. However, unlike Westaco’s
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Program Managers, his seniority in terms of experience and tenure were less than the
heads of functional units. A similar situation also occurred at the lower level teams. Most
supervisors and lead engineers were significantly more junior than their counterparts in
functional units. The situation was worsened by the elimination of the matrix mechanism
between the Program and functional units in engineering integration and designproduction coupling stages. Many senior engineers, particularly from design-related
functions, opted to leave their positions in the Program and stay in their functional units.
They were substituted by more junior members. This was contradictory to the Westaco
model, which, according to one ex-intern, selected only experienced engineers for the
team.
Like the Westaco model, since the adoption of CE (i.e. engineering matrix stage) the
PLTs Program Manager had extensive authority to perform and control the development
tasks. He also had significant authority over the budget and resource allocation. However,
unlike the Westaco model, this authority was not delegated further down to the lower
level teams. Instead, most leaders of the operational teams (i.e. design integration teams)
often had difficulties in asserting design decisions on their respective components. All
budget and resource allocation issues had to be channelled back to the core team for
decisions.
On the other hand, inexperienced engineers and representatives from functional units had
little delegation from their units and had to refer their analyses and decisions back to their
respective functional managers for further direction. As the result, the relatively
inexperienced leaders of the Program teams encountered difficulty in directing and
controlling the activities of these members. These difficulties were partly reduced by
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abandoning the matrix of TOP - engineering specialist groups and instead internalising
engineering specialists as part of the Program teams in the engineering integration stage.
In the design-production coupling stage, as an autonomous division the Program had full
delegation from functional units. However, the number of inexperienced lead engineers
and supervisors increased. They had little delegation from the Program’s core team and
had to refer most of technical decisions to members of higher level teams (i.e. Technical
Adviser or Chief Engineer) for validation.

6.5.2 C om m u n ication a n d D ecision -M akin g M ech an ism s

1) Form al Com m unication

Like the Westaco model, the PLI Program used a combination of formal meetings,
written documents and a computer-based system for technical information. However,
unlike Westaco model that set up communication media to bridge various levels of
Program teams, various communication media in the PLI Program were not so well
integrated. Rather, they were ad-hoc and based on preferences within various teams. The
Design Centre, for example, preferred a more informal medium (e.g. ‘on the spot
discussion’, ‘management by walking around’) while the Operation Centre opted for
communication by a more formal one (e.g. meetings, written reports). Most of the time,
therefore, these various formal, informal and computer-based communications worked
separately as a stand-alone medium and their integration were ad-hoc.
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2) Collaboration
Similar to the Westaco model, informal collaboration within each of the operational
design integration teams was relatively high, particularly within the ‘backbone’ engineers
who had worked on the PLI since the beginning. The collaboration within each of the
production teams was also relatively high. However, unlike the Westaco model, such
collaboration was less evident within the higher level teams.
3) Inter-Team Com m unication

Unlike the Westaco model, inter-team collaboration remained less evident, despite all
efforts and mechanisms (e.g. collocation, computer system) to enhance across-team
integration. Conflicts between design integration teams in the Design Centre, for
example, tended to be handed to the Chief Engineer for resolution. Since the beginning,
the relationship between design-related and production-related teams had also been
distant and sporadic. Even though there were times during which these two separate
functional teams enjoyed a fairly good relationship and collaboration started to develop,
particularly at the beginning of design-production coupling stage, a later development
showed that they drifted apart due to the influence of the Technical Adviser.
Unlike the Westaco model that, as suggested by some published reports8, had vertical
dialogue in their meetings, which often extended into collaboration outside the meeting,
vertical communication in the PLI Program tended to be formal and characterised by one
way communication. Often, the meetings were used as a reporting medium that could
8 Due to confidentiality concerns, these reports cannot be revealed in the references
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easily and more effectively have been carried out using written communication.
4) D ecision-M aking M echanism

Unlike the Westaco model that respected decisions made by low-level teams, in the PLI
Program most of the design decisions were made at the higher level (e.g. by members of
the core team). This was partly due to the relatively junior status of the Program members
and lead engineers. At the program initiation stage this was considered as appropriate as
the engineers saw the task as an ‘exercise’. At the engineering matrix and engineering
integration stages, decisions of a few experienced lead engineers were highly respected
by the higher level teams. However, at the design-production coupling stage most design
integration teams had experienced their decisions, often made with collaboration with
other teams, being disregarded and ignored.

6.5.3 S tru ctu re L a g g in g b eh in d th e P rocess

Unlike the Westaco model that systematically set up all the structures and protocols from
the outset, the PLI Program followed a more ad-hoc emergent process. The program
structure was incrementally adjusted based on current activities. The findings showed
that the organisational structures set for the Program throughout the stages were
continuously lagging behind the process they supposedly supported. This lagging
phenomenon can be seen in all three structures applied after introducing CE in the
Program and was seemingly part of the reason to change from one structure to another.
In the engineering matrix stage, the structure was adopted from the concept established in
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the program initiation stage in which the Program was part of the Technology Division.
The matrix arrangement, therefore, involved only various design-engineering functions
and did not include other functions required for several tasks during this stage.
Marketing, Sales and Finance functions required for carrying out cost estimation and
feasibility study, for example, were not included in the program structure. The PLI
Program, therefore, became dependent on those ‘externaT functions.
As the co-ordination tasks with those functions became more demanding, the Program
moved to an integration structure that involved Sales, Finance, Production and
Procurement Co-ordinators within the program structure, and hence moved to the
engineering integration stage. However, the issues around the feasibility study and
financial scheme soon decreased after the establishment of Prico. The Program started to
face design and production interface issues. In this stage, these issues were tackled by the
production-related teams (i.e. the design build process team and the production-related
TIP teams) and initially channelled through the Production Co-ordinator. As the
relevance o f these issues increased due to the development progress, the Program
Manager emphasised the need to bring the production to the same status as design
functions. This led to the design-production coupling stage in which the Program
established two centres: the Design Centre and the (Production) Operation Centre.
In this latest stage, Chiefs of both Centres continuously stressed that the two centres
should be regarded as one in the development process. However, there was no sense of
clear direction on how to achieve it in a systematic way. Some engineers, particularly
from the Operation Centre, expressed concerns over the lack of a common systematic
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protocol of CE implementation through all development phases to ensure synchronised
activities and they urged a more serious and substantial discussion over the issue. The
Program never did tackle this issue.

6.5.4 C onclusion

The framework used in this study places the CE approach introduced to an organisation
as the substance o f change that underwent a change process through which it was shaped
and adapted by the contextual and political factors of the organisation. The longitudinal
case study of introducing CE in the Indaco’s PLI Progam indicates that despite the
intention to apply a particular model of CE, the change process had caused different
models to emerge during the process and these did not necessarily comply nor show a
clear direction toward the intended model.
Furthermore, the analysis of CE initiatives in both Westaco, from which the intended CE
was adopted, and Indaco, to which CE was introduced, showed that there was no single
model o f CE. Rather, there is a wide range variation of CE implementation. It varies in
to which initiatives being applied and focused. The application of any initiative also
varies in the characteristics of its dimensions and sub-dimensions. The characteristics of
one CE initiative may inter-relate with or constrain the characteristics of the other. This
set of initiatives and their characteristics defines a particular CE in a particular product
development program.
Although Indaco had established a ‘CE-like’ structure (i.e. cross-functional team
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complemented with heavyweight management) similar to the intended model since the
beginning of the CE introduction, the organisational structure, team’s architecture, scope
and level of functional involvement, team membership pattern, as well as the nature of
delegation and authority of team leaders were all changed over time to fit in with one
another and with their surrounding circumstances. This ‘CE-like’ structure and the
availability of computer support system did not necessarily lead to the ‘CE-like’
communication and decision making process. Ironically, the communication and decision
making mechanism prior to CE introduction (i.e. program initiation stage) showed more
resemblance to the intended model than such mechanisms in other stages.
As we shall see in the next chapter, a number of factors were influential in creating these
changing characteristics across the stages. Detailed analysis of each stage in this chapter
has revealed that the most significant factors were the shortage of competent engineers,
the absence of clear direction on the approach to be applied, the strong and dominant
design engineering culture, the rigidity of functional compartmentalisation, and the
cultural tendencies associated with personal and group interaction. These factors were
affected by the context and politics of the organisation.
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Chapter 7: Contextual Explanation of Change

CHAPTER 7
CONTEXTUAL EXPLANATION OF CHANGE

7.1 Introduction
The previous Chapter 6 discusses the change process of how CE in the PLI Program
developed over time, through which CE continuously changed and transformed. This
transformation tended to deviate from the intended CE modelled after the Westaco’s
CE. This transformation process started from a relatively traditional program
initiation stage, followed by the injection of a Westaco model for CE, and three
subsequent stages of engineering matrix, engineering integration, and designproduction coupling, each more or less extensive introducing elements of the Westaco
model.
The analysis of the substance of change in this CE case reveals the complex
multidimensional characters of organisational integration and communication and
decision-making mechanisms. At each stage, the degree of integration increased in
some ways but was weakened or remained less strong in other ways. The scope of
functions represented in various teams of the Program, the vertical control of those
who comprised the teams, their degree of expertise, and teams’ authority varied in
these stages.
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This study aims to provide some explanation of these complex changes. The main
factors considered are:
1) the ‘inner’ contextual factors within the substance of change;
2) the ‘outer’ contextual factors in the wider organisational context; and
3) the organisational politics surrounding their implementation.
This chapter focuses on contextual factors both within the substance of change and in
the wider organisational context. The organisational politics is discussed in Chapter 8.
As outlined in Chapter 2, the overall substance of change consists of several
interrelated sub-processes that undergo a process of change. Due to their
interrelationship, any.one sub-process has the other sub-processes as a ‘context’. The
holistic feature of processual approach (Pettigrew, 1997) implies that it may not be
possible to establish a single direct cause for a change, rather it provides a holistic
analysis across several levels of context about what might be the factors and how they
contribute to the change. Hence, one contextual factor might influence changes in
several sub-processes and a contextual factor from the outer level might influence
different level of the inner layers.
In this case study, the focus is on CE initiatives in (internal) organisational integration
and communication and decision-making mechanism sub-process. Consequently,
other CE initiatives in enabling technology, external integration, and human resources
are seen as ‘contextual factors’ that influencing those main focal initiatives. These
factors are referred as ‘the contextual factors within the substance of change’ or ‘the
inner contextual factors’. The wider organisational context in this study refers to other
internal factors that influenced and were, in turn, influenced by the CE initiatives.
These factors include the company’s organisational structure and co-ordination
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mechanism, organisational culture and sub-culture, and stage of development.
Because they are not the target of the change initiative, these factors are more stable
than factors in the inner context.
The first part of this chapter analyses thé contribution of each of ‘inner contextual
factors’ (i.e. CE initiatives in enabling technology, external integration and human
resources) on the changing shape of internal integration and communication and
decision-making mechanisms. The analysis of the change process has revealed the
most significant inner contextual factors were the lack of competent human resources
available for assignment to the PLI Program and the lack of systematic protocols
which could guide the Program in implementing CE.
The second part discusses the contribution of each factor in the organisational context
(i.e. organisational structure, culture, sub-cultures, and stage of development) at
Indaco’s CE initiatives in the PLI Program. This analysis reveals the role of the nature
of Indaco’s organisational structure and mechanism in the continuous problems in
carrying out heavyweight matrix program organisation that led to the formation of an
autonomous program division. The analysis also shows that difficulty in
organisational integration and communication initiatives, particularly between the
important production and design functions, was stemmed from the history of Indaco
that had created a culture that emphasised design engineering.
This chapter is arranged as follows: Section 7.2 provides a brief description of CE
initiatives in enabling technology (i.e. computer-based technology, CE tools and
methods, and collocation), external integration (i.e. supplier and customer
involvement), and human resources (i.e. CE-related training and human resource
policies) in Indaco and their intended model from Westaco. The effect of these
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initiatives on the internal organisational integration and communication and decision
making mechanisms are also briefly discussed. As the analysis of the case study has
revealed the importance of initiatives in systematic protocols and human resource
competency, Sections 7.3 and 7.4 are dedicated to these two initiatives. Section 7.3
discusses the contribution of the lack of competent human resource in the change
process. Chapter 7.4 discusses the contribution of the lack of systematic protocols.
Section 7.5 discusses the contribution of the wider organisational context in the
Indaco’s CE. Section 7.6 provides a summary.

7.2 CE Initiatives in Enabling Technology, External Integration and
Human Resources
By focusing on the organisational integration and communication and decision
making mechanisms, the nature of initiatives in enabling technology, external
integration and human resources become the changing contextual factors within the
substance of change that affect the change. This section discusses the nature of these
initiatives in Indaco, compares them with those in Westaco, and outlines their
contribution on the complex transformation. The summary of these discussions is
outlined in Table 7-1.

7.2.1 E nabling Technology

This section briefly discusses three CE initiatives in enabling technology: computerbased technology, CE tools and methods, and collocation. The other initiative, namely
systematic protocols, is discussed in detail in Section 7.4.
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Table 7-1: Contribution of Initiatives in Enabling Technology, External Integration,
and Human Resources
C E In itia tiv e

O th e r E ffe c ts

C o m m u n ic a tio n and

O rg a n is a tio n a l In te g ra tio n

D e c is io n M a k in g M e c h a n is m s
C o m p u te r-b a s e d T e c h n o lo g y
-

poorly integrated system

-

inadequate capacity

-

technical & compatibility problems

-

- not conducive for effective
cross-functional team in later stages

- limited on-line shared data throughout
stages m ainly within design functions
- less efficient com m unication across

little involvem ent of program

team in later stages

- limited comm unication
betw een developers and users
led to less user-friendly
application, conflict and distrust

m em bers in the pilot project
C E T o o ls a n d M e th o d s
-

em bedded in the system

-

manufacturability/producibility

- Increasing role of production-related
functions throughout stages

- foster early design/production
com m unication in Engineering M atrix stage

C o llo c a tio n
-

full collocation at Initiation stage

-

partial collocation at the engineering

in engineering matrix stage to mainly

matrix and engineering integration stage

dedicated in last 2 stages

-

train wagon and exclusion
som e functions at the last stage

- from m ixed part/full dedicated m em bers

- from little access to control to extensive
access in last 2 stages

- high collaboration within team s across
stages
- low collaboration across team s
- increasingly self association to the
program

S y s te m a tic P ro to c o ls*
-

absence protocols and
implem entation plan

-

under developed standard

-

under developed operating

manuals

procedures
-

absence of clear exit criteria
and deliverables

- partly contnbute to changing structure
and arrangem ent throughout stages
- changing scope and mem bership pattern
of design team s in the last two stages
- increasing lack authority lower team s

- ineffective utilisation of support system

- expectation m ism atch,

- no trust for collaboration across team

disappointments and conflicts

- reduced comm unication across team

betw een the program and

- chaotic comm unication modes
- more dependent lower team

functional units
- anxiety, chaos, distrust
within and betw een Design

in the last two stages

and Operation Centres

- slide back to traditional/functional
arrangement in the Design C entre in

- im posed non-CE approach

the Design-Production Coupling stage

- lack of CE-related training

E x te rn a l In te g ra tio n
-

mainly absence of customer
and supplier involvement

- no significant effect during the phase
in d e r study

- no significant effect during the phase
under study

C o m p e te n c e *
-

increasingly lack of com petence
particularly in design-related
m em bers

-

-

throughout stages
- changing the mem bership pattern of cross

mainly young, educated but

functional team s throughout stages

inexperienced design-related

• changing the nature of delegation to

m em bers
-

- changing structure and arrangem ent

mem bers and lower level team s

mainly m ature, experienced

- changing the seniority level of m em bers

producbon-related mem bers

- hamper total integration betw een design

mainly young team leaders

and production related functions

- poor comm unication betw een the program
and functional units
- increasing high power differential betw een
lower and higher team s in three last stages

- on going conflict and
tension betw een the
Program and functional design
units at the last three stages

- reduced comm unication and collaboration

- suspicion and distrust

betw een Design and Operation Centres

betw een Design and

in the Design-Production Coupling stage
- lower team s rarely m ade decisions and

Operation Centre at the
last stage

w ere often ignored and intervened

C E -R e la te d T ra in in g
-

almost absence, pilot project

-

pilot projects involved a few mem bers

• slideback to traditional/functional
arrangement in the last stage

- ham per inter-team communication
- not conducive for collaboration

H u m a n R e s o u rc e P o lic ies
- little access to control representatives

•

functional based reward system

-

individual-based performance

during the Engineering M atrix and

evaluation

and Engineering Integration stages

*

- identification with the functional units prior
to the Design-Production Coupling stage

Discussed further in the next sections

7.2.1.1 Computer-Based Technology
Modelled the Westaco’s CE, Indaco relied heavily on advanced computer-based
technology as the enabler for CE implementation. Initiatives in enabling technology
were directed toward a paperless design that relied heavily on the availability of stateof-the-art computer technology. However, the development of a computer support
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system for the PLI Program was not well integrated into the design and development
process and dissatisfied most of the leaders of the program teams.
The computer technology that supports design integration, such as CAD/CAM, 3-D
CAD, and CATIA, had been available in Indaco for several years. In addition, the PLI
Program Manager, together with the CADCAM Division, established the Sidina
. group to develop an integrated computer system to support CE in the Program. The
main features of the Sidina system were an integrated database, on-line data sharing,
an integrated application system, and a digitally controlled product configuration.
This included the following initiatives:
1) Fully digital product definition in three-dimensional using CATIA system.
2) Digital mock-up, including digital pre-assembly that electronically simulated
assembly of all parts/tools to check the possible fit and interference, and a digital
assembly sequence that electronically simulated the assembly of components to
optimise the assembly sequence.
3) A product data management system that stored and maintained all product
definition data in a single electronic database throughout all phases of the designbuild-support process.
4) A distributed computing system that distributed computer power and data to work
areas through networked workstations to provide higher performance and
availability as well as independency and flexibility.
In preparation to implement this enabling technology, the Sidina group ran two pilot
projects: a CE simulation with the application of digital product development and
cross-functional team; and a knowledge-based engineering system application to
accelerate design process for the PLI Program. These pilot projects paid great
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attention to the infrastructure of the support system but mainly ignored organisational
and human resource issues. At the time of the field study, i.e. October 1997, the CE
pilot project, using the redesign of PLP’s door as the case study, was just finished.
Sidina initiatives, to a large extent, mimicked the enabling technology in Westaco.
However, according to an ex-intern that had experience at Westaco, the memory
capacity of the computer system was far less than the capacity available in Westaco.
This caused prolonged processing time and continuous technical problems. Further,
unlike Westaco’s support system that was mainly developed in-house combining the
development of the computer technology with Westaco’s cumulative experience and
facilities, the Indaco support system relied entirely on what was available and offered
by its computer and system development suppliers.
Overall, the computer-based technology in Indaco was not as developed as in
Westaco. There were problems partly brought about by the lack of technological
capacity and the lack of integration between the technical group developing the
support system and the members of the PLI Program. Since the Program was still in
its preliminary phase, it was hard to see the impact of the state of these initiatives to
the overall performance of the PLI Program. To date, nevertheless, it contributed to
less efficient communication particularly for non-design functions since the on-line
data were only shared between the design-related functions. Tooling engineering, for
example, had difficulties to fully utilise the on-line data from the computer system.
This contributed to a lack of support for effective cross-functional integration and to a
lesser degree of internal organisational integration.
The use of a non-PLI component as the object of the CE pilot project meant only a
few members of the PLI Program were involved. Hence, the CE pilot project did not
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provide the hands-on cross-functional team experience as intended for most members
of the Program team. Interaction between the system developer (i.e. the Sidina group)
and its users (i.e. the Design and Operation Centres) which necessary to ensure a userfriendly system application, also limited. As the result, engineers from both Centres
often complained that the Sidina did not provide adequate support1.

7.2.1.2 Collocation
As in Westaco, physical collocation was also used to support CE in Indaco. Indaco
and Westaco both started with partial collocation involving only design-related
functions and then extended to other functions. In Indaco, collocation was a matter of
gradual introduction and retained some elements of traditional office division.
However, collocation itself did not lead to total integration. Despite the ‘open plan
working space system’ adopted in the collocation area, there was a clear separation
between one team to another.
At the Initiation stage, all team members worked in one location as part of the New
Product Development (NPD) Department. A need for collocation was suggested by
the Program Manager in the engineering matrix stage. But, new members that joined
the program remained in their original functional locations. As the number of
involved members extended from 23 to more than 100 people in the beginning of
design-production coupling stage and the single collocation area was not yet
available, the relative number of collocated members reduced from 100% in the
initiation stage to about 25%. The partial collocation of ex-NPD group which
remained mostly intact throughout all stages had contributed to the high level of
1

for example in the Coordination Fomin between the Design and Operation Centres
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collaboration within some of design teams, but this was not enough to foster
collaboration across teams when the number grew.
At the beginning of the design-production coupling stage (June, 1997), most members
of the Design Centre were collocated in one area in the Technology Centre Building.
Each design integration team was clustered in an ‘open-plan’ office. Except for the
Chief Engineer and a meeting room, there were no real barrier between groups other
than desks, filing cabinets, and drawing boards. Later, the Chief Engineer separated
the aerodynamic specialists from the design integration teams and located them in a
different room. Members of the Operation Centre occupied several rooms on different
floor. They clustered according to their positions in the Program’s hierarchy.
Supervisors occupied one room, TIP Leaders and other members occupied another
bigger room. The Chief of Operation had his own room separated from these two.
Functional representatives from tooling engineering, manufacturing development and
manufacturing planning were in their functional offices. The Program Manager and
other members were in the Management Centre Building. These office locations of
various program members are illustrated in Figure 7-1.
In May 1998, both the Design Centre and Operation Centre moved into another
location, i.e. Training Centre Building, with a larger space that had been prepared
specifically for collocation. The office layout of the new collocation area, which some
members coined as ‘the wagon train’ for the obvious reason, is in Figure 7-2. Besides
the convenience that they were on the same floor with adequate computer facilities,
the layout mirrored their previous space allocation. Walls bordered the Design Centre
and the Operation Centre and between groups in the Design Centre. Tooling and
manufacturing engineers were excluded and remained in their functional locations.
243

Chapter 7: Contextual Explanation of Change

This situation played a role in changing the status of some of them from fullydedicated to partly dedicated to the program.
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Figure 7-1: Locations of the PLI Team Members in the Company Site at the
beginning of Design-Production Coupling Stage
The partial collocation was partly caused by hesitancy of the functional design units
(i.e. Technology Divisions) to collocate their assigned members due to the limited
number of their competent specialists. The above computerised enabling technology
initiative was often used by functional units as an excuse for not collocating design
representatives as they could have shared the information online through ‘virtual
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Figure 7.2: Layout of the Collocation Area in May 1998
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collocation’. This hesitation added to the tension between the PLI Program and the
functional design units over human resource issues. It also contributed to the failure to
achieve organisational integration through the matrix mechanism during the
engineering matrix stage. This led to changes in the Program’s organisational
structure.
The single collocation area for both the Design Centre and the Operation Centre in the
design-production coupling stage did not significantly increase the degree of inter
team communication within and across the two Centres. The nature of layout and
cluster (i.e. train wagon, functional-based clusters) seemingly contributed to this
modest effect of the collocation initiative in organisational integration and
communication and decision-making mechanism.

7.2.1.3 Formal CE Methods
Both Westaco and Indaco did not include any formal CE methods in their initiatives.
Nevertheless, the purpose of these methods, to some extent, was embedded in their
design process and computer support system. In Westaco, CE tools and methods were
well captured, either in the design process standard manuals/procedures or in their
computer-based technology enablers, and integrated with their CE applications. The
digital pre-assembly application, for example, focused on easy fabrication and
assembly as suggested by DFA/DFMA methods. Another example was the addition
of manufacturing engineers in the approval process prior to the formal release of
drawing. Previously, the approval process only listed design, stress analysis, and
material technology engineers.

*

246

Chapter 7: Contextual Explanation of Change

Formal methods as described in CE literature, such as DFM/A and QFD were not
evident in the Indaco’s PLI Program, but similar to the Westaco, the aim of such tools
was attempted to be incorporated in the design process and computer support systems.
The Sidina support system included, for example, the digital pre-assembly application
as part of its integration system although had not been fully applied. The
consideration over manufacturability and producibility issues led to the establishment
of the Design Build Process team to foster early communication between design and
production functions early in the engineering matrix stage. This had extended and led
to the formation of the Operation Centre in the design-production coupling stage.
Despite the absence of the formal CE tools, the objective of such tools remained parts
of the consideration and contributed to the change in internal organisational
integration initiatives.

7.2.2 E xtern al Integration
Westaco was also at a considerably advanced stage in integrating its customers and
suppliers into its development programs. By contrast, external integration in Indaco
was clearly far less than it was in Westaco and very limited in terms of CE ideas.
However, during the period of the case study, at least, these differences did not have
any significant effect on the CE initiatives in the focal sub-processes.

7.2.2.1 Supplier Involvement
The aircraft industry is normally characterised bv a relatively higher degree of
supplier involvement due to the complexity of its technology. In Westaco, suppliers
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were closely involved early in the development process, either as representatives in a
product development team or as a whole sub-team within the program teams . The
equipment suppliers were typically involved as representatives and manufacturing
subcontractors as sub-teams. These supplier involvement arrangements became part
of contractual issues between Westaco and its suppliers and subcontractors.
In Indaco, by contrast, supplier involvement did not go further than a business
relationship between the customer and its suppliers. Although some suppliers had
their representatives visiting and talking with Indaco’s engineers to clarify the
material/component specifications, none were involved as part of the PLI cross
functional teams in the development process. Supplier representatives, mainly sales
engineers, were typically engaged in lengthy discussion sessions with the team
members to clarify the material/component specifications. Some suppliers agreed to
the risk sharing clauses in which they would provide the initial investment for making
the components specifically met the PLI’s requirements, although never be put into
practice due to the PLI termination. This contractual clause merely reflected the
widespread business trend in the aircraft industry to lock-in suppliers and minimise
the investment risk rather than as part of an intention to engage in a cross-functional
development team.

7.2.2.2 Customer Involvement
In the Westaco’s programs, customers and potential customers were typically
involved in two different phases of the development process. Firstly, in the conceptual
phase, the programs tapped into customer requirements first-hand by establishing a
:A published report that due to confidentiality reason cannot be referred
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series of discussion sessions with potential customers, following up their suggestions
and, at the end, presenting back the aircraft concept. Secondly, in the design phase,
customer representatives became part of the product development teams. Some
Westaco’s engineers reported the advantages of having these representatives as they
were typically airlines’ maintenance engineers who understood aircraft operation and,
therefore, were able to provide simple suggestions that often turned out to be critical3.
In Indaco, customer involvement was limited to the airline visitation and the
formation of the airline-working group that met annually, during the engineering
integration stage, the Program Manager and his staff contacted and visited local and
international airlines in order to capture the customers’ views of airliner requirements.
Then, the PLI Program established the airline-working group to maintain the
relationship with potential customers and organised an annual meeting to obtain
updates on the latest developments in customer needs. Other than this annual
gathering, there was no direct contact between the programs’ engineers with the
airlines’ representatives.

7.2.3 H um an R esource P olicy a n d C apability

This section briefly discusses two CE initiatives in human resource policy and
capability, which are CE-related training and pilot projects and human resource
policies. Another CE initiative in this aspect, namely competency, is discussed in
Section 7.3. These discussions on human resource aspect of CE are focused on the
‘local’ policies and initiatives in the PLI Program. However, as we shall see the
analysis moves to the broader organisational context as the current state and policies
y

A published report that due to confidentiality reason cannot be referred
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in human resources in this inner context were contributed by and, in turn affected the
broader organisational context.

7.2.3.1 CE-Related Training and Pilot Projects
In Westaco, CE-related training was provided at the outset of the programs.
According to both ex-intems and engineers from a Westaco’s subcontractor, the
launch of a new product development program typically started with the
familiarisation session for all people involved in the programs. This familiarisation
process included the training on the programs’ charter and protocols and all related
manuals and procedures. These sessions involved members from inside as well as
outside the company. Some outsiders coined this kind of sessions as the indoctrination
to the ‘Westaco’s way’4.
At Indaco, acknowledging that the new approach required familiarity with features of
the computer-based tools, the Sidina group offered regular training courses to prepare
engineers for using the advanced computer technology. The Sidina pilot projects
offered the potential for providing know-how and hands-on experience in cross
functional teamwork. However, since this pilot project used a component from other
program as its case study, the members of the PLI Program were not deeply involved.
Only a few engineers were involved, which was ironic given the pilot project’s main
objective was to support the PLI Program. Furthermore, although the pilot project
intended to simulate CE implementation, it focused more on the infrastructure of the
support system than on organisational and human resources. Therefore, even though
the effects of team members’ competence were noticed in a Sidina pilot project
J Personal interview with engineers in die subcontractor sue
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report5, no further action was taken.
In contrast with the availability of various training courses in computer-based tools,
there was no CE familiarisation and team-related training available for the Program
team during all stages of the development process. A few members from the
Operation Centre showed some know-how on team-related issues and admitted that
they had acquired this through training course in Total Quality Management in their
previous functional units. This lack of CE-related training was attributed to the lack of
systematic protocols discussed in previous section, and, this also contributed to the
state of internal organisational integration and communication and decision-making
mechanism in the PLI Program in the same way as the lack of systematic protocols.

1.2.3.2

Human Resource Policies

In Indaco, except for administrative purposes, the involvement of the Human
Resource Department in the selection, training, career development, and performance
measurement of the employees was insignificant. Decisions over these issues rested
almost solely in the hands of line managers of the functional and program units. Thus,
CE-related human resource management issues were generally at thes-.' units’
discretion. Unfortunately, due to limited sources and failure to obtain access to
Westaco, this study does not have sufficient data from Westaco on this issue.

1) Selection:
Almost all team members were drawn from various parts of Indaco. Only a few were
newly hired. Members from the Design Centre joined the PLI Program through four
? Item (45) Appendix-B
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different paths: 1) early involvement in the program initiation stage as a member of
NPD Department; 2) assignment as representatives from functional units; 3) voluntary
application to move from a functional unit and join the Program; and 4) new
recruitment. Members from the Operation Centre joined the PL1 Program through
four different paths: 1) involvement as focal points; 2) being approached and asked by
one of Program leaders; 3) voluntary application; and 4) functional assignment.
Managers and supervisors were selected by their respective superiors. This selection
were based on: 1) involvement in previous stages; 2) experience and specialisation;
and 3) previous activities as focal points.
As mentioned in the previous section, internal recruitment typically added tension
between the Program and the functional units due to scarcity of competent engineers,
particularly in the design area. This issue also contributed to the state of competency
of the Program members which is discussed further in the Section 7.3.

2) Training and career development:
The career development issue was one major cause of a tension between the PLI
Program and functional design units. Collocation and full dedication demands from
the Program, which had been aired since the beginning of engineering matrix stage,
were seen as reducing the role of functional units to merely a ‘human resource pool’
that supplied engineers to the program, particularly at the design production coupling
stage in which the Program intended to become an autonomous division. This pool
user relationship raised issues of who would control the specialists and who was
responsible over their performance evaluation.
Functional design units (i.e. Technology Divisions), in particular, resisted the notion
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that they served only as a pool of expertise for the Program. This ‘pool’ role was in
stark contrast with their roles in the previous PLP Program in which they had had
significant influence in the development process. Furthermore, functional design units
viewed that product development competence involved cumulative learning of both
tacit and explicit knowledge, and hence assignments on a particular program should
ensure fitness with longer-term career development in the company and
organisational knowledge rather than being solely based on the short team specific
interest of the program. They believed that it was part of their responsibility to get
involved in systematically assigning and routing engineers to various stages of the
development process in various programs in order to ensure the program assignments
matched the overall career development system and organisational knowledge.
This conflicting view was never properly addressed. The PLI Program only provided
to the functional design units the opportunity to suggest a list of engineers for
functional representatives to be selected by the Program, which obviously dissatisfied
those units. Although it could be considered as a major strategic issue, it was never
put in the agenda of Indaco’s top management council. Overall, this issue contributed
to various forms of tensions, conflicts, suspicions and distrust between the PLI
Program and the functional design units as mentioned in the discussion of
competency, which affected the state of organisational integration and communication
and decision-making mechanisms as discussed later in this chapter.

3) Performance measurement and reward system:
In Indaco, the link between the company-wide performance evaluation and the reward
system was indirect and not always clear. The company-wide performance evaluation
was based on individual contributions administered twice a year. The company
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reward system basically consisted of a base salary and an incentive system for
individual contribution. The base salary system was developed on the basis o f the
education level with a gradual annual increase given for the appropriate level of
performance. The incentive was discreetly granted on the basis of the Heads of the
Divisions subjective evaluation of the individuals’ achievement. It was widely
believed that a great disparity of the incentive level existed. Design engineers were
believed to receive much higher incentive compared with other employees at equal
positions. Since the nominal amount of the incentive was significant to the total pay
cheque (i.e. it could be much higher than the base salary for the engineers), this
system was widely regarded as unjust and needed a major overhaul. Efforts to
improve this salary system had taken place in the company since mid-1980s but no
significant improvement had been achieved.
During the design production coupling stage, in addition to the company-wide
performance evaluation and reward system, the PLI Program initiated an additional
reward system based on individual performance on program’s tasks exclusive to the
people involved in the Program. Since this program-specific reward system directly
linked to the performance, it was seen as an improvement to the company system.
Similar to the company-wide appraisal system, it involved superiors filling in
individual-based evaluation forms about their subordinates. However, this reward
system was cancelled after its first application due to objections from many other top
managers who considered this as unfair to other employees who were not involved in
the Program. Given its financial situation, Indaco was unable to afford a similar
additional system to the entire company.
In the PLI Program, awareness of strong attachment between representative engineers
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and their functional superiors (i.e. a large portion of their income attributed to the
subjective valuation from those superiors) contributed to the continuing anxiety over
the loyalty of functional representatives. This, in turn, contributed to several structural
changes in the pursuit to achieve effective integration. Within this perspective, the
attempt to have an exclusive performance and reward system could be seen as a ‘lure3
to buy loyalty from members and functional representatives. However, it had a
contrary effect as it added more tension to the already tense relationship between the
Program and functional design units.

7.3

Competency and the Effects of the Lack of Competent Human
Resources

7.3.1 L evel o f C om petency in the P L I P rogram

Overall, most design-related members of the Indaco’s PLI Program were
inexperienced but highly educated engineers. Only a few managerial positions were
occupied by senior persons. The production-related engineers and team leaders were
typically more experienced but with less formal education. This situation was
different from Westaco’s programs that mainly consisted of senior experienced
engineers and managers.
Most members of the PLI’s design integration teams were young engineers, between
25 to 35 years of age. Some of them held doctoral and master degrees in engineering
from various universities world-wide. For most of them, the Program was their first
practical design experience at a development program. Despite their education, they
were considered by managers from functional design units as not mature enough to be
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independently involved in such a big project. On the other hand, most members and
leaders of the Operation Centre were experienced engineers who had been with the
company for more than 10 years. They had mostly been involved in the production
phase of the previous development programs. Most of them held engineering degrees
from local universities. A few had Masters degrees. Some members started their
careers as mechanics or support staff and completed their degree in engineering by
taking part-time study. All supervisors and leaders of the production-related TIP
teams were engineers.
In the program initiation stage, the lack of competency of design engineers was
compensated for by the experienced team leader (i.e. the Project Engineer) who was
considered to be one of most respected engineers in Indaco. The scheme to have
experienced engineers leading a largely inexperienced design team was attempted in
the next two stages. Initially, most leaders in the design related TOP teams during the
engineering matrix stage were experienced engineers with recognised reputations in
their specialisation. However, the Program Manager’s policy requesting fulldedication assignments to the PLI Program had made functional design units pulling
out their experienced engineers from the Program during the engineering integration
stage because these engineers were also needed to support other programs. In the
design-production coupling stage, only a few lead engineers and supervisors in the
Design Centre were sufficiently competent for independent design work. This created
the opportunity for the Technical Adviser, who was initially assigned to assist the
Program in technical issues, to impose his design approach and play a more dominant
role.
The main reason for this situation was the limited number of 'competent engineer’
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available as the functional design units struggled to support all programs with
competing schedules. In the view of these functional units, assigning competent
specialists only to one program could jeopardise other programs. Furthermore, these
competent specialists most likely were managers or supervisors in their respective
functional units. A compromise scheme to resolve this issue was proposed and
discussed between the functional design units (i.e. Technology Divisions) and the
Design Centre at the beginning of the design-production coupling stage. The scheme
involved the Design Centre working together with Technology Divisions to define the
PLI design concept during the preliminary design phase. This design concept would
be dispatched in work packages and allocated to various Technology Divisions for
detail design. The deliverables (i.e. detail drawings and specifications) would be
handed back to the Design Centre for sign-off. However, this scheme was never put
into practice.
In a later development, there was a mutually agreed scheme to use the statement of
work for acquiring personnel support from functional units. The Design Centre had
full responsibility for product performance and full control over the personnel
assigned to the Program. The Design Centre was also able to reject assigned engineers
based on their qualification. Technology Divisions could provide suggestions over
technical issues, but the technical decisions’ sign-off was in the Design Centre.
During the case study, however, this scheme was only partly implemented for aircraft
system specialisation. These ineffective schemes to overcome shortages in competent
design engineers resulted in conflicts and tensions not only between the Program and
Technology Divisions but also between the Design Centre and the Operation Centre
within the Program.

•

257

Chapter 7: Contextual Explanation of Change

The increasing conflicts and tensions between the PL1 Program and functional design
units (i.e. Technology Divisions) attributed to four factors:
1) the Program’s demand for fully dedicated engineers;
2) the scarcity of competent engineers in the Technology Divisions in relation to the
demand from all programs;
3) the strong commitment of the Technology Divisions to other programs, especially
the PLP Program; and
4) the expectation of the Technology Divisions that they would be given autonomous
PLTs work packages.
Initially, Technology Divisions committed more senior people to support the PLI
Program according to their perception and expectation. However, as they did not
devote enough resources to fulfil the Program Manager’s demand, the Program
Manager tried to get engineers to be integrated into the Program and under his
managerial control that led to several changes in program structures. In response to
this action, the Technology Divisions pulled out their more experienced engineers and
gave only junior ones to the Program. This meant that expert dependence continued
on the functional design units, and on going conflict was the norm.
The relationship between the Design Centre and the Operation Centres was also
affected. The Design Centre had less senior people than the Operation Centre. Both
Centres could not have the full sign-off authority because the need to check design
adequacy and tooling requirement with functions outside the Program due to the
intentional exclusion of those functions from the Operation Centre. This situation
displeased the Design Centre. The result was suspicion and distrust in various forms.
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7.3.2 E ffects o f th e L ack o f C om peten t H um an R esource

Although sometimes mentioned in the CE literature as part of a CE requirement that
could be an impediment in its implementation (e.g. Fujimoto, 1997, Statham and
Kleiner, 1996), the importance of competency was rarely emphasised in supporting
CE. It seems that much CE discussion has an embedded assumption that the engineers
have had adequate design (both tacit and explicit) competence. The case study
findings showed how the lack of competency shaped CE practices in the PLI
Program. The precondition of skill necessary to apply CE was not available and this
caused several adjustments in CE initiatives that led to the deviation from the
intended approach.
Ln Indaco, several senior managers in both design and production units were
convinced that the company-wide lack of competent personnel was a major obstacle
in applying CE. One top management member support this view:
The mam obstacle for CE is that our people are not qualified enough. ... Although we have
enough in number [of engineers], engineers that could be given fully delegation are not many.
(Steve. Top Management Member. April. 1998)

The Ex Project Engineer expressed his concerns in applying CE in Indaco because of
this competency issue, particularly regarding the engineers’ level of experience:
At [the PLI]... it is not CE....... For me. the ability of [Indaco’s] designers is not mature
enough: the svstem could not compete with the accumulation of experience. That should be
handled first. It should be based on discipline...then we have to increase communication,
interaction, and dialogue. But they should be in the strict specialisation because they haven't
got enough experience to provide judgement.... Otherwise, the quality will be deteriorated ...
We are not read's' for CE vet.... CE is not only a tool.... CE is a culture.... It cannot be planted
right away (Mark. Ex Project Engineer. July 1998)

In a later interview with the Chief Engineer, he admitted that members of his team,
including him, were far from adequate for the job to develop a new aircraft and that
they were ‘learning by doing" as he stated:
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There are two types of design people, designers and analysts. ... An analyst is a deeper
specialist such as structural analyst or stress analyst. ... A designer needs to know analysis
issue and design issues that relate to producibility. ... Designers are the ones who shape the
product. ... It is hard to find people who know the knowledge deeply. All [engineers in
Design Centre] are far from it, no experience. I myself still need a lot of learning. I started
with aerodynamics, although I got structure at school, it does not detail enough. I could not
argue on a detail issue... (Robert. Chief Engineer, February' 1999)

However, rather than the explicit competence such as the level of education in
relevant disciplines, the case study findings emphasised the importance of the more
intangible aspect of design competence that related to tacit knowledge, which could
only be acquired through the accumulation of experience and involvement in product
development programs. While the level of explicit knowledge was rarely mentioned
as a problem, the level of experience was found to be very important. Almost all of
the competency concerns were attributed to the limited experience. One engineer
involved in the Design Centre expressed his concern in these words:
We made mistake in [the PLI Program], We have established an unbalanced team: too many
youngsters. The youngsters are good because they are dynamic, but if too many we cannot
bring with us previous experiences. ... We intend to create a multi-functional to be an integral
one. To understand die right portion of each discipline, we should have die experience in
product development... Widiout diat, people will easily become out of proportion, which
leads to a domination of a discipline in [cross-functional] teams. That what happens in die PLI
[Program]. [To understand die right portion of each function] we need die experience because
it is not written. (John, Design Centre. January 1999).

Even the Chief Engineer himself noted that his team caused concerns:
Sometimes, I have die impression that [Technology Divisions] do not trust us... (Robert,
Chief Engineer. November 1997).

The more explicit statements about lack of experience in the Design Centre came
from some of its supervisors, as one of them, for example, said:
No one of die current [Design Centre] members experienced die hectic of [the PLP Program],
... [These young engineers], do tiiey know what it was like being here 24 hours, [including]
Saturday and Sunday, and had not gone home for weeks...(Roger, Design Centre, November
1997). ’
’

Within the Design Centre to which most of the concerns were expressed, most of the
engineers had considerably high levels of education, mainly master degrees in various
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engineering specialisations. Yet, most of them were young and inexperienced
engineers. Most of them also admitted that the PLI Program was their first, and that
they were ‘learning by doing’. However, most were confident that they were capable
to do the job and in some cases implied that their seniors might not be better than they
were, as one of them put it:
Here, seniority does not mean senior. Maybe he is senior because he is older... (Susan. Design
Centre. March 1998).

This situation was in contrast with Westaco practices, which only assigned
experienced design engineers to its large-scale development programs, as one of
Indaco’s ex-interns recalled:
When [Westaco] was developing [the PLX]. I was there. They took mv Lead [Engineer], the
best in mv team, the most knowledgeable person technically. They posted him in [the PLX]
Program. They took many Lead [Engineers] and made them configuration managers. When a
company develops a brand new product normally there are a lot of ‘ifs\ It is a matter of
common sense to assign experienced engineers, isn't it? (John. Design Centre, January 1999).

Although most concerns were about engineers at the operational level, there were also
concerns of the lack of competency at the managerial level. Those who were
concerned pointed out that the Program Manager, the Chief Engineer, and the Chief
of Operation had never been part of the managerial level of the previous programs.
One design engineer expressed in the interview:
... Tire Program Manager also lacks of experience. He has no life of experience and he is
unable to see that everyone in his Design Centre has to be able to express their creativity.
Without creativity thev could not do the best. This can only be achieved after experiencing
design job. [The Program Manager] does not see this. He thinks by following [the Technical
Adviser's] advice, everything must be OK. He has not yet understood the essence of the
problem. (John, Design Centre, January 1999).

One engineer from the Operation Centre expressed his concern about the Chief of
Operation and supervisors in the Operation Centre with the following:
There is a tendency that [some members] do not trust them [because] they do not have the’
guts to decide tilings. ... I am fully aware that they had never been worked directly down [in
the production area], ... Their experience in this particular matter is relatively low. (Peter.
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Operation Centre, November 1997).

Similarly, an engineer from Design Centre admitted the indecisiveness of the Chief
Engineer as follows:
... sometimes he is indecisive. ... If there were two options, then he asked for more study. He
was often unable to make up his mind even though the study has been completed (Frank.
Design Centre. March 1998).
.

The Program Manager's lack of experience was, in particular, considered by his team
as a major factor contributing to his indecisiveness and his reluctance to inform his
team about the update of organisational restructuring plans during the economic
turmoil. This further demotivated some of his team members who saw it as a betrayal
of his previous confidence in the team. As a team member recalled:
At the beginning, he highly praised us saying that we were selected people and that many
others strongly wished to be in the program. Then he said . "I cannot tell you yet about this,
please be patient." ... Those were contradictory statements ... (John. Design Centre. January
1999).

Obviously, it was not the intention of the company to assign so many inexperienced
engineers to the PLI Program. In the beginning of the CE initiation process, there
were several attempts to acquire more experienced engineers for the Program,
particularly for managerial positions. However, the limited number of experienced
engineers and the existence of other programs that competed for the scarce personnel
resources resulted in this situation. The company-wide shortage of competent
engineers was expressed by one of the engineer as follows:
We have 3000 [engineers] in [Technology Divisions]. They are all specialists. But only 50
[could] functioned as Lead Engineers. For [the PLI] we may only need 250 engineers, [but]
20% of them should be Lead Engineers. (Roger. Design Centre, November 1997).

In comparison to this remark, at the time of the case study, the Design Centre had
over 60 engineers, but on the basis of their involvement in previous programs no more
than 5 engineers could be considered as experienced lead engineers.
262

Chapter 7: Contextual Explanation of Change

The company-wide shortage of competent engineers became a real problem for
human resource allocation particularly when the PLP program experienced a massive
delay, which forced Indaco to run parallel programs requiring similar specialisations
at the same time. In addition, a derivative program of the PLC that was launched at
the same time as the PL1 Program turned out to be much bigger than expected, and
subsequently required a substantial number of engineers. This problem was the main
trigger of the ongoing strain between the PLI Program and Technology Divisions, as
well as the trigger of some changes in the structure and working approach.
Many organisational adjustments resulted from this lack of competency. At least five
management issues in the PLI Program arose from, or responded to, this lack of
qualified personnel, which affected the program structures and CE initiatives:
1) changes in program structure,
2) changes in working approach,
3) a lack of trust between the Design Centre and the Operation Centre, and
4) conflicts between the Design Centre and functional design units

7.3.2.1 Changes in Program Organisational Structure
At the beginning of CE adoption, i.e. in the engineering matrix stage, the PLI
Program had difficulty acquiring appropriate lead engineers for the TOP and
engineering specialist groups due to scarcity of competence engineers. This led to an
integration structure that merged TOP and engineering specialist groups into four
design integration teams in the engineering integration stage. Even with fewer lead
engineer positions, the Program struggled to acquire fully dedicated engineers for.
some of its design integration teams. Within these engineering matrix and engineering
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integration stages, many names of experienced engineers that initially appeared in the
program structures could not be retained to support the PLI Program, as one
interviewee remembered:
They were non-active, only names. At that time they were asked [to join in]. You might hear
that they were fighting over names and putting those names [in the structure], [ButJ [those
peoplej did the design [for PLP], so they could not be in [the PLI Program], ... [The PLI
Program] have a lot of new people. Top engineers never been seen in TOPs. That’s why they
kept changing (the structure]. ... (Kevin. Tooling Engineering. January' 1999).

Organisationally, there were two possible reasons for this situation: either the persons
already occupied managerial positions in the functional design units or they could not
resign from their involvement in other programs that were still in progress at that
time. The Chief Engineer admitted this:
So. I resigned from my other position in the [Technology Division] and became a manager
responsible for the Design Centre. ... [Prior to that], some [engineers] were fully dedicated to
the program, [but] mostly at the operational level. At the managerial level, there was just
[John] and me. [Lance] was asked but he could not join because of his involvement in [the
PLP], There were a lot of such cases. [Joel] was still involved in [tire derivative program]. So.
they were replaced with others. (Robert. Chief Engineer. November 1997).

Engineers mentioned in the above remark were regarded as Indaco’s best engineers in
their areas and had held managerial positions in functional design units. Faced with
the demand from the PLI Program to be fully dedicated, these engineers opted to
remain in their previous functional units in which they could support more than one
program. Traditionally, their involvement in a program was indirect, via their staff as
representatives, as the Chief Engineer said:
Previously, we threw work packages over [to Technology Divisions] and they sent the
representatives. But only one or two people really knew about the issue and they typically
held [managerial] positions, either as head of departments or supervisors, and most of them
were full time in [the PLP Program], ... Under pressure of the [PLP] continuous delay, they
panicked mid took all resources to that program. (Robert, Chief Engineer, November 1997).

This led to the engineering integration structure in which most leaders of design
integration teams, while they had authority to control the members, had far less
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authority in design decisions due to their youth and inexperience. The move to an
autonomous program division in the design-production coupling stage can be seen as
an effort to secure the best available talents for the PLI Program so that they could not
being disturbed by demands from other programs. The Chief Engineer explained in
the interview:
Therefore, it is better for ine to have a clear cut in people [arrangementj and a set of
engineers. Engineers that I can control and recognise their capabilities. For sure. I would
always doubt their output if they were not the best [engineers]. But, 1 could consult the output
either back to their functions or somewhere else in the industry. (Robert, Design Centre.
November 1997).

7.3.2.2 Changes in Working Approach
The working approach intended by the PLI Program Manager since the engineering
matrix stage, was teamwork in which specialists from company-wide functions
worked together and were fully dedicated to the Program and collocated in one area,
as he stated in the interview:
CE concept is the basis to improve QCD [quality', cost, and delivery'] ... CE is actually cross
functional teamwork. ... It involves not only engineering but also all functional units that
involved with the product. ... The product actually integrates those organisational units. So
CE is product oriented, teamwork oriented and tire output is the excellent product. That is a
fundamental of tire [PLI] program ... The most important thing is a real team in one site. Tire
factual integration occurs at working level in which everybody that works together and also
sits together at tire same room. ... If someone, e.g. material representative, is not required on
daily basis, he may handle three or more parts. The space should be optimised. ...
Engineering, tooling, manufacturing and production planning people, but not direct workers,
have to meet on site every' day. (Clive, Program Manager, June 1996)

The internalisation of design-related functions into the program structure in the
engineering integration stage and later the production-related functions in the designproduction coupling stage were part of the scheme to fulfil this intention. However,
with the second best engineers as part of the Program team and the company-wide
shortage of competent engineers to fulfil the demands from other competing
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programs, the initial intention to provide empowerment and full delegation to the
cross-functional teams at the operational level could not be achieved.
Further, instead of having empowered and fully delegated engineers, the process in
the design teams (TOP teams and design integration teams) remained involving
managerial decisions from functional design units (albeit informally in the design
integration stage) and, hence, added one more step into the process as the Chief
Engineer commented:
Sometimes |functional engineers] have worked well, but they did not lune authorisation to
hand out the result to us. Thai's the problem, they were uncertain about the result wlule their
supervisors were not having time vet to have it checked. Should they sent it to us. we could
had reviewed it together. (Robert. Chief Engineer, November 1997).

The concept of autonomous division in the design-production coupling stage was
intended to reduce this intervention from functional units and rely more on functional
expertise within the Program, i.e. the technical advisers and the leaders of design
integration teams, to provide guidance for engineers.
The removal of aeronautic engineers from design integration teams by the Chief
Engineering to be put as a separate group later in the design-production coupling
stage caused disintegration of design integration teams and contributed to the
deviation from working approach intended by the Program Manager earlier (i.e.
product-based cross-functional team). The reason behind this decision was:
Aerodynamics could not work partially. It should be part of [aircraft] integration group.
Because the responsibility of Wing Integration Team is [wing] configuration, structures and
systems, [the Supervisor] may not comprehend all aspects of aerodynamics. ... So, he had to
rely on his aerodynamic engineer. But. aerodynamic engineers [should] conceive aerodynamic
integration as a whole. [For example] he could not see only the aerodynamic of the nacelle
because there is interference between nacelle and wing. [In his analysis], he has to include the
aerodynamic of wing section as well. Therefore, I merged all aerodynamic engineers together
under my direct supervision. (Robert. Chief Engineer. February 1999).

Although did not explicitly point to competency concerns as the main reason, this
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explanation implied that the Chief Engineer was unsure whether the design
integration teams were capable of providing proportionate balance between
specialisations and thorough consideration of every aspect (including the global
aircraft configuration) at the outset of each component design.
In the design-production coupling stage, the Program failed to establish single cross
functional teams incorporating both design and production functions, and instead
established two separate teams, the Design Centre and the Operation Centre. Despite
all efforts to integrate the component-based teams from these two Centres, they
remained separated. The cause of this failure was the perceived lack of experience of
the designers as discussed earlier. There was a worry that the more experienced
engineers from the Operation Centre would drive the design process, which, in turn,
could force the inexperienced young engineers to give up product performance over
the manufacturing or cost considerations. The Chief Engineer partly admitted the lack
of competence in his team had put him in a defensive position in co-operating with
the Operation Centre:
[Members of the Design and Operation Centres) have to be physically close each other ... It is
better for them to stay nearly. It would be easier for them if they need to meet, sit and discuss
together. ... [But] surely, they should have not to work too close and [design engineers]
should not let the manufacturing take the drive... (Robert Chief Engineer, November 1997).

This led to the deviation in communication mechanism between the two Centres.
Instead of having collaborative inter-team communication, the communication
mechanism was dominated by formal communication. Even some collaborative
relationships that flourished in the beginning was reduced and replaced by increasing
lack of trust between the two Centres. This issue is discussed in the next section.
In the production area, operational representatives from tooling engineering and other
functions that were excluded from the Operation Centre were also dominated bv
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young and inexperienced engineers. This also altered the intended development
process. In tooling engineering, engineers assigned to the Program were required to
present their work for approval from the supervisors in functional tooling department.
This was because the supervisors in this department were not sure that the assigned
designers had considered all matters when developing their tooling designs. In short,
there was a lack of trust in the capability of the tooling engineers. Therefore, the
conceptual design of the tools remained under the control of the functional tooling
supervisors. One supervisor explained:
In tiie design process, [tooling engineers] are authorised in detail design. We provided them
with a design authority to complete and to check the task but not to sign off the conceptual
design. Fortnightly they have to make a presentation. ... The jig designs have to be internally
presented first [in tooling engineering]. [The tool engineer] should explain liis idea and we
help him in [developing] the concept. ... When a tooling engineer makes a jig, the jig should
be checked with the master [tool]. He has to consider how die master tools work for quality
inspection]. Because of the limitation of his knowledge, he focuses only to the jig.... (Kevin.
Tooling Engineering. January 1999).

7.3.2.3 Lack of Trust between the Design Centre and the Operation Centre
The noticeable lack of experience of many engineers from the Design Centre had both
advantages and disadvantages for the introduction of CE. One advantage was that
they were willing to learn and to co-operate with engineers from the Operation
Centre. These inexperienced engineers showed significant interests to the
production’s points of view. These design engineers welcomed and appreciated input
from the Operation Centre, at least at the beginning of the design-production coupling
stage. Some of them commented in the interview:
... die Operation Centre’s engineers were die ones who explained things to me. ... They sent
us something [to be reviewed]. When we got confused, we just made a phone call and they
would explain it to us. That’s good for us. We get much closer... (Susan, Design Centre,
March 1998).
•
It is cool. .. . A metal forming guy often took us to die plant. If we want to know [about
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' manufacturing] we can just go down there. We were taken to the machining [plant] by [the
machining specialist], (Frank, Design Centre, March 1998).

This attitude fostered the intensive interaction between the two Centres at the
beginning of the stage. The expected resistance from design engineers to work
together with production engineers, which could have created obstacles for CE
implementation, did not happen, albeit with some concerns from the Operation
Centre. This revealed in interviews as follows:
In my opinion, both parties are active. When I needed guidance, like on how to make [a part]
because I could not imagine how the machine work. I phoned and asked them. I [also]
provided them with suggestions on how's if we did tliis by this. etc. They made an initiative to
run a [familiarisation] course about fabrication. That's good. The trainers were experts from
the field. They also made a manual for our reference, such as the proper radius we should use
(Darren. Design Centre, March 1998)
We provided a short course for the Design Centre on how to make manufacturing process
easier. It took about three sessions, the Design Centre [engineers] was very positive toward
tins course. They think they really need it. (James. Operation Centre. March 1998)
There is a willingness [to co-operate]. But just the attitude is not enough. If there is
willingness but the skill is not adequate, it would remain design for design not design for
manufacturing ... I think they lack [engineer's] intuition. ... It should be supported by
experience. Tire experience could not be bought. ... It might be OK for now. but I don't know
how it will be after we enter the detail phase ... (William, Operation Centre. December 1997)

However, when significant design decisions began to be made, the inexperienced
design engineers had to refer to the Chief Engineer or the Technical Adviser. Often,
these inexperienced engineers could not defend the result of collaboration with their
Operation Centre counterparts. This apparent powerlessness of the designers was
derived from their status as inexperienced engineers:
There is a lot of input from [the Operation Centre].......As long as it did not divert the design.
we changed it. but sometimes they just have to conform [to design criteria] and at the end it
will go to [Chief Engineer] or [the Technical Adviser], To date, everything should go through
[the Technical Adviser], ... One example is the window concept ... We made a study together
with [the Operation Centre's] engineers. Although [based on the study] the concept with rivet
[method] is better, the bosses decided in favour of machining ones. I don’t know why...
(Frank. Design Centre, March 1998).
Last tune, [the Technical Adviser] stud that the stabiliser front spin should become one part
with die fitting. Then [Albert] said it could not be like that. He made an analysis about the
difficulty, die man-hours [needed]. We discussed it together with [the Technical Adviser] and
got his OK: it could be cut. Then, we put it in paper ... but [the Technical Adviser] later
changed his mind (Darren, Design Centre. March 1998).
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This situation dissatisfied engineers from the Operation Centre. They felt betrayed by
their counterparts in the Design Centre. This dissatisfaction led to a growing lack of
trust toward the Design Centre and scepticism about their commitment over
operation-related issues. The Chief of Operation, in particular, expressed concerns
that the Design Centre simply did not respond to input from the Operation Centre:
We prepared producibilitv analysis. We sent this analysis to the Design Centre. We told them
the constraints: the radius should be like this because of the machine and the cutter: the
maximum movement of the machine etc. There are also assessment results, ... e.g. whether
[window frame] should be machined one by one, or using forging, etc. We made assessments
on both technical and economical viability. ... There is a lot of input, but there is no response.
It is not clear, but I tlunk the problem is the level of skill. There are a lot of new comers [in the
Design Centre]. (Howard. Chief of Operation, December 1997).

Further more, the Operation Centre asserted that the lack of competence of design
engineers was the only reason that the previously unscheduled material and
technological tests of wing box and skin panel became a necessity and caused a
significant delay in program schedule. The tests aimed to find the best alternative
panel designs in terms of its structural strength against a certain amount of static and
dynamic loads. One tooling engineer commented:
When we were equally senior, many problems could be resolved in a short time. [We were]
quick to understand [the problem]. But if our partner [said.] "what do you 016011'' or "we want
to test it first”, it would take a very long [time]. They call it concurrent process but I call it
learning process. ... Newcomers are newcomers, no experience. (Kevin, Tooling Engineering.
January 1999).

This indecisiveness was even admitted by one of Design Centre supervisors,
reflecting to the situation within the Design Centre itself:
There are several factors. The first one is lack of experience; they are very young teams. They
went to the left [then to] the right, but could not focus. The result is they could not complete
the important ones. The DR&O never really completed; they keep changing the mission &
objectives. They have dispatch & reliability but there is no structural design requirement, no
system design requirement. ... That is our problem as a team. In my opinion, most problems
are actually because of lack of experience that unable [us] to focus on what we should do
(John. Design Centre. January 1999).

Lack of experience among design engineers also hampered the communication
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between tooling engineers from functional tooling department and design engineers.
This was due to the design engineers lacked of familiarity with the terminology being
used and with the level of detail information required by their counterparts. This
resulted in further unnecessary delays. The following incident between tooling
engineering and design engineering over the master gauge information illustrated the
nature of this communication problem, as revealed in the interview:
Actually, [the Design Centre] already have a significant amount of output but they did not
know that we need that output. [For example,] I asked for gauge info, they did not know what
gauge info looked like. They understood tire term differently. After several interactions, they
said, "oh that, we already have had that a long time ago. I don't know it is needed'....
Secondly, they do not know tire need of production....... Thirdly, some of them perceive
[information] as top secret and refused [to provide it]. With a rough gauge info, we might
proceed as many as 60% of tooling design work. ... The other 40% are tire detail design after
they complete the design. Then, when [these designers] agreed to provide it. they thought that
they had not done it completely and hesitated to send the half-cooked information ... We do
understand that such data is an estimation that might be changed later on (Kevin, Tooling
Engineering, January 1999).

The situation worsened as some members of the Operation Centre discredited design
engineers for using the input from the Operation Centre for their own benefit without
acknowledging its source, as one of the Operation Centre’s engineers expressed:
Sometimes I could not accept that. There is a lot of work done by the Design Centre, which
actually used our input. But, they put that as if it was prepared by them. It is destructive. ...
(William. Operation Centre, December 1997).

On the other hand, the Design Centre viewed the Operation Centre and its assemblyfocus as part of an unnecessary bureaucratic red-tape mechanism, particularly in
dealing with the tooling and detail part manufacturing aspects, which were the main
issues faced by the Design Centre at that moment. This led to some reservation from
the Design Centre to foster further collaboration with the Operation Centre.
As a result, the communication and relationship between the Design Centre and the
Operation Centre worsened under three conditions. Firstly, the lack of expertise of the.
Design Centre members led to hesitation from the Design Centre managers to hilly
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collocate their members with the Operation Centre because the more experienced
Operation Centre members were seen as threats that could dominated design
decisions. Secondly, lack of authority in the lower level teams of the Design Centre
led to increasing lack of co-operation because the Design Centre teams, even when
they were able to make design decisions, were unable to defend the decisions they
made together with the Operation Centre members. Thirdly, the lack of authority of
the Operation Centre in tooling and detail part manufacturing issues led to a lack of
co-operation because the Operation Centre could not make decisions on behalf of
functional production units.

7.3.2.4 Conflict between Design Centre and Technology Divisions
As mentioned in Chapter 5, the Technology Division, a central function of design and
technology had been divided into seven divisions since 1989. The development and
the expansion of these functional design units (i.e. Technology Divisions) directly
related to the development process of the PLP, the first indigenous 50-passenger
airplane. At the beginning of the PLP Program, the Technology Division only had
several departments, which then expanded in size and became relatively independent
divisions. Obviously, most of the managers within this central function regarded the
PLP Program as a source of pride as well as the artefact of their personal
achievement.
With this background, the attitude of the managers from Technology Divisions
toward the PL1 Program was twofold. Firstly, they expected that a large portion of the
Program would be handed over to them just like the PLP Program, particularly as they
now had hands-on experience. Secondly, as the PLP was still underway, their first
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priority was to complete that program. This attitude was emphasised when the top
management declared that the PLP Program should be higher priority over the PLI
Program during the economic crisis.
To the dismay of those managers, the PLI’ Program Manager opted to establish an
autonomous team that limited the involvement of Technology. Divisions to merely
that of “resource pools”. This dissatisfaction was apparent in conversations with many
functional managers. The conflict was also apparent at top management level as one
member recalled:
It seems there are different interpretations over the distribution of tasks between the Design
Centre and [Technology Divisions] as resource centres. [The Technology Division] perceived
that the Design Centre should only [cover] tins [design aspect] only. The Design Centre
perceived that [the Design Centre] also covered all other [development] aspects. As such that
made the Technology Divisions commented that they themselves had no longer of any use.
[The head of] Technology Divisions said. "So take [the PLI] as theirs, but do not put us as the
[one who] responsible'7. ... He also commented. "But. the constraint is we do not have
enough manpower for that77. While when those tasks were their responsibility', they could
optimise [the use of manpower]. However, this is their opinion. It may contain vested
[interests]. (Brian. Top Management Member. April 1998).

One engineer from the Design Centre who was also a supervisor in one of
Technology Divisions tried to ‘down-play’ this conflict and stated:
There are some [functional] managers that wanted the tasks to be handed over to them and
became the ones who were responsible. But I drink diose are not many. [The Program
Manager] and the Chief Engineer saw diat as the cause [of conflict] perceiving those
[functional managers] wanted to be in control. I drink it was not like dial (John. Design
Centre. January 1999).

However, this dissatisfaction was widely recognised by the members of PLI team. In
turn, these members were suspicious that the decision to give the priority to the PLP
Program over the PLI Program had other reasons:
Yesterday, it had just been decided diat die number one priority' is PLP [certificadon phase],
.... [Thev said] diev still need 3000 designers ... What would all those designers do anyway'7
... Are they redesigning die aircraft'7 (Ray. Design Centre. November 1997)

As their sense of belonging toward the PLP was higher than toward the PLI, it seemed
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that managers of the Technology Divisions tended to put themselves and other
experienced engineers into the PLP Program and allocated the less experienced
engineers to the PLI Program. Many engineers from the Design Centre complained:
I cited that the qualification [needed] was lead engineer, that caused conflict [with
Technology Divisions], ... The names [of lead engineers] I asked for in my list caused the
problem. They would never release them because they are key... (Roger. Design Centre.
November 1997).
■
When we had a problem we asked these [engineers from functional units] to come and sit
together in front of CATIA. That's the ideal. But, most of them were tied up with other tasks.
... The allocation of manpower to the programs remains unclear due to tire limited available
manpower. (Victor. Design Centre, March 1998).

Some members of the PLI Program attributed this to a company-wide lack of
competence, but others attributed it to rivalry between the PLI Program and the
Technology Divisions. This is confirmed in the interviews as some engineers stated:
[Technology Divisions] have numerous engineers, but engineers allocated to [tire PLI
Program] were not so many. We cannot complain because of this [perceived] shortage. But. it
makes me wonder though, because [Indaco] do have many engineers (Victor. Design Centre.
March 1998).
Have vou read tire previous letter from [Technology Division]? The substance was just one: in
tire case of [PLI], it was not [Technology Divisions] who got the experience, so [for them]
there was no technology transfer (Ray, Design Centre. November 1997).

7.4 Protocols and the Effects of the Lack of Systematic Protocols
7.4.1 The Existence o f Systematic Protocols in the PLI Program
One stark contrast between Westaco and Indaco was the availability of systematic
protocols for program development and CE implementation. Westaco had
documented and internally published procedures and manuals that systematically laid
out the course of actions and deliverables for each step, as well as the objectives and
benefits of the approach. The Indaco’s PLI Program entirely lacked any formal and
committed protocols to support the implementation of CE and to provide detail course
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of actions to achieve the Program’s goals.
At Westaco, although most of the decisions in a creative process of developing the
product were taken on the spot, the process itself was systematically planned at the
outset. For each development program Westaco systematically laid out all applied
manuals and procedures, their integration, and their link to other relevant manuals in a
written protocol specific to each program. This protocol listed and described all
applied initiatives and methods for the program. The availability of such protocols
provided a clear guideline on what needed to be done and how the effect of their
variations resolved. The protocol provided a brief description of each development
phase and the typical activities from each function. A more detailed version of the
activity description was provided in a separate manual.
Ample reports revealed that team members followed the process set out in the
protocols. ‘Bending the rules’ was not seemingly acceptable. Subcontractors
commented that Westaco’s staff typically regarded the manuals as their ‘bible’6.
Indaco's engineers who experienced the internship program at Westaco confirmed
this. This attitude was also confirmed as a particular characteristic of Westaco, as
noted by a representative from a European aircraft manufacturer7 in Indaco.
The Indaco’s PLI Program had attempted to implement the approach modelled closely
on what had been adopted by Westaco, in particular the DRX program. Despite the
availability of various Westaco protocols in implementing CE, there was no specific
protocol to guide the CE implementation process in the PLI Program. During the field
study, there was an attempt by the Chief Engineer to issue a procedure for governing
h

Based on personal interview in the subcontractor's site in 1997
Based on personal conversation dated back to 19S9
275

Chapter 7: Contextual Explanation of Change

interactions between the PLI Program and functional design units. It was more of an
ad-hoc attempt in response to rising conflict between the Program and those units.

7.4.2 The Effects of the Lack o f Systematic Protocols
CE implementation is a great leap from functional silos toward functional integration.
It involves a significant amount of organisational change and needs to be carefully
managed. Much change management literature suggests that the availability of the
standards and procedures ensure that the result of change lasts and does not bounce
back to the old way (Kanter, 1989, Belasco, 1990, Carnall, 1991).
In Indaco, the lack of written protocols to guide the process played a significant role
in shaping the course of introducing CE in the PLI Program. This negligence was a
result of the assumption that the Westaco model could be applied in the Indaco’s
context without much difficulty and that Westaco’s protocols could be used to guide
the implementation of CE in the PLI Program. The Westaco’s protocols on CE
initiatives were widely available in Indaco. At a later stage, the Sidina group started to
realise the need of such protocols and attempted to establish one protocol specific to
the PLI Program. However, this attempt had not been completed.
The absent of systematic protocols had four significant effects. Firstly, there were
mismatches of expectations between the PLI Program and the functional design units
due to the lack of well-defined CE concept and common approach. These mismatches
led to later disappointment, conflict, and mistrust that fuelled the conflicts over the
gradual integration of design engineers into the Program structure. Secondly, the
communication between Design Centre and Operation Centres were hindered by
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three factors: (1) there were no clear exit criteria around which they could discuss and
negotiate their different views; (2) there was very little clarity and mutual
understanding on the roles of the participants; and (3) there were different, conflicting
and chaotic forms of communication initiated by different members. Thirdly, it
hindered the Sidina group from developing integrated computer support, as there were
no real standards to guide them. And fourthly, the lack of working procedures and
other lacks of clarity resulted in uncertainty, chaos and distrust, and provided an
opportunity for some members to start imposing views and actions that were opposed
to CE.
Overall, this lack of systematic protocols had a major effect in effective development
of CE integration. Conflicts and tensions over CE, taking the form of organisational
changes, were fuelled by this lack of protocols, as there was neither up-front
discussion nor understanding on the way of implementing CE. As a result, the
integration arrangements were shifted over time and more likely to be influenced by
problems and issues faced later on in the process rather than overt major negotiated
conflicts and differences at the outset. This lack of protocols also had the effect of
freeing up individual actors to change their course of actions quickly if they wanted
to, as there was no embedded CE structures and ideas to bounce off. This issue is
discussed further in the following chapter.
Four major problems derived from the absent of a written guiding protocol for CE
implementation in the PLI Program and significantly hampered the intended CE
model to perform in the PLI Program were:
1) Lack of a well-defined CE concept and common approach,
2) Lack of commonly agreed operating procedures,
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3) Lack of commonly defined exit criteria and deliverables, and
4) Lack of standard operating manuals for the enabling technology.
Detailed discussion on the effects of each of these main problems to the complex
transformation process is provided in the following sections.

7.4.2.1 Lack of Well-defined CE Concept and Common Approach
At the macro level, the lack of written and systematic concepts played a role in the
on-going strain between the PLI Program and the functional design units (i.e.
Technology Divisions). On its introduction to the top management, CE was praised
by the Program Manager as the vehicle to improve quality, cost and delivery (QCD)
and to foster co-operation across functional units. However, how this CE approach
would be applied in the Program had never been discussed or committed at the outset.
As a result, some functional units had their own interpretation and that led to
expectations incompatible with the concept intended by the Program Manager.
In the absence of protocols on CE and detail program implementation, most
functional design units presumed that the Program Manager would allocate some
responsibilities in product definition (work packages) to their units according to their
specialisation. Therefore, some experienced engineers were parts of the program
structure at the beginning of the CE introduction at the engineering matrix stage.
From the persistent demand of the Program for collocation and full-dedication, these
functional design units later realised that this was not the case. This late realisation
triggered a sense of deception in some units that contributed to the ongoing tension
between the Program and those functional design units. Expressions, such as “[the
PLI Program] was too arrogant” and “If they do not need us, fine!”, often expressed
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by managers from those units in personal conversation. As a result, most experienced
engineers resigned from the PLI Program, which left the Program with the less
experienced ones. This led to several structural changes as the Program adjusted itself
to this response from functional design units,
At the micro level within the PLI Program organisation, the lack of CE protocols
caused anxiety and confusion in both Design Centre and Operation Centre at the
design-production coupling stage. They never knew whether the way they operated
was on the right track with the intended CE. In an initial co-ordination meeting with
Sidina group in April 1998, engineers from both Design Centre and Operation Centre
expressed this concern as follows:
Actually, we are still confused, maybe [SidinaJ could tell us the lesson learned from the pilot
project (Victor. Design Centre, April 1998).
Could what I am doing with Victor's group be labelled as CE? Could [Sidina] give us
illustration based on the door [pilot project] experience? (Peter, Operation Centre. April
1998).

Unfortunately, this co-ordination meeting that aimed to establish a written protocol
for CE implementation in the Program failed to progress further.
Despite the rhetoric, such as “there is no problem in the relationship between the
Operation Centre and the Design Centre” and “we always act as a single unit”,
expressed by both Chief Engineer and Chief of Operation, they approached the
integration issue in different ways as discussed in the previous chapter. The Chief of
Operation took formal meetings as the preferred medium while Chief Engineer
believed that formal meetings were “wasting engineers’ precious time” and therefore
opted for on-the-spot informal meetings and discussions among engineers. Chief
Engineer’s perspective was amplified by the Technical Adviser who preferred to
isolate design engineers from operation engineers because “[operation engineers]
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distractedXdesign engineers]’ concentration”.
This led to chaos and contradiction in communication and decision-making
mechanisms, particularly when involving inter-team relation between Design Centre
and Operation Centre. The regular co-ordination meeting between Design Centre and
Operation Centre was reduced and by September 1998 ceased altogether following a
heated meeting concerning the progress of a technological test. Since there was no
constraining regulated procedures set for the PLI Program, these uncertain, chaotic
and distrustful circumstances allowed the Technical Adviser to impose his approach,
which was incompatible with CE, and dominated the process. As a result, on-the-spot
discussions between engineers from the Design Centre and their counterparts from the
Operation Centre decreased due to the hesitation of operation engineers to come over
to the Design Centre following this growing dominance of the Technical Adviser.
One engineer from the Operation Centre expressed:
When we came over [to the Design Centre], [the Technical Adviser] always looked
suspiciously at us. I did not like being watched like that. It was like we were disturbing them.
The worst of it, he even once said that all die output of the Operation Centre could be better
off in rubbish bin. (Phillip. Operation Centre. December 1998).

7.4.2.2 Lack of Commonly Agreed Operating Procedures
In the design-production coupling stage, both Design Centre and Operation Centre
attempted to establish operating procedures that would govern the interaction between
them and other functional units. Within Indaco, procedures that involved more than
one unit were termed as operating procedure agreements and required approval from
each of the involved units before being put into practice. Some drafts of operating
procedure agreement had been initiated and reviewed by both Centres (e.g. operating
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proced'ures~on Statement of Work, the Design Centre and Technology Division
Working Relationship in the PLI Program, TIP Co-ordination). At the end of the case
study, however, only the operating procedure agreement on the Statement of Work
had been officially approved. Since the program management claimed that the PLI
Program would be handled in a specific way and different to other programs (i.e. in
financial management and CE implementation), the lack of the operating procedures
caused uncertainty among functional units supporting the Program.
In the production area, for example, it was unclear whether the Fabrication Division
would support the PLI Program in the management of raw material inventory, as was
usually the case in other programs. The Statement of Work issued for the
manufacturing of tooling and part specimens did not mention this particular issue. The
short notice request by the PLI Program asking the Fabrication Division to store and
manage the PLI’s raw material was made only after the raw material had arrived. This
had been seen as a ‘fait accompli’, which hampered the future interaction. One
manager from the Fabrication Division expressed her disappointment as follows:
They are so spoilt. They seem to assume that everybody ought to support them regardless of
whatever problem they might cause for other people. They just never care. (Tracy, Fabrication
Division, February 1998)

This, in turn, reduced the reputation of the Operation Centre over their ability to
handle the production issues in the eye of the Design Centre and contributed to the
reduced communication between Design Centre and Operation Centre.
In the design area, the lack of operating procedures, particularly on the issue of
human resource support from the functional design units, added to the tension
between the Design Centre and the Technology Divisions. Several meetings had been
carried out to resolve this issue. At best, these meetings gained some partial and
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individual- agreements that were mainly ad hoc in nature. In general, this ongoing
tension between the Design Centre and Technology Divisions remained apparent until
the end of the study due to the ad-hoc and unclear operating procedures. This
contributed to the ineffective communication between the Design Centre and
Technology Divisions as evident in the Configuration Review meeting described in
Chapter 6.

7.4.2.3 Lack of Commonly Defined Exit Criteria and Deliverables
Although the master phasing plan of the PLI Program had been established in 1996,
the deliverables of each phase were never clearly defined. These deliverables should
have been in the design requirement and objectives (DR&O) as the exit criteria of the
conceptual design phase. The level of detail of the DR&O was never clearly set up
and resulted in a dispute even among engineers within the Design Centre. Some
engineers believed that they had already achieved the target set up in the DR&O on
time at the end of the conceptual design phase. Others said that that DR&O was too
superficial to become a reference for the preliminary phase. These engineers argued
that this level of DR&O caused more uncertainty in the design and this, in turn,
reduced the speed of the development process.
The real DR&O never existed. Riot] the DR&O that I knew of. The one that has enough detail
to do the design. What we got is the mission and objective. We wanted the product [to be
able] to fly fast [in a certain range] and come back again [to its hangar], things like that. It is a
mission & objective. A DR&O need more than that. It is not enough, far from enough. (John,
Design Centre, January 1999)

The Chief Engineer admitted that the DR&O resulting from the previous conceptual
design phase was a high-level one. Besides undertaking the preliminary design tasks,
his team was also refining the contents of the DR&O to provide adequate detail.
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Likewise, the deliverables for the preliminary design phase were never clearly
defined. Many believed that these deliverables should contain the fifth level definition
of the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS), as was the case in the PLP program. With
the whole aircraft configuration typically referred to as the first level of Work
Breakdown Structure, the fifth level would contain the detailed structure, such as the
flap and the slat of the aircraft wing. It meant that the deliverables should contain
definitions of all components or sub-components at those levels.
The Chief Engineer, however, had his own interpretation. For him and some members
of his team, the deliverables of preliminary design phase should contain a welldefined primary structure of the aircraft (e.g. the wing and the body section that holds
the wing). It meant some components might be well detailed into the sixth or seventh
level as necessary. For example, there would be a detailed design of main joints, e.g.
the wing to body joint. But for other components that are not part of the primary
structure the third or fourth level was enough. However, none of these interpretations
were documented. The understanding of these deliverables, therefore, varied. The
Chief Engineers explained his interpretation as follows:
At [this] preliminary design [phase], we defined the configuration with a level of certainty' to
enable us to continue to the detail design. ... When we complete the preliminary7design phase,
the primary structure must not be changed. So we should go to the detail and define how to
attach other systems. If the primary structure changes, the concept of structural strength might
be affected and it would affect other configuration. For example, if wing joint must be
changed, it might caused a change in landing gear position. This might affect the definition of
pneumatic system of the landing gear, which in turn might affect the centre of gravity'.
[The definition of preliminary design] in the [aircraft] industry varies. From my point of view,
the primary structure is the wing. It cannot stand-alone. It is hold by the body, so the structure
in section 44, the big frame that holds the wing should also be defined; it becomes critical. It
means that I should know its structural and the dynamics calculation to ensure that my design
envelope is safe. I might make some refinements, such as weight improvement in detail design
[phase] later. In wing, for example, I should think about the joint between inboard wing and
centre wing box. I should know the detail of the bolt diameters because we know the highest
structural force is in the back. Tlus detail sometimes makes people confuse about the
preliminary design phase. There is a misconception that the preliminary' design should not be
[that] detail. In contrary, from design philosophy point of view, it should be that detail.because it could not be changed [later]. The devil is in the detail.
On the [previous PLP Program], we thought that we have defined the main hard points in
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' preliminary design, but, at times, vve did not know whether they were the correct solutions
without going into the detail. Even to date, you will get different perceptions if you talk to
different people... (Robert, Chief Engineer, February' 1999)

These undocumented and competing interpretations confused the younger and less
experienced engineers in the design integration teams even more. As a result they
became more dependent on the direction from the higher level leaders (i.e. the Chief
Engineer or the Technical Adviser). This led to higher power differential between
lower teams and higher teams and increasingly less authority of the lower team.
The lack of common exit criteria in each development phase created a sense of loss
within the Program teams, as they could not benchmark themselves against certain
criteria. At the micro level, many engineers from both Design Centre and Operation
Centre understood that their tasks needed to be carried out in several stages. Without
well-defined exit criteria, engineers from both Centres struggled to find a common
ground in defining the deliverables at this micro level. Due to the increasingly lack of
openness between the two Centres, this issue was never really resolved until the end
of the PLI Program. This perpetuated the lack of openness environment despite some
attempts made during the course of development process. In a group meeting
between Sidina, Design Centre and Operation Centre, an engineer said:
Sometimes, we just wonder whether our line of thinking in the Operation [Centre] is tire same
as of the Design [Centre], Do we have the similar approach? For example, we divided the
development process front the preliminary design to the final assembly into seven stages. We
broke down each stage into tasks and responsibilities. We are expecting [any] feedback from
the Design [Centre]. With that, we hope our supplier [the Design Centre] can make analysis if
we doing all of that,, how they could support us (Peter, Operation Centre, March, 1998).

This situation contributed to the decreasing level of communication between Design
Centre and Operation Centre because the basis of negotiation between them was not

available.
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7.4.2.4 Lack of Standard Operating Manuals for Enabling Technology
Standard operating manuals that could guide engineers in operating within the
enabling technologies, such as CATIA, Digital Product Definition, Digital Pre
Assembly, or a configuration management system, were not available for the design
engineers early in the beginning of preliminary design process. Therefore, each
engineer typically followed his/her own preferences, which led to the problem of
compatibility even after the standard operating manuals were available. By doing this,
they limited the design integration capability of the enabler technology to that of a
computerised drawing board. Although the design could still individually be linked to
the manufacturing area for further processes, such as tooling design and NC
programming, the overall design integration capability could not be exercised.
In the design-production coupling stage, the significant feature of the enabling
technology, in which the integration of all individual designs was simulated in a
three-dimensional image, could not be utilised yet because this feature needed
systematic compatibility, e.g. for data storage and filing system. Interference between
one individual part/component and other parts/components could not be checked
either. Therefore, the identification of interference between components, which would
help designers to make early adjustments, could not be provided. A continuous
reminder from the Sidina's technical officers on this issue did not make these design
engineers aware of the importance of standard operating manuals. The technical
officer responsible for the Digital Product Definition application expressed her
concern:
I have talked to them again mid again. I think it is too late now. I give up. It is so difficult to
talk them into it. They always said that it would take so much time to revise the data all over
again [in order to comply with the recently published standard operating manuals], mid they
apparently did not have that time (Laura, Sidma. Febmary 1999).
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Furthermore, within the unwritten interpretation of the deliverables from the
preliminary design phase, the designers drafted the main structural components and
all detail designs associated with that component in one drawing to simplify their
work. Apparently, this practice was incompatible with the system developed by the
Sidina group and the PLFs Configuration Management Department, which was based
on a unique drawing number as part identification. This system required the
consistency that one drawing (with one unique drawing number) represented only one
part. By identifying the drawing as merely the attribute of the part, the part would
have a single identification number throughout its life cycle. The objectives of this
system were to ensure design traceability for certification purposes and to ease
configuration management in tracking down the aircraft configuration at the serial
production phase. With more than one part included in one drawing, the system lost
its ability to trace the configuration since some parts could not be identified. Only
after prolonged dispute, the Chief Engineer tried to resolve this conflict through the
offer to provide a basic aircraft design course for the Sidina engineers to increase their
familiarity with the design process.

7.5 Organisational Context
As outlined in the conceptual framework in Chapter 3, there are four organisational
factors that influence the change process: the organisational structure and co
ordination mechanism, the organisational culture, the organisational sub-cultures, and
the stage of development of the company. This section analyses the contribution of
each factor in the process and in the shape on organisational integration and
communication and decision-making mechanisms throughout CE introduction.
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The detailed analysis is provided in three sections. The first section analyses the
contribution of the company-wide organisational structure and co-ordination
mechanisms. The second analyses the contribution of the organisational culture and
the dominant functional culture. The third analyses the contribution of the company s
stage of development. The summary of these analyses is provided in Table 7-2.
Table 7-2: Influence of the Organisational Context
Organisational Context

Contribution to

Contribution to Communication

Organisational Integration

& Decision-Making Mechanisms

General Effect

Structure and Coordination Mechanism
- Highly differentiated structure

- Sib effect in functional units

- Highly centralised structure

- Limited power to control activities

- Restructunng toward product-based
organisation in 1997
- Merging production functions into
program dvisions

in functional design units
- High power differential between
high and bw level managers and
between superiors and
subordinates

- Problems in carrying out matnx and

- Mainly high power differential

heavyweight program at all levels

between high and bw level

throughout stages

teams throughout stages

- Increasing integration of production
functions throughout stages
- Autonomous division at Designproduction coupling stage but with two
parallel design and operation teams
- Sliding back to functional arrangement

- Only a few decisions made
by lower teams particularly
toward the later stages
- Tendency to ignore bwer
team decisions particularly in
later stages

m Design-production coupling stage
Organisational Culture and Sub-cultures
- High technobgcal onentation
- Domination of design and technobgy
sub-cultures

- Technobgy imperatives
- Functional design units as the
'golden kid" pnor to PU Program

Strong and well-connected founder

- Rivalry between the PLI Program

with strong onentation to design and

and functional design units and

technobgy

resulted in ongoing tensions
- Company-wide jealousy toward
functional design units
- Strong support for CE from
functional production units

- Changing structures to adjust to
functional design units responses
- Design functions in the main role
for the first three stages
- Tremendous support from production
functions to the program teams since

- Focusing on computer technobgy
to foster communication in CE
- Hampenng communication
between Design Centre and
Operation Centre
- Poor Communication between

the beginning of Engineering matnx

the Program and Technobgy

stage led to the formation of the

Divisions

Operation Centre in Design-production
coupling stage

Stage of Development of the Company
- 'New kid' in the aircraft industry
- Euphona from the success of the PLP
flight test
- Competing schedule between PLC
denvative. PLP. and PLI programs
particularly due to PLP certification
problems and unexpected design
changes in DRI

- Immatunty in term of organisational
tacit knowledge leading to lack of
competence
- Engagement in consultancy and
internship proyams
- Secunng financial source specific
to the PLI Program
- Jealousy of functional design units

- Very heavyweight Program Manager
- Difficulty in keeping heavyweight

- Communication difficulties
across functions

program teams at the lower levels

- Ability to afford a 'state of the art'

- Problems in acquiring delegated and

enabling technology specific to

fully dedicated representatives from
functional design units throughout
stages
- Quick response of functional design

toward the PLI Program leading

units in puling out their support to the

to on going tensions

PLI Program

the PLI F

' im

- Poor ccr.m'ji.ication between
Program and functional design
units
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7.5.1 Company-wide Organisational Structure and Co-ordination Mechanism
As described in Chapter 5, the organisational structure and co-ordination mechanism
of Indaco were high in centralisation, high in formalisation and high in differentiation,
which in general reflected both industry and societal contexts in which the company
operated. Three particular organisational developments influenced the implementation
process of CE:
1) The increasingly important role of the Program Manager in integrating activities
across functional units.
2) The increasing number of specialisation departments in the Technology Divisions
as a result of the previous PLP Program, which was the first indigenous
development experience.
3) The company’s organisational restructuring toward a more product-based
organisation, with a flatter organisational structure in 1997.
The PLI Program was initiated within the above contextual circumstances. The
Program Manager clearly wanted to smooth the interaction between the Program and
functional units as he stated early in 1996:
... We are implementing CE not only to increase quality, decrease cost and speed up delivery,
but also to increase co-ordination [between functions] not only among engineering
[functions], but also among all other [functional] organisations related to the product. The
orientation is to tire product ... The product-based program actually integrates those
[functional] units.......The product [team leaders] are tire co-ordinators, they have to work
together with other [functional] units. But tire real integration is at tire working level. (Clive,
Program Manager, June 1996)

However, the intention of the PLI Program to attain more direct control over work
done by functional units could not be fully established through the matrix mechanism
adopted by the Program during the program’s early stages of CE introduction, i.e. in
the engineering matrix and engineering integration stages. The major problem
occurred in the relationship with functions within The. Technology Divisions. The
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managers of the Program felt that they did not have enough power to secure the
required level of control over the design activities undertaken by those functional
design units to ensure that the process and product performance were within their
expectations. Some reasons for this have been discussed in the previous sections, e.g.
the lack of competence and the lack of systematic protocols.
The underlying cause for this problem was the ‘silo effect’ of the Indaco’s highly
differentiated structure that had been adopted since 1984 and become part of the
company culture. The members of functional units tended to focus inwardly to
achieve optimal solutions in terms of their own specialisation. An aeronautical
engineer presented this attitude in an interview:
In designing a wing, I want it as aerodynamic and as light as possible. I want it to be like a
paper [airplane] wing the first time around. I don’t want to think about what the [airframe]
structure people would say. We certainly will discuss it in the next iteration and I may have to
make some compromises. [But.] for the start. I will do just like that. (Ralph. Aircraft
Technology Division. February7. 1998)

This attitude remained with most functional members when they became functional
representatives for the PLI design teams. Due to the high centralisation in the
structure, the functional leaders were typically consulted before such a technical
solution was applied. This triggered various integration and communication problems
discussed in the previous chapter and led to the formation of an autonomous division
in the design-production coupling stage.
The relationship and organisational arrangements with the functional production units
(i.e. Production Divisions) were less complicated than the relationship with the
functional design units (i.e. Technology Divisions). In part, this was attributed to the
company-wide restructuring scheme that commenced in 1996 and was realised in
1997. This restructuring scheme proposed a more product-based organisation in the
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company’s existing production lines. Within this scheme, the production support
divisions, such as Production Engineering and Industrial Engineering, were
eliminated and their functional specialists were merged into the program divisions.
The change of the PLI Program organisation into an autonomous division was in line
with this scheme.
Unlike lndaco’s other programs that maintained a matrix arrangement with functional
design units, the PLI Program attempted to free itself from matrix and instead, asked
the engineers to become full-members of the Program. When necessary, individual
engineers were ‘hired’ from functional design units to work on the Program.
However, as previously discussed, the PLI Program could not achieve the planned
autonomous and integrated team and, instead, was divided into the Operation Centre
and the Design Centre in the design-production coupling stage.
From the perspective of the Program Manager, the existence of this major partition
within the PLI Program despite the initial intention towards an integrated cross
functional team, was seen as a necessary but temporary compromise to gain
functional support for the intended total integration. The evidence discussed later on
the politics and actions in Chapter 8 indicated that this might be seen as one necessary
increment step within a ‘non-threatening’ change strategy employed by the Program
Manager that seemingly fitted with the surrounding circumstances that were deeply
entrenched into functional silos. Within this perspective, the next planned step would
be the integration of Design Centre and Operation Centre, which was expected to be
easier to achieve.
At first, these design-production coupling arrangement looked like as if they would
work well. The combination of more experienced engineers from the Operation
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Centre, who viewed the approach as a chance to ease their tasks in the production
phase, and the less experienced but willing to learn engineers from the Design Centre
provided the bridge for integration at the operational level as indicated in the previous
chapter. However, the movement to break down the functional silos was not easy.
Such organisational change has the potential to ‘slide back’ to the previous
arrangement (Carnall, 1991), as illustrated in the following two instances.
Firstly, the Chief Engineer took out all the aeronautic engineers from the design
integration teams and put them in an integrated aeronautics specialisation group that
supported all design integration teams within the Design Centre. The combination of
continuous design problems, the scarcity of competent human resources, and the lack
of clear implementation protocols played a significant role in this movement. The
Chief Engineer expected that under such isolation from other component-related
design issues, aeronautic engineers would be able to deliver an optimum integrated
design solution, as opposed to an optimum solution for each component design team.
However, this decision modified and reduced the scope of cross-functionality of the
design integration teams due to the exclusion of those aeronautic engineers.
Secondly, the Operation Centre's focus on assembly led to the exclusion of some
tooling and manufacturing functions, which in turn, made the Operation Centre rely
heavily on a functional production unit, i.e. Fabrication Division, that housed those
functions. From the Design Centre perspective, this arrangement made the Operation
Centre the unnecessary liaison that mediate the Program (i.e. the Design Centre) and
that functional unit and preventing the Design Centre from directly interact with
specialists from those functions. These issues caused much tension between Design
Centre and Operation Centre as discussed previously, which was eventually resolved
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by an agreement that empowered the Design Centre to interact directly with those
functions. However, tension was created within and between design and production
functions despite the efforts to establish harmony at the beginning of the Program
(e.g. through the formation of the design build process team, TIP teams, Production
Co-ordinator, and Operation Centre). This incident illustrated that even between the
production-related functions barriers existed, and in turn made it more difficult to
break the larger barrier between design functions and production functions.
Highly centralised structure led to high power differential between superiors and
subordinates because the power was typically centralised in the superiors at all levels.
This contributed to the presence of a power differential between the program’s higher
and lower level teams throughout CE implementation stages. It also contributed to the
fewer decisions made by the lower level teams and the ignorance of the decisions
already made by the lower level teams in the Design Centre, particularly in the later
stages when the design integration teams consisted of many younger and
inexperienced engineers. This happened despite the Program Manager’s best intention
for a truly CE at the working level.

7.5.2 Organisational Culture, Sub-cultures, and the Strong Founder
Beside high centralisation and high differentiation, the Indaco culture was also
dominated by a ‘high technology’ orientation. This culture was acknowledged
internally and was seen as the result of the aircraft industry characteristics that
continuously deal with advanced technology. However, ‘hi-tech’ had a deeper
meaning to Indaco than the mere advance in technology. This was born out in theIndaco’s mission statement, which clearly stated that the company was “a vehicle of
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technology transformation” within the nation. As a state-owned company, Indaco
claimed that it was expected to be “one of the nation’s Centres of Excellence” that
would bring the country toward a “prosperous industry-based nation” in the future8.
This has led to over emphasis on technology acquisition and technology
transformation. The previous PLP Program, for example, suffered from this as one
engineer commented:
At [the PLP], [they said] we wanted this and that kind of technologies, and [the PLP’s] price
went out of control. [The price] became so high; who wanted to buy it [at that price], (John,
Design Centre, January' 1999)

Equally typical was the response given by the Ex-Project Engineer for both the PLP
and PLI Programs to defend this situation, as he expressed in the interview:
There are people who argue that tire cost [of the PLP] would be too high. No, it is not true.
The price of one configuration is set by itself. We call it 'tire duty of configuration' (Mark, Ex
Project Engineer. July 1998)

Indaco’s vision and mission were mainly developed by its founder in the late 1970s.
Beside his position as the President Director of the company, he was also an
influential Cabinet member of the Government. To fulfil its mission, Indaco was
equipped with billion of dollars investment in state of the art facilities for aircraft
development and production process. The President Director’s position in the
Government was crucial in securing the government’s direct investment to acquire
such facilities.
In line with this strong tendency toward technology orientation, an immediate
initiative in introducing CE in the PLI Program was to set up and invest in the
computerised enabling technology. In fact, the enabler was seen as the major part of
the CE adoption as reflected by the following statement by the Program Manager:
* Item (88) and (108). Appendix-B
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[Westaco] calls it enabling technology. With tins technology, they can work optimally. ... So
are we in [the PLI], There is no compromise, 100% digital. The [product] definition will be
made with CATIA, 100% digital and it will also be used for the digital mock up....... So
everything can be computer simulated, part manufacturing, tool manufacturing and its
interface with the part, system interface, ergonomics, maintainability, etc. For the PLI, we will
use that.......We have to totally upgrade our [human resources]. ... This month, Sidina project
will go ahead. ... Other than Westaco, I don’t know ... [but] there is a prerequisite [for CE],
have to have this enable technology. (Clive, Program Manager, June 1996)

In a complex development process such as the development of PLI, the use of such
technology was inevitable. It is also the typical engineering focus which remains
dominant in engineering literature (e.g. Gunasekaran and Sarhadi, 1997).
Nevertheless, an over-emphasis on enabling technology led to the danger of
neglecting other aspects of CE (e.g. organisational and human resources), which in
turn, became disastrous for the process as discussed in the previous section.
The Indaco’s founder was also influential in the establishment of an engineering sub
culture as the dominant culture within the company. Trained as an aeronautical
engineer and with a significant academic career in that specialisation, he enjoyed the
time he spent with design engineers discussing various technical issues of the
development process. He often allocated a significant portion of time during his visits
to the plant for such discussion, despite his busy schedule and other demanding
matters within the company. He also knew many key engineers by name. He regarded
engineers, the design engineers in particular, as the company’s most valuable assets.
This view was expressed in various meetings and gatherings within Indaco. In order
to retain these valuable engineers, the nominal value of the individual incentive was
skewed in favour of engineers from the functional design units. One top management
member confirmed this in the interview:
Of course [the difference] is huge. ... It is a huge [gap], but not for all. There is a gap between
[design] engineers and our engineers or specialists [in Production Divisions). At the
operational level, the apprentice graduates for example, in Production they may get one
hundred or fifty [thousand Rupiahs], there [in Technology Divisions] they get two hundred
and fifty [thousand Rupiahs], (Steve, Top Management Member, April 1998)
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These circumstances led to the dominance of the functional design units (i.e.
Technology Divisions) in the company. Top management placed design-related issues
first. In the past, product features were mainly defined by capabilities and interests of
the functional design units. In the development process of the previous PLP Program,
for example, technology-related considerations were the main determinants of the
product features and the development process rather than marketing, financial or
operational considerations. Functional design units also had all the time they needed
to accomplish their task regardless of the schedule, and left functional production
units sandwiched between the targeted flight test schedule and this extended
completion time of the design, which meant less time available to manufacture and
assemble the aircraft. Within the compressed time, the functional production units
also had to deal with numerous engineering changes.
Other functional units typically believed that, due to the perceived importance of their
tasks, functional design units always got what they asked for regardless of the
program’s budget. Some facilities they requested were regarded as unnecessary but
‘nice to have’. Any rejection by the Program Manager or the Investment Board could
be by-passed by directing the request to the President Director who often over-turned
the rejection. Some rumoured that the formation of additional divisions in the
Technology Division was due to favouritism by the President Director as appreciation
of some engineers’ contributions to the PLP Program rather than a real necessity. In
short, the functional design units were often regarded as the President Director’s
‘golden boys’.
The introduction of CE in the PLI Program and, in particular, the push from the
Program Manager to make the Program independent from the influence of functional
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design units by asking fully delegated, fully dedicated and collocated members,
created a sense of rivalry in the Technology Divisions. This was the underlying cause
of the on-going tension between the PLI Program and the Technology Divisions that
led to poor communication and several changes in program structure as the program
management tried to adjust the Technology Divisions response to their CE concept
and arrangements throughout the implementation stages.
Within this dominant culture, other differentiated and fragmented functional sub
cultures (Martin, 1992) eventually emerged. These were mainly based on the
resentment over the domination of functional design units knowing that nobody could
compete with them. Typically, this resentment was expressed by downplaying the
undoubted technological achievement of the Technology Divisions. The failure of the
PLP Program to meet its certification target, for example, was seen as evidence that
the functional design units did not deserve undue attention from top management.
This perspective was common among members from Production Divisions who
typically worked on a tighter schedule and under tighter managerial control than their
design counterparts. Non engineering-related functions, such as Finance and Human
Resources Divisions, typically felt left out because top management favoured
engineers over non-engineers. These functional units often perceived engineers as
cost centres, spoilt and hard to manage.
Company-wide, these fragmented and conflicting sub-cultures were often seen as a
lack of company culture, as one member of the Operation Centre stated:
It seemed that [Indaco] does not have a culture, so it does not have any standard [of
behaviours]. Some [employees] even spread bad words about [Indaco] outside, because of the
lack of such organisational culture. ... That's why Eve suggested splitting both the Design
Centre mid the Operation Centre [from die rest of Indaco], 1 did not want to be exclusive, bill
it is for die establishment of die so-called company culture (William. Operadon Centre.
December 1997).
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The existence of these sub-cultures with the perceived united strong technological
culture of Indaco, was clearly expressed by the above member as he continued:
At the first flight of [the previous PLP], production [people] was furious, because among
four people that got patted by the President Director [in the national television] none from
production. It was not fair. Did it mean there was no contribution of production [people] to
[the PLP I? Then, who assembled it? ... That’s why these functions do not get along; it starts
Irom the very' top and goes down to the lower levels. Tliis incident raised some protests from
[production] people who did not sleep for days to build and assemble the product; why
Production [Divisions] were not represented in such event. (William. Operation Centre.
December 1997)

Understandably, the announcement of CE introduction in the PLI Program was
welcomed by the staff of other functions, particularly within the functional production
units, who viewed CE as a means of creating a more balanced culture within the
company. This expectation triggered the enthusiasm of several middle managers from
functional production units to embrace the Program during its early stages and led to
the formation of the Operation Centre as part of the program structure in the designproduction coupling stage. In the previous PLP program, involvement in the
preliminary design phase had been the sole prerogative of engineers from functional
design units.
However, some of this resentment remained even after the formation of the Operation
Centre and was often manifested in under-estimating the design engineers’ capability.
The effect of the lack of seniority among the majority of the Design Centre’s
members, for example, was often exaggerated by the Operation Centre’s members,
particularly in analysing disputes between Design Centre and Operation Centre. To a
much lesser extent, the Design Centre’s members sometimes expressed their doubt on
the capability of the Operation Centre’s members due to their relatively lower
education level. This contributed to the tension, which in turn hampered the inter
team communication between Design Centre and Operation Centre.
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7.5.3 The Company’s Stage o f Development
The PLI Program was publicly announced following the success of the first flight of
the previous PLP Program. Within the company, the first flight of the first indigenous
aircraft marked the success of Indaco in undertaking its third phase of development, it
indicated its readiness to move on to the fourth phase, the implementation of R&D in
future technology, which was to be manifested in the PLI. Indaco also enjoyed nation
wide support and admiration due to this success, which was seen as a ‘national pride’
event and proof that the country would soon become industrialised. This led to the
success of Indaco in arranging a unique financing and financial management strategy
for the PLI Program with the establishment of Prico (discussed in Chapter 6). This, in
turn, provided more discretion for the Program to use the allocated money, free from
Indaco’s financial regulations and performance. This financial arrangement
contributed to the assertion that the Program had a very heavyweight management.
Meanwhile, the certification process that followed the first flight of PLP was not as
smooth as planned. It dragged along due to various technical and non-technical
problems that had not been fixed until the end of the field study in 1999, far behind
the 1997 target and considerably over budget. Meanwhile, the sales prospects of other
programs diminished during the 1990s. The only.product selling was the PLC, a
product co-developed with a European company that entered the market in the mid1980s. The PLC production line also struggled to meet its delivery schedule due to
technical and, later, financial problems. The value of such sales was enough to cover
the PLC operational expenses but could not cover development expenses and other
overhead costs. Therefore, Indaco was in financial crisis and continuously appealed to
the government tor additional financial support to cover the development expenses of
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the PLP Program. The overall company’s financial situation was in stark contrast with
the secure financial situation of the PLI, at least during its early phases.
The above situation, which made the PLI Program appear as an exclusive division,
created resentment and increased organisational rivalry. This contributed to the
hesitation of the functional design units (i.e. Technology Divisions) to provide full
support to the Program because it was they who were used to be the ‘golden boys’.
Furthermore, the fact that many functional design units were formed as a result of the
PLP Program led to a sense of belonging toward the PLP Program, which in turn, led
to some suspicions from the managers of the PLI Program that these functional design
units would prioritise the PLP over the PLI. This contributed to problems of acquiring
appropriate representatives from the functional design units throughout all the stages.
When the crisis finally hit the PLI Program, due to financial problems faced by Prico,
and had temporarily terminated the program after preliminary design phase, the
functional design units, in particular, were quick to respond by retracting some of
their support. This response worried the Chief Engineer who struggled to complete
the preliminary design phase. The organisational rivalry between the PLI Program
and the functional design units contributed to this quick and immediate response.
In term of business and technology maturity. Indaco was inexperienced and naive
within the aircraft industry. Many companies have been in operation for more than 50
years, while Indaco after approximately 20 years had just flight-tested its first 100%
indigenous design. The management of the company acknowledged that they were
immature, particularly in term of organisational tacit knowledge and, in order to
overcome this, engaged in various technical and managerial consultancv and
internship programs with renowned companies such as Westaco.

For the
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implementation of CE, this immaturity created a sense of anxiety in some managers,
which was derived from the recognition that the company as the whole might not
have enough experience. They were not so convinced that CE, the prominent concept
within the aircraft industry, was the right approach, given the internal context and the
stage of development of Indaco. For them, the adoption of such an approach was
more of a ‘technology-push’ from the industry trend rather than a necessity.
The Ex-Project Engineer, who was one of the most experience engineers in Indaco,
expressed his opinion in the interview:
In my opinion, the competency of [Indaco] engineers is not mature enough. The [enabling
technology] system could not override the accumulation of experience. ... People who could
apply CE should have 4 or 5 times experience in designing products (Mark, Ex Project
Engineer. July 1998)

Considering a technical issue and relating this issue to the current attempt to model
Indaco’s CE on Westaco’s, one Operation Centre’s member recalled:
At that time, I emphasised that Westaco and us were so different. Firstly, we do not have a proper
database. We started from scratch. Secondly, our competence people could not join the program.
(William, Operation Centre, December 1997)

Furthermore, this also contributed to the different interpretations of the CE concept,
even within the Program team, and communication difficulties and confusion across
functions because the terminology had not been properly shared nor standardised.

7.6 Summary
Other than a serious attempt to acquire enabling technology similar to Westaco’s,
Indaco’s CE initiatives in other aspects were much less developed. Even the attempt
on enabling technology did not provide a significant positive contribution on the
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internal organisational integration and the communication and decision-making
mechanism across program teams. The significant differences from the Westaco
practices were the absence of external integration (i.e. supplier and customer
involvement in the program team), the absence of systematic protocol for
implementation, and the lack of competence. At the termination of the PLl Program,
the Indaco’s ‘specific model’ of CE was represented by a ‘frozen emergent’
arrangement, which characterised by:
1) An autonomous product development team instead of a heavyweight program.
2) Parallel design and production teams instead of single integrated teams.
3) Increasing hostile environment instead of teamwork within the Program teams.
4) Unsystematic utilisation of the enabling technology.
Detailed analysis of the rest of CE initiatives in the Indaco’s PLI Program reveals that
two most significant factors that influencing the changing and final shape of
organisational integration and communication and decision making mechanisms were
the lack of a required level of tacit and explicit competency, and the lack of
systematic protocols for CE. Further, the absence of these two initiatives contributed
to the failure to effectively utilise the enabling technology set for the Program.
The lack of competent engineers played a major role in the formation of various
program structures and working mechanisms as the Program struggled to adjust and
fit the CE approach to reality. During the initial stage, in which the task was tackled
by a small group led by an experienced engineer, this was not a significant issue.
When the technical tasks grew and the size of the Program team increased, this human
resource factor became more critical. It was behind a stream of structural changes in
the Program. It was the root cause of the ongoing conflict between the Program’s
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Design Centre and functional design units (i.e. Technology Divisions). It was also the
primary cause of the increasing lack of trust between Design Centre and Operation
Centre. Ultimately, this lack of competence was the major factor in the schedule over
run, as various unplanned tests needed to be. undertaken and various incidents further
delayed their completions.
The lack of systematic protocols caused confusion among both members and non
members of the Program team as they moved from the old sequential approach
without clear guidelines towards a new one. The absence of such protocols caused the
solutions taken to deal with the lack of competence were often inconsistent with the
initial intention in implementing CE. It reinforced pressures to return to the previous
sequential approach. This was particularly evident in various developments during the
design-production coupling stage, such as the removal of aeronautical engineers from
the design integration teams, discouragement to work with the Operation Centre, and
ignorance over the systems developed by the Sidina group.
The transformation process of CE into a ‘specific model’ that differed from its
original model was also influenced by the wider organisational context. Indaco
organisation could be characterised as ‘centralistic-bureaucration’ with a strong
technology culture in which a dominant design engineering sub-cultur^ coexisted and
often competed with other various functional sub-cultures (e.g. production sub
culture). It was a relatively young and immature organisation in terms of its
accumulative tacit and explicit knowledge in the aircraft industry.
The silo effect of Indaco’s highly differentiated structure combined with its
knowledge immaturity caused problems in carrying out matrix mechanism that led to
autonomous program division cut off from functional resources. Within the Program
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team, this led to the formation of two parallel centres (i.e. the Design Centre and the
Operation Centre), rather than a single integrated team. This reflects the sliding back
to functional arrangement that reinforced by the lack of systematic protocols.
Meanwhile, the high level of centralisation infected the Program’s decision-making
mechanism with the tendency to ignore the decisions and commitments made by the
lower-level teams.
The strong and dominant technology culture influenced the strong emphasis on
enabling technology in the overall initiatives to foster communication and interaction
across functions and less emphasis on human resource readiness, such as teamwork
and team building. The previous domination of design-related functions was
influential in the early welcome of the CE approach by functional production units
that made the early stage of implementation process ran smoothly. On the other hand,
this created rivalry between ihe Program and the functional design units that
contributed to the on going tension and conflicts, particularly over human resource
allocation that led to the lack of competency in the Program team.
Overall, these findings emphasise the importance to consider the organisational
context in the decision to implement CE to an organisation. CE initiatives
implemented should suit the overall nature of the organisational context to be
effective. Furthermore, the selection of the right configuration of CE initiatives at the
outset plays an important role in ensuring the success of implementation.
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CHAPTER 8
POLITICS OF CHANGE

8.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the role of both individuals and groups in shaping the
introduction of CE in the PLI Program from the initiation through to the elimination
of the program due to financial and economic circumstances. The analysis provides
important details in the organisational politics that were crucial in shaping the CE
initiatives in the Program. It also shows how actions by some individuals and the
decisions they consequently made or did not make, significantly affected some issues
in the CE implementation process.
Using the tripartite analysis of power (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995), this chapter
reviews various actions of six key individuals throughout the CE implementation
process. The review is arranged chronologically despite the inevitable overlapping.
The power sources, will and skill, and context and structure of each individual were
analysed in relation to their actions (or in-actions) that contributed to the changing
nature and final shape of CE. These individuals were chosen because they were key
players in shaping the CE in the implementation process. They are (in pseudonyms):
Mark, the Project Engineer; Clive, the Program Manager; Alan, the Sidina Co
ordinator; William, the Production Planning Supervisor in the Operation Centre;
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Lucas, the Technical Adviser for the PLI Program; and Robert, the Chief Engineer of
the Design Centre.
Actions and interactions made by each of these individuals were driven by particular
interests. Their behaviour and attitudes were also shaped by their experiential,
contextual and cultural factors. Together, these six individuals played the most
significant roles in shaping the organisational integration and communication and
decision making process in the introduction of CE to the PLI Program. As we shall
see in this chapter, the actions and interaction of these key individuals, both within the
Program and in the broader context, contributed to the enthusiastic promotion of CE
ideas which later was not adequately followed up by their implementation, the lack of
integrated technology support for CE, continuing tensions with the functional design
units (i.e. Technology Divisions), the lack of implemented system protocols, and the
division between design and production functions in the final phase of the Program.
This chapter is arranged as follows. Section 8.2 analyses the actions of Mark, the
Project Manager when the program was initiated. Mark contributed to the
development of a cohesive enthusiastic group of young engineers that remained the
core engineers of the Program in later stages. The actions of Clive, the Program
Manager, are explored and analysed in Section 8.3. Clive was an all-powerful
Program Manager who introduced CE into the Program. Section 8.4 reviews and
analyses the actions of Alan and his Sidina group. Alan, the CADCAM Manager, was
the adviser whom Clive relied on to establish the Sidina system, the enabling
technology for implementing CE. Section 8.5 analyses the actions of William. As a
young supervisor originally from Production Division, William played an important
role in the establishment of the Operation Centre, the significant part of the Program
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that reflected its CE intention. Section 8.6 analyses the actions of Lucas and the
implication of his interactions with Robert, the Chief Engineer. Lucas was the
Technical Adviser assigned by Clive to assist the Chief Engineer and his teams. Lucas
increasingly became more powerful and was responsible for the deterioration of CE
near the end of design-production coupling stage. Section 8.7 provides summary of
the chapter.

8.2 Mark: The Project Engineer at the Program’s Initiation
Mark was one of the few experienced engineers involved in the PLI Program.
Trained in aeronautics, he joined Indaco at the end of the 1970s. He had been
involved in the development of all two Indaco’s platform products, the co
development PLC and the first indigenous designed PLP. Starting as a new graduate,
his involvement in the design process grew. By the middle of the 1980s, he became
the Project Engineer for the PLP Program and was responsible for the overall
engineering performance of the aircraft. He was also the Manager of New Product
Development (NPD) Department in the Technology Division that was responsible for
facilitating for the development of any new product or derivative. The tripartite
analysis of Mark influence in the CE implementation is summarised as Table 8-1.
Mark’s power source came from his position as the Head of NPD Department, his
experience and his excellent reputation as the Project Engineer of the previous PLP
Program, which led to his direct and strong links to the President Director. Mark was
a devoted aeronautical engineer. He was keen to involve young engineers in design
exercises and believed that the company should continue to accumulate design
knowledge in strict functional-based specialisation to achieve knowledge maturity
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prior to implementing an integrated approach such as CE.
Table 8-1: Tripartite Analysis of Power: Mark
Stage
Role

Program Initiation Stage

Engineering Matrix Stage

|
f«PO

I

]Eng Specialist Groups | |

Structure
and Context
Skill and
Will

Head of N PD Department
Hierarchical position as NPD Head
Reputation as Project Engineer of the PLP Program
Direct link to the President Director
Strong technology focus
Strong autonomy within Technology Division
Strong will for cohesive team
Emphasis on functional-based expertise

Im pact on C E Strong fully dedicated and cohesive design team
Introduction
in the beginning of CE implementation

-j

Business Repr
Finance Repr

Power
Sources

|

, _
x
..................
: f^ e c i Eflötaeef: :: :
ïÿ:Oepüty:Prog War

l£ :

1----------------------—
H-------------------------------------1
De sign G io up
O esg n Group
Design Group

Program Manager

Prog. Mgmt Office

J

j,----------------------*---------------------,
TOP Airplane
| |
Eng. Operation

Project Engineer/ Deputy Program Manager
Hierarchical position as Project Engineer

Leaking reputation of the Program Manager
CE was not yet suitable
Not active due to other managerial assignment
indifference and lack of will to impose his opinions
The implementation of CE with various problems
associated with lack of competence

Hence, according to the tripartite analysis of power (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995),
Mark had significant power sources and structure to influence the process. Mark used
both his ‘power sources’ and ‘context and structure’ capability in developing a
cohesive and enthusiastic design team which consisted of various design
specialisations and supporting the program to secure its financial support.
When the President of Indaco suggested developing a 100-passenger jet airplane in
mid-1993, he assigned Mark to explore its possibilities. Armed with less than 20
newly-graduated engineers and a few experienced engineers, Mark carried out this
task as part of the activities within the NPD Department. This task was carried out
enthusiastically as expressed in various program reports. In the documents written
early in 1994, for example, team members were regarded as “mostly graduated abroad
in aeronautics, highly motivated, highly dedicated”1.
1 Item (4). (7) and (8) Appendi\-B
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Some engineers admitted that they regarded the task, at least in the beginning, simply
as a hypothetical exercise, as one engineer recalled:
At that time. Mark assigned some engineers to start the PLI. I was a new (comer), just 2
months ... I just followed it through casually. Somebody worked on configuration: I helped
with bits of small calculations. I calculated a bit of weight and balance, a bit of G point, a bit
of payload configuration system, etc. (Frank. Design Centre, March 1998)

This attitude might have fostered influenced the enthusiasm. It was apparent that by
treating this task as an exercise, Mark deliberately established a free environment for
the engineers to explore all design and technical possibilities. He emphasised,
however, the need for mastering specialisation and took an approach similar to the
previous programs; a functional compartmentalisation approach. He explained:
i developed [PLI] in the same manner of [PLP], I continued the capability accumulation
process based on specialisation. ... A good aircraft is only made possible if each of its
elements is optimised. It means it we talk about wing: it should be the best wing. To conceive
the best wing, aerodynamic engineers have to assess more than 30 types of wing and only 2 or
3 will be tested in wind tunnel. This process should be done in isolation: aerodynamic
engmeers cannot interact with others...... Then there is a comparative analysis, comparing one
configuration with another. ...[Only] after that you could go to the next step: is it an optimum
configuration? Could we optimise the process? Could we optimise the cost?
The initiation approach for the [PLI] was similar to the [PLP]. They were divided into system
and structure. ... What I did in PLP and PLI was making imaginary building blocks for
aerodvnamics and others, but in the way they behaved they were integrated. So in
aerodynamics, for example, when they reviewed the wing, it was as an integrated part that
could not be separated between the structure and the aerodynamics. We usually earned out
discussion and dialogue reviewing the design in the ground floor ... The PLI Program should
have continued that way, but I don’t know I am not involved [any longer], (Mark, Ex Project
Engineer. July 1998)

Mark was popular among younger engineers and mixed well with them. Many
engineers proudly admitted that they had worked with him. He was often seen by
many young engineers across the company either as a formal or an informal mentor.
His team, at its peak consisted of 23 engineers, was loosely divided into nine groups
with overlapping membership. This overlapping membership allowed technical
information to flow freely among the team, which not only facilitated the
developm ent process but also increased the team cohesiveness. Within this
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environment, the team presented their work at meetings chaired by Clive, the future
Program Manager, between March to June 1994. During these meetings, the team not
only presented and reviewed their concept of the aircraft but also suggested a way of
working for the development team.

.

Hierarchically, the appointment of the meeting’s chair person was unusual since at
that time Clive was an engineer finishing his doctoral degree in aeronautics abroad.
However, it was widely speculated that he, notably a close relative to the Indaco’s
President, would become the Program Manager. This might partly be explained by
considering the Indonesian cultural tendency to accept high power differential
(Hofstede, 1984) and leaking reputation (Trompenaars, 1994). In such culture, being a
close relative of the 'man at the top’ working in the company was typically enough
for the subordinates to perceive that something further was expected and, hence, to
behave accordingly.
The acceptance of Clive as the chairperson could also be related to Mark’s personality
and his passion for the aeronautic profession. His egalitarian nature might make him
feel indifferent towards an otherwise offending circumstance, i.e. a mere engineer
chaired his team’s presentation meeting. His devotion to the aircraft development
process made him always pursue excellent aircraft development over anything else.
Such devotion might partly explain why the previous PLP Program, in which he was
the Project Engineer, was far over budget. In the interview he expressed:
For me. there is no airplane better than [PLP], ... All the state of the art technologies are
certamlv there. It is highly appraised by others. Front marketing point, it would be a success,
whv not0 ... When [Boeing] 737 was launched to the market, no one said it was the best, and
so with [Boeing]
Tliev all were in doubt, in panic; they could lose their money. And so
was with [.Airbus] A300. ... They should dunk in reverse. You have invested 800 million
dollars and now asking whether it is competitive. It is a crazy question that would kill die
program ... The important dung is having a room for modify'. The modification cannot be one
and for all, it is a pile of serial improvements. ... In a scary experience of a big flow of cash
out. I know there would be a bottom line. The scare of big cash outflow caused many
erroneous policies I by-passed some of them. (Mark.-Ex Project Engineer. July 1998)
"’4 7 .
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Such devotion was also apparent through his continuing involvement in this PL1
Program as a Vice Program Manager after the Program Manager was appointed in
1995. He played a significant role in the conceptual design phase of the PLI Program,
during which the Program Manager spent most of his time abroad. He also made a
signiticant contribution establishing the business plan of the program which secured
its tinances. Only after the financial scheme was established at the beginning of
1996, did his involvement cease.
As the Program Manager, Clive was handed over a rough concept of the aircraft and a
relatively cohesive small team of engineers by Mark. Clive expanded the membership
of the team, and announced the adoption of CE as the approach for the development
team. Mark did not agree with the adoption of CE because of the lack of competence
among the engineers involved. He later argued that CE involved cultural change and
the introduction of enabling technology was not sufficient to successfully implement
CE. He expressed his opinion in the interview:
What they call CE [here] is first, people sit in one place. Second, that place had an integrated
software and everything is computerised. ... The objective is. so they said, to increase
efficiency, less cost increase quality, less person... In my view, what they are doing in [the
PLI] is not CE. the philosophy is not right. ... [Indaco] engineers are not mature enough. The
system could not override the accumulation of experience. ... The [first] iteration should be
specialisation-base. During my time, we still had aerodynamics, a distinct specialisation, and
then we increased the communication, the interaction, the dialogue. Essentially, they need to
remain in a tightly specialisation-base because they have not had experience to provide
judgement yet. Dialogue involved judgement. People could not be involved in negotiation
before they understand what it is: otherwise quality suffers. We are not ready yet. ... People
who apply CE should have 4 or 5 times experience in designing products.......In technology.
the acculturation process is earned out through the accumulation of experience. Without
accumulation of experience, there is no CE. (Mark. Ex Project Engineer. July 1998)

However, he lacked the will to use his power sources to confront the CE and Sidina
concept pursued by the more powerful Clive or to create a political 'agenda' at the top
management level by opening the issue of whether to use CE or not in the PLI
Program. Factors in the context and structures (e.g. cultural tendencies of power
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distance, his lesser degree of involvement in the Program, his new assignment) can be
attributed to this lack of will.
It was strange that such an opinion from such a respected engineer as him was not
taken into consideration. It is possible, however, that at that time Mark was not
pressing his argument, given the cultural tendencies and his own personal traits which
inhibited him from doing so. If he had clearly and openly opposed these concepts,
with a ‘compromised but contextually-proper’ approach, a potentially successful
implementation might have been obtained. The criticism of the lack of competence
was widespread within the Technology Divisions and at times served as arguments to
increase scepticism to the CE pursued by the Program Manager.
In summary, Mark actions and in-actions contributed to the shape of organisational
integration aspect of the PLI Program. In the program initiation stage he contributed
to the formation of a relatively cohesive and highly motivated design team, that later
became the basis of design-related cross-functional team in the beginning of CE
hi Program. In engineering matrix stage, although remained
actively supporting the Program, he did not make significant action in shaping the
organisational arrangement of the PLI Program. While having a depth understanding
of Indaco’s engineers’ competency, he was indifference toward CE, which he
believed was not compatible with such level of competency. As a result, he also
contributed to the decision adopting CE and its associated organisational arrangement.
In a sense, the whole relation between Mark, the Project Engineer, and the adoption of
CE approach was ironic. He had established the team that would be perfect for CE
implementation in terms of its cohesiveness and openness, yet he was opposed to CE
within Indaco perceiving that the engineers were not competent enough for such
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approach at this time. Mark had a significant argument in his opposition in regards to
the engineering competence because he had worked closely with this particular team,
yet he apparently did not express his argument clearly enough. The significance of his
argument became evident throughout the case study.

8.3 Clive: The Power of the Program Manager
Clive's power in promoting CE came from various sources including his close
relationship with the CEO of the company and was supported by his structural
position as the Program Manager of the PLI and later as the Head of the Airplane
Group. This power supported the PLI Program into a heavyweight position within the
company. The summary of tripartite analysis of Clive power and its contribution to
the implementation of CE is provided in Table 8-2.
After being appointed as the Program Manager, Clive often flew to the U.S. to finish
his internship. The daily operation of the program was run by the Manager of
Program Management Office. Although he was away, the Program enjoyed the full
benefit of the fact that the Program Manager was closely related to the Indaoc’s
President. Supports were easily secured. Statements, such as “[Clive] wants tins to
be...”, were usually enough to acquire the necessary support from other senior
managers, such as in the establishment of the Program’s master phasing plan, and
gaining approval for the Program’s enabling technology facility.
Besides the Indonesian cultural tendency discussed in the previous section,
organisational structure was another contextual explanation for this situation. Due to
its delicate state as an infant development program, the PLI Program reported directly
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to the President Director. Historically, the previous two programs had also enjoyed
this privilege in their early stages and so there was a precedent for this arrangement.
Although, when those previous programs were initiated, the Indaco structure had not
been as developed. This precedent provided a comfortable justification among many
top management members. Through this position, the Program gained tremendous
support company-wide as it also indicated the relative importance of the Program and
its Program Manager within the company.
Table 8-2: Tripartite Analysis of Power: Clive
Stage

Engineering Matrix, Engineering Integration and Design-Production Coupling

¡¡llliiil (vision; • '

Role

Manager

Chief Engineer

j

■——

Prico Coordination

Chief Operation

i
Operation Center

Business Management

--------- 1______ ______!______
Finance

Design Center

|

Program Manager
Power
Hierarchical position as the program manager
Sources
Closely related to the President Director
Young, clever, broad-minded, well-educated
W ill and
Im plem enting CE, but often absent and later busy with other assignments
Skill
U nclear description of CE as a strategy to get CE o ff the ground
M aintaining harmony in the top m anagem ent council
C ontext
High power distance and leaking reputation led to respect superior relatives
and
Cultural tendency to maintain harmony
Structure
Dissatisfaction of production and other functions on design centric environment
Unique financial arrangement of the program
Program 's position as an infant program with direct line to the President Director
O ther assignment as the Director of Airplane Group in last stage
Golden boys' positions of functional design units prior to initiation of the PLI Program
Effect on CE A ttra ct staff to join the program at earlier stages
Introduction Gain support from functional production units but rivalry from functional design units
Lack of detail protocols and im plem entation plan of CE concept
Resistance that in turn required adjustment in organisational arrangement
Confusion at the lower level, competing concepts, lead to conflicts and tensions
Provide opportunity for others to impose approaches different from the intention

However, substantial support was also gained through the personality and attributes of
the Program Manager. A doctorate in aeronautic engineering, he was seen as young,
clever, broad-minded, well educated, and well connected both within the country and
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within the global aircraft industry. One of the top management members emphasised:
Of course his name has a significant effect. He has a hotline to the President Director. But we
do not look at it as a negative tiling, but in a positive way. If something was not in line with
die boss's vision, we could know it straight a way. This is the positive side. ... Oh, another
point, he might have his name, but he is also smart, his idea is often brilliant, his point is
logical. (Brian, Top Management Member, April 1998)

Many saw him as promising a bright future for Indaco. His decision to adopt CE and
the price target he set for PLI were seen as a breakthrough for Indaco’s experience
and a solution to the ever present problems of cost and schedule over-run of the
previous programs. One engineer expressed his support in the following way:
The driving factor is right. We have the right product and we have the right approach. ...
Clive announced that we wanted to sell the product around US$ 22 million range. We got it
wrong in PLP, we said we wanted that kind of technology, but in [aircraft] price we were at a
mess. (John. Design Centre, January 1999)

The adoption of CE and the Program’s cross-functional team, in particular, won
support from many people functional production units (i.e. Production Divisions) who
had been disappointed with the design-centric environment of previous programs.
These people believed that Clive could make the difference. The effect of these
personal attributes was more evident at the micro level. Many engineers throughout
the company applied or decided to join the Program. Some application letters were
dated as late as 1998. These applicants expected that they would have a better work
environment in the new program under Clive, the new leader:
The top man is great, he ran several review meeting. That is very important in encouraging
us... So he knows what we are doing ... There are some superior who do not know what their
subordinates are doing ... (Darren, Design Centre, March 1998)

Others who were assigned by their functional units as focal points expressed similar
enthusiasm. The establishment of the master phasing plan was an illustration of this
enthusiasm in resolving conflicting goals and schedules between functions. Many
regarded this task as an exercise toward a truly cross-functional team and a test of
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whether they were ready for it. Many focal points voluntarily put more time and effort
than they were expected or required to in supporting this Program. Without such an
enthusiasm, the Master Phasing Plan, which became the single reference point for the
program, could have not been established. -In short, during the engineering matrix
stage Clive actions with all his attributes were able to attract company-wide support to
the PLI Program and his CE.
At the Executive Management Council (EMC) however, this enthusiasm was lacking.
There, Clive often played The lack of clarity’ game providing inadequate details in
order to obtain senior management commitment. For example, the Program Manager
explained CE simply as an approach to effectively achieve quality, cost, and a
delivery schedule without detailing its implication on functional units across the
company. One senior manager recalled Clive’s presentation to the EMC:
As far as I can remember, CE has never been fully introduced [Indaco]-wide. But I might be
wrong ... [Clive] informed us about the basic principle, that the core of CE is to shorten and
to reduce bureaucracy between functions so that involved functions are in one place to
develop the design. That is the idea, isn't it? He told us that, but not the exact form of it and
[neither] how he would proceed. [For example] I am not so sure, is it part of CE tliat design
groups have been taken over by the Design Centre"? (Brian, Top Management Member, April
1998)

’

Considering that the literature on CE was widely available in Indaco, this account did
not indicate that those functional managers were not aware of the implication of CE.
It indicated, however, that they were not sure of the Program Manager’s
implementation plan. It seemed that the issue of company-wide implication of
introducing CE was deliberately meant to remain unclear. Such further clarification
might have opened the inevitable shift in organisational ‘balance of power’ since the
implication of CE was heavily related to this balance of power across the company
(i.e. between the PLI Program and the functional units). The functional design units,
for example, would have a less direct role in defining the aircraft features than they
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used to have in the previous programs, which in turn, might offended some top
management members. It seemed that the management was not ready for such
organisational-wide transformation. In this sense, all parties intentionally, although
covertly, decided not to put the clarification on their decision-making agenda. Clive
started this ‘non-decision’ by not offering the detail of his concept at the first place.
In promoting CE he was widely supported, notably by the Production Divisions who
were concerned with continuous cost and schedule overruns of the development
process. However, without the clarification of its implication to the top management,
the political arena of CE implementation moved to the periphery and was manifested
in various tensions and problems between the Program and the functional units,
notably the Technology Divisions as discussed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. These
tensions and problems became more intense in the next Engineering Integration stage
when the Program adjusted the organisational structure and internalised functional
specialists from Technology Divisions as members of the Program.
Clive’s decision to abandon the matrix system in favour of an autonomous system in
the Design-Production Coupling stage was seemingly an effort to reduce the effect of
this power struggle on the Program. However, eliminating the Program’s dependency
to functional design units proved to be impossible due to the limited number of
competent engineers. The PLI program remained dependent on the Technology
Divisions as its source of manpower, particularly in the area of system engineering
and detail engineering analysis. This manpower issue contributed to the political
battleground between the Program and the Technology Divisions.
The hard-line position taken by the technology divisions can be related to the
functional and organisational cultures of Indaco discussed in Chapter 7. Clive's
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intentional change from technological dominated into a cross-functional teamwork
process in the stiong technology oriented culture was a very difficult venture. The
Program, in its later stages, suffered from this failure to change the culture. The
separation of the Design Centre and the. Operation Centre instead of a single
integrated cross-functional team, the reliance and emphasise on enabling technology
and the domination of the Technical Adviser illustrated this problem.
The continuation of this power struggle was also reflected at the operational level.
Many Design Centre members simply ignored the feedback offered by the
Technology Divisions in a Configuration Review Meeting between the PLI Program
and the Technology Divisions mentioned earlier in Chapter 6. Some stated that the
aim of the review with the functional design units was not to acquire feedback from
them. Others believed this feedback was hardly necessary':
Oil, that's the comment from [one of Head of Divisions]. Sometimes his feedback is different
from Lucas's ... and I trust Lucas. He is smart Therefore, the aim of the review with
functional units was to present the progress, not to gather feedback but to let them know what
our design look like. At the end we will pass it to them for detail design. (Darren Design
Centre. March 1998)

Nevertheless, Clive's power sources, notably his close relation to the CEO and the
cultural tendencies associated with that, prevented other senior managers to demand
further clarification and hence, created a blockage for the issue to go on the
management agenda. In his part, this was seemingly a necessary pragmatic political
strategy to get the CE and PLI Program off the ground.
However, this blockage moved the problems into the micro level, and were
manifested in particular in hesitation of the Technology Divisions to provide full
support (e.g. to provide experienced engineers), which caused deterioration in the
competency of the program team. His coping decision to move to an autonomous
.? i /
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program in design-production coupling stage, deteriorated the situation even further
as most experienced engineers opted to remain in their functional units. At the end,
the Program mainly consisted of inexperienced engineers who relied on the powerful
Technical Adviser who was not aware of the initial intention of implementing CE as
discussed later in this chapter (i.e. Section 8.6).
Lack of detailed clarity in Clive’s CE also created confusion within the Program
teams in which each group pursued its own version (e.g. the Operation Centre’s mini
factor/, the Design Centre’s preliminary design approach, and Sidina’s enabling
technology) which were not compatible one another and caused tensions and conflicts
among them. In an early interview, Clive stated his concept was not going to integrate
production’s operators into the development process as in the mini-factory concept:
They have to meet everyday. But it does not include tire hardware. It involves die planning,
manufacturing planning, tooling engineering, but not the people from the [Production] floor.
There is a concept that involves shop-floor, but we do not go to that concept ... where the
design people sit in die manufacturing company as a design bureau.... I have seen it in some
units of Westaco: they tried it. ... There is a small building where engineers and planners sit in
one corner and die hardware workers in die other comer. So, die communication between
diem works well. But diat's a different concept. (Clive, Program Manager, June 1996)

However, one Supervisor in the Operation Centre had exactly this in his mind when
he referred to the CE concept:
.in TIP is we divide [the program] into 4 stages. First it is as die process integration. Then,
it becomes [a design produedon team] diat works concurrently with die design [teams]. We
are in this stage now. Then, it becomes product integration and at the end it becomes a mini
factory. So. die TIP members will become shop-floor people. That’s why we plotted shopfloor people diere. ... That’s my idea since die beginning. (William, Operadon Centre.
December 1997)

This Supervisor expressed his opinion in various documents that had been submitted
to the Program Manager (e.g. The 1997 Operation Management Charter). These
documents had informally become references in the conduction of the Operation
Centre. One TIP Co-ordinator, for example, explained the function of TIP as:
3 18
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In principle. TIPs will be the incarnation of program executor. They will reincarnate to
become the assembly line. In the assembly stage later on, therefore, it will be impossible that
the assembler making a fuss saying it is not right or it is wrong because they have followed
the process. It is possible that during the time [Phillip] will be the shop manager of the
fuselage, other will be the shop manager of the centre body. TIP co-ordinator will become the
assembly manager. It will be much easier, we can say. you were there at that time, so you
have 10 be responsible. (Peter. Operation Centre, November 1997)

However, these conflicting opinions were never put forward or resolved. Even, the
whole Operation Centre was seemingly unaware of the difference since the above
Program Manager’ intention was never clearly documented. This apparent lack of
clarity about the applied concept might simply have been the result of cultural
gestures such as hesitation to express differences, face saving, or protecting harmony.
But it might also be intentional as a part of organisational politics considering the
Operation Centre was a significant part of the Program that differentiated it from
previous programs. Any internal conflict within the Program might be seen as
reducing the reputation of the Program in adopting CE.
The political action using the deliberately imprecise issue was also apparent in Clive’s
decision to introduce an additional program-based reward system in his program,
which was later abandoned. He did not provide the top management members the
precise details of this reward system nor did the top management demand clarification
on details, partly due to the separate financial arrangement, as two top management
members commented:'
They introduced this reward system, they said it based on the Work Breakdown Structure.
[Clive]' defence was that the good people have worked and met schedule with less cost; that
people elligible for bonus. That what he said. (Brian. Top Management Member. April 1998)
Tire way [the PLI Program] did that would cause problem. They attached tire bonus system to
die Statement of Work packages. ... [Clive] felt like he and the Program owned die money
because he got it directly front [Prico] for each package. He took, for example 5%. for dus
reward system. This is different from odier programs, in which all die inflow go to [die
Finance Division] and die outflow should be based on die budget. (Steve. Top Management
Member. Apnl 1998)

According to some members of the PLI Program, the actual allocation and calculation
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of the system did not involve the Work Breakdown Structure nor Statement of Work
package that have been completed except as a source of money. Instead, the allocation
was based on the performance appraisal that, in a sense, was similar to the one that
the company already had. However, after furious opposition from most senior
management members, the reward system was cancelled after only a short
implementation period.
These conditions that preventing CE from developing indicate that the ‘non-decision
making7 in Indaco’s organisational politics played as significant role as active
decisions (e.g. the move toward autonomous teams) in shaping the CE throughout the
process. If Mark’s opinion in the earlier stage had been taken more seriously and a
better coalition involving Technology Divisions, CADC AM, Production Divisions
had been built in negotiating and setting up a detail implementation plan, CE in the
PLI Program might have been more successful.
Following the introduction of a new organisational structure in June 1997, beside his
position as the PLI Program Manager, Clive was also appointed as a Director of the
Airplane group. In this position, he was not only responsible for the PLI Program but
also for fabrication and ail other airplanes. As the airplane production was the core
business of Indaco, this position was very important. It provided him with tremendous
power that was beneficial for the PLI program. For example, the need for tool
designers and assemblers from Fabrication other divisions to support the test
experiments was secured by a directive from the Director of the Airplane Group
requesting all divisions to support the project and release from other tasks any
member required for the Program.
However, the position was very demanding and took most of his time and made him
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very busy. Particularly because of the unfolding Indonesian economic crisis, he spent
less time on the Program. In a way, he lost some direct contact with ihe process and
relied heavily on the Technical Adviser. Clive still had weekly regular meeting with
the PLI Program leaders including the Chief Engineer, Chief of Operation, Business
Manager, and Financial Manager. Often these meetings were not solely dedicated to
the PLI program, but covered issues relating to the Airplane Group and involved
managers from other programs. He lost almost all contact he used to have with the
rest of the program members, except in the big formal meetings such as design review
or operation review. He also became less sensitive toward the development of the
team. One engineer stated:
The next operation review will be in 2-month time. Recently. Clive does not focus on detail
... and focuses more on the business side. I observed that he made only a few comments on
technical meetings. He relies on us. So he works less on the program's side and more on the
director's side (William, Operation Centre, December 1997).

Apparently, Clive was not aware of a growing anxiety among engineers over the role
of the Technical Adviser, although he seemed aware of his domineering attitude He
was also seemingly not aware that with the Technical Adviser’s guidance the
development process was deviating from his intention with CE implementation. The
Chief Engineer could not take any action because officially the Technical Adviser
was responsible directly to the Program Manager.
This situation led to the CE implementation process resembling March and Olson
(1983) 'garbage can’ model and it had difficulty sustaining "the attention of major
political actors” (p.286). Furthermore, this situation allowed "less central actors to
move into foreground and inject competing definitions of the situation” (Buchanan
and Badham, 1999,

p.

164) as represented by the Technical Adviser, who took over

the development process ignoring the previous change intentions
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In summary, Clive had enough power sources, skill and will, and supporting context
to initiate CE in the PLI Program, e.g. establish the matrix with the Technology
Divisions, and, later, form the Design and Operation Centres; but not enough to
overcome barriers and make it work. He- employed a strategy not addressing the
detailed concept of CE up-ffont in order to get the CE implementation off the ground,
but this led to unintentional incremental changes: continuing integration problems
with a tendency to slide back to the traditional functional-based approach.

8.4 Alan and the Sidina Group: The Power of Enabling Technology
Alan joined the company in mid 1980s as an engineer in the Information Technology
Division. By the end of the 1980s, he was involved in a study that aimed to find a
computer system that was suitable for supporting the development of a new aircraft
platform (i.e. PLP) particularly in the area of design and manufacturing process. The
study assessed various business processes across the company. Alan was appointed to
assist the ex-officio leader of this study team to deal with daily operation. Following
the proposal of this study, Indaco decided to implement the CATIA system,
established a CADC AM Division in Technology Divisions and appointed Alan as the
Head of Division. The Division provided technical support to CATIA users, provided
CATIA and related systems training courses, developed the necessary software
systems, and monitored the development of advance computer technology in this area
Alan’s influence in CE was primarily based on his CADC AM Division expertise and
his link to Clive, the Program Manager. The tripartite analysis of Alan is provided in
Table 8-3. When the PLI Program Manager announced the intention to implement
CE, he expected Alan’s division to support him in providing the enabling technoloitv.
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Although Alan’s involvement started in the early stage, the effect were mostly
appeared in the last Design-Production Coupling stage where the development of
computer system started to take form. Ironically, rather than eased the development
process the system brought more tension-in the Program particularly due to its
incompatibility with the habit developed among engineers in using computer
technology.
Table 8-3: Tripartite Analysis of Power: Alan
Stage

Engineering Matnx/Engineering Integration
President and

Role

Will and
Ski!!
Context and
Structure
Effect on CE
Introduction

jA eroplane Group !

CEO
------------1_______

Power
Sources

Design-Production Coupling

_______ !_______
1
_______ _________________ 1_______
PLI Program
CA£

mm

j P U Program

Head of CADCAM Division
Leader of Sidina
Hierarchical position as Head of CADCAM Division at the beginning of Implementation
CAD/CAM, expertise
Link to the Program Manager and later to the Director of Aeroplane Group________
Developing a 'state of the art enabling technology
Emphasis on maintaining vertical commintment to top management
Ignorance toward horizontal relationship with teams in the PLI Program
Strong focus to technology
Cultural tendency of power distance
Unique financial management of the Program and financial crisis at the later stages
Heavy investment plan of Sidina system, but the acquisition less than planned
Ignorance toward the Sidina system, particularly from the Design Centre
Complaints, such as not user friendly, not provide necessary support
Unintegrated and stand alone system_______________

In providing enabling technology for CE, Alan proceeded through a similar manner as
with the previous CATIA implementation. He formed a cross-functional assessment
team made up of his staff at its core, convinced the Program Manager to lead the
team, and put himself as the daily operations manager. The team had a weekly regular
meeting and later was divided into several subgroups to tackle detail assessments. He
typically oriented their actions vertically, constantly referring either to the approval
from the top management on Sidina implementation or to many program directives
that stated the group responsibility as system developer in the program. When the
323

Chapter 8: Politics of Change

CADC AM Division was eliminated in 1997 Indaco’s restructuring, Alan moved to
become an expert cn the staff of the Director of Airplane Group (i.e. Clive) but all his
staff remained intact as the Sidina group.
His deliberate actions in obtaining senior management commitment strengthened his
position and, hence, shaped the PLI’s CE to be the one that emphasised the role of
enabling technology. Although never directly involved in the PLI, he was regarded as
a very important person behind the adoption of CE:
CE is Alan's idea: it is not Clive's but Alan's. ... (Mark. Ex Project Engineer. July 1998)

This illustrated that Alan’s actions in mobilising his power sources and contexts had
created the political ground that his group to become very influential in a process in
which they were otherwise only marginally involved. Alan and his team were never
part of the PLI Program team, yet their Sidina system was instrumental, if not the only
tangible result from the experiment with CE.
The development of Sidina system was started by running three pilot projects:
concurrent

engineering,

knowledge-based

engineering,

and

configuration

management. The CE pilot project used the task of modifying the PLP’s door as its
object. During the field study, the design phase of the pilot project was completed and
the modified door was in manufacturing. Despite the intention to support CE in the
PLI Program, only a few PLI members were involved in CE pilot project because its
timing coincided with the PLI’s preliminary design phase during which most
engineers were fully involved with their design tasks. The use of a PLP component
naturally drew more people from the PLP program. This decision to use a non-PLI
component as the object of the pilot project, while provided the opportunity to go on
with his implementation plan, did not provide adequate help for the PLI team to work
324
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with the CE concept. This led to ignorance in the Design Centre and Operation Centre
of the results of the Sidina group, which in turn prevented the Sidina system to be
fully utilised by the Program.
Not surprisingly, many engineers from the Design Centre and the Operation Centre
were unhappy with the support provided by the Sidina group. They, ironically, argued
that the Sidina group should work more closely with the PLI Program and familiarise
themselves with the program environment so as to enable them to provide sufficient
support as Sidina was established to support the PLI Program. They argued that the
workshop and training provided based on the lessons learned from the pilot project
was not enough to transfer the Sidina concept to the Program. One engineer
commented in the interview:
Frankly. Sidina support was less than expected, but I cannot blame them. They are not
designers: they do not have designers’ experience. It was not their fault We were fully
occupied in the design process. We did not have a smooth interaction and, hence, there was
less synergy between us. (Robert, Chief Engineer, January 1999)
... we haven’t seen its benefit yet. It might, partly, be our fault because we were not involved
due to die time constraint. But it is also a weakness of Sidina group in transferring the result to
us. ... [they] should train us. Or perhaps our group should get involved then, so that file
transfer process was smoother. If we only inherit the document, most probably it won’t work.
... Sidina works in parallel with the program and, hence, the result cannot be implemented in
file program. (Victor. Design Centre, March 1998)

In one meeting, the Design and Operation Centres both agreed to undertake a pilot
project for the digital tool definition in co-operation with the Fabrication Division but
without the Sidina group participation. This issue was then raised again in a review
meeting with Clive the following week informing him that the Fabrication Division
had its own pilot project on the digital tool definition after Sidina failed to established
one for them.
The more serious conflict between the Design Centre and Sidina was a dispute on
configuration management issue. It was exposed when the Design Centre carried out
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Chapter 8: Politics of Change

the design process for two technological experimental tests (i.e. the wing box panel
and the skin panel tests). The objective of these tests was to select the optimal design
concept of the panels and provide the technological proof for the selected concepts.
These activities were also used to check the readiness of the Program as a whole,
including the systems surrounding configuration management, operation management
and the enabling technology tools.
The dispute centred over the numbering system of the drawings. Together with the
Program’s Configuration Management Department, the Sidina group had established
a configuration management system using a unique one to one drawing number to
ensure traceability. With this system, one drawing number was designated to only one
part number so that the number became the property of the part not of the drawing.
Alan explained in the interview:
We defined a unique single product structure. Because it is a single product structure, it
should also reflect the requirement of manufacturing. The product structure is not based on
designer's viewpoint but based on the product itself, the assembly sequence, so that designers
will establish the design according the structure of assembly. The drawing and its numbering
system are also arranged accordingly. We established one drawing for one part concept The
unique identifier is the part, and the drawing is one of the part attributes, the container to place
the shape of the part (Alan. Sidina, January 1999)

The Design Centre violated this system by designating a drawing number to several
designed parts. With support from the Chief Engineer, the Technical Adviser (i.e.
Lucas) urged engineers to design various related parts on one single drawing sheet
and identify them with a single drawing number. The argument for this deviation
from the established system was that the prototype drawings did not need to be treated
as the serial drawings. The Chief Engineer explained:
The fundamental was that we changed the design concept. For the prototype, it is impossible
to draw every part of the component. The drawings will be in the form of assembly drawings.
These assembly drawings have enough detail to make both assembly and detail parts. To
make it work, we need a prototype group in manufacturing as a partner who have high skill
and is able to interpret these (drawings] into detail drawings ... We don't have time to make
all the detail drawings in the Design Centre. Later in serial phase, we will have a draw ing for
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each part. It is supposed to be like that to ease the configuration management. ...We are
searching for the best way. The biggest problem is the Sidina people have never been involved
in the design process, so their solutions did not help. They try to help but they do not help us
in solving our problems. (Robert, Chief Engineer, January 1999)

However, not many people were convinced by this argument. Rather, it was a
widespread awareness that the Program should make it right in the beginning to avoid
complications later in the process, particularly in terms of compliance with
certification process that required traceable configuration development.
The vision of Sidina is very good. They prepare the digital system to support our design
process, to set up the configuration management system and, therefore to reduce mistakes in
the design process and in tire shop floor. The configuration control will be much better.
(Victor. Design Centre. March 1998)
But. [at a development program] we don't stop at designing the product, we should
manufacture it. With this [new] way. there is a shift in our control base, from based on
drawing in design to based on part in production. ... The formal reason for this backward
movement from the PL1 [program] was that they ran out of time. But they also mentioned that
tlie manpower were not familiar with the system and that they aimed to make the process
more flexible and faster. But I am in doubt about the speed. It is not necessarily faster, it
maybe faster in the beginning but causes more troubles in the end. It will cause problems in
configuration control too. (Alan. Sidina. January 99)

These incidents illustrated the distance between the Sidina as a support group with its
customer, i.e. the PLI Program. This distance was partly caused by the approach taken
by Alan as the team leader of Sidina. By not seeking and, subsequently, not gaining
support from horizontal peers, they, at times, lost sight of their main objective,
supporting the Program, and instead focused on mastering the system as another
knowledge achievement. In doing so, Alan ignored the necessary coalition with the
PLI team, which was notably the main customer. This also implied that the interest
was more on getting the new system the group wanted and using the PLI Program as a
mechanism for this rather than toward the successful implementation of CE in the PLI
Program. On the other hand, the objections from the Design Centre could also be seen
as resistance to change to thing that was not ‘invented here’, given the strong
domination of design engineering culture in Indaco.
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After months of dispute, Alan slightly modified his approach in collaborating with the
Design Centre. He asked the Technical Adviser and the Chief Engineer to provide a
basic design course to familiarise support system engineers with the development
process. The aim was to provide awareness, of the design process that would enable
computer system engineers to provide a more designer-friendly support system. This
might be too late for the PLI Program. But, according to Alan the Sidina group had
been directed by the Program Manager to continue with CE preparation despite the
cancellation of the PLI Program and, therefore, would have plenty of time to develop
a sufficient support system either for PLI or for any other program in the future.

8.5 William: The Role of Middle Management
William joined the company in the early 1990s after finishing his masters degree in
France as one ofIndaco’s sponsored students. He started his involvement in the PLI
Program as a focal point from one of Production Divisions in 1995. His power source
in the PLI Program initially came from his education level which relatively higher
than other focal points from Production Divisions. The tripartite analysis of his
influence throughout the process in provided in Table 8-4.
William was genuinely interested in pushing production aspects into design
considerations. His influence in the process came from his ‘will’ to make a
contribution in the PLI Program. During Engineering Matrix stage, he voluntarily
took the initiative to co-ordinate and integrated support from all focal points from
various

divisions within the Production Divisions Later, this initiative was supported

by the Director of Production, who saw this as the opportunity to improve Production
Divisions’ position in the development program. He recalled in the interview:

Chapter 8: Politics of Change

At that time. I saw that representatives from Production Divisions did not have the same view.
We were not integrated. Then, I tried to get them together to make a team. The group
consisted of representatives from divisions, a good [quality] people....... 1 co-ordinated all of
them ... We produced a lot of concepts, which later became the basis of the current system ...
At the beginning, it was just voluntary, no formal assignment. ... Then we presented to [the
Production Director], After the presentation, the team was established and formalised with the
Director's memorandum to the divisions. (William. Operation Centre, December 1997)

Table 8-4: Tripartite Analysis of Power: William
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This group of focal points came from various functions, such as manufacturing,
assembly, manufacturing planning, tooling engineering, process development, facility
planning, industrial engineering, quality control, material procurement, manufacturing
resource planning and material development. William’s contribution in integrating
production resources to support the PLI program was significant. The Program
Manager was impressed. In the beginning of Engineering integration stage, he was
appointed as Production Co-ordinator, a liaison role that interface the Program with
the Production Divisions. He explained:
Then, parallel with that. I was appointed by Clive to be the Operation Co-ordinator to co
ordinate operation activities. So. I had dualism in reporting, responsible to Clive and to the
Director of Production. (William. Operation Centre. December 1997)

Durinu this stage, the group of production representatives was formalised as Design
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Build Process Team and production-related TIP teams aimed to prepare production
aspect of the Program. Additional members were added from the relevant functional
units. In the Design-Production Coupling stage, these teams were merged as part of
the program organisation, i.e. the Operation Centre, which together with the Design
Centre became the main part of the autonomous PLI Program.
In this sense, William was influential in promoting CE and equalising the role of
production functions to the same level as the design functions. However, the position
of Chief of Operation was given to Howard, a long serving manager, who was the
Manager for Marketing and Customer Support Department in the previous PLI
Program organisation. William was appointed as the supervisor of Production
Planning Department in the Operation Centre. Most TIP members joined the Program,
as members of the Operation Centre and continued their activities as in the previous
stage. This made William remained influential within the Centre, as he commented:
All those [organisational] boxes are actually under the my Department. In fact, the division of
tasks is not well balanced because Clive wanted to continue the previous process ... So. I
haven't changed [an\thing].......Most tasks earned out by the Facility Planning Department.
for example, are based on our request. The requests about assembly facility came from TIPs,
under my co-ordination. It is not well balanced but it is fine by me. (William, Operation
Centre. December 1997)

Even the Chief of Operation admitted his influence as he noted in the interview:
Most members of the Operation Centre] were actually pan of William 's group back then.
William was [responsible for] Design Build Process, or whatever, but it was mainly
producibilitv. They were pan of that, but we could not accommodate all of them, just pan of
them. Then, there were TIPs that remain functioning [now]. We involve shop-floor people
from [the PLP] and [the PLC] and Fabrication. I usually rely on William for recruitment,
because he was the one who ran it. Back then, he co-ordinated up to 200 people for those
teams. So he knows it quite well ... He has been involved since the very beginning. (Howard.
Chief of Operation. November 1997)

However, the operation concept pursued and developed by William and his group was
ditferent to the one put forward by the Program Manager and Sidina group,
particularly the concept of mini factory’ (see Section 8 3 ) In this concept, the
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production activities, the assembly of aircraft and major components in particular,
were seen as the core business of the program. Other functions, including the design
engineering functions were seen as suppliers that supporting the assembly activities2.
Stating that the Operation Centre’s core business was the assembly line3, each of the
TIPs was projected to be an autonomous mini-factory that delivered components to
the assembly line.
This concept conflicted with the Design Centre’s interests, particularly with respect to
the supplier - customer relationship between the Operation Centre and Design Centre.
The Design Centre viewed that the objective of the Operation Centre was to assist the
Design Centre in developing a sound manufacturable design, and hence the Operation
Centre was the supplier of the Design Centre. In contrast, the Operation Centre was
convinced that the ultimate aim of the Operation Centre was to became mini factory,
as William stated:
In the Operation Centre, we have four overlapping activities: firstly as process integration:
secondly as design-production team [similar to Westaco’s], which is the role of TIP teams
right now in relation with the Design Centre: then [thirdly] as production integration team [to
build the prototype]: and finally to be mini-factories. That’s why we plotted shop floor staff
here in the planning stage. (William, December 1997)

These conflicting views were, to a large extent, strengthened by the lack of any clear
protocol in CE implementation. However, being a supervisor in the Operation Centre
and cut-off from his original function decreased William’s power. As a supervisor he
was not part of the program core team as he was as the Production Co-ordination in
the Engineering Integration stage. His mini factory concept although internally
adopted as the Operation Centre concept towards CE, for example, was never
seriously discussed or considered at the program management level. Without its
: Item (80) Appendix-B
Item (56) Appendix-B
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original champion at that level, the mini-factory concept was prevented from being
listed on the program’s agenda because of its obvious deviation from the Program
Manager’s intentions.
Further, focusing on assembly as the core business of the PLI Program excluded
manufacturing and tooling functions from the Operation Centre. Without adequate
links to Production Divisions, the Operation Centre was an unnecessary bureaucratic
mediator. Although the Operation Centre gave attention toward the producibility and
manufacturability aspects and even provided some courses on the subjects, most of
the operational tasks in detail part planning, NC-programming and tooling
engineering activities were carried out by engineers from the Fabrication Division.
William and the Operation Centre, hence, acted as the co-ordinating medium to
channel the flow of information between the Design Centre and the Fabrication
Division. Increasingly, the Design Centre felt this co-ordinating mechanism was
unnecessary and even slowed the flow of information, particularly after some
incidents surrounding the manufacturing process of the test specimens. These
incidents indicated the powerlessness of the Operation Centre. One engineer of the
Operation Centre explained:
We authorised the Statement of Work to the Fabrication Division in October 1997. Last
December, a Fabrication staff reported in a meeting that some parts were completed. We
believed this and told our colleagues in the Design Centre that some parts were ready, in
[Januan 1998], [we] went to the shop and realised not even one part was ready. The
Fabrication Division had a problem with NC-programming ... We came there last Friday,
three weeks after we discussed with [the NC expert], it was OK. But. it was three weeks later.
... The situation changes now because everybody involved is concerned. But we cannot
change the priority [set by Fabrication management], the [PLI] is their third priority. Right
now, our parts are already in queue but not to be put into the machine ... That’s why
Fabrication said that the parts would be ready on the third of April Imagine how long we have
to wait. (Nathan. Operation Centre. March 1998)

The Chief Engineer expressed his concern and dissatisfaction with the support
provided by the Operation Centre as the following:
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[The Chief of Operation], and his group are becoming co-ordinators. It is their weakness. For
example, when I have a problem in the manufacturing process of the wing, I need an expert
who knows about 'wing forming’ directly from the shop floor. The objective of collocation is
to avoid the "men in between". ... The problem is the Operation Centre has responsibility for
operation but does not have the tool. Tooling engineering and other manufacturing functions
remained in Fabrication Division. ... The Operation Centre only adds a node in the process.
The procedure becomes lengthier than before. It is not right. (Robert Chief Engineer. Januan

Some engineers from the Operation Centre admitted that such a structure slowed
down interaction with their counterparts in both Design Centre and Fabrication:
Before, it was not too bureaucratic; we did not have to go through the co-ordinator like it is
now. Before, when we were separated, we could just call,a design engineer who was
responsible for structure. "Could we gather in TlP-Structure to discuss this?" At that time. I
was m tlie Fixed Wing Division. The TIP had a weekly meeting. There was no im itation
memo, no nothing, just on-call basis. But now. through the coordinators ... I don't know.
(Phillip. Operation Centre. March 1998)

In the middle of 1998, this issue was raised in a PLI management meeting. The
discussion was heated and ended up with an open confrontation between the
Operation Centre and Design Centre. The confrontation resulted in a resolution that
activities of the Fabrication Division for the PLI were not under the co-ordination of
the Operation Centre. The Design Centre was encouraged to contact the Fabrication
Division directly. This resolution, obviously, made William and his group very
unhappy and significantly demotivated them during the whole period of the second
field study. He failed to further mobilise and strengthen the production functions
within the program team.

8.6 Robert and Lucas: The Role of Expertise Power
Robert was one of Indaco's senior engineers. He joined the company in 1984 after
finishing his Master degree in aeronautical engineering abroad and was deeply
involved in defining aerodynamic feature of the PLP Robert had involved in the
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Program since the Engineering Matrix stage as one of experienced representatives
from Technology Divisions. Starting from Engineering Integration stage he was fully
dedicated to the program and assumed the position as the TOP-Airplane Manager. In
Design-Production Coupling stage, he became a full-member of the Program and in
charge of the Design Centre as the Chief Engineer.
Lucas was an expatriate who had been hired as the Technical Adviser since the end of
1996. Together with four other expatriate advisers, his task was to assist the PLI
Program in various aspects of aircraft design and analysis. He had more than 40
years’ experience in a design division of a renowned European aircraft company and
an expert in aeronautics and structural design. The tripartite analysis of Robert and
Lucas is summarised in Table 8-5.
Table 8-5: Tripartite Analysis of Power: Robert and Lucas
Lucas
Stage

Robert
Design-Production Coupling
P LI C ivi si on
Program M an a g er

•: r^fcak&tAasffe«:' ------------!----------|

O peration C enter

[B u s in e s s M a n a g e m e n t

[

F inan ce

|[

ötttgoCerner

j

Technical Adviser to
Chief Engineer
the Program Manager
Manager of the Design Centre
- Expatriate with 40 years experience in
- Education and experience
Power
aircraft design
- Early involvement in the PLI Program
Sources
- Link to the Program Manager
- Willing to increase the quality of designers - Willing to proceed according to the CE
Skill and
concept mutually agreed previously
- Strong and dominant personality to make
Will
- Avoid confrontation and seeking harmony
things done according to his plan
- Ignorance toward the attempt to implement - Indecisive
CE-related systems and concepts
Experienced engineers leaving the Design Centre due to conflicts with Lucas
Effect on CE
Introduction - More inexperienced engineers with greater dependency to Lucas
- Tensions and conflicts between the Design Centre and the Operation Centre
- Tension and conflict between the Design Centre and Sidina Group
- Tendency to slide back to the traditional sequential apporach
- Unutilised integration capabilities of Sidina system
Role

Within the Program, Lucas expertise was highly respected. The Chief Engineer often
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referred to him as a rare ‘dinosaur’, since it was getting hard to find people in the
modern aircraft industry with his combination of breadth and depth of expertise:
Typically, there are groups of people who not only know about structure but also about
aerodynamics and other disciplines. But they are very rare now; they are almost extinct,
particularly due to the education system. Therefore, I told you that Lucas is a dinosaur. He is
part of the generation in which one person knew everything. ... His mathematical ability' is
very strong, so he knows aerolastics too. (Robert, Chief Engineer, November 1997)

Similarly, all engineers within the Design Centre referred him as a genius. They
respected his expertise and were grateful for the technical assistance he offered. He
also ran several basic applied engineering courses for the engineers to enhance their
expertise. Some expressed their gratitude as the follows:
[Lucas] teaches us the very basic calculation to do the design so we have the ’feeling'. ...
Now. we have several engineers working with us and under [Lucas's] direct supervision. That
is good. Before, we had a lot of technical advisers but they were just telling us and were not as
useful as him. He told us the basic of design, made us having the feeling about design. (Frank,
Design Centre, March 1998)
[Lucas] is die champion. He not only knows structure, but also everything else. Whereas
[Robert] is still young, hasn’t made many products, hasn’t got a lot of knowledge and
experience. [Robert] once confessed to me that he and I are learning together in this program.
(Darren. Design Centre. March 1998)

However, some were offended by Lucas’s manner in the Design Centre. He often
raised his voice at and mocked those engineers whose work was not to his
satisfaction. Most engineers, particularly the younger ones, accepted this as part of the
‘eccentricity of a genius’ and, in particular, because his help was worthy. The more
experienced engineers were more offended. As one of them said:
[Lucas] is supposed to assist us only in technical matters, but he does everything else too. As
a genius, his attitude is just like that There is no democracy in here, only authoritarian.
(Roger. Design Centre, November 1997)

This particular engineer, a Supervisor in the Design Centre, later left the Program
after a heated confrontation with Lucas over the wingbox technological experiment.
Some others felt that Lucas did not respect others, including the Chief Engineer. One
engineer, a Supervisor who often had confrontations.with Lucas said:
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[Lucas] is weird. I have worked with many technical advisers. We know [Indaco] need them,
no question about that. But, it has to be based on respect. If we respect each other we could
listen to each other. But, [Lucas], he might be a champion, but has no respect for us and does
not hesitate to put people down and saying bad words. It is very discouraging. Our culture
cannot accept this discouraging attitude. I am not sure about his position in the organisation,
but I know he does not report to [Robert], The saddest thing is he does not respect [Robert],
That’s the main problem for me. How dare he talking to [Robert] like that? As [Robert's]
subordinate, I could not accept that. 1 don’t care that he is [Clive’s] people. He has no respect
[toward us], that’s the problem. (John. Design Centre, January 1999)

Increasingly, others began to feel that Lucas had taken control of the development
process. At one point, he ordered design engineers not to go to a meeting conducted
by the Operating Centre. He also ignored engineers from the Operation Centre who
came to the Design Centre to discuss issues with their counterparts. He often referred
to them as a group who had no job other than disrupting designers’ concentration.
During the financial crisis when Indaco had to let go most foreign advisers, Lucas was
the only one who remained. In a sense, this reflected that the Indaco’s top
management respected him and relied heavily on his expertise to support the
development process. This made him become more dominant in the PLI Program.
Lucas’s domination became a major factor that inhibited more experienced engineers
from Technology Divisions in joining the PLI program. His approach was seen as
Hocking the creativity out’ of the designers. Many questioned the effectiveness of his
approach, particularly, in terms of building up the creativity needed in the design and
development process. Inevitably, without support from more experienced engineers,
the PLI Program had more inexperienced engineers in the design teams and, in turn,
became more dependent to Lucas. One engineer expressed this issue:
A more driving force why people hesitate to participate is [Lucas], Because of the absence of
creativity' freedom, senior engineers do not want to participate. I wanted to put the best people
in die program, but I could not because diey argued "my experience would be of no use
diere”. Therefore, I put die junior ones ... No senior engineers wanted to get involved in die
program on a full tune basis. The lack of experience in die Program is getting worse. There is
no school for designing, ... It is a matter of experience and a matter of creativity. You can be
creauve on die basis of experience, we build our creadvity based on our experience. ... It is
true diat Lucas has die experience, but m die aircraft development diere are a lot of other
disciplines. This means the development process involves the way we work and interact, a
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more cultural issue. It should be a flexible environment. ... But with Lucas, it is based on his
instruction; the creativity is not channelled. To be a designer we need to be creative, otherwise
the designer is dead and becomes a coolie. (John, Design Centre, January 1999)

The Chief Engineer was seemingly powerless to deal with this situation and at times
indecisive, particularly in the issues that previously had been mutually agreed with the
Operation Centre. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, hierarchically Lucas
was not under his control but reported and took orders directly from the Program
Manager. Given the Indonesian cultural tendency, questioning Lucas might imply that
he was questioning the Program Manager, his superior, which was not a proper
behaviour. Secondly, professionally he respected Lucas’s expertise and knew that he
needed him to complement his own lack of experience and expertise in some aspects
of the design process. Furthermore, he knew that most members of his team were
inexperienced and needed guidance that he might not be able to provide. Thirdly,
personally he hated confrontation and most of the time sought compromise to avoid it.
Many members characterised Robert’s leadership as ‘soft’ and ‘need of more
toughness’. Some of them illustrated his leadership as follows;
As the Chief Engineer, [Robert] knows a lot about aircraft. But in managing engineers, we
haven’t heard a lot from him. We heard that from [Lucas], [Robert] once said to me, ''Darren
if something is going on with [Lucas], would you please tell me”. ... [Lucas] is very
persistent, stubborn and tough. How could I call [Robert] [to face] with all the yelling and
shouting from [Lucas], ... [Robert] is soft and very patient. (Darren, Design Centre, March
1998)
In my opinion we need a tougher Chief Engineer. Theoretically, [Lucas] cannot make the
decision; the Chief Engineer is the one who makes decisions. So tire Chief Engineer must be
tough. Theoretically, [Lucas] is not the Chief Engineer, but he is so dominant. (Ray, Design
Centre, November 1997)

For the Design Centre’s engineers the every day design activities were characterised
by juggling between the officially scheduled tasks and those given by Lucas. The
officially scheduled tasks were based on the schedule established by the Operation
Centre. This schedule was derived from the Program’s Master Phasing Plan and
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consisted of target dates for the design to release the engineering data for production.
However, Lucas ignored the schedule and ordered designers to work according to his
preference, Robert took no action. This situation partly explains the absence of
schedule review in most meetings. A design engineer illustrated the typical every day
situation as follows:
We are supposed to be schedule driven. ...But, our work is actually driven by Lucas. ... When
we were doing something [based on the schedule], [Lucas] came and said.” I don't want to see
this”... We want to do the official ones that based on the schedule, but there is also something
from [Lucas], He is one man show: sometimes his show sacrifices other. ... I feel pity for
[Robert], He was often caught in an awkward position. He wanted to co-ordinate us but
[Lucas] is in the way. Hence. [Robert] took a compromise way. said. "You do whatever
[Lucas] asks but don't forget other tilings. Manage your time.” At the end. it goes back to us:
we have to manage the time. In the schedule we have to do the centre-line diagram. ... But
[Lucas] goes directlv to [for example] vertical tail and defines its hard-points. ... According to
hint hard-points are the most important tilings for manufacturing to enable Fabrication
Division preparing tools. ... It is true, but the schedule is not like that. So. we just do our best
to comply with both. (Darren. Design Centre. March 1998)

The confrontation avoidance of the Chief Engineer toward Lucas cost him the trust of
his team. These engineers felt they could not rely on him to back them up, even when
they were right and he knew it. An incident that happened in the later stage of the
field study when the skin panel was finally tested illustrates the situation created by
the combination of the nature of explosive Lucas, the indecisiveness and
confrontation avoidance manner of the Chief engineer, and the immature engineers.
Before the on-site static test witness meeting with the Regulation Authority officers. Robert
briefly met 3 engineers from tire body integration team near the test site. They discussed the
current test result. Andrew, a structure analyst said that die result was different from the
theory. He also provided tentative explanation suspecting the effect of both the mbber and the
aluminium flat installed between the rubber and the omega stringer. Robert seemingly agreed
with the logic of the explanation, thanked him and asked him to explain that result to the
authority officers in the meeting. At the meeting, the authority7 officer directly took over the
meeting, asking various questions of documentation and conformity of the process of
developing the specimen. In die area of testing installation, the officer questioned die absence
of setting strain gauges and doubted diat they were actually testing die criucal area widiout
such gauges. The engineers tried to response and Robert tried to support his members but
unconvincingly. At die end. die engineers agreed to install at least one of setting gage and
asked the facility specialist to change die test installation who, in response said it would take
about an hour.
While waiting. Robert discreetly questioned die decision not to put setting gage on place.
Andrew said diat he wanted to put it on. but the facility expert said diey did not have it and
installing it would take time. The fact diat die installation only took one hour amazed him.
They discussed the discrepancies of the result. Robert then quesdoned die decision to put the
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aluminium flat between the rubbers. Three engineers looked at each other. Andrew said that
he (and apparently all) was against it at tire beginning. Robert wisely asked whether it was
Lucas idea, and all of them nodded. Robert said, ’’All right, do not finger pointing, but you
have to explain this result to Lucas and that you suspect that the discrepancy was due to tire
flat, and suggest to remove it”. He went on,” you should have confidence on your own
concept and convince others dirough various different ways, try to be more straight in
argumentation". He gestured that it should include argumentation with the authority officer.
Andrew said. "yeah. 1 would feel confident explaining things that I belief, but it is hard to
made argument on tilings you don't agree with, like tire setting gage. I could not argue with
die officer since I knew dial he was right".
Lucas came and asked about die result. At first he looked at it- tentadveiv. did not fully
understand die explanadon. Seeing die chart of stress versus pressures, he said diat die stress
on die way back is not die same widi on die way up. Somediing was absorbing it. Being told
diat diey suspected die discrepancy was because of the aluminium, he asked. ’’why did you
put die aluminium diere?” and dien went on and on about how stupid die idea was and
provided teclirucal reasons why it should not be diere. When he comprehended dial he was
actually accused of being responsible of suggesting die idea, he burst out. "When you said dial
1 told you to put aluminium diere. you are insulting me.” He was very angry. ’’I may be old,
but my memory and my brain still perfect. I will remember tilings like dus." The engineers did
not respond but when Lucas went out of the circle, diev said diat diev had proved it was Lucas
idea. They still had die draft diey discussed with Lucas. They have tried 3 dines to convince
liim not to put die aluminium. More importandy. 3 of them remembered die same version
against Lucas denial. Then. Robert told die engineers, not to finger pointing and calmed down
Lucas and said. "It seemed diere was a misunderstanding." One engineer whispered. ’’Look,
no body stand on our side for diings like diis. Never!” (Field Study Journal. February 1999)

Obviously, this situation inhibited the implementation of CE in the PLI Program. The
Operation Centre, in particular, was very' upset at Lucas’s domination and the
deviation from a CE approach caused by him. Lucas’s interference in the supposed to
be CE process was very apparent:
The drawing was wrong. The colleague from Design Centre told me diat Lucas was furious
and got verv angrv to him. ... At diat time Lucas also said diat die Operation Centre should
just back off and stay out of die Design Centre. According to Lucas, all assessments made by
the Operation Centre could well go to rubbish bin. (Phillip, Operation Centre, January 1999)
We had a routine meeting witii die Operation Centre. But Lucas said we did not need diat.
Only if we have problem we would run a meetmg and so it is.... Sometimes, we have problem
but Lucas said we do not have to [have the meeting], (Frank. Design Centre. March 1998)

Engineers from the Operation Centre became reluctant to visit the Design Centre.
They blamed the Chief Engineer and his inexperience for this threat to CE. The
explosive confrontation between the Chief of Operation and Lucas in a program’s
management meeting (i.e. September 1998) resulted in a complete breakdown in co
operation between the Operation Centre and the Design Centre. In one of his
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explosive outbursts after this meeting, Lucas said that he did not want to talk to the
Operation Centre any more, and instead asked an engineer from the Design Centre to
explain things. Coincident with the growing anxiety over the continuation of the PLI
Program, this breakdown added to the demotivation of Operation Centre engineers.
Similarly, the Sidina group was unhappy with Lucas’s domination. ‘The Lucas way
of designing’ that dominated the development process was incompatible with the
configuration management system they developed. On the other hand, Lucas and
Robert accused the Sidina group of developing a system that was not user friendly
because they were not familiar with the design process as discussed previously.
Lucas’s power came from his technical expertise and his links to the Program
Manager. In design-production coupling stage, within various conditions that
prevented CE from developing as intended by the Program Manager (e.g. lack of
competence in design teams, lack of clarity in CE concept, the distance between the
Sidina group and the Program, the failure of the Operation Centre to integrate all
production functions, and lack of attention from the Program Manager), he
increasingly became influential. His dominance was, in part, due to the lack of
strength and power of the Chief Engineer in the face of his idiosyncratic and forceful
personality. All aspects of the Chief Engineer’s power were undermined by Lucas’s
power. Lucas was more knowledgeable and the Chief Engineer needed his assistance.
Lucas reported to the Program Manager and not officially under control of the Chief
Engineer. Cultural tendency of non-criticism strengthened Lucas’s influence. The will
and skill of Robert, the soft-spoken Chief Engineer, was not a match for Lucas’s
structural position and his forceful personality

Lucas’s domination, combined with Robert’s inability to take necessary actions.
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shaped the PLI’s CE to a form that deviated further from that initially intended. Under
Lucas direction, the design process ignored the system developed by the Sidina group
and did not use the full benefit offered by the Sidina system. He also discouraged
design engineers to interact with production engineers. This interaction started to
flourish at the end of the Design Integration stage and in the early of DesignProduction Coupling stage. He even ignored the official schedule for the PLI. These
deviations remained until the termination of the PLI Program.

8.7 Summary
The organisational politics as manifested by actions (or in-actions) and decisions (or
non-decisions) of key groups and individuals, played an important part in shaping and
transforming CE. The transformation of CE toward a model specific to the company
was not only an adjustment process to fit the approach with its contextual factors but
also a result of political behaviour of key groups and individuals in forcing and
securing their own interests, sometimes through manipulation of contextual factors.
The analysis in this chapter shows that initially the Program Manager had the
opportunity to introduce CE with strong support and company-wide enthusiasm,
particularly from functional production units as reflected in their involvement in
various program activities during engineering matrix stage. However, his lack of
understanding of the sensitivity and culture of functional design units led to actions
that enhanced rivalry and created tensions with those units. This led to increasingly
young design engineers being assigned to the Program during the engineering
integration and design-production coupling stages. Meanwhile, key individuals from
production and computer support functions also had their own interests and agendas.
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The functional production units longed for improving their position in the product
development process, while the agenda of the computer support people was to get
their hand on state of the art technology. Furthermore, the Program Manager was
increasingly busy with other tasks. Combined with the lack of systematic protocols,
these led to confusion and raised the opportunity to the Technical Adviser to dominate
with the approach that different from CE. The result was that CE ideas were not
followed up by their implementation. Instead, the organisational arrangement and
mechanisms were continuously adjusted throughout four stages of change process.
It is also evident that cultural tendencies, particularly power distance and collectivism
dimensions (Hofstede, 1991; 1984), influenced the actions of people involved in the
process. The attitudes of Mark toward Clive’s appointment as the chairperson, the
ambiguousness of Clive’s CE presentation in the Executive Management Council, the
harmony sought by Robert in dealing with Lucas, all can be, at least partly, attributed
to high power distance and collectivism of Indonesian society. These all contributed
to the changing forms and final shape of CE.
The result in reality was a messy process of CE implementation in which various
competing contextual factors and organisational power and politics were intertwined.
The application of tripartite analysis of power (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995)
framework into the political actors’ actions is useful to capture such an involved
process. It provides explanations why the process made a particular turn and not
another. In general, this chapter strengthens March and Olson (1983) suggestion of
reorganisation as a ‘garbage can’ in which the course of events seem to depend less
on properties of the initial concept than on the happenstance of short-run political
attention, over which the implementation team typically have little control.
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CHAPTER 9
THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE: SUMMARY
DISCUSSION

9.1 introduction
The main objectives of this chapter are to provide an overview of the dynamics of
introducing CE in Indaco and outline some of the ways in which the processual
analysis captures its complex and changing character. The chapter is arranged as
follows. Section 9.2 summarises the main stages of change chronologically through
four stages of CE introduction. Section 9.3 outlines some of key drivers and barriers
in the configuration of adopted CE that affected the form of organisational integration
of CE. Sections 9.4 and 9.5 describe the influence of some key features of
organisational politics and the broader organisational context.

9.2 Case Study Findings: Four Stages of CE Introduction Process
Although modelled to Westaco’s CE that integrated all necessary initiatives, CE
introduction to Indaco was characterised by strong focus on enabling technology
initiatives, particularly its computer-based technology The most important
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organisational integration initiatives, such as cross-functional team and heavyweight
management, were mentioned as important but never carefully prepared at the outset.
Combined with the nature of Indaco’s organisational context, this ignorance created
various problems and failures during the process.
The decision to introduce this kind of CE was influenced more by considerations
associated with the external context rather than by requirement to find an appropriate
solution for the company’s problems associated with new product development
process or serious consideration on its organisational context. Both industrial and
national contexts provided a push to the same direction: an emphasis on computerbased enabling technology. CE was widely used in aircraft industry. It was spread
and transferred to Indaco through aircraft industry’s common practices: technical and
management consulting services and internship program. On the other hand, bearing
the mission as the nation’s agent of technology transfer, Indaco was interested most
on the advanced of Westaco’s CE enabling technology and tried to mimic it without
full consideration on its own readiness and the nature of its organisational context.
In term of its organisational integration aspect, the process of CE introduction in the
Indaco’s PLI Program can be divided into four stages, each with different
organisational structure and mechanism. These stages reflected efforts to find
appropriate means of achieving an appropriate organisational integration within a
specific Indaco’s context and organisational politics. They also illustrated the ad-hoc
nature of organisational integration initiatives. The summary of the organisational
integration mechanisms and the contribution of contextual factors and organisational
politic in each stage is as follows:
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1) Program Initiation Stage (November 1993 - August 1995)
This stage was a pre-CE stage. The PLI development was carried out by engineers of
a functional department, namely New Product Development (NPD) Department of
Technology Division. Consequently, the scope of the development team was limited
and only involved design engineers. However, this stage provided a relatively
cohesive, highly motivated team that became the basis for CE introduction and
enabled CE to develop in the next stage. The formation of such a team was made
possible due to the mixed of senior leader and junior engineers, overlapping
membership pattern, two-way communication pattern, and extensive collaboration.
To a large extent, the leadership of Mark, the head of NPD Department and the
Project Engineer of the PLI Program, contributed to the shape of such a CEconducive team. His leadership and actions encouraged young and inexperienced
engineers to tackle the obviously daunting tasks in a manner that emphasised on
mastering and exploring various engineering specialisations while at the same time
encouraged collaboration within a relatively unrestricted environment. Other than his
personality, Mark’s approach was also influenced by his understanding on the state’s
of Indaco’s technological capabilities, particularly on the level of the accumulative
tacit and explicit knowledge of its engineers. His approach was also made possible by
the combination of his close link to the Indaco’s President Director, Indaco’s highly
centralised structure, and Indaco’s strong technology orientation, that provided the
team with more than enough resources to play around.

2) Engineering Matrix Stage (August 1995 - October 1996)

This stage was the beginning of CE adoption. A major change from the previous stage
was the upgrading of the Program’s position from a functional department led by a
middle manager to become a heavyweight organisational division led by a senior
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manager. In line with CE adoption, the PLI Program involved company-wide cross
functionality although only design-related functions played the main role in the
development process. The design teams were divided primarily based on integrated
end product. The Program set up a matrix arrangement between its design teams and
engineering specialist groups from the functional design units, which viewed as
resource pools for the Program. Due to engineers involved in the matrix were
mostly inexperienced and collaboration across teams were limited functional design
units had a significant influence in technical decisions, which dissatisfied the leaders
of the PLI Program as they saw it as eroding their control in the development process.
This stage was characterised by enthusiasm of non design-related functions,
particularly production-related functions, to get involve in the development process.
However, it also characterised by growing tension between the Program and
functional design units, particularly concerning the issues of design decision
responsibility and human resource allocation. To a large extent, this tension led to the
change of organisational structure in the next stage.
Several factors can be accounted for the state of organisational integration on this
stage. Firstly, the strong technology orientation often put other functions in ill-fated
situation in the previous development programs. CE is seen as an opportunity to alter
this situation and improve their status. Secondly, focusing on computer-based
technology, all these major organisational changes were executed without substantial
preparation in human resources or in protocols that guide the new company-wide
arrangement while the intended computer-based technology required a significant
time to be developed. Thirdly, in pushing his intention on CE, the Program Manager
failed to build necessary coalition with experienced key personnel in functional
design units. Should he, for example, have taken benefit of Mark’s understanding on
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the contextual situation, he might pursue his intention differently. This cost him and
the Program not only the necessity to change the organisational structure and
mechanism, but also the growing rivalry and tension with functional design units in
the next stage.

-

Fourthly, his ignorance on the need to set up the necessary protocols in undertaking
CE approach did not provide the program teams with guidance to proceed according
to his intended approach which were significantly different from the way most team
members and other fellow employees knew and practised. This was exaggerated by
his ignorance on the need of team-related training courses, such as team building and
interpersonal communication skill.

3) Engineering Integration Stage (October 1996 - June 1997)
This stage was characterised by more intense tension and conflict with functional
design units and continuous enthusiasm from production-related functional units in
supporting the Program. Three major changes in organisational aspect occurred in this
stage. Firstly, the internalisation of engineering specialists from the matrix between
the Program and Engineering Specialist Groups. This made engineering specialists to
become fully members of the Program’s design teams. Technical decisions, therefore,
were fully in the hand of the Program. Secondly, the increasingly younger and less
experienced engineers involved in the Program. Thirdly, the establishment of several
Co-ordinators as fully dedicated functional representatives to perform liaison role
between the Program and functional units, most notably the Production Co-ordinator.

To a large extent, the development in this stage was contributed by the fact that the
Program

Manager was unaware of the implication ot the previous PLP Program and

its subsequent first flight success on the pride of engineers in functional design units
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either as an individual or as a group. The internalisation of engineering specialists and
conceiving functional design units as the resource pools not only buried the
expectation of most leaders and engineers from functional design units to continue
their company-wide domination through their design decisions but also directly and
openly challenged this pride. On the other hand, the growing activities in productionrelated functions fostered by the Production Co-ordinator, who got strong back-up
from the leaders of functional production units, created awareness in the Program
Manager on the importance of production-related functions. These two were major
factors that led to another organisational change that marked the final stage of CE
introduction process.

4) Design-Production Coupling Stage (June 1997 - June 1999)
Three major changes in organisational integration aspect distinguished this stage from
the previous one. Firstly, the Program became an autonomous division that cut-off
from the influence and resources of functional units. Secondly, the formation of two
centres, the Design Centre and the Operation Centre, which in effect provided
production-related functions with an equal status to the design-related functions in
product development. Thirdly, increasing number of young and inexperienced
engineers and team leaders that led to increasing ignorance and disrespect toward the
technical decisions made by the lower-level teams that frustrated both design and
production engineers. Overall, this stage was characterised with increasing tensions
and conflicts between the PLI Program and functional design units, increasing
frustration among engineers involved in the Program, and increasing attempt to
impose approach that clearly deviate from CE through separation of design and
production functions in the Program, the lack of effective matrix organisation
between the Program and the functional units, authoritarian leadership, and one-way
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communication in the design development process.
At its abrupt termination due to the continuing Indonesian economic crisis, the CE
introduction in the PLI Program froze at the following characteristics of its
organisational integration, communication, and decision making mechanisms:
1) an autonomous product development team instead of heavyweight program team,
2) parallel design and production teams instead of single integrated teams,
3) increasingly hostile environment instead of teamwork within the program teams
and between the program teams and other involved functions,
4) reduction of lower level teams’ participation in design decision, and
5) failure in utilising computer technology as an integrating mechanism as suggested
by engineering literature (e.g. Norman, 1990; Volk, 1992; and Fan, 1995) due to
the stand alone and ad-hoc nature of the current system.
Several major factors significantly contributed to this development. Firstly, due to the
development in the company and its wider context, the Program Manager tied to other
assignments and could not intensively supervise the Program. Secondly, the Program
Manager had not established a successful coalition with functional design units but
rather increased rivalry through the autonomous program division. In response to this,
functional design units pulled out most of experienced engineers from the Program.
The Chief Engineer and young engineers remained in the Program became vulnerable
to the actions of a domineering technical adviser who imposed contrasting approaches
including discouragement to interact with the Operation Centre and ignorance toward
the schedule. Thirdly, unavailability of guiding protocols on the intended CE left the
inexperienced program teams off-guard upon imposed different approach. Fourthly,
the lag in the preparation of the computer support system provided inadequate support
for the engineers and forced them to invent their own systems, such as data storage
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and retrieving system and the drawing identification system, that were incompatible
with the intended support system.
During the process of the four-phase of CE introduction, there were many episodes in
which aspects of CE were partially implemented; for example;
1) High level of collaboration during the program initiation stage and, at least in
some part of design teams, at the beginning of CE adoption (i.e. engineering
matrix stage).
2) Heavyweight management team although for most of the time it was limited at the
highest level of the program management (i.e. the Program Manager).
3) The formation of matrix arrangement between the Program and functional design
units and the assignment of focal points from company-wide functional units to
support the Program in engineering matrix stage.
4) Active involvement of production-related functions in supporting the Program
since the beginning of CE adoption (i.e. since engineering matrix stage).
5) Formai equalisation of the role and status of production-related functions with the
role and status of design-related functions through the formation of the Design
Centre and the Operation Centre in the design-production coupling stage.
6) High level of collaboration between design engineers and production engineers in
the beginning of design-production coupling stage.
However, the final form of Indaco’s CE was far from the intended Westaco model
except for its equalisation of the status of production-related functions and the
heavyweightness of the Program Manager. The form that emerged could hardly be
called a CE process although it can be argued that the abrupt termination forced by
the external context did not provide the opportunity to further shape the final form of
CE in the PLl Program.

"
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9.3 Drivers and Barriers of Integration in the Adopted CE
Configuration
The case study findings illustrate the vagueness of CE concept. CE means different
things to different product development undertakings across companies and even in
the same company. In this respect, assessing CE adoption and implementation
through its operational initiatives become crucial. This operationalisation enables to
see CE concept ‘in action’.
The case study shows the importance of not only selecting which technology or
approach to adopt (i.e. CE approach), but also the selecting the right configuration of
the appraoch (i.e. the combination of CE initiatives) (Thomas, 1994). In this respect,
CE introduction in the case study suffered from five major obstacles:
1) The heavyweight Program Manager’s lack of seniority and organisational clout in
driving the implementation of a CE structure.
2) The chaotic and ineffective nature of the ad-hoc character of shifting
organisational arrangements to deal with ongoing problems of horizontal
integration.
3) The lack of integration of the development of enabling technology with an
evolving product development process.
4) The lack of competency, including necessary explicit and tacit skills and
knowledge, of the Program team.
5) The lack of systematic CE protocols and plan for their implementation.
From amongst these factors, a particular feature of the case study was the way in
which it highlighted the importance of competent staff and systematic protocol for
organisational integration. The increasingly young and inexperienced engineers in the
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Program caused both technical and non-technical problems in the development
process. Other than the assignment of technical advisers to assist in solving technical
problems, the PLI Program did not make significant effort to increase the competency
of the program team. A technical adviser .might solve the technical problems by
imposing his technical opinions but did not contribute to the accumulation of
internalised tacit knowledge that according to Nakayama (1997) necessary in such
development. Such knowledge could only be internalised through fieldwork
knowledge (e.g. intuition, experience and analogy), that helps in understanding
overall circumstances and actively re-framing or integrating various technologies.
Although engineering literature has mentioned the importance of tacit knowledge in
the product development (e.g. Nakayama, 1997), the defining factors of tacit and
explicit knowledge are mostly taken for granted and embedded in CE. It seems that
the term ‘skill competence’ had said it all, whilst this difference between tacit and
explicit knowledge has a very significant implication in the implementation process.
The necessity of systematic protocols involves two issues: What CE initiatives are
carried out (i.e. CE-related manuals) and how CE is implemented in the organisation
(i.e. CE charter and implementation plan). The case study shows that the lack of these
two types of protocol in the PLI Program caused at least four problems include the
absence of a well-defined CE concept and commonly agreed approach, operating
procedures, exit criteria and deliverables, and standard operating manuals for the
enabling technology. These problems caused inconsistency in management decisions
particularly in dealing with the issue of lack of competency. These problems also
caused confusion among those involved in the Program as they embarked on the
change from traditional sequential approach but without clear guidelines for the new
one and contributed to tensions within the Program teams and between the Program
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teams and company-wide functions supporting the Program. Such confusion and
tension contributed to the failure of CE and the infusion of contrasting approaches.
The case study also shows that organisational integration, both structurally and
processually, is the most important feature of CE. Instead of focusing on initiatives in
these two categories, CE in Indaco’s PLI Program emphasised on initiatives in
enabling technology, particularly computer-based technology. In organisational
integration aspect, the most consistent initiative was the heavyweight Program
Manager, which decided at the outset and kept throughout the process. This initiative,
though, had its weakness due to the relatively junior status of the Program Manager in
term of his tenure that later cost the Program because of his lack of organisational
clouts and thus inability to build coalition with the key individuals in functional
design units. Organisational arrangement to achieve cross-functional team was
continuously adjusted to fit in with the developing situation. This ad-hoc nature of
organisational arrangement reflected the program management’s ignorance to the
organisational aspect of CE. The Program kept changing its structure to reduce the
influence from outside, which perceived as eroding the Program’s control and
authority in the development process.
The communication and decision making process were also ad-hoc, according to the
preference of the leader of each team. This ad-hoc nature prevented the collaboration
to occur within and between teams, the information to be shared systematically, and
the interlocking communication structure to exist. Further, design decisions and
commitments made by the lower-level teams were increasingly disrespected and
ignored. This prevented the necessary collaboration across lower-level teams. These
initiatives, though, were not totally independent, but also dependent upon initiatives
from other aspects. They can be seen as both part and result of CE initiatives.

Chapter 9: The dynamics of Change: Summary Discussion

In the case study, the weakness of the above initiatives was failed to be complemented
by initiatives in the computer-based technology, the focus of the CE adoption in this
case. The focus on this technology in effect treated CE as a tool that was indicated by
over excitement in supporting computer .system development. This led to the
ignorance to the needs of the current development process. This ignorance to some
extent was also contributed by the obvious failure of the approach taken by the PLI
Program in adopting CE: developing the computer-based enabling technology in
parallel with developing the product. The success of CE initiatives in Westaco’s
product development programs could not be separated by the state of their in-house
computer support development. But, CE initiatives in each product development
program relied on the ready to use computer support systems that have been achieved
rather than the support system that was in the development process.

9.4 The Significance of Organisational Politics
The empirical findings of this case study confirm that organisational politics is central
to the technological change process as has been recognised by Thomas (1994).
Thomas (1994) argues that innovation and change in technology and organisation
may be as much products of internal political action as they are products of
exogenous forces, conscious design of top leaders, or efforts of units formally
sanctioned to it. In this CE introduction process, intentional actions and non-actions
of key individuals significantly shaped the nature of change process. These key
individuals were not necessarily the important leaders of the Program. Rather, they
also included a lower-level manager within the Program, an expatriate technical
adviser, and a manager from outside the Program team, all with their own sources of
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power.
The case study also shows that the uncertainty nature of the adoption (Madison et al.,
1980; Tushman, 1977; Hickson et ah, 1971) and the interests of people involved
(Thomas, 1994; Guth and Me Millan, 1989; Wilkinson, 1983; Porter et al. 1976) were
the main reasons for increasing political activities in the process. Two types on
uncertainty occurred in the case study: the uncertainty due to the major transformation
from traditional sequential approach to CE (Riedel and Pawar, 1991) and the
uncertainty due to the absence of clear direction of CE configuration implemented.
This uncertainty interacts with the self-interest activities of individuals and groups in
the organisation. The case study shows that the contribution of interests of individuals
or groups of individuals were immense, particularly considering the unbalanced
domination of one functional group (i.e. design engineering) over the other (i.e.
production engineering). Indeed, status inequality between design engineers and
production or manufacturing engineers in high-tech industries, not to mention other
staff from even lower status functions, had been noted by many researchers (Kunda,
1991; Thomas, 1994).
In this case study, CE was seen as a potential vehicle by manufacturing and
production engineers to show their existence, enact their worldviews, and in turn
attain greater influence in the development process that previously dominated solely
by design engineers. This was reflected by their effort in increasing functional
involvement in the process and later imposing the mini-factory concept. The success
of this effort could significantly alter the existing structural context and power
relation between design engineers and production engineers as noted by Thomas
(1994) in his case studies. In this case study, however, this balance of power could not
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truly be achieved despite of the structural formation of both Design and Operation
Centres. The effort of production engineers lose a significant back up power in
relation to decreasing power sources of its main champion due to the alternation of its
structural context included the cut off from the production-related functions and
relatively insignificant hierarchical status of the main champion. Despite this failure,
this case study clearly shows the role of organisational politics in the change process,
in which CE was regarded as an opportunity to attain greater power and improve their
status particularly by the production-related engineers and their functions.
In relation to the computer-based technology initiatives, the interest of a particular
group rather than the integral interest of the company, or in this case, the product
development process, was a dominant explanatory variable. For the computer support
(i.e. Sidina) group, the PLI Program and its CE introduction were not the objectives,
but rather a means that could enable them put their hand in an advanced computerbased technology. This helps explaining the ignorance of this group in building
horizontal coalition with the PLI Program team. It also helps explaining the decision
to use a component from other Program.

9.5 The Significance of Contextual Factors
Contextual factors influenced the shape of the changing process and the final form of
CE in two ways: 1) directly, through imposing constraints and limitations to the
process and 2) indirectly, through providing a constrained arena for political actions
that influences the process. It should be noted, however, that the context was not only
constrained the process and political actions, but it could also be altered as a result of
a process or political action. The latter can be seen in the changing nature of the
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program structures throughout the process, each with different boundaries for political
arena.
The case study was intended to focus on the contribution of organisational context,
but the findings also show a significant contribution of the industry and national
context in the process. The individual level of analysis in discussing organisational
power and politics revealed the contribution of societal culture in the process that
worth further discussion. These findings clearly confirm Thomas's (1994) strong
recommendation for extending both organisational and temporal context.
Within the organisational context of the case study, a major significant factor was the
nature of stage of development of the company, particularly in the aspects of
individual and organisational knowledge accumulation. As shown in the previous
chapters, most problems encountered in the PLI Program were associated with lack of
competent engineers in the Program teams. In respect of the product development
process, Indaco had not yet had enough knowledge, particularly the tacit design
engineering knowledge. This situation is understandable since such tacit knowledge
could only be accumulated through experiencing various product development
processes while Indaco had completed only one co-development process (i.e. the PLC
Program) and its other program (i.e. the PLP Program) was in the certification phase.
Hence, the number of experienced engineers was limited and some of them had
already been promoted into managerial positions hence unavailable for detail
engineering tasks.

In this state of engineering competency, the PLI Program had to compete over the
valuable experienced engineers with other programs, the PLP program that
encountered huge engineering problems in its certification process and the PLC
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derivative program that considered essential to boost PLC market after its more than
12 years field operation. Unfortunately, the PLI Program had not yet had as strong
attachment to the engineers and design-engineering functions as the other two
previous programs. Such a strong attachment was related to the fact that the PLC was
the only selling product contributed to the company’s revenue, hence the employees’
pay-cheque, and that the PLP Program, to which most experienced engineers were
previously involved with, played a crucial role related to greater domination of design
engineers and functional design units.
To make the matter worse, instead of forming a coalition with key individuals in
functional design units, the Program iManager dealt with such situation through
limiting the Program’s exposure from the functional design units with internalisation
of engineering specialists and forming an autonomous program divisions. These
actions triggered a sense of rivalry in those units. As the result, the PLI Program had
to cope with the increasingly less experienced engineers in its design teams that leads
to conflicts and tensions within the Program between the Program and those
functional design units.
Other major contextual factors were the organisational culture that had strong
technology orientation and its subsequent domination of design-related functions.
This was strongly fostered by the founder of the company, an aeronautic engineer
who almost single-handedly built Indaco. The domination of design-related functions
was not only in the design development process but also in the organisational status as
reflected by the parity of the pay-cheque between design-related engineers and
production-related engineers and between those engineers and non-engineering staff.
As discussed in the previous section, CE introduction was seen as an opportunity by
production engineers to alter their status, settle a more balance environment, and

_______________________________
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enact their worldview or what their perceived as a better way for the company.
Consequently, the PLI Program with its CE was seen as a threat to their domination
by the funtional design units, particularly after the Program internalised the
engineering specialist group and later became an autonomous division.
By extending its organisational and temporal contexts, the case study shows that both
industry and national contexts fostered such domination. In high-tech industries the
domination of design engineers is common (Kunda, 1991; Thomas 1994). Kunda’s
(1991) empirical qualitative study shows that such domination often intended and
carefully planted as part of organisational means to control the engineers. Thomas
(1994) case studies also show such a domination that triggered production-engineers
to involve in various political manoeuvrings to create an opportunity to improve their
status and to enact their own worldviews.
In this case study, the domination of engineers, design engineers in particular, was
also triggered by national interest. Indaco was a state-own company that had
technology transfer and industrialisation as parts of its mission and contribution to
national development and economic growth (Todd and Simpson, 1986). This national
contextual factor also helps explaining the strong emphasis in computer-based
enabling technology. The acquisition of such technology, rather than the optimal used
of it, was sufficient to convince the nation that the technology transfer was in process.
This national interest also helps explaining the eagerness of the Government’s official
to assist the company bearing the financial burden of such aircraft development

program by fostering the establishment of the private company (i.e. Prico) as the
Program's financial backer.
Another contextual factor that worth further discussion is the contribution of the
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societal culture, particularly the Indonesian tendencies on power distance and
collectivism dimensions (Hofstede, 1991), in the whole process of CE introduction. In
contrast with the Western country in which the Indaco’s CE was originated,
Indonesian culture has a strong tendency of higher power differential and
collectivism. The case study, particularly from the analysis of the processual aspects
of integration (i.e. communication and decision making mechanisms) and
organisational politics, shows that this cultural tendencies reinforced the negative
effects of competing subcultures (i.e. design and production) and hampered the
problem solving communication.
The tendencies of collectivism reinforced functional compartmentalisation because
functional representatives remained with strong attachment to their functional units
with which they were formerly identified and were not yet ready to merge with others
from different functions. Through all stages of CE implementation, the Program
struggled to establish a cross-functional team with fully delegated functional
representatives as its members. This strong attachment toward functional units
hampered the unification of a cross-fimctional team. Such a strong attachment is less
likely in Western countries where people are more individualistic and relatively
independent from association with one another and, hence, are able to move more
easily from one working coalition to another. This tendency towards collectivism
reinforced differences among functions and made integration more difficult. The
formation of an autonomous program team in the last stage can be seen as the
decision to cope with the failure to acquire such a cross-functional team.

The acceptance of high power differential between superiors and subordinates
hampered the crucial authority delegation from functional supervisors to the
specialists. The managers were not prepared to delegate, while the subordinates
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typically hesitated to accept delegated authority and tended to rely on their managers
for direction. During the process, this cultural tendency seemed to reinforce the effect
of the lack of competence. There seemed to be reciprocal behavioural tendencies
between functional supervisors and their subordinates. The superiors were doubtful
about their subordinates' competence and therefore often acted to directly control their
detail work. They hesitated to delegate authority to those subordinates who became
representatives in the Program team. Likewise, the subordinates did not have the
courage to fully accept delegated authority, although this was demanded in the
Program, and often relied on their superiors for detailed directions. Within the PLI
Program, this tendency also explains the low level of respect showed toward the
decisions made by engineers from the lower level teams and the acceptance of such a
behavioural attitude by those engineers, despite all the rhetoric about full delegation.
Generally, such an attitude was perceived as the superiors’ prerogative, accepted and
regarded as normal.
The combination of high power differential and collectivism also created a tendency
to be less open in the interaction as argumentation in open dialogue between superiors
and subordinates was sometimes regarded as improper and distracting harmony. This
cultural tendency explains the engineers’ hesitation to defend their calculations and
analyses when questioned by their superiors, even when they were sure about their
conclusions. Arguing with superiors was regarded as unacceptable behaviour. The
incident regarding static and fatigue test of the skin panel described in Chapter 8
illustrates this hesitation and its significant effect on the development process.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

10.1 Case Study Conclusion: Variation in CE Implementation
Although CE implementation in Indaco was originally modelled on Westaco’s, the
case study revealed that the implementation brought about a complex and dynamic
change process. During this process, the ‘actual’ initiatives did not conform to the
intended model. Different types of initiatives emerged and the Westaco model was
not entirely realised. The ‘realised’ model specific to Indaco was not fully established
due to the program’s premature termination.
The complex and dynamic change process is reflected by the presence of four stages
of CE introduction: (1) Program Initiation (prior to CE adoption), (2) Engineering
Matrix, (3) Engineering Integration, and (4) Design-Production Coupling. Each stage
could be seen as part of the transformation process of CE initiatives as they
encountered, and were subsequently adjusted and shaped by, specific contextual
features of Indaco and the actors involved in the implementation. Each stage had a
distinctive organisational structure reflecting the struggle to achieve adequate
integration. CE initiatives also varied from one stage to another. This changing nature
of

CE was not in a linear fashion, but revealed complex and multidimensional

processes

and sub-processes, each with a different but- interweaving path.
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This research also notes that CE practices vary not only across countries but also
within an organisation as shown by different protocols across development programs
at Westaco. The so-called ‘Westaco model’ had been developed over a period of time
through several distinct initiatives in previous programs. In further contrast with
Indaco’s attempt, it had also been built on very extensive experience in the aircraft
industry through which Westaco could draw on a vast pool of resources inside and
outside the company. The implication of these findings is the classic argument of the
contingency theory: there is no ‘one best way’ in implementing CE. Rather, both
internal and external contextual factors are influential in determining which set of CE
initiatives is selected and the way it is implemented in a product development
program.

10.2 Conceptual Contribution of the Thesis
10.2.1 Definition and Application o f an Operational Model o f CE
The concept of CE started to appear in the late 1980s combining two different
knowledge domains: engineering, manufacturing automation in particular, and
management of technology and innovation. Early discussions on CE we«-e dominated
by conceptual development of its approach and technical development of enabling
technology for its implementation. Empirical research on CE implementation started
to appear in mid 1990s. But, detailed case studies remain rare, particularly concerning
the implementation of CE within a particular context. This present study, therefore, is
an attempt to fill this gap by specifically looking at the change process during CE
implementation and providing some explanation for such a process in terms of its
contextual factors and organisational power and politics surrounding the
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implementation.
In order to view the change process in CE implementation, this study has
operationalised CE into a set of initiatives derived from a largely descriptive literature
and often used as means to achieve CE objectives. This operational model of
assessing CE implementation can be seen in Table 10-1. Through-applying qualitative
measurements along the dimensions and sub-dimensions of each initiative, this model
contributes to the development of CE concept. Such measurements construct key
characteristics of CE that are significantly different from the traditional product
development process. This model, therefore, helps in reducing the vagueness of CE
concept.

10.2.2 Definition and Application o f Context and Politics o f CE Process
Using a processual approach, this study is able to reveal explanation for the complex
CE introduction process and for its variation from the intended model. In analysing
strategy implementation process in organisations, Mintzberg and Quinn (1996) found
that organisation strategies were often applied not in the way they were intended, and
therefore argued for strategy formation, rather than strategy formulation. During an
implementation process, other issues and approaches emerge which lead to the
realisation of a strategy or an approach that is different to that originally intended. The
processual approach can also be used to explain this strategy formation process: the
intention, the emergence, and the realisation of strategies. The generic model of
processual approach as in Figure 10-1 is proposed as a model to analyse such
changes.
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Table 10-1: Operationalisation of CE through CE Initiatives and Their Dimensions

Cateqory

Organisational
Integration

CE Initiative

Dimension

Size and architecture

Subdimension

Number of member
Number of (sub)team
Number of layer of teams
Division of program team
Scope
Number of function
Level of functional representation
Role of functions
Membership pattern
Position at functional unit
Nature of member activity
Level of dedication
Temporal characteristic
Multiple membership
Higher team composition
Heavyweight Management
Hierarchical position
Formal structure
Authority of program leaders
Nature of delegation
Delegation from program manager
Delegation from function
Seniority of leader
Tenure
Age
Education
Communication Fomal Communication
Communication mode Richness of media
and
Frequency
Decision-Making
Direction
Mechanisms
Timing
Type of data conveyed Type of data released
Type of data used
Collaboration
Interactional relationship pattern
Conflict and negotiation process
Presence of collective goal
Presence of shared vision
Inter-team Communication
Formal communication
Collaboration
Decision-Making Mechanism Authority of teams
Respect to lower team decision
Power differential perception in low and high level teams
Computer-based Technology Support individual design task
Enabling
Integrate across function
Technology
Assist information management
Support collaboration work
Collocation area
Collocation
Space layout
Direct utilisation
Formal CE Methods
Utilisation of informal methods
Formal description of CE-in-practice
Systematic Protocols
Implementation strategy and planning
Number of supplier
Supplier Involvement
External
Position in the team
Integration
Temporal characteristic
Number of customer
Customer Involvement
Position in the team
Temporal characteristic
Educational background
Competency
Human
Experience
Resource
Multiskilling
Knowledge and skill parity
Team -related training
CE-Related Training
Training on CE concept and initiatives
Recruiting
Human Resource Policies
Career development and training
Performance measurement
Reward system
Cross-functional Team
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Figure 10-1: Generic Model of Processual Approach for Strategy Formation
In this study, detailed analysis of each of CE initiatives in the Indaco’s CE revealed
the importance of human resource competency and systematic protocols, particularly
in shaping the organisational integration aspect of CE implementation. The
importance of these two factors has been strongly indicated in various accounts and
occasions throughout the process of implementation in the PLI development process.
The lack of competency and the lack of CE definition and protocols, accompanied by
the inability of the change agent, i.e. the Program Manager, to impose intentions and
build a coalition led to a messier process and the enforcement of approaches that were
incompatible with CE in the later stages.
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CE literature acknowledges the importance of technical skills, multiskilling, and tacit
knowledge in product development process (e.g. Riedel and Paws, 1991; Iansiti,
1993, Klein, 1994; Klein and Maurer, 1995; Volk, 1992, Nakayama, 1997). In
discussions of CE, however, the defining factors of tacit and explicit knowledge are
mostly taken for granted and embedded in CE. It seems that the term 'skill
competence’ had said it all, whilst this difference between tacit and explicit
knowledge has a very significant implication in the implementation process.
Perhaps, the fact that CE originated in technologically 'mature’ companies
contributed to this lack of discussion because the concept was developed in the
context in which tacit knowledge was not part of the concern. Hence, it is an
embedded assumption in CE that some level of knowledge maturity has been acquired
prior to the implementation. The stage of development in Indaco, in contrast, had not
yet reached such a knowledge maturity, and hence the lack of competency became a
crucial issue in CE implementation process in the Indaco’s PLI. Many problems faced
by the program management were associated with this issue and caused several
adjustments in vertical and horizontal integration. It also caused several interaction
difficulties within the Program and between the Program and the supporting
functional units. This study therefore, provides rare empirical evidence on the
strategic important of competency and knowledge maturity in CE adoption and
therefore provides a significant contribution to CE literature.
Some CE literature have emphasised the importance of rules and procedures in CE
implementation (e.g. Pinto and Pinto, 1991; Cleland, 1991). This case study showed
that a lack of systematic protocols caused problems for CE implementation effort. The
absence of systematic protocols was one of the primary reasons for the failure in the
attempt to implement the originally intended CE. This lack of systematic protocols
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caused inconsistency in management decisions particularly in dealing with the issue
of lack of competency. It also caused confusion among those involved in the program
as they embarked on the change from the traditional sequential approach but without
clear guidelines for the new one. Furthermore, these weaknesses were not
complemented by the result of computer-based technology initiatives, which were the
focus of the Program. The main reason was that the development in this enabling
technology wras undertaken in parallels with the product development itself. Overall,
this study shows the important issues are not only selecting and implementing CE. but
also selecting the right configuration of CE initiatives that are compatible one another.
Applying the processual analysis in a single longitudinal case study of CE
introduction process contributes to the CE literature by providing detailed empirical
findings linking the CE implementation process to organisational context and politics
- issues rarely addressed in the literature. This study shows the significant effect ot the
organisation’s stage of development that relates to knowledge immaturity, and the
organisational culture, which dominated by technology orientation with the dominant
design engineering sub-cultures. Within this context, political manoeuvrings from
individuals or groups of individuals, such as production engineers and computer
support group, in pursuing their interests played signiticant roles in shaping the
process and the final form of CE.
Extending the organisational context into its national and industrial contexts, this
study notes the adoption of a 'Western' approach, such as CE, by a company from a
developing country' was often driven less by business objectives, such as marketing
demand and reducing development time, but more by the technological development
goals of the country'. As the societal culture of Indonesia is different from 'Western
culture, the detailed analysis of actions and in-actions of key indiv iduals taken to
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assess the organisational politics in the process also provides some interesting
tentative findings on the effect of such cultural differences, particularly in the
Hofstede’s (11984) cultural dimensions of power distance and collectivism. Such
findings worth to be considered prior adopting an approach originated from other
culturally different countries.

10.3 Limitations of the Thesis
While this study provides an understanding on the dynamics of a major
transformation process embedded in CE introduction and implementation as well as
the influence of organisational context and politics in such a complex process, this
form of study has several limitations. Firstly, the study used a single case study and is
therefore exposed to problems of generalisability to all settings. Secondly, this case
study examined only one CE introduction program in the company due to earlier
premature termination of another program that was initially part of the study. This
eliminated the chance to compare two different CE implementation processes in a
single setting.
Thirdly, even in such a complex case only partial insight into the whole picture of CE
introduction could be obtained. This study only focused on organisational integration,
communication, and decision making mechanism aspects of the process. Other
aspects were only briefly discussed. Fourthly, the case study only represented partial
introduction process and was unable to provide a full implementation cycle of CE due
to the premature termination of the program under study. Thus, the results of CE
implementation in term of quality, cost, and timely launching of the new product

could not be provided. The above limitations have implications on the directions for
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future research in this field, which are taken up later in this chapter.

10.4 Practical Implications and Recommendations
The practical implications of this case study can be summarised in the following three
issues:
1) The decision to implement CE is a strategic decision that involves technological,
organisational and cultural changes within the organisation. Therefore, a thorough
analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the implementation should be
taken prior to the decision. Particular consideration should be given on the
readiness and capabilities of the organisation and its contextual elements to
engage in such changes. Various audit procedures have been developed to assist
practitioners in this assessment (e.g. Couchman, 1998; de Graaf, 1996; Chiesa,
Coughlan, and Voss, 1996).
2) A thorough preparation at the outset is important in ensuring the sustainable
application of CE. This should include, but not limited to, top management
commitment; selection of a set of CE initiatives that best suit the company’s
internal and external context; a detailed implementation plan; detail protocols,
standard procedures and operation manuals; and the familiarisation process of the
approach through training and familiarisation courses.
3) The change champion, i.e. the initiator of CE implementation, should be strongly
committed to the implementation, not only to get the implementation off the
around in the early stage, but also to ensure that the process remains as originally
intended and achieves its objectives. As promotion and job rotation are inevitable.
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this includes a thorough briefing at the hand-over from the original champion to
the selected substitute officially assigned to follow up the process.
Furthermore, practitioners may take advantage of the operationalised CE initiatives
and their dimensions by developing a performance measurement of each initiative,
which can be used as in-progress performance measurement to assess and evaluate the
level of success of CE implementation. This in-progress performance measurement is
particularly important for new product development process that requires a long
development time prior the result and feed back in term of the product cost, quality,
and timeliness can be measured.

10.5 Implications and Recommendations for Further Research
Considering the limitations of this thesis, more CE research needs to be done on
implementation in order to capture the detailed change process in various different
contexts. This study could only focus on CE initiatives on organisational integration
in order to make the research manageable. To obtain a more comprehensive picture of
CE dynamics introduction process, the similar researches focusing on initiatives in
enabling technology, external integration or human resource management are
recommended.

Furthermore, this case study could not observe the whole

implementation process due to the nature of a lengthy development time of a new
platform airplane and the unfortunate economic situation of the country. Therefore, if
future research should engage with another complex product development process,
one with a much shorter development time should be used. This would provide a
better chance for the researcher to longitudinally investigate the whole process from
its conceptualisation to market launch.

-
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Given the advantage of the processual framework, the researcher recommends the
adoption of this framework for further study of CE implementation. In the aircraft
industry, the investigation of the development process of various aircraft systems and
equipment are recommended. Further, comparisons across development programs
within a company, across industries, and across countries are also recommended, as
they would increase the understanding of the inherently complicated process of
introducing CE. The above researches would eventually provide a clearer operational
CE model and framework. CE research with operational concerns in mind would, in
turn, assist practitioners to be adequately prepared prior to adopting CE. This would
immensely increase the chance of successful implementation.
Several precautions should be taken by researchers in conceptualising and
operationalising the implementation of an approach in developing countries, as the
national development program often drives such initiatives. These precautions involve
consideration of more generic issues that often have become embedded assumptions
in Western approaches, such as the level of staff competency and the consideration of
market and competition issues in the decisions, as well as consideration of cultural
differences between the country of origin and the adopter country.
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Appendix A
List of Meetings Attended by the Researcher during Field Studies
Meetings at the PLI Program:
1.
2.
3.

Design Centre and Technology Divisions Coordination Meeting, October 1997
Basic Aircraft Design Course, November 1997
[The PLI Program] Coordination Forum (Regular, Weekly), October 1997 April 1998
4. Design Review Meeting, November 1997
5. Operation Review Meeting, December 1997
6. Configuration Design Review Meeting, December 1997
7. TIP-Body’s Internal Meeting, February 1998
8. TIP-Body and Body Integration Design (BED) Teams Meeting (Regular, Every
second Week), January - February 1998
9. Suppliers’ Presentations and Discussions, 1998
10. Aircraft Design Familiarisation Course, February 1999

Meetings at the DRI Program:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6
7.
8.

Program Task Force Meeting (Regular, Twice Weekly), October 1997 - April
1998
Engineering Review Meeting (Regular, Weekly), November 1997 - April 1998
Production Review Meeting (Regular, Weekly), November 1997 - April 1998
Detail Engineering Meeting: Fuselage (Regular, Weekly), January - April 1998
Detail Engineering Meeting: Nacelle and Engine Mounting (Regular, Weekly),
January - April 1998
Detail Engineering Meeting: Aileron (Regular, Weekly), January - April 1998
Detail Engineering Meeting: Centre Wing (Regular, Weekly), January - April
1998
[DRI] Program’s Schedule Meeting, March 1998
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Appendix B
List of Indaco’s Documents Reviewed during Field Studies
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

[Indaco] and IBM Joint Application Study for [the PLP] Product Information
Management System, August 1989.
[PLX] Favourite Process, 1991.
[PLI] Project: Conceptual Design, January 1994.
[PLI] Kick-Off Meeting’s Document, March 1994.
[DRX] Road Map, April 1994.
[DRX] Favourite Process, 1994.
[PLI] Second Meeting’s Document, April 1994.
[PLI] Third Meeting’s Document, June 1994.
[PLI] Program Activities (Draft), June 1994.
[PLI] Development Schedule, July 1994.
[PLI] Preliminary Design Team: Way of Work (Not Organisation Chart),
September 1994.
TOP Fuselage’s Plan of Work (Draft), November 1994.
[PLI] Technology Program, December 1994.
TOP-300 Body: Workflow and Target, January 1995.
[Westaco] Teaming for Product Definition: New and Derivative Airplane
Program, May 1996.
Introduction of the [PLI] Program, August 1995.
Financial Scheme for [PLI] Development Program ([Indaco] Proposal),
August 1995.
[Indaco]’s Manufacturing Capabilities, [Indaco], 1995.
Reference for [PLI] Program Planning, August 1995.
Technical Note: Movable Florizontal Tail Structural Design Concept tor the
[PLI] Program, September 1995.
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21 .

22 .
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
J J .

34.
35.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41

Technical Note: [PLI] Material and Process Map and Planned Activities,
October 1995.
Assessment for [PLI] Program (Production Viewpoint), October 1995.
Minutes of Meeting: Program Master Phasing Plan Meetings, SeptemberDecember 1995.
Laporan Studi Skenario Program [PLI] (Report on Scenario Assessment for
the [PLI] Program), 16 December 1995.
[PLI] Master Phasing Plan (Draft), December 1995.
[PLI] Program Dictionary for Operation Area, January 1996.
Diskusi Eksekutif Program [PLI] (The [PLI] Program’s Executive Review),
January 1996.
Space and Facility Requirement Estimation for [PLI] in Fabrication Area,
February 1996.
[PLI] Financing and Organisation Structure, March 1996.
Pra proporsal of Extruded Part for [PLI] Wing Panel, March 1996.
CAD/CAM System: Sidina System for [the PLI] Program, June 1996.
Notulen Rapat Master Phasing Plan [PLI] (Minutes of Meetings: [PLI] Master
Phasing Plan), June - December 1996.
Design Factors that Influence Product Quality of Tube Forming Parts:
Assessment for the [PLI] Program, August 1996.
Design Factors that Minimised Production Process in Metal Forming:
Assessment for the [PLI] Program, August 1996.
Perjanjian Kerjasama Pengembangan, Rekayasa, Rancang Bangung Pesawat
[PLI] antar [Prico] dan [Indaco] (Co-operation Agreement on Developing,
Enginereering and Constructing of the [PLI] between [Prico] and [Indaco],
August 1996.
[Indaco]: Developing Nation Resilience through Aerospace Technology, 1996.
Information Technologies on Manufacturing Planning: Assessment for the
[PLI] Program, October 1996.
[PLI] Program Organisation Structure, October 1996.
Computer Investment for the [PLI] Program, October 14 1996.
Planning and Scheduling System for Cellular Manufacturing: An Input in
Establishing Manufacturing Strategy at [Indaco], November 1996.
Design Factors that Influence Machining Productivity: Assessment for the
[PLI] Program, December 1996.
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42. [PLI] Work Breakdown Structure (WBS), December 1996.
43. Resume Rapat Team Sidina (Resume of Sidina Team Meeting), April 1996 June 1997.
44. Aircraft Integration Directive: Withdrawal of the Coordination Memo,
February 1997.
45. Bahan Presentasi Tim Sidina kepada [PL1] Leadership Team (Sidina
Presentation Material to [PLI] Leadership Team), 25 March 1997.
46. Statement of Work Guidelines [PLI] Program, April 1997.
47. Feasibility Study [PLI] Development, April 1997.
48. Business Process Flow (External Operation [of the PLI]), April 1997.
49. OPA: Product and Process Integration (Draft), 1997.
50. OPA: Kerja Sama Rekayasa Rancang Bangun Pesawat [PLI] antara Divisi
[PLI] dan Direktorat Teknologi. (The [PLI] Engineering Development
Cooperation between the [PLI] Program and Technology Divisions (Draft),
1997.
51. SOW (Draft): Wing-3 Design, May 1997.
52. Configuration Management Guide Book: Drawing and Part Numbering
System, May 1997.
53. Manual, Operating Instruction: Prosedur Pemeriksaan, Approval dan Perilisan
Gambar/Dataset for [PLI] (Draft) (Procedure for [PLI] Drawing/Data Set
Verification, Approval and Release (Draft)), May 1997.
54. Minutes of Meeting: [PLI ] Planning Session (Design Centre), May 1997.
55. [PLI] Division: Airplane Business Unit, Organisational Structure, June 1997.
56. Minutes of Meeting: [PLI] Planning Session (Operation Centre), June 1997.
57. Activity Breakdown Structure (ABS) [for] [PLI]), June 1997.
58. Distribusi Perangkat {Computer per Unit Organisasi per 31 December 1996
(Computer Facilities Distribution to Organisational Division per December
1996)1997.
59. Summary of Equipment Capability Data: Fabrication Division, July 1997.
60. Struktur Organisasi [Indaco] (Indaco’s Organisational Structure), July 1997.
61. Manual, Operating Instruction: Penilaian Prestasi Kerja Karyawan - Staff
(Employee Performance Evaluation), August 1997.

62. Evaluation Result on Preliminary Design of Body Empennage Stmctural
Concept as Producibility Input, August 1997.
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63. Knowledge-Based Engineering Implementation. Targets, Strategy, Objects
and Resources, September 1997.
64. Research Proposal: Development of Optimation Procedures for Aircraft
Structural Design, September 1997.
65. Design Philosophy Flight Deck [of PLI], September 1997.
66. Structural Concept and Assembly Planning for Section 42 and 46 [Body
Compponent], September 1997.
67. Manual, Engineering Operating Procedure: Operational CATIA Standard
Library (Draft), September 1997.
68. Producibility Assessment: Machining Consideration for Frame Bulkhead,
September 1997.
69. Assessment for the [PLI] Program Quality Control Organisation: Rekomendasi
System Kerja Rekayasa Serentak dan Terintegrasi (Recommendation for
Concurrent Engineering and Integration Working System), September 1997.
70. Regulation and Procedure Assessment: Production Certification Process [for
PLI] (Draft), September 1997.
71. Design Practices Assessment for Machining Part, Volume 1, Version 1,
September 1997.
72. SOW: Wing Box Experiment (DPM), September 1997.
73. Front Pressure Bulkhead Proposal, October 1997.
74. Price Analysis for Window Frame, October 1997.
75. Buku Panduan Media Korespondensi Program [DRI] (Guideline for the [DRI]
Program’s Correspondence Media), 1997.
76. Work Breakdown Structure for [DRI], October 1997.
77. Technical Document: The [DRI] Configuration Civil Version, November
1997.
78. SOW (Draft): Assessment of Automatic Drilling and Riveting Machine
(ADRM) to Increase Quality and Productivity [PLI Program], November
1997.
79. SOW (Draft): Maintenance Management System, November 1997.
80. Management Operation (Charter) Operations [PLI], November 1997.
81. Business Flow: [PLI] Material & Manufacturing Technology, November 1997.
82. Number-1 Flow Schedule for [PLI’s] Wing-box and Fuselage, 1997.
83. [PLI] Passenger Aircraft: The Regional Breakthrough, [Indaco], 1997.
84. Minutes of Meeting: [PLI] Coordination Forum, October 1997 - March 1998
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85. Evaluation of Keelbeam and Bulkhead Frame Design Concept, January 5
1998.
86. Minutes of Meeting: BID and TIP Body Meeting, January - February 1998.
87. Garis Besar Program [PLI] Tahun 1998 ([PLI] Program’s Broad Outline for
the Year 1998), February 1998.
88. Rencana Kerja dan Anggaran Perusahaan Tahun 1998 [Indaco] (the [Indaco’s]
1998 Annual Planning), February 1998.
89. SOW: Capability and Capacity Analysis of Wire Bundles and Electrical
Boxes, March 1998.
90. OPA (Draft): Test Article Delivery for Testing, Development and
Certification, April 1998.
91. Quality Plan Concept, Quality Plan Requirement, April 1998.
92. SOW: Test Rig Wing Box Experiment, April 1998.
93. SOW: Assembly Jig Wing Box Experiment (Fixture), April 1998.
94. Report: [PLI’s] Quality Planning Activities Target and Progress, Problems,
and Alternative Solutions, May 1998.
95. Report: Activity Status of [PLI’s] Production Planning, May 1998.
96. Supplier Document Evaluation and Audit Check List for [PLI], May 1998.
97. SOW: Technical Assessment Fuselage Skin Stringer Panel, May 1998.
98. SOW: Design and Manufacturing Wing and Pylon Models to be Tested in
Transonic Wind Tunnel in August 1998, May 1998.
99. SOW: Fuselage Panel Test (DPM), May 1998.
100. SOW: Rig Fuselage Panel Test, May 1998.
101. Production Planning and Control: Business Process [PLI Program], June 1998.
102. SOW (Draft) for the 3D Full Model of [PLI] Wing-Fuselage-Nacelle High
Speed, Low Reynolds [Wind Tunnel] Testing, June 1998.
103. SOW: Assembly Jig Manufacturing Development, June 1998.
104. SOW: Assembly Jig (Fixture) Fuselage Panel Experiment, July 1998.
105. Engineering Cost Estimate [for] Wing Box Test ([Indaco] Proposal): Design of
Test Rig, Test Rig Assembly, Strain Gauge, Reporting and Documentation,
July 1998.
106. SOW (Draft) for the Model Design and Construction of [PLI] Half Model Low
and High Speed, High Reynolds Wind Tunnel Testing, August 1998.
107 SOW: Quality System and Standardisation, August 1998.

Appendix B

108. Rencana Kerja dan Anggaran Perusahaan Tahun 1999 [Indaco] (the Indaco’s
1999 Annual Planning), November 1998.
109. Keputusan Rapat Umum Pemegang Saham: Pengesahan Rencana Kerja dan
Anggaran Perusahaan Tahun 1999 [Indaco], (Shareholder General Meeting
Decision: Ratification of the Indaco’s 1999 Annual Planning, November 1998.
110. Familiarisation to Aircraft Design Process: Material for Internal Course,
December 1998.
111. Fuselage Fatigue Test: Pemilihan Konsep “Skin - Stringer - Frame Joint”
pada Struktur Fuselage Akibat dari Fatigue karena Perubahan “Cabin
Pressure” (Fuselage Fatigue Test: Concept Selection of “Skin - Stringer Frame Joint” at Fuselage Structure considering Fatigue due to “Cabin
Pressure” Change), January 1999.
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Appendix C
Time-Line of the PLI Program
Top M anagem ent Level
1994

1995

1997

1996

1999

1998

N D J F MAM J J A S ON D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M j J A S O N D J F

AMJ

^ P o s s ib ility erf undertaking PLI program first discussed

7] PLI conceptual design.

130 passenger (draft)

|M M anagem ent kick off meeting preliminary D R & O
A j2 n d m eetmg:fusetage or wing mounted engine

[7] 3rd meeting:
fj

3 year milestone

Th e PLI program activities (draft)

7] The PLI schedule

1994 -2006

[i~ | Preliminary design team way of working concept

0

Th e PLI 2-year conceptual design plan

m

I

[ a j Announcement of the PLI program, program manager and program structure (Engineenng Matnx)

Program planning reference
Focal points assg nm ent to program team
[ a ] Development cost estimation (draft)
[F |D o c u m e n t: development cost estimation, feasibility study (prelim), program item dictionary
J~| Program M aster phasing plan
[a ] Financial schem e Indaco-Prico (proposal
IF" M O U Pnco-lndacosigned

ItiTEstablishment of Prico as a private company
A Pnco-lndaco cooperation agreement (draft)
m]

Indaco top management meeting, contract review
[Â ] Pnco-lndaco cooperation contract signed

[ a J Program meeting: production facility and investment plan

[7] Hangar scenano
fo jN e w Program structure (Engineenng Integration)

m
I
I
[o jD R & O baseline. S O W workpackage, jcbcard
|F Formation of the PLI Investment Board
m]

Investment budget plafond for each functional division

[T js id in a (integrated digital system) formation
M Sidina presentation
M Sidina excecutive commitment signed
a

] Program request for feedback on plan & budget

m

I

|A | The feasibility study of the PLI development

New program structure (Design-Production Coupling)

Development optimation team

|7 j

[A____

T IP mem bership SJ
Program Directive Temporary halt after preliminary design phase

I

[7]

Indaco management decision Friday nonwerkmg day

n

[MJ
Prico liquidation [ 7

[7

Estimated completion time for preliminary design phase

N D j

F M ANI J J A S O N D J F M A MJ J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F
1994

1995

1996

" ”

1997

AMJ
1999

1998
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M iddle M anagem ent Level
1994

f i m a

N

j

1995

J A S ON D J F M A M J

1996

J A S O N D J FM AMJ

1997

J A S O N D J FM AMJ

1998

1999

J A S O N D J FM AMJ J A S O N D J FM AMJ

[n TOP-fuselage plan of work (draft)
Top fuselage, propulsion, wing, system members (draft)
TOP-fuselage workflow and target (draft)
F Typical TOP plan
I
m]

TO P -b o d y schedule (draft)

[ T ] Presentation from functional divisions about th a r scope & expenenc

n

1

1

I s industrial Engineering (IE i local point: Load projection H R requirem ent from IE local points
O IE focal p an t: S p ac e estimation
O jM a n power requirem ent, tooling, planning
0

Design Build Process Team (D B P): Space and facility requirem ent
[ a J d BP: revised space ang facility requirem ent
[ m JProgram requesting M H budget based on standard
[j~ j IE focal p an t: Manpower requirem ent

Initiation of m a|or m ilestone establishm ent
M ater phasing plan w eekly meeting, functional focal p a n ts
M aster phasing plan draft
^ P r o g r a m dictionary for operation
IM Prelim inary review of cost structure
0

List of people involved |
[ a ~ M a|or m ilestone review
Engm eenng Operation (E O P ) m eeting: Production structure discussion
M aster phasing plan review
Preliminary assem bly sequence
Production drawing release m ilestone clanfication
Com puter investment: O pen distributed computing
N | Budget plan and S O W proposals from divisions

(Ê

E O F m eeting: Digital A ssem bly (D A S ), Advanced System Development (A S D ). Enterpnse Resource Planning (E R P |
PH

I

[j |

[o~|

Sidina group meetings

Product Data M anagem ent (P D M ) presentation
PLP door for Sidina A
Sidina A meeting: M anhour budget
M anhour for door

|s

D B P process assessm ent m eeting 10 prototype
o j D B P meeting: PLI assessm ent

j

0 D B P m eeting: Matrix TIP s & production specialist group
[^ M e e t in g : T IP & Specialist report

[o' Design review T O P s , engineenng specialists, DBP
D B P meeting: review w ork breakdown structure (W B S )
D B P meeting: quality planning, space requirement, wing. W B S
Intorducton of PLI W B S (draft)
T lP -S ystem presentation
T IP -F u selag e progress report section 41 -4 2
Discussion: obstacles and lesson learned

[^ P ro p o s a l: Extruded part for W ing skin panel (W S P )
Pilot project (W S P )
Proposal 3 alternatives of W S P
J Decision: P rocure material and use available matenal
r a
1994

FM AMJ

1995

J A S O N D J FMAMJ

1996

J A S O N D J FM AMJ

lish tool material team
1997

1998

1999

J A S O N D J F M A V I J J A S O N D J F VI A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J
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1994

1995

F M A M J J A S O N D J FM A M J

1997

1996

J A S O N D J FMAMJ

J A S O N D J FMAMJ

H

1998

1999

J A S O N D J F MA MJ J A S O N D J F M A M J
J J jR & D and Production m eetings

Titanium m anufacture |
M |R e s id u a l stress, d a d difussion
Shot peening forming
j j L o w strain rate cold forming
P M O m eeting’ num bering system
M jD B P m eeting design standard limitation
|A ¡D ocum ent: S O W guidelines

,

|M Planning session: Design C entre product focus
J Planning session:Operation Centre assem bly focus
J Activity Breakdown Structure (A B S ) (draft)
[ o ] Budget Plan 1997 (draft)
O perating Procedure Agreem ent (O P A ) product & process integration/TIP
O P A T IP training

EL

Tooling experts: not collocated nor dedicated
Design C entre and Operation C entre collocated

M

P U B usiness Process: Production planning and control

J|

\S\ |

Certification meeting
j

[ a " Certification meeting

Parallel Type Certificate (T C ) and Production Certificate (P C )

MJ

S O W : Quality system & standard
Directive: Design C en tre leads all development design activities

[a ~|
[s~|

Familiansation course on aircraft design process for Sidina group
Skin panel test, onsite meeting with the authonty

1EJ

F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A MJ J A S O N D J F M A M J
1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999
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O p e r a t i o n a l Level
1994

1995

F MA MJ J A S O N D J F M A M J

1997

1996

J A S O N D J FMAMJ

J A SO N D J FMAMJ

[F

1999

1998

J A SO N D J FMAMJ J A S O N D J FMAMJ

Mo
Movable
part structural design

[ CM
° ] PLI material and process map
D 8 P docum ent: Design (actors influencing quality tubelormmg
D B P docum ent Design (actors influencing quality tubeforming
J F J d BP docum ent IT on manufacturing planning assessm ent
[ d | d BP document: Design factors influencing machining productivity
Airfram e Specialist Group Alcoa
O A irfram e Specialist Group: Preliminary matenal wing box
N A irfram e Specialist Group: Trip report
[cT T O P -F u s e la g e comm unication m em o (C O M ): nose. mid. em pennage skin splices
TO P-F uselage: Avionic component

|

D C O M Radom configuration concept and matenal
D C O M Typical fuselage structure concept
[ f ~ |T echnical Meeting: Superplasticity forming
TIP-Bo<fy meetings: Producibility fuselage
Fuselage: section 42. 44, 46, manhours, flow days, jigs
Skin cutting section48
D Skin cutting section 44
Fuselage, assem bly sequence prototype & senal
Machining standard and actual hour
New fuselage configuration, leveling system

TIP-Body/Body Integration Team : Skin splice section 41
Structural concept 42 46 48. assy plan
TIP-Body: Skin splice, assy sequence, jig requirement
TIP-Body/Body Integration Team : chem milling m atenal. spin lathe
Document: Machining consideration fram e bulkhead
C O M : Front spar rib machining analysis
Document: Design practice machining assessm ent

£
£
S

10
£
£
£

£

Docum ent: Front press bulkhead proposal
Docum ent: pnce analysis window fram

£

C O M : Vertical tail concept analysis

£

Docum ent: Keelbeam /bulkhead design evaluation

u

[ F js O W : Fuselage skin stnnger panel

[ q Focal p a n t meetings: A ssem bly plan
N jT a s k alocation
F Status review
F Assem bly sequence and tooling readiness
M W ing jig alternative, assem bly sequence reviewed
M S pac e requirement, 2 assem bly concepts: prototype and serial
M Space optimation. 2 alternatives manhours and space calculation

[D jT IP assembly and test A ssem bly and test plan
F TIP-system meetings: S O W and plan
F Assessm ent:Production capability for mechanical system
M S O W for mechanical system lesson learned (draft)
M S O W for electncal system, lesson learned tubing
TIP -S ystem / System Integration team assem bly and test system concept

fi~|

[ f |M a tenal tooling meeting:
|M O ptim ise procurement plan, alternative sources, detail schedule
Unique format of matenal list, procurement flow
Report to Program M anager

1994

FMAMJ

1995

J A S ON D J F M A M J

1996

J A SO ND J FMAMJ

1997

1998

1999

J A S O N D J FMAMJ J A SO N D J FMAMJ J A SO N D J FMAMJ
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1994

f m a m j

1995

j a s o n d

J FM AM J J A S O N D

a

M J

1999

1998

1997

1996

FNAAMj J A S ON D J F M

J A S O N D J FI v A A M J J A S O N D J F N A A M J
J jA s s e m b ly facility m eetings

Production rate, equipm ent requirement, site analysis
| j fprc

13

J | M odem assem bly equipm ent review

[s~ Facility Planning Charter

O Facility Planning progress report
nJ

|77 W in g

Facility Planning action plan

Skin Panel (W S P ): integral m achinm g+rubber hydraulic press

production specialist group to provide cost benefit for each W S P alternatives
2 contour methods: hydraulic press and age forming
[ m J t o o I matenal procurem ent m eeting
[j~ j Tool & Jig matenal approved by the program
[s~ W in g integration team /T IP -W in g meetings: Front spar assy
Meeting: non cut W S P 12 m
Meeting: matenal order by Fabncation
T IP -W in g : W ing - Body assembly concept
D Meeting: surface treatment, spin lathe body
Matenal order for wing test

j

[m ^

Man power support from P IP for wing test
Borrow PLP tools for wing test

Reorder standard part for wing and fuselage panels
C O M : W ingbox test: tolerance

T D

Quality Control (Q C ) docum ent: production certification process (draft)
Q C assessm ent m eetings
Q C docum ent for Operation C entre review
j

[/T

Quality plan concept (draft)

Docum ent: Supplier evaluation audit check list

F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J FM A M J J A S ON D J F fA A M J J A S O N D J FKAAMJ
1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999
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Master Phasing Plan of the PLI Program
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